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2ABSTRACT
The thesis questions the common assertion that only exceptional political leaders can 
implement their aims, such are the institutional constraints on their action. This assertion is 
examined in relation to DATAR, the regional development agency of France, where the self- 
confident and compartmentalised bureaucracy would be expected to provide leaders with a 
difficult challenge.
The analytical framework is derived from Blondel's Political Leadership, one of the 
few texts to assume that a full spectrum of leadership potential exists. The thesis starts by 
showing that political leaders could shape bureaucratic organisations to their own needs. 
Ministers interested in regional policy adapted its structures from a weak ministerial division 
to a model inter-ministerial agency, DATAR, whose reputational power was substantially 
affected by the political leadership's support for the policy. Political leaders were able to 
recruit DATAR's top staff on the basis of the criteria they chose; and to make DATAR's 
size, budget and work activities respond to their own policy aims. Through DATAR they 
could create, modify and direct interministerial committees and budgets to fit their particular 
objectives.
The thesis then assesses the leadership's impact on policy instruments in two 
contrasted domains to judge how much leaders are helped or hindered by bureaucratic and 
other institutions, including DATAR. Whether on roads policy or on regionalisation, the 
political leadership mostly achieved incremental change, either because that was what it 
sought, or because its ambitions were curtailed by internal conflict and local politicians as 
much as by bureaucratic opposition. Sometimes leaders failed to make headway, and 
occasionally they asserted their political will in a dramatic fashion. Overall, the variety and 
strength of outcomes demonstrate that political leaders have a capacity to make an impact on 
bureaucratic organisations and to re-orient bureaucratic activities towards their particular
political goals that is far greater than even Blondel anticipated.
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POLITICAL LEADERS AND BUREAUCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 
INTRODUCTION
Neustadt's work on American presidents showed over forty years ago that their 'influence 
on governmental action' varied with the incumbent.1 Though the legal 'powers' of an 
American president are derived from constitutional provisions that are similar for all, each 
president 'confronts a personal problem: how to make those powers work for him'.2 
Because Neustadt's interest was 'in what a President can do to make his own will felt within 
his own Administration',3 he observed the ways that different presidents treated a given set 
of institutions, and found that they varied. It was perhaps not surprising that outcomes 
would vary when Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman and Dwight Eisenhower used 
powers that relied on personal attributes, such as 'the power to persuade'. Yet Neustadt 
demonstrated that there were also differences between outcomes even when presidents acted 
through the more impersonal 'power to command' the bureaucracies. Nevertheless, 
Presidential Power stresses the common institutional constraints all presidents faced: 
'Presidential weakness was the underlying theme of Presidential Power'.4
In 1960 it was innovative and important, in theory and in practice, to draw attention 
to the gap between the formal and the real institutional resources available to a political 
leader. Though Truman had observed that '"powers" are no guarantee of power.
Presidential power is the power to persuade', Eisenhower found in 'shocked surprise' that 
orders would not carry themselves out5 For a president, 'the same conditions that promote 
his leadership in form preclude a guarantee of leadership in fact': officials had departmental 
duties and their own constituencies and they might see their duty as following him or they 
might not.6 Neustadt's work balanced the arguments for the unexpected 'presidential 
weakness' with practical observations of the variations between presidents. Formal powers 
were only one aspect of the power to persuade and they depended on how far the incumbent 
was 'able and willing to use them'.7 Studying Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower, 
Neustadt had found that personal influence on government action was 'a chancy thing',
1 Neustadt, R. (I960) Presidential Power: the Politics of Leadership (New York: Wiley). ‘Influence on 
governmental action' was Neustadt's definition of power (1960), p. 1.
2 ibid. p.vii.
3 ibid. p.i.
4 Neustadt, R. (1976) Presidential Power: the Politics of Leadership. 2nd edition (New York: Wiley), p.i; 
Neustadt, R. (1990) Presidential Power and the Modem President (New York: Free Press), p.ix.
5 Neustadt (1960), pp.8-9, p. 163.
6 ibid. p.7.
7 Neustadt (1976), p.4.
12
while Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon were regarded by most Americans as having 
’altogether too much influence on far too many acts of government’.8 Neustadt’s view in 
1976 was that ’the power of a President today derives from roughly the same sources as a 
generation ago, is comparably limited, similarly frustrated, more changeable than ever, yet 
as central to our system as before, a far cry from congressional government1.9
AN UNDER-EVALUATED POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
Political scientists studying the workings of government have in recent decades tended to
pay more attention to the constraints of institutions on political actors than to the effect of
political behaviour on institutions as defined in Hall’s study of economic policy:
Institutions' mean 'the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that 
structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy'.10
British public administration has traditionally been conducted within a more formal
institutional framework that gave little consideration to behavioural factors, especially those
relating to individual leaders. In the years following Neustadt's original research the 'Great
Men' genre fell from favour. In the era of student rebellions, feminism, and neo-Marxist
histories of the working class, studies of leaders seemed out of place.11 Blondel argues that
national political leadership, because it is a manifestation of power, is often treated as 'a
Leviathan, a frightening beast, which it is perhaps more urgent to tame than to dissect’.12
Leadership, notably as a psychological phenomenon inducing 'followership', is said to be
linked to times when there was a culture of deference and respect; it is even 'pre-
democratic'.13 As Foley remarks:
The role of political leadership has often been dismissed as something of an aberration in British 
political life. Except for the most extreme conditions of wartime, leadership has been seen as 
unnecessary, unseemly, and largely non-existent'.14
This view was also taken in 'Europe and Latin America’, where liberal thinkers tended to 
fear leadership, and political elites saw leadership as essentially bad, given the excesses of 
past rulers.15 In Britain there has been the same reluctance to talk of leadership, partly 
because of its associations with Fascism and the cult of personality,16 but especially because 
the normative institution of Cabinet government meant the concept of prime-ministerial
8 ibid. p.i.
9 ibid. p.2.
10 Hall, P. A. (1986) Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France 
(Oxford: OUP), p. 19.
11 When this thesis was presented to a 'Work in Progress' research seminar of the Social Policy Academic 
Group, Middlesex University, 21 May 2003, the first question, from Lesley Jordan, was: 'Have we really 
gone back to the great men theory again?'. We agreed that the impact of individual leaders could have the 
status of a 'residual'.
12 Blondel, J. (1987) Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis (Sage). p.3.
13 Heywood, A. (2000) Kev Concepts in Politics (Macmillan, p. 136)
14 Foley, M. (1993) The Rise of the British Presidency (Manchester. MUP), p. 151.
15 Blondel, J. (1995) Comparative Government 2nd edn (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf), p.301.
16 Gaffney. J. (1991) The Language of Political Leadership in Contemporary Britain (Macmillan), p. 11.
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leadership was rejected. Many authorities on the British premiership have been unwilling to
entertain the notion of personal leadership, or accept that the leadership actions and their
impact might vary significantly depending on the person in the post. The individual
contributions of the leading post-holders are seen to matter only in the most exceptional
circumstances, which are then defined as such.17 Within this framework the actions of the
British prime minister are conceived as being strongly determined by institutional
constraints. Foley calls in evidence Rose's 1980 study:
'Personal style influences how a Prime Minister carries out the demands of office, but it does not 
determine what is done. The first priority of a Prime Minister is to do what is expected of him or 
her. How a Prime Minister meets these role expectations reflects not only his or her basic 
personality, whatever that may be, but even more what the incumbent has learned in a quarter 
century of socialisation in Westminster and Whitehall'.18
As Rose says, it is not enough to look at 'personality stories'; an attempt should be made to
measure and assess the 'impersonal record'. His own research showed that:
'even a prime minister as radical in rhetoric and as long in office as Margaret Thatcher left in place 
two-thirds of Acts of Parliament inherited from predecessors, and more than seven-eighths of 
spending commitments'.19
The 'new institutionalism’ expounded by March and Olsen in 1984 gave a stronger 
theoretical base to this view of the relation between leaders and institutions.20 They 
contended that institutions should form a greater part of the explanation of political 
phenomena than behaviouralist approaches accorded them. The state is not only affected by 
society but also affects it'.21 Institutions shape perceptions, and therefore behaviour, by 
embodying norms of what should be done, and by providing rules to structure and guide 
behaviour. By arguing that institutions and their relationships strongly shape and constrain 
political actions, institutionalists infer that institutions are not easily susceptible to 
modification by leaders and other political actors. Their analysis readily explains the 
persistence and incrementalism seen in bureaucratic institutions and policy-making.
However, in trying to persuade behaviouralists (especially in the United States) to bring 
institutions back in, March and Olsen also renovated a traditional institutionalism (especially 
in Europe) that already placed more stress on institutions than on leaders. Journalists can 
write articles on the influence of leading politicians over events, and political biographers of 
leaders must aim their searchlight on the individual's contribution to events. However, 
academic analyses of the relationship between leaders and institutions, in seeking 
generalisations and typologies, more often smooth out or relativise the distinctive but smaller
17 Foley (1993), pp. 1-2, p. 19, pp. 150-1.
18 Rose, R. (1980) 'British Government: The Job at the Top', in R.Rose and E.Suleiman (eds) Presidents 
and Prime Ministers (Washington: AEI), pp. 1-49, p.44, quoted by Foley (1993), p.151.
19 Rose, R. (2000) 'When and Why does a Prime Minister Change?', in Rhodes, R. Transforming British 
Government: 2. Changing Roles and Relationships (Basingstoke: Palgrave), 47-62, p.60.
20 March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1984) The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', 
American Political Science Review. 78,734-49, p.735.
21 March and Olsen (1984), p.738.
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contributions of individuals.22 When Rose analysed in a comparative context the role of
prime ministers in Western Europe, he summed up his conclusions thus:
'Differences between national political institutions create more variation in the office of prime 
minister than do differences of personalities and circumstances within a country1.23
Elgie's Political Leadership in Liberal Democracies too stressed the common 
constraints and opportunities that applied to the leaders of each nation and that in the end 
seem more significant than the variations between individual leaders.24 Some individuals, 
having won the status of national leader (such as many German chancellors), secured 'a 
certain autonomy' from their parties, and found themselves in 'a dominant and advantageous 
position'; and others (for example, Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl), were able to profit 
from 'exceptional circumstances' to overcome the normal institutional conventions that 
dispersed power; while yet others, as a result of their personal ambitions or styles (including 
Roosevelt, Adenauer, Charles de Gaulle and Margaret Thatcher), could 'act as catalysts of 
change'. However, taking into account the features of the national institutional and social 
environments that are likely to affect a leader's freedom to act, Elgie concludes that 'what 
these leaders can and cannot do is primarily determined by the institutional structures of their 
countries'.25
Cole however, while too taking a balanced approach, thought the role of the leader 
should play a larger part in the explanation of events, even if institutional constraints meant 
that political leaderships in liberal democratic states have limited margins for manoeuvre.26 
He argued that:
'political science has traditionally reasoned in terms of the scientific study of political systems, 
where there is little place for assessment of the individual leader, but it will be contended ... that the 
analysis of politics is incomplete without a correct identification and assessment of the contribution 
of individual political leaders'.27
Cole used the elements of Blondel's analytical strategy (described below) as a systematising
'checklist' to sum up his comprehensive analysis of Mitterrand's political leadership. Putting
together the effect of personal characteristics with institutional factors and changing
environmental constraints and opportunities, he found that:
'the institution of the presidency is more important than the personality of the incumbent in 
understanding the French political system, although each individual President has left his own 
unmistakable mark on the institution'.28
22 P.Dunleavy and G.W.Jones with J.Burnham, P. Fysh and R.Elgie (1993), 'Leaders, Politics and 
Institutional Change: The Decline of Prime Ministerial Accountability to the House of Commons, 1868 - 
1990, British Journal of Political Science. 23, pp.267-98.
23 Rose, R. (1991) 'Prime Ministers in Parliamentary Democracies', West European Politics. 14/2, 9-24, 
p.9. Many thanks to Richard Rose for sending me a copy.
24 Elgie, R. (19951 Political Leadership in Liberal Democracies (Macmillan!. ’Preface1, pp.xi-xii, and see 
comments on de Gaulle and Mitterrand in France, and 'the greatest chief executives' in the USA.
25 ibid. p.88, p. 105, p.208, p.210.
26 Cole, A. (19941 Franfois Mitterrand: A Study in Political Leadership (Routledgel. p. 194.
27 ibid. p. 164.
28 ibid. p. 175.
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But he goes on:
The study of political leadership, in France and elsewhere, must be appreciated in terms of the 
interaction between leadership resources (personal and positional) on the one hand, and the 
constraints imposed and opportunities offered by particular socioeconomic and political systems and 
sets of historical circumstances on the other. The examination of political leaders within their 
environment is clearly preferable either to the denial of leadership by reference to environmental 
determinism, or the Great Man approach, which isolates leaders from their political context’.29
Edinger also sets out this two-way appreciation of the relationship between the leader
and the context, in his introduction to Sheffer's volume on innovative leadership in
international politics.30
'From one point of view, political developments may only in the last analysis be attributable to the 
leadership of a particular individual. It is at most a so-called residual variable—the last, if not the 
least important remaining factor that could conceivably account for events that cannot be entirely 
explained by other variables in an analytic framework for a sequence of causal factors.
A contrasting point of view makes individual leadership a primary postdictive or predictive causal 
factor, the former in retrospective historical studies and the latter in prescriptive political 
forecasting. One way or another, this sort of analysis starts with the premise that one person's 
leadership has a great deal to do with the course of past or future political developments'.31
Edinger and his co-authors were mostly sceptical about the capacity for autonomous 
leadership. Even if leaders might sometimes 'at least be the proximate cause', it was 
'extremely rare' to find them introduce new patterns of relationships, since it required the 
leader not only to have power to introduce such change but the legitimacy to maintain it.32 
Sheffer's conclusion was no more sanguine about the chance of most leaders making an 
impact:
'Quintessentially, only leaders who are handsomely endowed with immense inspiration and stamina 
and who can overcome powerful forces of inertia will be able to effect innovation in the 
international sphere and be remembered in the annals of politics'.33
The balance between, on the one hand, the levelling effect on a leader’s efforts of the 
enduring institutional environment and, on the other, the extent to which the leader can make 
this environment adapt to his or her own requirements, is more usually summed up in 
favour of the institutions. It is nevertheless a matter of academic judgement that is to a large 
extent guided by the theoretical assumptions and methodological approach. As Loughlin 
explains, 'scientific theories' accentuate by drawing our attention to the interesting aspects of 
the system they purport to explain.34 Institutional analysis was an advantageous theoretical 
perspective for interpreting informal institutions such as intergovernmental relations. 'In
29 ibid. p. 175.
30 Sheffer, G. (ed.) (19931 Innovative Leadership in International Politics (Albany: State University of New 
York Press).
31 Edinger, L. J. 'A Preface to Studies in Political Leadership', in Sheffer (ed.) (1993), 3-20, p. 15.
32 Edinger (1993), p. 15.
33 Sheffer, G. (1993) 'A Final Overview', in Sheffer (ed.) (1993), 245-7.
34 Loughlin, M. (1996) Understanding Central-Local Relations', Public Policy and Administration 11/2,48- 
65, p. 52.
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seeking to identify the significance of these institutions, we cannot ignore the issue of what 
the institutions mean to those whose institutions they are... ' 35 In contrast, because 
Neustadt rejected the idea of investigating relationships between the president and the 
institutions from the institutionalist perspective (the president’s role as chief legislator, chief 
administrator, chief of party...), and looked at them from the president's viewpoint (’from 
inside looking out'),36 he revealed the differences between presidents in their impact on 
other stakeholders, even while demonstrating their relative powerlessness in comparison 
with the popular image of a president.
Within the institutionalist approach it is common to assert that political leaders in 
executive posts - presidents, prime ministers and ministers - have little chance of putting 
their own imprint on the bureaucratic institutions nominally under their direction, such are 
the constraints to change. While the possibility that exceptional leaders can in exceptional 
circumstances impose their will is widely accepted, most analysts see little scope for 
conventional political leaders in ‘normal times’ to make more than a marginal impact In 
times of 'normal politics', political leaders are confined to roles that are strongly conditioned 
by institutional structures, referential frameworks or other rules of the game. Thus political 
leaders tend to be given an asymmetrical dichotomous character: a ‘few charismatic leaders’ 
on the one hand and ‘a mass of grey and indistinct office-holders’ on the other.37 There is 
little academic interest in differentiating between one leader’s impact on bureaucratic 
institutions and that of another, because the individual contribution of leaders to the 
outcomes is assumed to be insignificant in contrast with the much larger forces applied by 
the institutions. Leadership action becomes one of the 'residuals', left over when most of the 
observed variation is accounted for by more statistically-significant or theoretically- 
interesting factors. The real difficulty is therefore not so much about the large part played 
by some leaders but about the smaller impact of the great majority of leaders'.38
The main question addressed by the thesis is the validity of these assertions. Do the 
vast majority of political leaders have so little influence over bureaucratic institutions that 
they are unable to impose their own recognisably-distinct orientation on them? Are they so 
weak compared with the bureaucratic organisations that develop and implement policy 
programmes that the impact of one leader on these programmes can scarcely be differentiated 
from that of another? Blondel is among the few social scientists to insist that the full range of 
leadership impact exists between charismatic leadership at one end and 'managers' at the 
other; and to propose a framework in which this impact can be assessed against the 
background of their environment. It is to that methodology we now turn.
35 ibid. p.55.
36 Neustadt (1960), p.vii.
37 Blondel (1995), p.303.
38 ibid. p.300.
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ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL LEADERS
A far-reaching programme for assessing and comparing the impact of different political 
leaders was set out by Blondel in Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis. The 
object was to ’indicate the ways in which enquiries into the impact of leaders - and therefore 
of government - can be conducted...'.39 Blondel's strategy for measuring the capacity of 
political leaders to implement their individual policy aims, given the particular resources and 
the particular constraints they face, is mainly a hypothetico-deductive one, though each step 
in his argument is backed up with illustrative examples. The research would enable political 
leaders to be categorised on the basis of their potential impact on the polity in terms of the 
scope of the goals they determine and the extent of the constraints they face. Blondel 
provides a general framework for a comparative appraisal of leaders but does not embark 
upon a systematic empirical study of any particular leader or leaders. Indeed the 
comprehensive research programme he outlines, for a world-wide comparison of political 
leaders, is beyond the reach of any individual researcher. However, the conceptual scheme 
he develops can be used as a systematic guide to a more-focused study.
Blondel's research strategy
Blondel defines 'national political leadership' as the 'power exercised by one or a few 
individuals to direct the actions of the members of the nation'.40 He reasons that if leaders 
are able to affect their environment, it is a result of their power, which will in part be 
personal in origin and in part derive from the instruments made available to them by the 
institutional structures. The personal characteristics include elements of personality, such as 
energy and intellect, and sociological attributes, such as social status and experience. 
Institutional instruments, such as the bureaucracy, parties and parliaments, link the leaders 
to government and nation. The personal and institutional sources of power are analytically 
distinct, and Blondel analyses them in separate strands, while acknowledging that it is 
difficult to separate the person from the position, and the instruments may be both a source 
and consequence of power.41
Blondel would prefer on logical grounds to judge the impact of leaders on society by 
the responses of citizens to the exercise of leadership; and he discusses how leaders may be 
evaluated according to the bond that ties them to the population. In this strand of his ' 
analytical framework, derived from Weber, the impact of the leader depends mainly on the 
personal sources of power and societal conditions. Leaders would be categorised along two 
dimensions: the extent to which leadership is personalised (the presence or absence of 
charisma or something between) and the type of relationship between the leader and society 
(from the loyalty of traditional communities to the legalistic contracts of associational
39 Blondel (1987), p.viii.
40 ibid. p.3.
41 ibid. p. 5.
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societies).42 A study of the social impact of leaders, while important to Blondel’s world­
wide and historical study, is less relevant to modem liberal-democracies (their leaders would 
be placed in a cluster at one end of the typology). In any case, Blondel develops more fully 
the other strand of his analytical framework, which assesses leaders by the political goals 
they seek to achieve using power deriving mainly from the positional aspects of leadership.
In Blondel's earlier work on World Leaders the theoretical and methodological 
difficulties of measuring leadership had led him to deal 'with chief executives rather than 
with political leaders in the broadest sense'. He operationalised leadership there by adopting 
a 'positional standpoint', noting that someone is likely to be a leader if it is believed by 
others that he or she has the right to be a leader 43 Analysing in Political Leadership the 
personal component of leadership impact, he finds that socio-demographic, biographic and 
psychological studies have provided plausible accounts of individual leaders but not yet 
produced general criteria for assessing 'the precise extent to which personal characteristics 
affect the achievements of leaders'.44 As in the earlier work, Blondel therefore puts more 
emphasis in Political Leadership on the positional than the behavioural aspect of leadership, 
partly because it is more productive methodologically, but also because it can be justified 
logically: the position provides the institutional instruments that sustain leaders' actions 
while at the same structuring the environment of their political behaviour. The scope of 
leaders' activities depends on their personal ambitions but is conditioned by their 
institutional and non-institutional environment On the one hand the definition of which 
matters are in a leader's province, or are 'felt' to be so, will be determined by the 
institutional environment: that is, by constitutional and legal arrangements, and customs and 
conventions inherited from previous leaders, or acknowledged de facto by the bureaucracy 
and citizens as being part of the leader's role. On the other hand, the non-institutional 
environment (the economic problems or social demands they face, internal or external crises 
and other contingent events), may constrain or give greater opportunities, and here the 
leaders' own perspective and capacity to respond will come into play.
Thus, while a classification of leadership should essentially be based on the categorization of these 
leaders' actions, a second and necessary step has to be the examination of the ways in which the 
environment modifies the dynamics of the actions of leaders and indeed sets the boundaries between 
what is possible and what is precluded'.45.
The two principal conceptual components of Blondel's proposed assessment are 
therefore the leaders' actions and the countervailing influence of the institutional and non- 
institutional environment. First, how is the impact of leaders' activities to be assessed? 
Blondel dismisses the possibility of operationalising the concept through leaders' concrete 
actions (lengthy to list, hard to rank, and often implemented by others) or their 'intentions'
42 ibid. pp.51-7.
43 Blondel, J. (19801 World Leaders (Sage), p.9, p. 12, p. 14.
44 Blondel (1987), p. 128.
45 ibid. p.30.
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(often vague, merely excuses or rationalisations). Although it would ’unquestionably be 
valuable, for the preparation of a detailed analysis of the orientations of a particular leader or 
a set of political leaders, to examine the goals that are pursued in each field and sub-field',46 
Blondel suggests that, for a first pass at least, it would be more practicable to develop a 
broad-brush typology of leaders. He chooses to classify them by their goals, the 'set of 
intentions which leaders effectively attempt to put into practice147 The 'general orientation 
towards action' of political leaders would be categorised along two dimensions: 'the extent 
to which they are concerned with maintenance or change (small or large changes to a policy) 
... and the scope ...of intervention' (from changing policy to changing the system).48 Thus 
Blondel's scheme does not evaluate the concrete results from the leaders’ actions, but 
classifies leaders by their 'potential leadership impact'49
The second component of assessment is the policy-making environment, which 
takes institutional and non-institutional forms. The fundamental institution for a leader is his 
or her position or title as office-holder, from which a number of other institutional resources 
flow.
'Because they hold a position of national leadership, for instance, rulers will usually be able to 
appoint members of the government; they will also be able to "instruct" the bureaucracy to act in a 
certain way; finally, they will often have power within the dominant party and thereby will be able 
to try to mobilize the population towards their policies1.50
The effect of holding the leadership position will vary between countries and over time: a 
prime minister or president may or may not be able to appoint at will the minister in charge 
of bureaucrats implementing a favoured policy; and the bureaucracy may be more or less 
efficient.
The measurement of the potential effect of these institutional arrangements in helping or hindering 
leaders has obviously to remain rather crude... it is not possible to state exactly how much a ruler 
gains by being able to appoint and dismiss ministers at will or by having a strong bureaucracy'.51
Blondel debates whether leaders are more helped or hindered by constitutions and other
products of 'institutional engineering', such as bureaucratic organisations. He concludes
they are more likely to constrain leaders' power than add to it, since the formal structures are
often set up specifically to limit the discretionary power of leaders.52 The impact made by
the leadership depends especially strongly on the public bureaucracies, and Blondel devotes
several pages to the subject:53
'If governments are the arms of leaders in their effort to make an impact on society, bureaucracies 





50 ibid. p. 148.
51 ibid. p. 149.
52 ibid. p. 151.
53 ibid. pp. 167-73.
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rely ... This help... has to be considered realistically, that is to say, on the understanding that there 
is necessarily some gap between politicians and administrators, that administrators cannot be 
expected merely to implement, and that variations in energy and drive on the part of administrators 
will have to exist.54
Yet the system leaders encounter as they take office is often poorly designed:
The "lines" linking leaders to the bureaucracy and the populations are full of faults and "short- 
circuits". Thus, from the point of view of leaders, the "system" is often inefficient, badly-structured 
and badly-organized. This is not only because of deliberate opposition, but often, perhaps mostly - 
because the system is simply unresponsive or only partly responsive'.55
Blondel suggests that four characteristics of a public bureaucracy condition the impact of 
leaders:
- the design of the administrative organisation;
- the links between the bureaucracy and the leader;
- the competence of officials; and
- the links between the bureaucracy and the population.56
Having considered the relationships between political leaders and bureaucracies in various
types of polity, Blondel concludes that leaders will want to increase the effectiveness of the
bureaucracy, but he is not optimistic about their chances.
'Leaders of all countries are thus faced with structural problems with respect to bureaucracies...Of 
course, leaders - and in particular leaders who wish to achieve goals that are appreciably more 
"activist" than those of their predecessors - often wish to do more; to an extent at least, they can try 
and bend the "muscles" of the bureaucracy; but their expectations will remain largely unfulfilled1.57
New leaders, he argues, can attempt to improve the operation of the bureaucracy by using
their personal powers (their prestige, their following in the nation and in the bureaucracy
itself), and contingent environmental circumstances (such as a post-appointment 'state of
grace'), to obtain greater loyalty, zeal or responsiveness to their goals.
The more effective transformations are those that are concerned with, besides changes in the 
recruitment and training of the personnel, a systematic examination of the ways in which the 
linkage with the government, the organization of the service and the linkage with the population 
can be improved'.58
Blondel warns that reforms intended to improve one of the four important characteristics of a 
bureaucracy, listed above, may worsen one of the other characteristics (recruitment methods 
that favour loyalty may lead to a decline in competence, for example), so that leaders will 
need to consider the trade-offs; improvements are in any case likely to be slow, difficult and 
expensive. 'Bureaucracies are an important element in the process by which leaders can see 
their goals realized; but the constraints and hurdles are numerous and cannot be overcome 
easily, let alone rapidly'.59
54 ibid. p. 167-8.
55 ibid. p. 150.
56 ibid. p. 168.
57 ibid. p. 170.
58 ibid. p. 172.
59 ibid. p. 172.
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Blondel rejects some common assumptions: the hurdles are not erected by bureaucracies
deliberately resisting the implementation of leadership goals - bureaucrats are not in any case
sufficiently homogeneous to promote a single oppositional interest; and ineffectiveness is
not inherent to bureaucracy but more likely to be the consequence of unsatisfactory
conditions. Blondel emphasises the crucial role of the bureaucracy in implementation and the
difficulty for leaders of ensuring that it is played as they would like it to be played.
'Leaders have to accept that the bureaucratic tools at their disposal cannot enable them to achieve 
more than a certain amount over a specified period of time. The impact of leadership depends on the 
structure of the bureaucracy. Leaders are not powerless to move the machinery and the structures, 
but the extent of their power is, and to their detriment, often overestimated'.60
Blondel is similarly pessimistic about the constraints on leaders posed by other parts of the 
institutional environment, including local government, political parties and interest groups. 
Their ’permanent’ procedures and linkages structure relations between the leader and the 
population. Parties can help national leaders by reducing particularist loyalties, but may also 
oblige them to pay attention to regional and local leaders. Leaders might set up new 
’personalised’ parties to provide backing for their own aims, or try to modify the existing 
territorial organisational structure, but new institutions need time and the sharing of power 
with subordinates before they can reach into the community. They are of limited use to 
current leaders, who therefore need to rely on the bureaucracy nominally under their 
command. Blondel frequently reminds researchers both of the wide range of impacts that 
leaders can make on institutions (from maintenance to system change), and that institutions 
can facilitate as well as limit leadership action; but on the whole he seems to agree with the 
arguments of those who assert that institutions are the main determinants of a leader’s 
actions, and that their role is a constraining and limiting one.
In contrast, when discussing non-institutional environmental structures, Blondel 
sees more opportunities for leaders than constraints. The wider environment (a country's 
economic base or social structure, or a short-term economic or political crisis), provides a 
more or less exogenous framework to leaders' actions that is not always restricting. Crises, 
or 'the honeymoon period' or 'state of grace' sometimes given to new political leaders can 
offer opportunities as well as constraints.61 Blondel analyses the interaction between 
political leaders and the non-institutional environment as a complex two-way behavioural 
process. In one direction, 'some leaders are better able than others to make use of the 
opportunities the environment gives them', perhaps using them to counteract other pressures 
(for example, the success of a foreign policy initiative can bring domestic rewards). In the 
other direction a particular societal environment may give support to a would-be progressive 
reformer; or may 'call out' for a 'saviour' or a 'comforter'.62




Blondel’s summary of his conceptual assessment of the impact of political leaders
brings together this reciprocal influence of leaders and their environmental context with the
normative goals of his enquiry:
’Whether because they are forced to choose or because they are able to choose, leaders seem prima 
facie to be able to make an impact on the complex network of the environment Clearly, there is an 
interplay between the will of the leaders, their aims and ambitions, and the reality around them. It is 
by gradually analysing the conditions of this interplay that we shall be better able to assess the 
precise impact of leadership under various types of circumstances and discover the ways leaders can 
serve nations in the manner most profitable to their populations'.63
The thesis strategy
The thesis uses Blondel’s analytic framework as a departure point for a more focused 
exercise that tests the same hypothesis; that is, the impact that political leaders make on the 
institutional environment is too varied in strength and content, and too closely related to their 
own diverse goals, to be summed up as a dichotomous contrast between exceptional leaders 
and those so strongly constrained by institutional forces that their intervention has only the 
status of a residual. Figure 1.1 indicates the similarities and divergences between the thesis 
strategy and Blondel’s conceptual scheme (the numbers in brackets below refer to the 
numbered items in that Figure). For the Blondel scheme it summarises his train of argument 
and the sequence of steps his empirical analysis would take. For the thesis strategy it 
outlines the equivalent elements in the same order, to show the parallels with the Blondel 
analysis - in the thesis itself, as discussed below, these elements are brought together in 
different combinations to explore the leadership’s relationship with bureaucratic institutions. 
Overall, the thesis strategy seeks to adapt the universalist aims of the Blondel strategy to a 
more practicable exercise.
The thesis replaces the comparison of political leaders across different political 
systems with a longitudinal comparison of the impact of different leaders in one country (1). 
Though polities evolve over time (and indeed choosing a country for the case study that 
changes its political system in a distinctive manner adds empirical and theoretical interest), 
the task of comparing the impact of different leaderships against the environmental context is 
nevertheless facilitated.
Furthermore, the thesis concentrates on the institutional facet of the ’political 
leadership’, examining the input of political leaders in their roles as ’political post-holders’: 
presidents, prime ministers and ministers (2). There are two points here: the content of 
leadership’, and nomenclature. The thesis leaves to one side consideration of what Blondel 
refers to as the ’bond between leader and society’. Blondel assesses the leadership’s impact 
on institutions separately from his assessment of the leadership's bond with society (2a); 
they are ’stand-alone’ exercises. Some writers do not consider post-holders who do not 
exhibit the psychological trait of leadership' to be leaders’ and would reject the use of that 
word for mere ’post-holders': Rose distinguishes between prime ministers who are leaders
63 ibid. pp. 113-14.
Figure 1.1 Strategies for analysing the impact of political leaders
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Blondel's conceptual scheme 
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and others who are jugglers, bargainers or symbols.64 But ’leadership’ is the most useful 
generic term, particularly when the subject is, as here, a collection of top post-holders (a 
president with his or her prime minister and ministers), whose activities are discussed in 
interaction with each other. The political leadership' expresses well enough the group of 
leading politicians examined here. The further problem of distinguishing 'political' leaders is 
also eased by focusing on holders of key ministerial posts: the distinction between political 
and non-political governmental figures is not as clear in all countries as in the British 
traditional dichotomy of permanent, neutral, selected bureaucrats and temporary, political, 
elected ministers. The personal characteristics of leaders are examined to some extent, first 
because the relationship of a leader's level of interest in a specific policy domain to the 
outcome is part of the inquiry, and second, in the analysis of leaders' reactions to 
environmental opportunities. However, an examination of whether particular character traits 
help leaders make an impact on bureaucratic institutions is beyond the scope of this thesis.
By confining the empirical field of research to a single policy domain, the thesis can 
evaluate actual leadership actions (3). Blondel wanted in principle to include the whole of a 
leader's actions (3b), but had to settle for assessing the extent and scope of the leader's firm 
intentions. The thesis strategy is to choose a domain that implicates a number of bureaucratic 
and other institutions, and within that domain, to consider the leadership's actions with 
respect to creating, changing or maintaining bureaucratic organisations and bureaucratic 
instruments. The interplay between leadership resources and the institutional and non- 
institutional environment can be examined more easily with respect to one domain. While 
focusing on one policy limits the generalisations that can be made from the research 
findings, the Sheffer volume on leadership in international politics proved that such a 
restriction need not preclude a worthwhile research output. As a result of narrowing down 
the research in this way, the thesis can produce comparative evaluations based on detailed 
empirical research, assessing the actual outcome of the leader's actions in qualitative and 
quantitative terms, whereas Blondel had to use a broader-brush approach to inform a 
typology of 'potential leadership impact' (4).
The remaining elements of the thesis strategy are modelled on the Blondel 
methodology but reduce it to topics most relevant to the leader-bureaucracy relationship.
Few elements covered by Blondel's analysis are entirely omitted as a result of this choice. 
The bureaucracy is always implicated, whether as one of the leadership's positional 
resources, or as part of the environment structuring the leadership's action. Moreover, a 
focus on the relationship between leadership and bureaucrats does not neglect other 
institutions, whether formal or conventional, material or procedural, since all these are 
involved in leader-bureaucracy transactions. The leadership's use of positional resources (5) 
is addressed when considering the constitutional-legal powers and powers of appointment
64 Rose (1991), p. 19.
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(which enable top leaders to modify bureaucratic organisations and appoint competent and 
loyal officials), or examining the party system configuration and conventions on 'who does 
what' (which between them help decide 'the pecking order' within the leadership on 
decisions), or the duration of a leader in post (which affects control of implementation). The 
analysis of the influence of the institutional environment (6) must deal chiefly with the 
interplay between leaders and bureaucratic institutions but it will also be important to 
understand how it is often mediated by parliament and local government. Finally, the 
influence of the non-institutional environment (7) is treated under the same headings found 
in Blondel: the general state of the economy, the economic and political crises and the 'state 
of grace’ or 'honeymoon period' that may provide opportunities as well as constraints for 
leaders, depending on the leader's responses to these events.
Despite the close parallels between the two schemes in Figure 1.1, the thesis is 
deliberately focused on political leaders' impact on bureaucratic institutions; it does not claim 
to assess the entirety of the relationship between the political leadership and the institutional 
environment. The research goal (8) is a comparative assessment of the capacity of political 
leaders to make an impact on bureaucratic institutions, in relation to their aims in one 
particular country and one policy arena and in the context of the wider institutional and non- 
institutional environment.
Choice of case-studv
France is a particularly relevant polity in which to examine the interaction between the 
political leadership and bureaucratic institutions because both parties in that relationship are 
theoretically interesting. The characteristics of the French civil service are such that political 
leaders face a particularly difficult challenge. It is an hierarchically and rationally-organised, 
technically-competent institution led by a elite group recruited on formally meritocratic and 
competitive grounds. It is self-regarding and highly-autonomous, having been constructed 
before the development of popular democracy and trained to believe it incarnates the public 
interest as well if not better than do elected politicians. It is highly-regarded and defended by 
the population as a whole and by other institutions such as local government and the Senate. 
It exhibits strongly the characteristics Weber both recommended as the ideal rational model 
and feared would take control in the absence of strong leadership.
'Long before she had democratic institutions, France possessed an exceptionally capable, self-
confident, powerful and centralised bureaucracy'.65
The chief weakness of this strong bureaucracy - that is, the fragmentation caused by the 
vertical ‘silos’ of ministries and the multiplicity of corps - only adds to the problems faced 
by the political executive. In the 1960s Crozier emphasised the French administration's 
'bureaucratic rigidity', that reduced its effectiveness and made reforms hard for leaders to
65 Williams, P. (1972) Crisis and Compromise. 3rd edn (Longman), p.336.
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achieve.66 Those at the top had power in name only, because of divisions between 
hierarchical and vertical strata, deepened by poor interpersonal communication 67 It is hard 
to orient French bureaucratic institutions towards common goals, despite a number of 
horizontal linking mechanisms, including the top interministerial corps and specialised 
interministerial organisations. Top officials 'were paralysed when it came to reforms that 
might change some equilibrium'.68 Crozier related the culture of French administrative 
institutions to that of their social environment. 'Such a model of human relationships and 
such a style of action could only have developed because they corresponded to deep cultural 
traits in French society'. Only heroic leadership or social crises could change the 
bureaucracy. But that 'tended to make the reformer an authoritarian, charismatic person, 
acting intuitively rather than rationally', and produced a counter-reaction 69 To obtain a 
limited reform in France, one is always obliged to attack the whole "system''.'70
There is no single assessment about the character of French administration: Wright's 
'on the one hand... but on the other' chapter sums up admirably The foundations and myth 
of administrative power1 in France.71 France's apparently strong and autonomous 
bureaucracy is divided by corps and conflicts, as expressed in Thoenig and Dupuy's book 
L'administration en miettes,72 and personally by senior officials 73 It was likely to provide 
more of an obstacle than a valuable resource for leaders, and for that very reason a critical 
test case of the thesis that leaders can make an impact on bureaucratic institutions.
On the other side of the political leader- bureaucrat relationship, the political 
executive's constitutional and positional resources have changed a number of times since 
1940. After four years of authoritarian rule under Vichy, followed by the two-year 
Liberation government, Fourth Republic political leaders were given few constitutional 
powers over parliament, and were further handicapped by a fragmented and conflictual party 
system which brought unstable government. The Fifth Republic Constitution of 1958 
considerably strengthened the French political executive over the legislature and thereby over 
the bureaucracy (parliament is often the bureaucracy's strongest defender); and political 
executives remain in post for longer periods. Thus a demonstration that Fifth Republic 
leaders were able to inflect bureaucratic institutions to their own goals might not provide 
convincing evidence that leaders in other constitutional positions could do likewise. Yet the
66 Crozier, M. (1964) The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago).
67 Crozier, M. (1966) ‘Crise et renouveau dans l ’administration fran9aise', Sociologie du Travail. 8/3, 225- 
48, pp.225-32. All translations from French texts are by the thesis author.
68 Crozier (1964), p.240.
69 ibid. p.232, p.236.
70 Crozier, M. (1964a) The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Tavistock), p.287.
71 Wright, V. (1989) The Government and Politics of France. 3rd edn (Unwin Hyman), pp.99-131.
72 Dupuy, F. and Thoenig, J.-C. (1987) L'administration en miettes. 2nd edn (LHarmattan).
73 J.-C.Boual, head, 'Mission Europe', Ministry of Infrastructure, and K. Varin, chef de cabinet to P. Mayet, 
head of the Ponts et Chauss£es. told the author that the purpose of their association, Rfeeaux Services 
Publics, was to overcome the cloisonnement (partitions) of French administration. Limousin's H6tel de 
Region, Limoges, 16 Feb. 1998.
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Fifth Republic provides a particularly appropriate context because it offers both a period of 
continuity of political regime for the core empirical study, and useful comparisons and 
contrasts with the three previous regimes, including the crisis moments that enable the 
leadership's use of that potential opportunity or constraint to be tested. Setting the inquiry 
within the longer post-war period, with its varied institutional and non-institutional 
environments, could produce a fruitful response to the questions posed; and indeed a more 
detailed examination of the Fifth Republic shows that the ‘strength’ of the French political 
executive was often rather relative, especially where there were conflicts on aims or strategy 
within the 'dual-headed' executive.
To illustrate the complexity of the interplay between political leaders and the 
bureaucracy, the administrative organisation chosen as exemplar is that of the Delegation a 
Vamenagement du territoire et it Vaction regionale (DATAR), a government agency which 
coordinates the policy of amenagement du territoire. Amenagement du territoire is generally 
agreed to be untranslatable into English. The most succinct definition in English seems to be 
the following:
'It can best be described as a flexible and generic notion referring to that state activity which aims to
promote the balanced territorial development of France as a whole without neglecting the specific
needs and character of individual regions and their constituent parts'.74
Sometimes the terms regional policy or regional development or regional planning seem 
appropriate, but most academics recognise the difficulty in translation and adopt the French 
term (Appendix A explains the problem).
DATAR offers an exemplary case study of the impact of political leaders on the 
bureaucracy in France for a number of interlocking reasons. It is a bureaucracy in direct 
contact with political leaders: its staff are appointed by them, financed by them and 
instructed by them. It is the prime instrument for orienting the rest of the public service 
towards the leaders' goals on amenagement du territoire, but is at the same time itself a 
bureaucratic organisation that new leaders with an interest in the policy will want to reshape 
and put under their own control. A small interministerial agency, created in 1963, it is 
legally part of the Prime Minister's Office, though day-to-day responsibility is often 
delegated to another minister (an evolving structure that enables a number of issues to be 
explored). The interactions between ministers and DATAR's top officials are not 
complicated by intervening actors in the real world, and therefore relatively easy to evaluate 
for research purposes. It is a 'doubly-bureaucratic' subject of analysis, because of its status 
as a bureaucracy and its task of coordinating other bureaucratic institutions. It is the political 
leadership’s tool for coordinating the initiation and implementation of policy programmes 
that help stimulate and redistribute regional development, a wide-ranging policy domain that 
encompasses a large number of ministries, their field offices and local councils, enabling the
74 Biarez, S. (1982) 'Amenagement du territoire in France: State intervention or regulation?', West European 
Politics. 5, July, 271-86, p.270fn.
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leaders' relationships with these institutions to be explored. DATAR is an administrative 
organisation that leaders must be able to shape to their own demands, and be shown to do so 
if the argument of this thesis is to be sustained. Its functional role also allows more distant 
relationships between leader and bureaucratic institutions to be assessed, since its role is to 
persuade other officials at central and field levels, local councils and others to adopt 
centrally-decided measures as envisaged by the government of the day.
Just as it is theoretically useful to extend the boundaries of the case-study to more 
than one constitutional arrangement, it is also useful to extend them from DATAR to 'non- 
DATAR' in two ways: first to the period 'pre-DATAR', as various political leaderships tried 
in different constitutional contexts to promote the same policy through more conventional 
ministerial units; second, to 'anti-DATAR' or 'non-DATAR', when political leaders do not 
make use of DATAR in circumstances in which other political leaders have done so. 
DATAR's reputation has varied widely over the years, for which some blame the variations 
in its closeness to leaders, others its movements within the machinery of government or 
changes in the non-institutional environment; it is to that extent a good research object in 
methodological terms. Finally, there are well-established variations in the attitudes of French 
political leaders to amenagement du territoire and in its output. In sum, it provides a good 
test of Blondel's view that bureaucratic institutions are crucial to leaders as a tool to help 
conceive, decide and deliver a policy goal but, for the same reason, constitute a serious 
handicap if they are not sufficiently subject to leadership control and action.
The research design
The research design of the case study is outlined in Figure 1.2, which shows how and 
where the different elements of the thesis strategy are tackled. All chapters makes a 
longitudinal comparative analysis of the impact of political post-holders on bureaucratic 
organisations and instruments, centred on and around DATAR and (in some chapters) its 
forerunners.
Chapter 2 analyses the organisational reform process that starts with the initiation of 
the policy of amenagement du territoire in the 1940s and ends in the creation of DATAR, as 
leaders with an interest in amenagement du territoire make successive amendments to the 
ministerial divisions responsible for the policy before setting up DATAR as a radically- 
different form of agency. This study tests the capacity of both bureaucratic and political 
leaders with 'activist' ambitions to make structural changes to the machinery of central 
government to improve its effectiveness, as Blondel had suggested they might. The research 
method in this chapter is a historical narrative of the various reforms that contrasts the 
actions of different leaders, and identifies the distinctive roles of political leaders (of whom 
some are not typically 'political') and bureaucrats.75
Chapters 3 ,4  and 5 tackle questions Blondel posed about the characteristics of a
75 Blondel (1987), p. 170.
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Figure 1.2 Summary of case-studv design
CHAPTER 2 | RESHAPING ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES: THE CREATION OF DATAR 
; ’Leaders of all countries are ... faced with structural problems with respect to bureaucracies 
1 .. their expectations [for reform] will remain largely unfulfilled. Blondel (1987), p. 170.
Analytical
goals
1 - The capacity of political leaders to reform bureaucratic structures to improve 
i coordination, against the 'constraints’ and 'hurdles' posed by the bureaucratic institutions.
Empirical base i The reform process leading to the creation of DATAR.
Research
method
i A comparative and historical narrative of successive reforms from 1941 to 1963, 
1 contrasting the roles of bureaucrats and technocratic or political leaders.
CHAPTER 3 | LINKING DATAR TO THE LEADERSHIP: POSITIONAL OR PERSONAL?
1 Links between the bureaucracy and the leader must be close and effective', ibid. p. 168.
Analytical
goals
j - The nature of the effective links between the leadership and the bureaucracy: positional 
I [direct attachment to leader's office) or personal (leadership commitment)?
Empirical base 1 Changes in DATAR's location; leaders' interest in the policy; and DATAR's reputation
Research
method
I Qualitative and quantitative comparison of relationships between DATAR's position in the 
j government machinery against the leadership's level of interest and economic growth.
CHAPTER 4 j RESPONSIVENESS, COMPETENCE AND LOYALTY: CONTROLLING DATAR 
i The system is often unresponsive'. 'A manifest requirement is to increase competence... 
j and foster loyalty... '. There would be trade-offs and it would take time. ibid. p. 150 p. 168.
Analytical
goals
j - Capacity of new political leaders to ensure a bureaucracy responds to their goals. 
■: - Identification of trade-offs and poor responses to leadership goals.
Empirical base j DATAR's staffing, recruitment, budgetary controls, working methods and activities.
Research
method
1 Qualitative analysis of political leaders' capacity and use of powers of appointment 
j Comparison of recruitment, size and internal structure with leaders' demands.
CHAPTER 5 I STEERING POLICY THROUGH DATAR: COMMITTEES AND FINANCE 
I 'Bureaucracies must be closely linked to the population', ibid. p. 168.
Analytical
goals
1 - Capacity of political leaders to use and adapt administrative tools and its funding powers 
|  to steer implementing institutions towards its own particular interests.
Empirical base I Interministerial committees, funds and financial instruments in this domain.
Research
method
1 Qualitative examination of leaders' use of DATAR's main committee, and the effectiveness 
j of DATAR's financial tools. Matching of committees and funds to leadership interest.
CHAPTER 6 ! CASE STUDY 1: ROADS PLANNING AND FUNDING
j Blondel's framework for assessing how different leaders use positional resources and non- 
j institutional environment to meet obstacles from the institutions, ibid.p.25
Analytical
goals
1 - Capacity of political leadership to influence policy in this bureaucratic arena.
1 - Assessment of DATAR (compared with DAT) as a leadership tool in this policy area.
Empiri<^b^ilnputefra^
Research j Quantitative and qualitative analysis within the Blondel framework to compare impact of
method I leaders and bureaucratic groups on policy outcome. Identification of different leadership
1 approaches to dealing with bureaucratic institutions, with /without DATAR's help.
CHAPTER 7 j CASE STUDY 2: REGIONALISATION
j Blondel's framework for assessing how different leaders use positional resources and non-
1 institutional environment to meet obstacles from the institutions, ibid.p.25
 • ..................................................... T ” w ........................................................... *................... * ............................... *.........................   *.............................................................................. *............................. .......................................................................... ..
Analytical j - Capacity of political leadership to modify institutional structures at regional level
goals................. Assessment of D A T A R . ( c o m ^ ...........
Empirical base I Inputs from leaders, DATAR, prefects, local politicians to 34 steps in regional refonrn.___
Research 1 Quantitative and qualitative analysis within the Blondel framework to compare impact of
method \ leaders and bureaucratic groups on policy outcome. Identification of different leadership
 j approaches to dealing with bureaucrats and local government, with/without DATAR's help
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bureaucracy that political leaders might need to change to ensure the bureaucracy 
implemented leadership goals loyally and competently. Blondel argued that it is important 
for links between the political leadership and the bureaucracy to 'be close and effective... if 
bureaucracies are to provide a significant help to leaders in achieving their goals’.76 Chapter 
3 surveys the changes since DATAR's creation in its organisational links to the political 
leadership; its personal links to leaders, as indicated by presidents' and prime ministers' 
reported commitment to DATAR and/or the policy of amenagement du territoire; and 
DATAR's reputation. The goal is to test alternative understandings of the nature of the links 
between the political leadership and DATAR, and of how close they need to be to ensure 
DATAR is an effective instrument of leadership aims. The analysis compares the advantages 
and disadvantages of organisational locations to estimate their real importance; it charts 
DATAR's varying reputation first against the varying locations and then against the 
variations in the leadership's personal commitment. It also examines briefly a common 
alternative thesis that the economy is the prime explanation of DATAR's changing 
reputation, not location or leadership.
Blondel noted too that 'a manifest requirement' was for political leaders to improve 
their bureaucratic tools by increasing the competence of officials and the 'fostering of loyalty 
... by a variety of means - but not at the expense of initiative taking'.77 Through a qualitative 
analysis of the leaders' use of powers to make top appointments and to determine staffing 
budgets and numbers, Chapter 4 seeks to show the political leadership's use of positional 
and personal resources to make DATAR responsive to its needs by adapting is organisation 
and activities, and to examine the trade-off between loyalty and competence.
According to Blondel, the bureaucracy had to provide effective links to the 
population if the leader's aims were to be implemented effectively, such as through a system 
of field offices.78 DATAR is not a conventional ministry and its main role, as conceived in 
1963, was not to provide services directly to the population but to coordinate and steer the 
programmes of ministries towards the political leadership's goals for amenagement du 
territoire. DATAR’s relevant 'population' consists mainly of other bureaucratic institutions, 
and the main instruments it has been given by political leaders are the traditional bureaucratic 
coordinating instruments: committees and budgets. Chapter 5 therefore scrutinises the way 
the leadership has been able to use the major administrative and financial tools, with the aid 
of DATAR, to implement its policies for amenagement du territoire. It examines the creation, 
modification and abolition by leaders of committees and other interministerial administrative 
bodies in the amenagement du territoire domain. Through an analysis of their 'input' 
controls on budgets and special funds, and the evolution of funding mechanisms in 
particular sectors, it assesses the capacity of new leaders to adapt these bureaucratic
76 ibid. p. 168.
77 ibid. p. 172-3.
78 ibid. p. 168.
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instruments to their own needs.
However, assessing the political leadership's ability to adapt the organisation and 
management of the civil service to its needs is only part of Blondel's programme for 
evaluating leadership impact, even with regard to bureaucracies. The relationship with the 
bureaucracy fits into an analysis of the impact of leaders on the polity as a whole, 'helped or 
hindered' by their bureaucratic and other institutional resources.79 After all, whether 
'political leaders appear to "make a difference" to the type of policies which are 
followed'...'is in many ways the central question of political activity'.80 However, as noted 
earlier, Blondel did not propose to measure a leader's impact on the polity in concrete terms 
but to assess his or her 'potential leadership impact' by the ambition of their goals, defined 
in terms of their 'extent' and their 'scope'. The methodology of this thesis can and should 
modify Blondel's approach while preserving his underlying rationale. While Blondel is 
working 'towards a general analysis' of comparative political leadership, this thesis is 
specifically concerned to establish in empirical terms that political leaders can make an 
impact on and through the bureaucratic institutions, and to reach a better understanding of 
the institutional and non-institutional conditions that enable them to do so.
Therefore Chapters 6 and 7 undertake case-studies of two 'sub-fields' that have 
different levels of 'scope' and different dominant policy actors: one is a mainstream public 
policy (roads network planning), in which technical bureaucracies with a reputation for 
driving the policy agenda are likely to pose a powerful constraint on leaders as well as a 
necessary source of advice; and the other a process of institutional change (regionalisation) 
in which successive leaders make changes first to the bureaucratic territorial organisation and 
then introduce more ambitious change to political structures, while at all times local and 
national political actors are important players. Both case-studies include leadership initiatives 
that extend from incremental change to innovation. An assessment is made of the political 
leadership's impact that includes the main elements in Blondel's framework: the leadership's 
personal aims; positional resources such as constitutional-legal rules and conventions; the 
institutional environment, including parliament, local government and the party system as 
well as bureaucracies; and the non-institutional environment, such as crises. In effect, the 
assessment considers those parts of Cole's appraisal of Mitterrand noted earlier under his 
headings of 'positional resources' and 'internal constraints and opportunities'.81
Chapter 6 concerns the planning and funding of the major road network. It shows 
how three bureaucratic organisations are key actors in determining this highly technical 
policy. Political leaders try to inflect the officials' preferences towards their own aims, 
mostly by using DATAR (or its predecessor, the Direction a Vamenagement du territoire, 
DAT). The goal is to assess how much impact the leadership is able to make in this
79 Blondel (1987), p. 149.
80 Blondel (1980), p. 15.
81 Cole (1994), p. 170.
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bureaucratic arena, and to see what difference the creation of DATAR as a leadership tool 
made to the success and operating procedures of the political leadership. The aims and input 
of the political leaders, DATAR and the bureaucratic groups with respect to three dozen 
roads-and-regional planning projects are compared in a quantitative analysis with their 
outcomes, and the results used to guide a qualitative analysis within the Blondel framework 
of resources, constraints and opportunities. The different ways that leaders use the resources 
and opportunities are summarised in a flow chart.
Finally, Chapter 7 considers regionalisation, a process in which DATAR played a 
leading part in the 1960s. The analytical aim is to demonstrate the capacity of the national 
political leadership to modify territorial bureaucratic structures against a background of 
opposition from prefects and other field officials as well as local political leaders. Since 
some political leaders kept DATAR away from some aspects of the political transfer of 
power to regions in the 1980s there is also the chance to 'compare and contrast' these 
occasions. As in Chapter 6, the relative significance of the input from political leaders and 
different institutional groups is analysed first quantitatively and then qualitatively within the 
Blondel framework.
The validity of the thesis as a whole is enhanced by using a mix of quantitative and 
qualitative methods that are explained in each chapter, but all using a variety of indicators 
and varied data (summarised in Appendix B). Different aspects of the same phenomenon are 
thus examined from multiple perspectives, each with their different strengths. A consistent 
picture builds up to provide a persuasive case in the concluding chapter. Though the thesis 
methodology may lose something by being less generalisable than Blondel's methodology, 
it gains by not having to adopt the simplifying assumptions Blondel has to make to cover 
such a broad spectrum of people, issues and political systems, and especially by being able 
to establish empirically the conclusions about leadership impact that Blondel has to leave at 
the level of 'leadership goals'.
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CHAPTER 2 
RESHAPING ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES: THE CREATION OF 
DATAR
INTRODUCTION
The examination of the impact of the political leadership in the domain of amenagement du
territoire starts with the conception of the policy and the administrative arrangements to
deliver it. The bureaucracy is the final element Blondel explores in his study of political
leadership.1 Blondel considers that political leaders are likely to have to improve its
organisational structure if they are to achieve the outcomes they desire; but he is sceptical
about their chances of doing so.
Leaders have to accept that the bureaucratic tools at their disposal cannot enable them to achieve 
more than a certain amount over a specified period of time; they can improve these tools somewhat, 
but also over time. The impact of leadership depends on the structure of the bureaucracy. Leaders are 
not powerless to move the machinery and the structures, but the extent of their power is, and to 
their own detriment, often overestimated1.2
Blondel's analysis suggests that the setting-up of a bureaucracy responsible for an 
innovative or ambitious policy - and amenagement du territoire was both - would meet 
special difficulty.
'Leaders of all countries are.. faced with structural problems with respect to bureaucracies...Of 
course, leaders - and in particular leaders who wish to achieve goals that are appreciably more 
"activist" than those of their predecessors - often wish to do more; to an extent at least, they can try 
and bend the "muscles" of the bureaucracy; but their expectations will remain largely unfulfilled'.3
This chapter examines the efforts to find an effective organisational structure for 
amenagement du territoire, from the establishment of an administrative unit with that name in 
the 1940s to the creation of DATAR in 1963. The principal actors in this historical 
institution-building process, their posts and their professional status are listed in Figure 2.1.
THE SERVICE DE L'AMENAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE
The Vichy State invented the policy of amenagement du territoire and created its first 
administrative structure, the service de Vamenagement du territoire.4 While a near equivalent 
(’town and country planning') had started in Britain before the war, 'the term amenagement
1 Blondel (1987), pp. 167-73: The character of the bureaucracy and the impact of leadership'.
2 ibid. pp. 172-3.
3 ibid. p. 170.
4 Alvergne, C. and Musso, P. (2003) Les Grands Textes de l'amenaeement du territoire et de la 
decentralisation (DATAR/la Documentation fran^aise), p. 104, is the first official mention of the Vichy 
origins of the policy.
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Figure 2.1. Principal actors in changes to the organisation of amenagement du territoire
VICHY STATE
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Sudreau ex-official
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Some actors had also been on the border of politics and administration in cabinets: 
Lehideux, Giraud, Surleau in Dautry's 1939-40 cabinet, Pompidou in de Gaulle's 1944-46 
and 1958 cabinets, Sudreau in Faure's 1955 cabinet, Monod in Debra's then Schumann's 
cabinets:; and Guichard in Pompidou's cabinet.
For a full list of governments please see Appendix C.
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du territoire did not exist in France in 1939: it was bom in 1944 under Vichy'.5 
Initiation bv Vichv. 1941-44
The full powers given to Marshal Petain by the constitutional law of 10 July 1940 enabled 
his government to start reorganising an administration his supporters said had been 
corrupted by parliamentary influence.6 Some ministries were split into single-purpose units, 
and new types of administrative bodies {delegations, commissariats, secretariats...), were 
created. This movement accelerated after Petain made Admiral Darlan his deputy in February 
1941. Darlan brought into government a younger generation:'polytechniciens, inspecteurs 
des finances, company directors: that is, the "technocrats" with a new vision of society and 
the socio-economic future of France'.7 Many had been trained at the Ecole polytechnique or 
the Ecole libre des sciences politiques, which gave access to the best public service posts, 
and/or belonged to the State finance inspectorate, even if some were now directors of 
industrial firms or banks. They were the more right-wing members of the clubs of the 1930s 
(such as X-Crise, Nouveaux Cahiers, Urbanisme) that promoted a Keynesian economics, 
the orderly planning of infrastructure investment or urban development, and a technical 
rationality in decision-making.8 They had rejected both the Popular Front and liberal 
economics. Some of these technocrats were enthused with the overall Vichy project of the 
National Revolution; for others the first priority was the modernisation of a State 
administration they thought out-of-date.9
Among Darlan's new organisations was the Delegation General d VEquipement 
National (DGEN), set up in February 1941, which reported directly to Petain. Its function 
was to draw up investment and retooling plans for the post-war economy, and specifically a 
ten-year national infrastructure plan, of which versions were published in 1942 and 1944.10 
Two administrative bodies were attached to the DGEN: the Commissariat a la reconstruction 
immobilize, created in October 1940 from a section of the former Ministry of Public 
Works, and which was responsible for planning and reconstruction in war-damaged 
communes; and the service d'amenagement et d'urbanisme de la region parisienne, which 
combined urban planners from the Seine prefecture and from the Ministry of Interior's 
suburban offices. The first delegue general of the DGEN was Francis Lehideux, former 
second-in-command at Renault. He was more clearly a politician than later deleguis
5 Gravier, J-F. (1970) La Question r^gionale (Flammarion). p.57. Gravier worked for Vichy, was at the 
Ministry of Reconstruction in 1944 and introduced 'town and country planning' to the French public.
6 Baruch, M. (1997) Servir l'Etat franpais: l'administration en France de 1940 k 1944 (Favard). p. 171.
7 Dreyfus, F.-G. (1990) Histoire de Vichv (Perrin), pp.395-7.
8 Dreyfus (1990), pp.21-2, 34, 223; Paxton, R. (1972) Vichv France: Old Guard and New Order 1940-1944 
(New York: Knopf), p.356; Massardier, G. (1996) Expertise et amenagement du territoire: l'Etat savant 
(L'Harmattan), pp. 15-32.
9 Baruch (1997), p.222.
10 Shennan A. (1989) Rethinking France: Plans for Renewal 1940-1946 (Oxford: Clarendon), p.21.
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generaux, even if 'the administration of an authoritarian State is a political administration'.11 
Lehideux was simultaneously Minister for Industrial Production from July 1941, unlike his 
successors, Henri Giraud, previously head of Public Works at the Paris town hall, and 
Frederic Surleau, a senior official in the Fonts et Chaussees technical corps, who were both 
responsible to ministers. But all three had experience on the boundaries of politics and 
administration in the cabinet of Raoul Dautry, 'technocratic' minister of munitions in the last 
government of the Third Republic;12 and they had common ideas on reform: Lehideux was 
'genuinely interested in rationalising the outmoded French industrial system', and produced 
the ten-year State investment plan;13 while Surleau wrote that 'France had an overriding 
need for a new, keen administration that deliberately breaks with the errors of past ways'.14
The service de Vamenagement du territoire was created within the DGEN's urban 
planning division. Giraud had the idea of combining Dautry's pre-war policy of moving 
factories away from Paris with the need to tackle Paris's transport congestion and housing 
shortage.15 A report for Giraud by the engineer Gabriel Dessus recommended encouraging 
the relocation of industrial firms from Paris to smaller towns to 'balance' their agricultural 
activities;16 and it seems likely that the service de Vamenagement du territoire was set up to 
develop it. But one critic asserted that its role was to ensure that urban workers were not 
concentrated together, to reduce the likelihood of another Popular Front; and it may, like the 
rural elements in the DGEN's ten-year plan, have been in part a response to the provincial 
ideology of the Petain entourage.17
The changes to administrative structures at Vichy were made in pursuit of efficient 
coordination. The DGEN was cited by Darlan's secretariat in May 1941 as one of four 
institutions that had fulfilled the government's goal of 'concentrating in the hands of one
person responsibility for problems of a specific nature that in themselves belonged to several
)
ministries'.18 Yet DGEN's experience illustrated the 'hurdles' Blondel predicted would be 
placed in front of new administrative structures. Lehideux soon found that colleagues from 
'classic' ministries refused to regard it as 'a real ministry' (and he was also Minister of 
Industrial Production unlike his successors Giraud and Surleau).19 Two of the most classic 
State administrations' demonstrated their hostility: the prefects through the Interior Ministry 
complained about the independence of the delegues; and the Ministry of Finance criticised 
the cost of the new agencies. The Finance Minister, Yves Bouthillier, warned that the
11 Baruch (1997), p.380, citing a 1941 text by Maurice Duverger.
12 Baudoui (1992) Raoul Dautrv 1880-1951: Le technocrate de la R£publique (Balland).
13 Paxton (1972), p.219.
14 Baruch (1997) p. 173, quoting Surleau's note of 18 July 1940.
15 Randet, P. (1955) 'L’Am&iagement du territoire', reprinted in Randet, P. (1994) L'Am&iagement du 
territoire: genfese et Stapes d'un grand dessein (La Documentation fran9aise), 139-45, pp. 140-1; Pierre Randet 
worked in the Vichy urban planning division.
16 Mazet, P. (2000) Amenagement du territoire (Colin), p.7.
17 Mioche, P. (1987) Le Plan Monnet: Gdnfese et Elaboration 1941-1947 (Sorbonne). p.23.
18 Baruch (1997), Annex 16, reproduces the note, AN F60 592.
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country could not afford the new priorities, however urgent, and the DGEN was later put 
under his control.20
Restructuring bv the Provisional Government. 1944-46
The service de Vamenagement du territoire was available to be recreated in the Fourth 
Republic because de Gaulle decided the existence of the Vichy State had to be denied,21 and 
the bureaucracy survived ’almost intact'.22 De Gaulle's 'government of national unanimity' 
in September 1944 had 'no formal or legal title' of authority;23 its structure had been 
negotiated between de Gaulle's representatives and the Conseil national de la Resistance. De 
Gaulle had little room for manoeuvre in allocating ministers and portfolios because the 
appropriate weight had to be given to the main Resistance groups and political parties, old 
and new generations, 'technicians' and parliamentarians 24
The DGEN officials were transferred to a Ministry of Public Works and Transport, 
apart from Surleau and the officials working on the ten-year investment plan, who were 
assigned to the Minister of National Economy, Pierre Mendes-France. In November 1944 
the Minister of Public Works and Transport asked to be relieved of the reconstruction 
portfolio. De Gaulle invited Dautry to take it on. Dautry's 'apolitical' stance did not upset the 
political balance and he was famous for his reconstruction work after the First World War.25 
He was honorary president of the journal Urbanisme, and had kept in touch with the DGEN 
planners until 1943.26 Dautry persuaded de Gaulle to add urban planning to his portfolio, 
arguing France should be modernised, not restored.27 The Commissariat engineers and the 
urban planners were transferred to Dautry's Ministry of Reconstruction and Urban 
Planning.
Dautry set up two directorates in the new ministry: a construction directorate, in 
which the Commissariat officials were divided between reconstruction and war damage 
compensation; and a directorate of urban planning and housing, which included a service de 
Vamenagement du territoire. In practice however, though the minister kept its title 'to open 
up a wider perspective from the start', the service de Vamenagement du territoire 'drew up
19 Dreyfus p.534.
20 Baruch (1997), pp.202-3.
21 Guichard, O. (19991 Vinet ans en 40 (FavardL pp. 12-13. Bloch-Laind, F. and Gruson, C. (1996) Hauts 
Fonctionnaires sous l’Occupation (Odile Jacob), p. 119, p. 135.
22 Paxton (1972), p.333. 98% of active officials in the Cour des Comptes in 1942 were also there in 1946; 
97% of officials in the Inspection des Finances in 1948 served in 1942. Ibid, p.335.
23 Williams (1972) Crisis and Compromise, p. 20.
24 Rioux, J.P. (2002) La France de la Ouatri&me Republique. I, 1st edn 1980 (Seuil).
25 'Hardly a familiar name to British readers, he is an almost heroic figure in his own country1. Pacey. P. 
(2002) Lcs Chemins de fer de la Baie de Somme (Usk: Oakwood), p.67. During the 1914-18 war he built 
supply lines in record time, then headed post-war rail reconstruction; he unified French railways. He did not 
approve the armistice and took no part in Vichy but his 'managerial efficiency' inspired many who did.
26 Avril, M. (19931 Raoul Dautrv: La passion de servir (France-EmpireL p.230; Baudoui (1992), pp.264-88; 
Massardier (1996), p. 104fn, citing Archives Nationales documents.
27 Avril, M. (1993), p.246.
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urban redevelopment plans... for war-damaged communes’.28 Though the central 
arrangements were conventional, Dautry also appointed a tier of regional commissioners 
chosen from former colleagues in other organisations, and a mission de decentralisation 
industrielle, to which he recruited Jean-Fran9 ois Gravier as charge de mission. Dautry asked 
Gravier to 'set out the tenets of amenagement du territoire in a way that would be intelligible 
and useful to everybody'.29 Dautry was 'assuredly the father of industrial decentralisation, 
which was the first visible form of amenagement du territoire, but one circumscribed by 
economic problems... that pushed the spatial dimension into the background'.30
De Gaulle and Dautry were thus able to adapt the ministerial structure towards their 
own aims, yet only after experiencing constraints. Dautry too had been limited in his 
aspirations by the Conseil national de la Resistances in June 1944 they had refused him a 
role in urban planning, giving him other duties.31 Once de Gaulle was in post in Paris there 
were fewer restrictions: indeed the DGEN planners in the Ministry of National Economy 
were moved yet again after ministers in the Conseil iconomique decided that the Ministry of 
Reconstruction should draw up a national reconstruction plan to fit the Ministry of National 
Economy's investment plan.32 But this scheme was rescinded - a technical detail, but one 
that was at the origin of long-term conflict between the regional development planners and 
the investment planners. There had been disputes between ministers (Mendes-France, 
Pleven, Bidault and Dautry among others) about how the Plan should be organised 33 and 
the outcome was eventually decided by de Gaulle on political grounds. Investment planning 
was assigned to a Commissariat General au Plan (Plan Commissariat), which was placed 
under the authority of the prime minister 'to counterbalance the appointment of a Communist 
Party member [Billoux] as Minister of National Economy'.34
Removing the regional tier. 1946
In 1946 Billoux succeeded Dautry as Minister of Reconstruction. He was the first person 
with a ministerial responsibility for amenagement du territoire to fulfil Page's definition of 
'political leadership', by using his position, 'gained as a result of a career in politics, a 
career in the struggle for power through competition involving election within a system of 
representative government, to assert the choices of the politician';35 though, like Claudius- 
Petit who would be the next to restructure the service de Vamenagement du territoire, his
28 Randet (1994), pp. 16-18.
29 Avril, M. (1993), p.246.
30 Charles, H. and Cristini, R. (1992) 'Le general de Gaulle et la gestion du sol fransais', in Institut Charles 
de Gaulle, De Gaulle en son sifecle. III. Moderniser la France (La Documentation fran5aise/ Plon), 465-82, 
pp.468-9.
31 Baudoui (1992), p.276.
32 Mioche (1987), p.62; Ordonnance of 21 April 1945.
33 Mioche (1987), pp.45-7.
34 ibid. p.89. He cites evidence from both de Gaulle's chef de cabinet and Billoux.
35 Page, E.C. (1992) Political Authority and Bureaucratic Power A Comparative Analysis. 2nd edn (Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf), p. 148.
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career developed through Resistance activity not through conventional politics.
Billoux confirmed a minister's freedom to restructure by removing Dautry’s regional 
tier, dismissing all the regional commissioners and all but one of the regional construction 
inspectors appointed under Vichy. There was a general animus against regions, especially 
but not exclusively among the Left. 'Regionalism and regionalisation were equated with 
collaboration and Fascism'.36 Billoux kept the service de Vamenagement du territoire and 
was interested in its work.37 But, as a Communist, he was 'short-circuited' by prime 
ministers, and his policies increasingly limited by the Finance Ministry.38 In the first years 
of the Fourth Republic,
'the influence of the service de Vamenagement du territoire, which had no financial instruments, was
rather weak; as evidence, the first Monnet Plan, drawn up 1946-47, showed no interest in this
domain'.39
A Reconstruction official, Pierre Randet, admitted that 'the Ministry of Reconstruction and 
the Plan Commissariat did not at first feel the need to coordinate their efforts... The Plan had 
objectives for basic industries... that were not easily adapted to geographie volontaire 
[changing the map of France]....and the Ministry of Reconstruction was driven by the need 
to re-house people...'.40 While Reconstruction ministers from 1946 to 1948 were 
'completely indifferent to any policy of amenagement du territoire' ;41 they did not alter its 
structures, either to improve them or remove them; their housing portfolio took greater 
priority in their short terms in office 42
THE DIRECTION DE VAMENAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE
The concept of amenagement du territoire was brought to public attention in 1947 with the 
publication of Gravier's Paris et le desert frangais.43 Gravier reproduced his report to Dautry 
as a book, prefaced by Dautry, in order 'to attack the Plan'.44 The author feared that the Plan 
Commissariat's investment programme would reinforce existing regional imbalances. His 
book became a key reference for regional developers and geographers in many countries.45 
The centre-party leader, Eugene Claudius-Petit, promoted Gravier's book and ideas in the 
National Assembly at the time of publication and then within the government when he
36 M6ny, Y. (1987a) 'France: the Construction and Reconstruction of the Centre, 1945-86', West European 
Politics. 10/4, 52-69, p.53.
37 Randet (1994). p. 17; Avril, M. (1993), p.246.
38 Yvert, B. (ed) (1990) Dictionnaire des ministres (1789-19891 (Perrin), pp.668-9.
39 Gravier (1970), p.57. Gravier was posted from the Prime Minister's secretariat to the Plan Commissariat's 
’regional' section in 1947 but there was little regional content in the Plan until the 1960s.
40 Randet (1994), pp. 18-19.
41 Gravier (1970), p.57.
42 Randet (1994), p.24.
43 Gravier, J.-F. (19471 Paris et le desert franyais (Le Portulan). They were followed by Gravier, J.-F. (1958) 
Paris et le desert francais. 2nd edn [1947] (Flammarion) and Gravier, J.-F. (1972) Paris et le desert franyais en 
1972 (Flammarion) among many other texts on the subject by the same author.
44 Alvergne and Musso (2003), p. 110.
45 For example, Hall, P. (1975) Urban and Regional Planning 1st edition (Harmondsworth: Pelican).
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became Minister for Reconstruction and Urban Planning in 1948. Claudius-Petit's 
explanation of amenagement du territoire in his Ministry's 'green paper' remains the 
standard definition:
Amenagement du territoire is the search for a more balanced distribution of the population within 
the territory of France in relation to the distribution of natural resources and economic activity. Its 
constant concern is to provide people with better living and working conditions, and improved 
facilities for leisure and cultural activities. It is therefore being carried out not just from economic 
motives, but much more for the people's well-being and fulfilment46
Restructuring within the Ministry of Reconstruction. 1948-52 
Claudius-Petit renamed the ministry's urban planning directorate the Direction de 
Vamenagement du territoire (DAT); and divided its former service de Vamenagement du 
territoire between a service de Vamenagement national, under Randet, and a section that 
continued to draw up urban plans. The minister set officials to produce rival programmes for 
a national plan that would fulfil the aims of amenagement du territoire. Randet's version, 
Pour unplan national d'amenagement du territoire, outlining objectives and actions, was 
approved at a Cabinet meeting of the Bidault government.47 A Central Commission to advise 
on drawing up this Plan was set up by decree in 1950. Composed of nine top public sector 
officials or managers (including Francis Bloch-Laine of the State investment bank, the 
Caisse des Depots; Gabriel Dessus, by then a director at Electricite de France; and Alfred 
Sauvy, director of statistics), it met in Claudius-Petit's office to hear expert witnesses 48
Claudius-Petit, a leader of a centrist Resistance party, was in post for a much longer 
period than most Fourth Republic ministers - 1948-53 - and was supported until 1952 by 
three political leaders from his part of the political spectrum who 'took turns' at the 
premiership during this time (Queuille, Bidault, Queuille, Pleven, Queuille, Pleven). They 
introduced a law in 1950 creating a fund, the Fonds national d'amenagement du territoire 
(FNAT), that the DAT could offer industrialists as an incentive to relocate, and another law 
in 1951 that enabled public corporations or mixed-economy companies (SEMs) to be set up 
for regional development projects. But the regulatory texts implementing this law were not 
issued,49 and the Central Commission stopped meeting in June 1952, before a national plan 
for amenagement du territoire was agreed.50 Prime Minister Pinay (in office March to 
December 1952) was against planning.51 Claudius-Petit deliberately lowered his own 
ambitions rather than endanger the Plan Commissariat’s investment Plan, itself rather fragile
46 Ministere de la Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme (1950) Pour un plan national d'amenagement du territoire 
(MRU), p.3. Quoted in Lajugie, J. (1964) 'Amenagement du territoire et ddveloppement economique regional 
en France (1945-1964)', Revue d'economie politique. 74/1, 278-336, p.282.
47 Minist£re de la Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme (1950).
48 Randet (1994), p.60; Bloch-Laine, F. (19771 Profession: fonctionnaire (Seuih p. 141.
49 Pisani, E. ( 1956a) 'Administration de gestion, administration de mission', Revue frantpaise de science 
politique. 6/2,315-30, p.322.
50 Randet (1994), pp.65-7.
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from 1950 to 1952.52
'[Claudius-Petit] soon noticed that through this notion [of amenagement du territoire] he risked
calling planning as a whole into question. He therefore directed his actions mainly towards urban
policy.53
The DAT continued to pursue the goals set by this minister but there was opposition from 
other parts of the bureaucracy and other ministers: Randet, the official in charge of the 
service de Vamenagement du territoire, acknowledged in 1955 that the ’classic conflict of 
powers' between the Plan Commissariat and the DAT had led them into ’rivalry’.54 
Furthermore Randet 'was heckled' (apostrophe) in a corridor of the Matignon [the Prime 
Minister's office] by a Minister of Industry, who accused Randet of trespassing on his patch 
(pre carre).55 While there were differences between bureaucracies that constituted hurdles to 
a coordinated policy, the primary constraints were imposed by other political leaders.
An economic re-orientation. 1953-56
By the time Mendes-France became prime minister in 1954, the DAT had made itself 
'especially responsible' for encouraging Breton regional development56 However, 'the 
DAT encouraged initiatives from others because it was unable to provide them itself.57 The 
priority for Claudius-Petit's immediate successors was their housing portfolio. Courant 
(1953) is remembered for his housing action plan, and Lemaire (1953-54) for his levy on 
wages to fund house-building.58 Not only was housing the political issue of the time, but 
the prime minister, Laniel, disliked urban planners and had 'urban planning' removed from 
the ministry's title.59
However, outside the Ministry of Reconstruction, officials and other minuisters 
made organisational arrangements for regional economic development. The Caisse des 
Depots under Bloch-Laine started supporting development projects outside the ministerial 
investment programmes; and at the Ministry of Industry, the official Pierre Dreyfus, 
'working closely with Bloch-Laine', created an industrial expansion and decentralisation 
division attached to the minister's cabinet.60 The DAT was still formally responsible for 
amenagement du territoire but it had no formal powers or ministerial support to coordinate
51 Cohen, S.S. (1977) Modem Capitalist Planning: the French model 2nd edn (Berkeley: University of 
California), p.56.
52 Cohen (1977), pp.88-9.
53 Bloch-LainE, F. (1962) 'Pour une rEforme de l’administration Economique', Revue Economique. 6, 861-85, 
p.869.
54 Randet (1955), p. 140.
55 Administration (1994) 'La DATAR a trente ans', special edition, 11/164: contribution by P.Randet, p.22. 
The Matignon is the prime minister's official residence.
56 Le Monde. 7-8 Feb. 1954, selected for the '50-years ago' article, Le Monde. 7 Feb 2004.
57 Pouyet, B. (1968) La D.A.T.A.R. (Cujas). p.23.
58 Yvert (ed) (1990), p.778, p.810.
59 He instructed Courant, Tell the urban planners to go to hell'. Randet (1994), p.27.




When Mendes-France became prime minister in June 1954 he gave new impetus to 
regional development under the heading of 'decentralised expansion', but not through the 
Ministry of Reconstruction. The major role was given to the Minister of Finance and 
Economy, Edgar Faure, to whom the Plan Commissariat was also transferred by decree (In 
effect Mendes-France created the structure he had wanted in 1944.). Both Mendes-France 
and Faure
'emphasised their determination to modernise economic structures, were interested in economic
productivity, and conscious of the need for amenagement du territoire'.61
'Having launched economic growth, it was now a matter of accelerating it by dealing with the
weakest links through amenagement du territoire, industrial restructuring and agricultural
modernisation'.62
Mendes-France was foreign minister for most of his premiership and was fully occupied 
with that role: the practical steps were therefore taken by Faure in liaison with the prime 
minister's cabinet. Further instruments were decided by Mendes-France in February 1955 
with Robert Buron as Finance Minister. Then Prime Minister Faure with Pierre Pflimlin at 
Finance completed a set of 120 decrees in the economic domain that included 'the first 
attempt to put a coherent apparatus for amenagement du territoire in place'.63 These decrees 
were able to be taken because parliamentarians had given Mendes-France and then Faure 
special powers to make decrees in the economic, social and fiscal domain with the laws of 
10 August 1954 and 2 April 1955.
Apart from moving the Plan Commissariat, these ministers did not restructure 
administrative bodies at national level but at regional level: they started reforms that would 
require ministries with field officials to adopt common regional boundaries, in order to 
coordinate the planning and implementation of 'regional action programmes'. At central 
level, new interministerial institutions were added and new functions assigned, especially to 
the 'economic' bureaucracies. The Plan Commissariat was asked to draw up the regional 
action programmes, and to head an interministerial committee (the groupe de synthese) 
which would propose suitable regional boundaries. The Inspecteurs generaux de Veconomie 
nationale (IGENs, a former corps within the Ministry of National Economy) were asked to 
oversee the implementation of the programmes. The powers of the Finance Ministry in this 
domain increased further with the creation of a substantial development fund, the Fonds de 
developpement economique et social (FDES), whose committee was chaired by Bloch- 
Laine. The Ministry of Finance became strong [in the field of amenagement du territoire] 
because it controlled the tools for decentralised expansion: the legal measures put in place
61 Berstein, S. (1985) 'Un Mend€sisme sans Mendes-France? Les gouvemements Edgar Faure et Guy Mollet1, 
in Bddarida, F. and Rioux, J.P. (eds) Pierre Mendfes-France et le Mend6sisme (Institut d'Histoire du Temps 
Present / Fayard), 221-27, p.222.
62 Rioux, J.P. (2001) La France de la Ouatrifcme Republique. II, 1st edn 1983 (Seuil), pp.63-4.
63 Revue fran9aise de science politique (19561. 'Amenagement du territoire: probl£mes politiques et 
administratifs', special edition, 6/2, 1956, editorial, p.261.
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between 1954 and 1957 gave it the dominant role'.64 The DAT was assigned relevant but 
minor roles: it ran an interministerial 'decentralisation committee' that drew up a list of State 
industrial firms that could be moved out of Paris (chaired by Surleau, the former director of 
DGEN); it was vice-chair of the Plan Commissariat's groupe de synthese deciding regional 
administrative boundaries, and technical adviser to the FDES's industrial decentralisation 
sub-committee. It kept its own development fund, the Fonds national d'amenagement du 
territoire, much smaller than the FDES.
There were unlikely to be objections from finance officials to this increase in their 
powers and indeed this 'experiment... received the full agreement of the Rue de Rivoli 
[Ministry of Finance]'; moreover, 'the big names of the civil service... Gabriel Ardant, 
Claude Gruson, Francis Bloch-Lain6, Paul Delouvrier, Louis Armand, Alfred Sauvy, gave 
their unswerving support' to Mendes-France.65 But the reforms met substantial resistance 
from other bureaucracies (discussed further in Chapter 7). The decree setting out the 
boundaries for the regional action programmes was not published for 18 months, such were 
the administrative disputes - and national politicians with local mandates added last-minute 
changes favouring their own cities.66 Even then only two ministries designated a regional- 
level official. The IGEN officials were 'unable to overcome psychological and 
administrative resistance' from ministries to implement the programmes.67 Prefects took no 
notice of the IGENs 68
In the last two years of the Fourth Republic, 1956-58, senior officials and reforming 
politicians interested in administration and amenagement du territoire started to put forward 
recommendations for change, notably in a special edition of the Revue frangaise de science 
politique, with contributions from serving and former officials, including Michel Debre, 
conseiller d'Etat and regional commissioner during the Liberation; Jean-Fran9 ois Gravier, 
charge de mission at the Plan Commissariat; and Edgard Pisani, senator and former prefect. 
They observed that 'the extensions' made by Mendes-France and Faure to the policy of 
amenagement du territoire 'posed delicate problems of administrative coordination' which 
the Ministry of Reconstruction was incapable of resolving 69 Gravier wanted to reorganise 
the administration on the basis of the needs of amenagement du territoire, while Debre 
identified political and constitutional problems as the cause of the administrative problems. 
Pisani concluded that 'a real amenagement du territoire policy would require reforms not 
only to the administration but to the State, to taxation and to habits'. However, he 'brought
64 Pouyet (1968), p.38.
65 Rioux (2001), p.63, p.51.
66 Decree of 26 Nov. 1956. Monier, R. (1965) Region et £conomie r^gionale (Berger-Levrault), p.35; Clout, 
H. (1972) The Geography of Post-war France (Oxford: Pergamon), pp.31-5.
67 Pouyet (1968), p.39.
68 Monier (1965), p.67. Monier was an IGEN official.
69 Revue frangaise de science politique (19561. editorial, p.261.
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his small stone to the edifice’ with a proposition for reform at development project level.70 
Pisani's seminal article,'Administration de gestion, administration de mission',11 contrasted 
traditional ministerial bureaucracies {administrations de gestion): formalist, reactive, 
permanent, hierarchically-organised and suited to managing activities that did not change 
much, with what he termed administrations de mission, set up to conceive and carry out a 
’mission': lightweight, realist, forward-looking, project-focused, informal in working 
methods and interministerial in recruitment and function. There was a clear parallel in the 
contrast between the DAT and the Plan Commissariat, though ministers did not draw the 
consequences immediately. The government of Guy Mollet and Paul Ramadier, Socialist 
Premier and Finance Minister, 1956-57, was the last in the Fourth Republic able to envisage 
changes. They asked Bloch-Laine to prepare a reform of the economic administration, 
including the Plan Commissariat, but then 'dropped it'; Bloch-Laine concluded that 'the 
Socialist position was more verbal than operational'.72
The DAT continued to promoted its own objectives without being able to achieve 
them. Its top official (not its minister) had asked Pflimlin in 1955 if the Plan Commissariat's 
regional action programmes could be framed within regional development plans drawn up 
by the Ministry of Reconstruction, but Pflimlin refused, preferring actions that would 
produce jobs quickly.73 The Reconstruction ministers, Duchet and Chochoy, were focused 
on their housing responsibilities: Duchet in 1955 organised a massive low-cost housing 
programme; and Chuchoy was a housing specialist specifically appointed by Mollet to 
prepare a housing bill.74 Despite this ministerial disinterest the DAT, 'puffed up with its 
pioneering role in this domain', inserted a clause in the housing bill, to make regional 
development plans a legal requirement.75 Questions were immediately raised: would the 
DAT and the Plan Commissariat use the same procedures and consult the same 
organisations? Or would conflicting plans emerge, given that there were no formal 
arrangements for coordination and little prospect of the DAT and the Plan Commissariat 
working together voluntarily?
The government's official adviser on administrative efficiency, the Comite central 
d'enquites sur le cout et le rendement des services publics, issued immediately an interim 
report that was 'a long indictment of the inability of the Ministry of Reconstruction to ensure 
the coordination of regional development activities'.76 It recommended the Prime Minister 
set up and chair an interministerial committee on amenagement du territoire.
70 "E.P." [Pisani] 'Avant-propos*. in Revue franyaise de Science Politique (1956). pp.262-66.
71 Pisani (1956a).
72 Bloch-Lain6, F. and Bouvier, J. (1986) La France restaur£e. 1945 -1954 (Favard). p. 100.
73 Randet (1994), p.81. The Construction plans were maps showing the urban or rural centres where 
investment could be concentrated usefully instead of dividing it between communes.
74 Yvert (ed) (1990), p.786, p.773.
75 Lajugie (1964), p.307; Pouyet (1968), p.36. Act 57-908 of 7 Aug. 1957, Art.27.
76 Pouyet (1968), p.36. The Comite was set up at the Liberation as a standing body of top civil servants and 
parliamentarians to advise the government on administrative reform. Machin (1977), p.63.
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The implementation of amenagement du territoire cannot belong to a single ministry; all ministries 
are equally involved. A body placed at the highest level, responsible for following up each year the 
implementation of the policy as a whole, seems indispensable '71
Adding interministerial provisions under de Gaulle and Debre. 1958-62
The leaders of the new constitutional regime modified the organisation of amenagement du
territoire by adding new institutions. As last Prime Minister of the Fourth Republic, de
Gaulle appointed Pierre Sudreau as Minister for Construction. Sudreau was an official: a top
prefect, he was deputy director of the Faure cabinet of 1955 that prepared the regional
reforms, and then headed the Commissariat pour Vurbanisme de la region parisienne,
responsible for developing Parisian infrastructure. Sudreau was both interested in the
domain of amenagement du territoire and 'had seen on the ground how ineffective the
administration could be at achieving the public good'.78 He persuaded de Gaulle that his
ministry should retain Dautry's responsibility for amenagement du territoire but with
enhanced interministerial provisions to improve coordination. Sudreau was one of the few
ministers or administrators (with Delouvrier, Pisani, Bloch-Lain^ and Masse) whom de
Gaulle held in high esteem and whose proposals for reform he was willing to consider if
they promised to improve coherence and coordination.79 Though a strong supporter of the
General he resigned when de Gaulle proposed that the President should be directly elected.
The DAT decentralisation committee, listing State enterprises that could move out of
Paris, was now to select ministerial candidates too, but it would be located at the Plan
Commissariat. New interministerial committees, chaired by the DAT, would decide planning
permits for industrial or scientific buildings to be built in Paris, and give grants to firms
locating in disadvantaged regions. The DAT's regional development plans and the Plan
Commissariat’s regional action programmes were to be combined into a single set by a
regional plans committee, which the Commissariat would chair, with the DAT as vice-chair.
Finally, an advisory body on planning for amenagement du territoire, the Conseil superieur
de la Construction, was created, chaired by the well-known regional developer, Philippe
Lamour (see Figure 2.2 for a diagram of the organisational structure at this time). Bloch-
Laine must have been referring to Sudreau and his ambitions when he warned:
'[Claudius-Petit's] successors experienced, as he did, the temptation to overextend the boundaries. 
However discreet their staff, they could not avoid some conflict with the Plan Commissariat when 
the latter, somewhat belatedly, started to take an interest in regionalising its programmes1.80
The 'high-level ministerial body' recommended by the Comite central in 1957 was 
introduced in 1959 when Sudreau met similar problems with finance and industry ministers 
to those the DAT met with officials. At Sudreau's request, Prime Minister Debre started to
77 Report of Comity centrale d'enquetes Sept. 1957, quoted in Pouyet (1968), p.47.
78 Debre, M. (19881 Trois rgpubliaues oour une France: Mgmoires III (Albin Michel), p.91.
79 Chevallier, J. (1992). 'De Gaulle, l'administration, la rdforme administrative', in Institut Charles de 
Gaulle, De Gaulle en son sifecle. Ill (La Documentation fransaise/ Plon), 541-66, p.563.
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hold an informal monthly meeting, soon formalised by decree as the Comite interministeriel
permanent pour les problemes d'action regional et d'amenagement du territoire (CIAT, see
Chapter 5). Sudreau prepared reports for the committee; Debre's cabinet adviser for
administrative affairs and amenagement du territoire, Jerome Monod, organised the
meetings.81 Debre and Monod were simultaneously preparing more comprehensive
administrative reforms at regional level (discussed further in Chapter 7). However Debre
took more immediate steps to support Sudreau by appointing Commissaires &
Vamenagement du territoire to peripheral regions, to work with the DAT and local officials
under Sudreau's direction.
However, the DAT remained unable to unify the implementation of amenagement du
territoire. The Commissaires & Vamenagement du territoire ’clashed with the field officials,
especially the Prefects'.82 The agriculture ministry, under Pisani, and the Plan Commissariat
introduced their own redevelopment projects. The Plan Commissariat did not want
regionalised planning.
'Its tables of figures ...were already so complicated to draw up that an additional dimension was 
resented as at best a new constraint and at worst an unwarranted interference. Adding regional needs, 
even smoothed out by us... made it too obvious that some trends were erroneous, or did not fit Plan 
assumptions... It risked exposing the inconsistencies, even contradictions,.that were more easily 
masked in total national figures. ...What remained, therefore, was to go through the motions [faire 
"comme si*]. The Plan ... could not and did not want to integrate the regional dimension'.83
By 1962 the survival of the Ministry of Construction itself was under review: its
former responsibility for Paris plans had been transferred to a new Paris District authority
and 'post war reconstruction was now complete'.84 The ministry then published a Plan
d'amenagement du territoire that Sudreau had requested from the Conseil superieur de la
Construction.85 It was issued just before the Plan Commissariat's Fourth Plan was
presented to parliament. The ministry's Plan embarrassed the government politically by
encouraging parliamentarians debating the Fourth Plan to ask for multi-annual regional plans
too, first conceded by Finance Minister Val&ry Giscard d'Estaing, then countermanded by
President de Gaulle.86 The embarrassment became the stimulus for a more fundamental
structural reform by the incoming prime minister, Pompidou.
The Plan Commissariat and the DAT tried simultaneously to set out the principles of French 
regional planning. Regret was expressed during the parliamentary debate on the Fourth Flan that 
there was no harmonisation between the two plans, whether on their timescale, geographic 
framework or proposals. This situation could not have continued without endangering the 
effectiveness of regional policy'.87
80 Bloch-Lain6 (1962), p.869.
81 Debr6 (1988), p.22, pp. 166-7, p. 177.
82 Pouyet (1968), p.37.
83 Roche, J.-M. (1986) 'Missionnaire au Plan: La dimension r6gionale\ in Rousso (ed.), 65-70, pp.69-70.
84 Bloch-Lain6 (1962), p.869.
85 P. Sudreau, 'Preface' in Randet (1994), p.5; Conseil Superieur du Ministere de la Construction (1962) Plan 
d'amenagement du territoire (February).
86 Rodwin, L. (1970) Nations and Cities (Boston: Houghton Mifflin), pp.338-9.
87 Lajugie (1964), p.309.
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AN EPHEMERAL MINISTRY FOR AMENAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE
Unlike Debre, Pompidou was not a parliamentarian. He had served in de Gaulle's cabinet in
1944-46 and was his directeurde cabinet in 1958, helping him to set up the new
governmental structures. He was director-general of Rothschild's bank, but had also served
briefly in the Conseil d'Etat and on the Constitutional Council.
'He thought that France was not up-to-date, that it must industrialise, build up its infrastructure, and 
launch an ambitious policy of (management du territoire'. In fact, a proper executive body for 
amenagement du territoire was still to be created, and it was this gap to which Georges Pompidou 
applied himself urgently'.88
On the day he became Prime Minister, Pompidou brought under his direct authority
both the Plan Commissariat and amenagement du territoire by creating a new post of
ministre delegue aupres du premier ministre, charge du Plan et de Vamenagement du
territoire. The title signalled that the minister had the delegated authority of the prime
minister and was part of his cabinet. The post was offered to Maurice Schumann, a centre-
party leader. The Plan Commissioner, Pierre Massd, was not consulted and learned of his
transfer from the Ministry of Finance to Matignon from Schumann.89 Schumann appointed
as directeurde cabinet the Plan Commissariat's top finance official, who chose as his deputy
the specialist in administration and amenagement du territoire in Debre's cabinet, Monod.90
Schumann 'made no secret of his desire to construct {un grand minist&re de superposition et
de coordination,91 which would have included a delegation a Vamenagement du territoire for
interministerial coordination, supported by technical divisions. Critical comments quickly
appeared in the press 92
By the time Schumann resigned a month later for foreign policy reasons,93 his
ministry had still not been set up: no ministry would transfer staff or areas of competence.94
As a member of Schumann's cabinet told Catherine Gremion:
The decree appointing M. Schumann was not even issued, he resigned before that, because we had 
not managed to settle it properly. Why? Because the opposition from other ministries was 
formidable. In consequence, a minister of State existed but he had no decree setting out his 
responsibilities, he had no staff..... And secondly, there had been no provisions made to give him 
powers, especially financial.95
On Schumann's resignation Pompidou officially received the responsibilities for the Plan 
and amenagement du territoire that he had temporarily united under Schumann: the Plan
88 Roussel, E. (1994) Georges Pompidou 1911-1974. 2nd edn (Lattes), p. 150, p. 153.
89 Massd, P. (1986) 'Le metier de Commissaire au Plan: en feuilletant l'introduction au quatri&me Plan', in 
H.Rousso (ed.), 197-208, p. 199, p.210.
90 G. Brae de la Perrifcre, witness account in H.Rousso (ed.) (1986), pp.210-11.
91 Lanversin, J. de (1970) L'am&iagement du territoire et la rationalisation. 2nd edn (LITEC), p.62.
92 Pouyet (1968), p.45, quoting R. Barillon, Le Monde. 18 April 1962, among others.
93 With other centrist ministers because of de Gaulle's anti-EC 'Volaplik' speech of 15 May 1962.
94 Pouyet (1968), p.45.
95 Grdmion, C. (1979), p. 143.
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Commissariat had already been moved from the Ministry of Finance and National Economy 
to the prime minister by decree.
THE DELEGATION A L'AMENAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE ETA LACTION  
REGIONALE
The top official, Bloch-Laine, analysing the structure of the 'economic administrations', said 
that amenagement du territoire needed an executive 'horizontal administration' like the Plan 
Commissariat, that would work closely with the Plan Commissariat, but preferably not be 
the Plan Commissariat.96 For academics the Schumann ministry had been a valuable 
practical experiment; it seemed to demonstrate the importance of two 'fundamental 
principles':
'[the principle that ] a delegation a Vamenagement du territoire placed at the heart of State 
administrative and financial action should be responsible for coordinating the implementation of this 
policy., and die principle that the responsibility for amenagement du territoire must be located at the 
highest level in the government hierarchy'.97
Pompidou's closest aide, Olivier Guichard, put it more pragmatically.98
'[Pompidou] relaunched the idea of amenagement du territoire by asking a minister, Maurice 
Schumann, to invent the role. It was not the best method. It was much better for the role to be held 
by someone located outside the classic governmental structures but directly attached to the Prime 
Minister, sufficiendy discreet not to raise alarm, sufficiendy well-supported to secure decisions, and 
with real power, that is to say, money. After a month, the departure of the MRP ministers... gave 
him the chance to arrive at this formula."
Like Pompidou, Guichard was political but not an elected politician, and had the status of an 
official without having been a bureaucrat. His father had been Darlan's directeur du cabinet 
at Vichy, though de Gaulle had the 'good manners never to mention him',100 and Guichard 
himself was de Gaulle's chefde cabinet from 1947 to 1960, working at times with 
Pompidou. He was made a prefect by special decree (see Chapter 4), and ran the 
Organisation for Saharan Development until France left Algeria. From 1962 to 1967 he 
occupied the office next to Pompidou's in Matignon, a charge de mission but independent of 
the cabinet. Guichard said the idea of DATAR came mainly from Pompidou, but they often 
talked it over.101 Monod and many others say Guichard was the 'inventor' of DATAR.102 
Because of the problems met by Schumann the structural arrangements and legal texts were 
prepared in detail for several months before DATAR was announced. Guichard, Monod and 
Xavier Ortoli (Pompidou's directeur du cabinet) 'surveyed the principal decision-making 
nodes in the administrative and financial apparatus and organised the necessary regulatory
96 Bloch-Lain^ (1962), pp.884-5.
97 Gr6mion, C. (1979) Profession: d6cideurs: Pouvoirs des hauts fonctionnaires et reforme de l'Etat (Gauthier- 
Villars), p. 143; quotation from Pouyet (1968), p.46.
98 Guichard, O. (19751 Un chemin tranquille (Flammarionl. p.89.
99 ibid. p.90.
100 Guichard (1999), p. 161.
101 Guichard (1975), p.89.
102 Administration (19941. contribution by J. Monod, 28-34, p.29.
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provisions’.103 The delegue was made a member of any committee or secretariat that dealt
with issues important for amenagement du territoire. ’Right from the beginning, he had all
the legal powers required and seats in all the arenas where these problems were
discussed'.104 The delegue was also given financial powers that Schumann had lacked. One
of the first acts of Schumann's cabinet had been to ask for a special aid fund to be set up. In
preparing the creation of DATAR, Pompidou asked the Minister of Finance, Giscard, for a
fund for amenagement du territoire to be added to the prime minister's budget, so that he
'could dispose of a sum to be used at the discretion of the Matignon without the sometimes
stifling supervision of the Ministry of Finance'.105 The Fonds d'intervention pour
Vamenagement du territoire (FLAT), was created by decree at the same time as DATAR. It
was agreed that the delegue would participate in the settling of each ministry's budget, and
report on the outcome at the end of each financial year (The reality of these powers is
examined in Chapter 5). The organisational diagram in Figure 2.3 illustrates this notion of
giving the prime minister, through this one centrally-placed agency, a comprehensive
oversight of all pertinent committees, agencies and funding bodies.
There were arguments on the detailed text of the decrees, ’the technical
administrations having reservations on everything'.106 The phrase 'regional action' at the
end of DATAR's title was a particular sticking point:
There was pressure to create a delegation a Vamenagement du territoire, full stop. An economic 
problem had to be resolved, a certain number of technical problems were to be resolved, and that 
was it'.... 'Every time the text came back from those countless meetings 7'action regionale' had to 
be added again'.107
Guichard, in his last public speech, revealed that Pompidou and de Gaulle were
among those reluctant to admit the regional dimension.
'As for me, I was particularly engaged, with some tenacity, in persuading the President of the 
Republic and the Prime Minister that the last two letters of DATAR should be adopted, that is, the 
'A' and the 'R'. In effect, since it was thought that the regions were going to be the preferred 
framework for regional planning, and that the Delegation would be in charge of the coordination and 
promotion, it was essential that it was concerned in regional action. Therefore I positively insisted, 
in the end successfully, that the Delegation Vamenagement du territoire" should also be called"a 
Vaction regionale”. Even though the President of the Republic had thought about these issues less 
than had his Prime Minister, he accepted that DATAR would adopt the whole of its acronym.108
In relation to DATAR the decree says only that 'it will be created, under the authority 
of the prime minister', and that 'it will be directed by a delegue appointed by decree'.109 
Other Articles give the delegue powers to attend, chair or prepare the meetings of named
103 Gr6mion, P. (19761 Le Pouvoir p6riph6rique (SeuiP. p. 124.
104 Pompidou cabinet member, interviewed by C. Gremion (1979), p. 144.
105 Roussel (1994), p. 153.
106 Perrilliat, J. (1992) 'La revolution de la Ve Republique dans la representation', in Hamon, L. (ed) La 
Region de De Gaulle k nos iours (Maison des sciences de I'homme), 1-13, p.9.
107 ibid.
108 Intervention d'Olivier Guichard tors du 40e anniversaire de la Datar le 13 fevrier 20Q3.www.datar.gouv.fr.
Figure 2.3 Organisational structure of French regional planning at national level 1964-65







































Note: Solid arrows represent stronger influence. Dashed and dotted arrows represent weaker influence.
Only the links related to DATAR and regional policy are shown here (e.g. the CGP's other links do not appear). 
Sources: Information on the bodies and links comes from texts by leading participants cited in Chapter 2.
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policy or funding committees, to use a few named divisions of sectoral ministries, and
responsibilities for 'harmonising' or 'monitoring' the allocation of grants or ministerial
budgets to meet the 'objectives of amenagement du territoire'. The report to the President
that accompanied the decree explained that the new institution was stimulated by the 'need
for a new stage in improving structures responsible for regional expansion and
amenagement du territoire'. There needed to be 'a more complete coherence': first in
planning, to 'put an end to the dual structure', in which 'the Plan Commissariat drew up
four-year economic and social plans and the Conseil Superieur de la Construction much
longer-term plans for amenagement du territoire'; and second, in implementing planning
objectives, 'where they concerned regional action and amenagement du territoire'; while
ministries were 'fundamentally responsible for execution, there was a need for more
efficient coordination... and monitoring., and promotion'.110 Further decrees reconstituted
the DAT as the direction de Vamenagement fonder et de Vurbanisme (DAFU) reducing its
functions to urban planning; the delegue was made a member of the FNAT fund committee
(renamed FNAFU) though it remained under DAFU control.111
From the decree it appeared that the delegue had little direct executive power: he or
she would mostly rely on interministerial committees, a few specified ministerial divisions
and budgetary oversight to coordinate the implementation by ministries of the Plan
Commissariat's schemes. It reassured ministers that there would be no further attempt at a
ministry of amenagement du territoire.112 But DATAR had been designed to be a more
effective organisation. The delegue was left free to staff and organise DATAR within the
prime minister’s wishes and budget, and set up immediately at Guichard's former Office for
Saharan Development, retaining a number of former colleagues there,113 and recruiting by
word of mouth from among those who had heard 'something promising was going on'.114
The methods used were those that Georges Pompidou was hoping for. They included "the 
administration de mission", very light, very mobile, using flexible procedures. It was an 
administration that was not at all bureaucratic, very close to the ground, very close to the local 
authorities, and it benefited, more than any of the usual organisational schemes ever could, from a 
real interministerial power'.115
In addition to the more usual characteristics of an administration de mission, DATAR was 
made more powerful by Guichard combining his role as delegui with that of the charge de 
mission at Matignon closest to Pompidou.
109 Decree 63-112, Art 1,14 Feb. 1963, Journal Officiel (J.O.). 15 Feb. 1963, p. 1532: decree reproduced in 
Teneur and di Qual (1972), pp. 14-17.
110 Lanversin (1970), pp. 70-2, reproducing Le Rapport au President de la Rdpublique. J.O. 15 Feb. 1963.
111 Decree 63-122, 14 Feb. 1963, modifying Decree 58-1305,23 Dec. 1958, relating to the Ministry of 
Construction's field of competence.
112 Pouyet (1968), pp.57-8.
113 Administration (1994). contribution by P. Camous, 36-9. Camous was the 'regional' charge de mission.
114 Roche (1986), p.70, Essig, F. (19791 DATAR. des regions et des hommes (Stankel. p. 19.
115 Ortoli, F.-X. (1990) 'La politique dconomique et sociale', in Georges Pompidou: Hier et Aujourd'hui: 
Tdmoignages (Neuillv: Breet), 121-40,pp. 130-1.
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The double post gave us sufficient weight to carry out activities that inevitably involved having to
counteract all the bureaucratic inertia (pesanteurs) of the time.116
The power was guaranteed by the choice of a man, Olivier Guichard, who was very close to
Pompidou, and by the permanent, pressing intervention of the Prime Minister.117
Guichard claimed afterwards that, as delegue, 'he had been placed in an exceptional 
position: simultaneously outside the administrative circuit and yet able to intervene 
everywhere, on almost all development problems', and that he had enjoyed more real power 
at DATAR than in his next post as Minister of Industry.118
CONCLUSIONS
The ability of the French political and administrative system to adopt a new policy and eight 
different bureaucratic structures to deliver it in a twenty-year period seems to refute 
Blondel's worst assumptions about the time political leaders would need for restructuring a 
bureaucracy. The body responsible for the policy of amenagement du territoire expanded by 
stages from the service de Vamenagement du territoire initiated by Vichy's DGEN, retained 
at Liberation, to a full directorate, the DAT. However, the DAT proved unable from its 
vertical 'silo' to coordinate other institutions in this broad-ranging policy domain. Although 
it retained its official role, political leaders gave powers in related fields to other 
bureaucracies; these too failed to work together. The new political leaders of the Fifth 
Republic first consolidated then improved existing structures by adding 'horizontal' 
interministerial committees, but conflict continued. A more thorough attempt at reform, 
retaining vertical divisions but under a horizontal coordinating structure in a ministry for 
amenagement du territoire, failed almost immediately for unrelated reasons, but not before it 
had shown it was unlikely to overcome the objections of other ministers or ministries. 
Learning from this failure, as well as from the analyses of reform-minded officials and 
politicians, the prime minister's aides prepared a radically different form of bureaucratic 
institution. A new agency, 'lighter but stronger', was introduced - DATAR - whose 
formally-prescribed powers were few in number but critical for effective coordination and 
intervention on the prime minister's behalf.
How easily was the political leadership able to 'bend the "muscles" of the 
bureaucracy', as Blondel put it? What 'constraints and hurdles' did it meet from officials?119 
The relationship between political leaders and bureaucrats in these organisational changes 
was often complex. Not only did the contributions of political leaders and officials 
intertwine, but the distinction between 'politicians' and 'bureaucrats’ was frequently 
unclear. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, only during the Fourth Republic did the key actors 
conform to 'ideal types'. The first administrative unit for amenagement du territoire was set 
up by technical officials at the top of the Vichy DGEN, itself created by Darlan, a military
116 Administration (1994). contribution by G. Worms, 35-6. Worms was at DATAR at the start.
117 Ortoli (1990), p. 131.
118 Guichard (1975), p.87.
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officer and former Third Republic ’technical' minister. However, the creators of the service 
were more like ministers than official heads of ministerial divisions, in terms of the position 
they held, the DGEN having been conceived as a unit directly responsible to the head of 
state, and run first by a business leader with political aspirations. The DGEN, like the other 
new agencies created by Vichy, was resented by officials in traditional ministries, and the 
DGEN's autonomy, which the reformers hoped would add efficiency, was eventually 
curtailed by the finance minister. De Gaulle, as head of the Liberation government, was able 
to move DGEN's staff between ministries repeatedly without obstacle from officials, and the 
Minister for Reconstruction, Dautry, decided not only to recreate the service de 
Vamenagement du territoire but to introduce additional units to advance that policy. Both 
ministers had career backgrounds more like those of the Vichy leaders of 1941 than of the 
party politicians who were now their colleagues. Still, Dautry's successor, Billoux, a 
political leader typical of the Fourth Republic, demonstrated a similar ability to alter 
bureaucratic structures by removing Dautry's new posts while retaining the service de 
Vamenagement du territoire. Although the continued existence of this service under four 
ministers uninterested in amenagement du territoire could have indicated inertia, these short­
lived ministers had more urgent priorities than internal ministry restructuring.
Then in the early 1950s the Reconstruction Minister, Claudius-Petit, with prime- 
ministerial support, was able to restructure the ministry, creating the DAT, and adding other 
bureaucratic institutions. A change in political leadership halted these activities at ministerial 
level but Claudius-Petit had engaged the interest of the DAT and reform-minded top 
officials. Despite two subsequent governments taking a different economic direction these 
officials continued to pursue an agenda they saw as in the public interest. Yet, without 
political support DAT was unable to overcome opposition from other bureaucracies, while 
the top officials did not have the appropriate tools. In 1954 and 1955 more interventionist 
political leaders - Prime Ministers Mendds-France and Faure, and Finance Ministers Faure 
and Buron - provided economic instruments and interministerial institutions that could have 
addressed the problem effectively. However, the reforms required some restructuring of the 
field administrations of ministries, and their stronger coordination at regional level. Other 
ministries and ministers were thus brought into the domain, and their opposition delayed 
implementation. Although official advisory bodies and individual (official and political) 
campaigners for administrative reform called for administrative reorganisation to resolve 
these deficiencies, political leaders in the late 1950s were not prepared and eventually not in 
a position to contemplate reform.
De Gaulle's government of 1958-59 resembled that of 1944-46 as far as the 
organisation of amenagement du territoire was concerned. The Construction Minister was a 
top official with practical experience and interest in the sector; like his predecessor in 1944 
he was a strong supporter of de Gaulle but uncomfortable in party politics. Like Dautry too,
119 Blondel (1987), p. 172.
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Sudreau kept the existing structures with additions to improve horizontal coordination, and 
with Prime Minister Debre's aid appointed regional commissioners to help this task. 
However he was opposed by other ministers and their officials, and policies he initiated 
clashed with those of the Plan Commissariat, despite Debre initiating the interministerial 
committee on amenagement du territoire that should have resolved those issues. Officials 
openly questioned the utility of the Ministry of Construction's continued existence. Another 
political - though unelected - Prime Minister (Pompidou) tried out more innovative 
arrangements; first an 'interministeriar ministry to which bureaucratic groups and probably 
their ministers mounted an effective opposition; and then an administration de mission, 
DATAR, whose strong positional advantages were carefully prepared in advance by official 
and political aides to the prime minister.
While a summary of eight specific attempts by the political leadership to alter 
bureaucratic structures is necessarily rather crude (they were not equally ambitious and they 
took place in different contexts), it is worth comparing the successes and failures. Leaders 
seem to have achieved most of what they wanted and with lasting effect on more than half 
those occasions (in the creation and re-creation of the service de Vamenagement du territoire, 
the suppression of the regional Reconstruction tier, the creation of the DAT and DATAR). 
Only the introduction of a ministry for amenagement du territoire ended in outright failure.
In other cases, the changes in structures that minister and prime minister demanded were 
made (the Mendes-France regional boundaries, the Sudreau interministerial devices), but 
they did not lead to the speedy restructuring or enhanced cooperation their initiators 
anticipated. Yet opposition that was sufficiently constraining to limit the choices made by 
political leaders, or even reverse the changes made, came from other political leaders more 
than from bureaucratic groups. When top officials developed ideas for organisational 
reform, they were able to be implemented only when ministers took them up with 
enthusiasm. Politicians had more power to change or to resist change to organisational 
structures than had bureaucratic organisations.
There is some evidence of a tendency for the most radical and lasting changes to be 
introduced by leaders with strong political convictions (whether or not they had been elected 
or were leaders of a party), and those decisions made by 'technical' ministers to be those 
least likely to be accepted by their more political colleagues. Nevertheless, the position of 
ministers conferred the de facto as well as de jure authority to make organisational changes. 
Decisions were not queried or opposed by bureaucrats according to the personal status of 
minister: whether politician or former official; elected or unelected. Blondel's 
operationalisation of the concept of political leadership by the holding of an executive 
position in government, with the argument that it is position that both confers and 
acknowledges political authority, seems to be justified in practice, at least where it concerns 
the relationship between leaders and bureaucratic institutions.
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CHAPTER 3 
LINKING DATAR TO THE LEADERSHIP: POSITIONAL OR 
PERSONAL?
INTRODUCTION
Blondel insists that 'the links between the bureaucracy and the leader must be close and
effective' because he fears that these links are often imperfect.1
The "lines" linking leaders to the bureaucracy... are full of faults and "short-circuits". Thus, from 
the point of view of leaders, the "system" is often inefficient, badly-structured and badly-organized 
This is not only because of deliberate opposition, but often, perhaps mostly - because the system is 
simply unresponsive or only partly responsive’.2
Bureaucratic institutions may hinder political leaders more than they help them, he argues,
because they are not 'reliable'. Leaders may be able 'to press a button' to the bureaucracy,
but they cannot expect decisions to be implemented just because they have pressed the
button; 'all they can hope for is that some of these decisions will be partly implemented in
the fairly near future'.3 Yet it is possible for leaders to improve the conditions under which
the bureaucracy operates. In his view,
'the more effective transformations are those that are concerned with, besides changes in the 
recruitment and training of the personnel, a systematic examination of the ways the linkage with the 
government... can be improved4
The political leaders who created DATAR in 1963 were of the same view, as the last 
chapter showed. They were concerned to bring the coordination of amenagement du 
territoire under the political leadership's control by placing it directly in the hands of the 
prime minister. Given the prime minister's other commitments, the day-to-day responsibility 
was delegated to DATAR and its delegue. The reformers also gave DATAR better 
connections to the implementing bureaucracies than the DAT had enjoyed. Using Blondel's 
imagery, the political leadership's button to amenagement du territoire connected directly to 
DATAR which in turn assured links to the bureaucracy; but for all except the most strategic 
decisions DATAR pressed the button on the leadership's behalf.
The close link between DATAR and the prime minister in law has remained intact for 
40 years: DATAR is part of the prime minister's office, and the prime minister continues to 
perform the strategic functions such as appointing the delegui and chairing interministerial 
committees. However, as Figure 3.1 illustrates, DATAR has usually been attached to other
1 Blondel (1987), p. 168.
2 ibid. p. 150.
3 ibid. p. 150
4 ibid. p. 172.
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Figure 3.1 Location of ministerial responsibility for amenagement du territoire
PM Ministerial responsibility Minister
PRESIDENT DE GAULLE





Ministre-delegue to Prime Minister, 




1969-72 Chaban ff Bettencourt
1972-74 Messmer Minister of AdT, Infrastructure, Housing, 
Tourism (and later Transport)
Guichard
PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING
1974-76 Chirac Minister of Interior Poniatowski
1976-77 Barre Minister of Plan and AdT Lecanuet
1977 II Minister of Infrastructure and AdT Fourcade
1977-78 II ii Icart
1978-81 II Prime Minister —
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
1981-83 Mauroy Minister of Plan and AdT Rocard
1983-84 fl Prime Minister
- Junior Minister could 'call on' DATAR [Le Garrec]
1984-86 Fabius Minister of Plan and AdT Defferre
1986-88 Chirac Minister of Infrastructure, Housing, AdT and 
Transport
Mehaignerie
1988-91 Rocard Minister for Industry and AdT 
- Junior Minister for AdT
Fauroux 
and Chereque
1991-92 Cresson Minister for Urban Affairs and AdT Delebarre
1992 Beregovoy Junior Minister to Prime Minister Laignel
1992-93 tl Minister of Industry and Trade 
- Junior minister for AdT
Strauss-Kahn 
and Laignel
1993-95 Balladur Minister of Interior and AdT 




1995-95 Juppe Minister of AdT, Infrastructure and Transport Pons
1995-97 If Minister for Urban Affairs and AdT Gaudin
1997-01 Jospin Minister for Environment and AdT Voynet
2001-02 II ff Cochet
2002-04 Raffarin Minister for Public Service and AdT Delevoye
2004-05 If Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, AdT, 
Tourism and the Sea 





ministers, the prime minister delegating his or her oversight to the minister. The prevailing 
opinion among political and academic experts on amenagement du territoire is that this 
arrangement harms DATAR's capacity to coordinate bureaucracies:
‘While each solution may have a good explanation, in reality it favours one aspect of amenagement
du territoire and weakens others.' In particular it makes coordination more difficult'.5
Yet there has been no empirical evaluation of this claim and, though there are good 
arguments to justify attaching DATAR to the prime minister, there are plausible arguments 
for (and against), attaching it to other ministers.
This chapter therefore examines more fully the nature of the link between the political 
leadership and DATAR, and its relationship to DATAR's capacity to act. It asks, first, what 
are the arguments for and against the various ministerial locations? Second, how important 
is proximity to the prime minister to DATAR's effectiveness as a coordinator? Existing 
evaluations of DATAR's work are limited to official figures of simple outputs that take no 
account of context Hypothesis-testing studies by academics are also restricted by the lack of 
data. An indirect measure of DATAR's effectiveness had to be developed by assessing its 
reputational power, with the assumption that the more powerful DATAR is perceived to be 
the more likely it is to persuade bureaucracies to adopt its programmes. Its reputational 
power at different periods was then matched to the different ministerial locations. Then, 
what countervailing factors were proposed by those who noticed that DATAR's sharp 
decline in reputation occurred in the mid-1970s and not when it was first detached from the 
prime minister in 1967? The most frequent explanation is the oil crisis of the early 1970s; 
and the validity of this alternative thesis is explored below.
Further, if 'location' is not of supreme importance and economic crisis is not an 
adequate explanation, is the 'close link' between leadership and DATAR really less 
significant than Blondel asserted? One finding of the last chapter was that leaders keen to act 
in this policy domain were those most likely to change its structures. Is DATAR's 
effectiveness related less to its formal closeness to the political leadership than its ideological 
closeness to leadership concerns? Blondel argued that political leaders could also affect their 
environment through actions with a personal origin.6 The crucial characteristic of the link 
between leadership and bureaucracy may not be positional but personal. While the 
leadership's position gives it the authority to press the button represented by DATAR, the 
leadership's interest in amenagement du territoire may also need to be invoked. That 
hypothesis is tested below, comparing the interest in amenagement du territoire expressed by 
(or imputed to) different political leaders with variations in DATAR's reputational power.
DATAR'S LOCATION IN THE MINISTERIAL STRUCTURES
The view that DATAR's direct attachment to the prime minister is the essence of its power is
s Montricher, N. de (1995) L'Amdnagement du territoire (La Ddcouverte), p.38.
6 Blondel (1987), p.5.
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widespread, stretching from political scientists7, law academics8 and public administration
specialists,9 to the national consultative body, the Cornell economique et social, 10 a
commission of enquiry11 and three former delegues.12 It was held on both sides of the
political spectrum, as shown by the reaction of the Socialist Party leader Francis Mitterrand
in 1963 to the new Gaullist arrangement:
'Attaching DATAR to the prime minister's office seems to me to be a very good decision. When 
amenagement du territoire was treated like a ball that could be tossed from one ministry to another... 
neither industrial decentralisation nor any other aspect of amenagement du territoire could be tackled 
in a comprehensive way'.13
Before he became President, Mitterrand endorsed the principle by copying it, making Robert
Fabre responsible for amenagement du territoire and directly under his 'presidency' in the
first 'shadow government' he set up in 1966.14 There is general agreement that the greater
impact DATAR made in the first decade of its life was related to its governmental location.
The 1960s and 1970s were the golden age of amenagement du territoire when a direct line
joined DATAR to the Matignon’.15
'Returning to the 1967 situation and attaching amenagement du territoire directly to the prime 
minister, without a minister or junior minister in between, would enable DATAR to be given its 
maximum authority and effectiveness'.16
The reformers in 1963 argued that DATAR would be more authoritative than the DAT 
precisely because of its link to the prime minister. DATAR's role as an 'intermediary', 
ensuring that
'the sectoral ministries modified their actions., in order to make them converge on the government's 
overall objectives,...required it to have the permanent possibility of appeal to the arbitration and the 
authority of the prime minister'.17
DATAR, 'like other administrations de mission, has suffered from more or less judicious
7 Biarez (1982), p.271.
8 Lanversin (1970), p.73; Madiot, Y. (1979) L'Am&iagement du territoire (Masson), p.50; Madiot, Y. 
(1996) Amenagement du territoire. 3rd edn (Colin), p,21.
9 Bodiguel, J.-L. and Quermonne, J.-L. (19831 La haute fonction publique sous la Ve Republique (PUF).
p. 181; Rigaud, J. and Delcros, X. (19841 Les institutions administratives franyaises: Les structures (Dalloz). 
p. 195.
10 Conseil economique et social (1994) Report by G. Parrotin, 'Les orientations de la politique de 
l'amenagement du territoire h. l'horizon 2015', Avis 4249.
11 Guichard Commission [Commission de reflexion sur l'amenagement du territoire] (1986) Propositions 
pour l'amenagement du territoire: Rapport au Ministre de l'equipement. du logement. de l'amenagement du 
territoire et des transports, p. 59.
12 Essig (1979), p.286; Monod, J. and de Castelbajac, P. (1980) L'Amenagement du territoire. 4th edn 
(PUF), p.33; O. Guichard, interviewed by B. Jerome, Le Monde. 13 Feb. 2003.
13 A.N.Debats. 26 Nov. 1963, reprinted in DATAR (1964) Un Grand debat parlementaire: l ’amenagement du 
territoire (La Documentation fran?aise), p.70.
14 Pouyet (1968), p.70; Stevens, A. (19921 The Government and Politics of France (Macmillan), pp.216-7.
15 Le Monde. 23-24 March 1986.
16 Madiot (1996), p.21.
17 Rapport au President de la Republique, J.Q. 15 Feb. 1963, reprinted in Alvergne and Musso (2003), 
p. 124.
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attachments to other parts of the administration’.18 The array of locations listed in Figure 3.1 
can be grouped under five 'functional' headings:
- attached directly to the prime minister, with a variant in which a junior minister in 
the prime minister's office 'can call on' DATAR's services;
- attached to a minister for planning, alongside the Plan Commissariat, another 
administration de mission in a related domain. This option was first tried under a 
ministre-delegue, then a full minister;
- attached to the interior ministry, sometimes through a junior minister;
- attached to a technical ministry: first and most often the ministry of infrastructure, 
but also the ministry for the environment or the ministry of industry, the latter 
through a junior minister;
- attached to a minister responsible for other 1cross-cutting' areas, such as urban 
affairs or 'State reform and public service' (the Plan and the environment could fit 
here too).
The arguments about the effects of different locations
The conventional view on options other than a direct link to the prime minister is that 'none 
of these groupings is illogical', but that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages.19
Direct attachment to the prime minister
The closest link possible between prime minister and DATAR is regarded by most analysts 
as the best arrangement. 'This solution is unquestionably the simplest. It also confers the 
greatest prestige on amenagement du territoire and the greatest authority on DATAR'.20 As 
well as the initial period 1963-67, DATAR was also directly attached to the prime minister in 
Raymond Barre's third government, 1978-81, when he brought DATAR under his own 
authority and made much of DATAR's 'exemplary character' as an active'mission21 
During Mitterrand's presidency, Pierre Mauroy brought DATAR within his own orbit in his 
second government, 1983-84, though arranging for his junior minister responsible for State- 
region Plan contracts (see Chapter 5), to be able 'to call on' DATAR’s services with regard 
to the Plan. Pierre Beregovoy briefly assigned amenagement du territoire to his junior 
minister, in 1992, before transferring the minister and DATAR to the minister of industry.
For two early DATAR members, Jerome Monod and Philippe de Castelbajac, its 
close link to the prime minister was its most desirable attribute for making maximum impact; 
it was one of the three vital characteristics of amenagement du territoire in France:
the authority of the prime minister as the direct source of power in the area of amenagement du 
territoire;
18 Bodiguel and Quermonne (1983), p. 181.
19 Madiot (1979), p.49.
20 Madiot (1979), p.50.
21 M. Cuperly, La Croix. 24 April 1980; Le Monde 3 May 1979.
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- the regular holding of Cabinet committees devoted to it (comites interministeriels d'aminagement 
du territoire);
- the existence of a financial budget that is not already committed (FIAT)'.22
All three characteristics link DATAR closely to the prime minister since the comite
interministeriel d'amenagement du territoire (CIAT, now called CLADT) is chaired by the
prime minister, even when DATAR is attached to another minister, and the fund FIAT (now
called FNADT), is financed from the prime minister's budget. De facto as well as de jure the
prime minister and DATAR are closely linked wherever the latter is located.
Despite the arguments put forward in 1963, Pompidou in 1967 appointed Raymond
Marcellin ministre-delegue, responsible to himself for the Plan Commissariat and DATAR.
Guichard had left DATAR to become Minister of Industry and some academics argued that
DATAR staff, as mere officials (and even Guichard, for all his role as charge de mission to
Pompidou, was only an official), had not been able to persuade other officials to adapt their
programmes and that a minister was therefore required.
'It was observed that DATAR by itself was incapable of ensuring coordination. The delegue could 
not manage to prevail over officials in the relevant ministries such as industry, construction, etc.'.23
Ministers as well as officials had made difficulties, the Minister for Industry, Jean 
Charbonnel, 1966-67, demanding that he should be responsible for regional development 
grants DATAR was allocating.24 The decision on location also probably owed something to 
political expediency because Pompidou was unexpectedly dependent on Giscard's 
Independent Republican Party for his parliamentary majority after the second round of the 
1967 parliamentary elections (the polls and the first round had indicated a large majority for 
the Gaullists). 'Giscard was the arbitrator of the situation' and Pompidou suddenly had to 
find additional posts for Giscard's colleagues, such as Marcellin.25
The principle of direct attachment continues to be promoted strongly. In a 'grand 
parliamentary debate on amenagement du territoire' in 1990 many deputes told the minister 
for 'amenagement du territoire and industrial conversion', Jacques Chereque (a junior 
minister responsible to the industry minister), that DATAR should be returned to the prime 
minister's office.
- Tour ministry is not located where it should be within the governmental structure. You should 
not be attached to the industry minister but directly to the prime minister' (Francis Geng, O m e)...
- 'Policy on amenagement du territoire must be all-encompassing, all ministers must contribute. 
That is why it would surely be preferable to re-attach it to the prime minister' (Auguste Bonrepaux, 
Arifcge)...
22 Monod, J. and de Castelbajac, P. (1971) L'A management du territoire. 1st edn (PUF), pp.38-9; and 
similarly in subsequent editions until 1997 (9th edn), p.31. The 10th edn (2001), no longer refers to the link 
to the prime minister. The two characteristics are...', p.31.
23 Teneur, J. and di Qual, L. (1972) Economie rdgionale et amenagement du territoire [Documents and 
Commentaries] (PUF), p. 14.
24 Madiot (1979), p.50.
25 Chevallier, J.J., Carcassone, G., Duhamel, O. (20021 La Ve R6publique: 1958-2002 (Colin), pp. 134-40.
62
- 'We deplore the lack of coordination on decisions... I am one of those asking for the minister of 
amenagement du territoire to be made directly responsible to the prime minister and to become a real 
conductor of the orchestra1 (Ren6 Drouin, Moselle)...
- 'Everyone agrees about the poor organisation of amenagement du territoire at State level as a result 
of it not being attached to the prime minister1 (Olivier Guichard, Loire-Atlantique).26
Guichard 'insisted' for forty years that DATAR 'must be attached directly to the prime 
minister to be able to exercise an authority over all the other ministers'.27
Attachment with the Plan Commissariat to a minister for planning 
Joint responsibility with the Plan to a minister for planning ought to help DATAR be 
effective since DATAR's official remit had been to ensure that ministries carried out the 
objectives developed by the Commissariat. This option, introduced by Prime Minister 
Pompidou in 1967, continued undisturbed until 1972, when President Pompidou put 
amenagement du territoire in the hands of the Infrastructure Minister, Guichard. Then in 
1976 President Giscard made Jean Lecanuet, leader of the centre party, minister for Plan and 
Amenagement du territoire, one of three top posts given to the leaders of his coalition 
partners.28 For ministers of Plan and amenagement du territoire in the Left governments 
after 1981, it was not a powerful position (The Socialist Party took some time to reconcile 
regional planning with decentralisation). When President Mitterrand appointed 'Michel 
Rocard, the rival, Minister for the Plan and amenagement du territoire: it was a way of 
marginalising him'.29 Rocard told interviewers: 'It was my time in purgatory, I paid on the 
nail' (paye comptant).30 'Michel Rocard was confined to the ministry of the Plan'.31 In 1984 
Gaston Defferre, 'though tired, wanted to remain in government. He had to be content with 
the Plan and amenagement du territoire' . 32
Grouping the two planning bodies, DATAR and the Plan, is often seen as 'the least 
bad solution' for those who think DATAR should really be linked directly to the prime 
minister.33 Yet a Plan Commissariat official who had experienced this arrangement during 
the 1967-72 period, found that it did not work well in practice. The relations between 
DATAR and the Plan Commissariat were: 'characterised by a mixture of cooperation and 
competition, a relationship facilitated when the two bodies were united under the control of 
the minister responsible for planning and spatial development, [but] 'the allocation of
26 A.N. Ddbats. 29 May 1990, reprinted in DATAR (1990) Une nouvelle £tape pour l'amenagement du 
territoire (La Documentation fran9aise), p. 14, pp.31-3.
27 Statement to B. Jerome, Le Monde. 13 Feb. 2003.
28 Chevallier et al (2002), p.249.
29 Brachet, P. (1995) Du Commandement au Management (Publisudl (1995), p.81fn.
30 Favier, P. and Martin-Roland, M. (19901 La Decennie Mitterrand: 1. Les Ruptures (Seuill p.70.
31 Le Monde. 'Un quart de si&cle d'affrontements1. 6 April 1993.
32 Favier, P. and Martin-Roland, M. (19911 La D6cennie Mitterrand: 2. Les Epreuves (Seuill p. 166.
33 Madiot, Y. (1993) L'Amdnagement du territoire. 2nd edn (Masson), p.37.
63
responsibilities ...was not really operational'.34 An official inquiry on planning later warned
against trying to combine the two bodies, since they were carrying out tasks 'difficult to
reconcile: forward planning and the operational execution of amenagement du territoire',35
However, a more important constraint was their historically-poor working relations:
'Joint working by DATAR and the Plan Commissariat... is indispensable; but certain aspects of our 
administrative sociology sometimes make this collaboration difficult Collaboration is however 
essential and requires the capacity for dialogue between the two institutions to be strengthened'.36
In the early years their conflict was 'latent' rather than 'flagrant', because their top officials 
(Guichard at DATAR, Masse at the Plan) kept it so, by 'reducing amenagement du territoire 
to mere regional planning'... and 'restricting DATAR’s coordinating activities',37 while the 
the Plan Commissariat concentrated 'on problems everyone agreed about (medium-term 
growth) and refused to let itself be dragged into political fights over short-term decisions... 
or ideological disputes about the longer-term future'.38 However DATAR, especially under 
its second deligue, Monod, wanted to plan 20-year developments and look at scenarios 30 
years ahead. The Plan Commissariat's style was to depoliticise decision-making, relying on 
consensus-building.39 DATAR's style was 'imperial', 'sure of itself, 'domineering' and 
'authoritarian'.40 The overlap between the Plan Commissariat's role of conception and 
DATAR's role of execution was made 'more complex by personal conflict... There was, it 
seems, some fear at the Plan Commissariat of a certain expansionist tendency at DATAR'.41 
The rivalry between the Plan Commissariat and DATAR became too entrenched for them to 
work effectively together.42
Attachment to the minister o f interior
A link to the minister of the interior has also has been recommended as a 'second-best' 
option to that of a direct link to the prime minister. If the prime minister 'did not think it 
advisable to return DATAR to its original position, would it not be better to attach it to the
34 Ullmo, Y. (1975) 'France' in J.Hayward and M.Watson (eds), Planning. Politics and Public Policy 
(Cambridge: CUP), 22-51, p.35.
35 De Gaulle, J. (1994) L'avenir du Plan et la place de la planification dans la socidt6 franyaise: Rapport au 
Premier ministre (La Documentation fran9aise), p.72.
36 ibid.
37 Pouyet (1968), p.96, p.97.
38 Crozier, M. (1965) 'Analyse sociologique de la planification fran^aise', Revue franyaise de sociologie. 6/2, 
147-63, p. 154.
39 Hayward, J. (1975) 'Introduction: Change and choice: the agenda of planning', in J.Hayward and M. Watson 
(edsL Planning. Politics and Public Policy (Cambridge: CUP) 1-21, p.9.
40 Madiot (1979), pp. 51-4.
41 ibid. p.55, p.55fn.
42 At a local government conference (Entretiens Territoriaux de Strasbourg, Dec. 2001), when the DATAR 
and CGP officials responsible for public services policy danced together, it was the event of the evening, the 
'only time the two organisations had ever cooperated'. The DATAR member was atypical for DATAR (a 
lecturer who became a mature student and sous-prefet), and she said he was atypical for CGP, service in the 
centrist Stoleru cabinet in the Rocard government making his subsequent career difficult. They offered a 
photo for the thesis, thus confirming their unusualness.
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Minister of Interior?’, asked the Conseil d’Etat43 Le Monde's long-term specialist on 
amenagement du territoire argued that, since political decentralisation had increased the role 
of local authorities, DATAR would be strengthened by an alliance with this minister, 
responsible for local government44 However, when Giscard put his closest colleague, 
Michel Poniatowski, Minister of the Interior, in charge of DATAR in 1974, it ’weakened 
DATAR's image because the minister of interior is in charge of elections'45 The award of 
the first contrats de pays (schemes for improving rural areas) showed that "favours" were 
given to deputes or mayors from the political majority'.46 Francis Essig, who was deputy 
to the delegue in 1974 and delegue 1975-78, advised against this particular link since 
'Michel Poniatowski had been more interested in public security problems [mass strikes and 
Corsican terrorists] and party politics than in DATAR'.47 Nevertheless, when Charles 
Pasqua was Minister of Interior and amenagement du territoire in 1993, he made effective 
use of the prefects as well as DATAR to raise the profile of amenagement du territoire (and 
his own profile too),48 by organising local consultation on the 1995 Loi d'orientation pour 
Vamenagement et le developpement du territoire (the 'Pasqua Act' or LOADT).
Attachment to a technical ministry
Despite Guichard's frequent exhortations for a return to the original arrangements, he 
categorised his own early experience as Minister of Amenagement du territoire, 
Infrastructure, Housing and Tourism, 1972-74, as 'a notable effort of administrative 
coordination'.49 Although this ministry would seem to be an agglomeration of rather 
disparate sectors, it should be remembered that the main programmes of amenagement du 
territoire at this time concerned developing metropolitan centres and infrastructure-intensive 
tourist schemes and the combination was appropriate. The minister told Le Monde:
I am not achieving absolute administrative and political rationality from the accumulation of powers
provided by the new ministry. But I think it is at least progress.50
A similar combination was tried by other prime ministers: Barre in 1977-78, Chirac in the 
cohabitation government of 1986-88, Juppe in his brief first administration and Raffarin in 
2002-04. In two Socialist governments, those of Rocard and Beregovoy, DATAR was 
assigned to a junior minister for amenagement du territoire who worked under a minister for 
industry, reflecting the policy concerns of those governments. Rocard in 1988 had planned 
to fuse DATAR and the Plan Commissariat but instead decided to put amenagement du 
territoire under his close colleague, Roger Fauroux, at Industry, and appointed Chereque,
43 Conseil d'Etat (1986) Structures gouvemementales et organisation administrative (La Documentation 
fran9aise), p.24.
44 F.Grosrichard. Le Monde. 20 Jan. 1990; 17 March 1991.
45 Audouin, J. (19771 La France culbutde (Moreaul. p.201.
46 Madiot (1979), p.50.
47 Essig (1979), p.34.
48 M.Valo, Le Monde. 3 Nov. 1995.
49 Madiot (1979), p.50.
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who had ’made a good job' of industrial restructuring in Lorraine, the junior minister.51 In 
the run-up to the elections of 1995 and 1997, the Socialist leader Lionel Jospin agreed with 
the Green Party to put DATAR under a Green minister with the environment and transport: 
in the event transport was allocated to a Communist Party minister.52
Attaching DATAR to a sectoral ministry ’presents the major disadvantage of putting 
amenagement du territoire at the service of a sectoral concern'.53 As a parliamentarian said of 
Chereque, 'the minister is slightly too much the minister for industrial restructuring and not 
enough the minister for amenagement du territoire'.54 Notwithstanding, a sectoral minister 
who wants to make an impact on amenagement du territoire is better able than DATAR to 
implement policies in that sector. Under Jean-Pierre Fourcade, 1977, and Pierre 
Mehaignerie, 1986-88, there was good implementation of transport projects that linked 
peripheral or isolated regions. Even the more complex ministerial structures of this type did 
not hinder the prime minister from having close links with DATAR. DATAR in 1988-91 
was 'under the authority' of the minister for amenagement du territoire and industrial 
restructuring, who was himself junior to the minister of industry. But DATAR still worked 
directly for Prime Minister Rocard in areas not related to industrial restructuring, such as 
negotiating the State-Region Plan Contracts, preparing an interministerial committee on 
Corsica, and taking on the coordination for France of European Community structural 
funds, which until then each ministry had organised separately.55
Joint responsibility to a minister with other interministerial agencies 
The link of amenagement du territoire to urban affairs was seen as a political response to 
'inner-city' crisis when Delebarre was made minister 'a la ville et a Vamenagement du 
territoire' in the left-wing government of 1991-92, and Gaudin similarly in the right-wing 
government, 1995-97. Because Delebarre had expertise in regional development, but mainly 
because he 'wondered what to do to make his mark' (urban programmes having already 
been announced), he encouraged Prime Minister Cresson to reinvigorate the policy of 
'decentralising' public bodies, and thus promoted amenagement du territoire.56 Gaudin was 
also interested in amenagement du territoire but in his case adding urban policy to the 
portfolio adversely 'affected the implementation of the Pasqua Act' on amenagement du 
territoire.57 Finally, President Chirac appointed Jean-Paul Delevoye as minister for public 
service and amenagement du territoire, only because Delevoye asked Chirac to add the latter 
role 'so that he was not a minister who just says no' [because of threatened civil service
50 Le Monde. 10 Oct. 1972.
51 Drevet, J.-F. (1991) La France et l'Europe des regions (Syros), p.216. The author was then at DATAR.
52 J.P.Besset, Le Monde. 6 June 1997; Manesse, J. (1998) LAmenapement du territoire (LGDJ), p.45.
53 Manesse (1998), p.45.
54 Georges Chavannes (Charente), reported in Le Monde. 11 Nov. 1989.
55 Interview with the dfldguc Jean-Pierre Duport by F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 25 Jan 1990.
56 Bezes, P. (19941 LAction publique volontariste (L'Harmattanl. pp.76-77; Favier, P. and Martin-Roland, 
M. (19991 La D&ennie Mitterrand: 4. Les Ddchirements (Seuill. p. 102.
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cutbacks], as his wife explained to reporters.58 The rationality of appointments does not 
always have much to do with arguments about the advantages and disadvantages of certain 
locations.
The consequences o f a changing location
There seem to be two separate problems about locating DATAR other than directly under the 
prime minister: the first is that the particular ministerial position may emphasise one part of 
DATAR's role to the detriment of its other activities - but that may reflect accurately the 
leader's emphasis, too, and it does not hinder DATAR working directly for the prime 
minister on other issues as seen in Rocard's premiership. The second is that 'nomadic 
behaviour' may in itself be deleterious to DATAR's reputation. DATAR's place in the 
ministerial structure has changed every two years on average but some researchers argue that 
little changed when DATAR was relocated since it was still in law part of the prime 
minister’s office.
This capacity for arbitration does not seem to have been prejudiced by the successive attachments of 
DATAR to different ministries, since the Delegation has remained in the prime minister's service'.59
But the former delegues Guichard and Essig thought differently. Essig said:
•Even though we were placed under the authority of influential members of the government, these 
frequent changes made people forget DATAR was still part of the prime minister's office'.60
The Guichard Commission thought the instability led to a loss in effectiveness.61 DATAR
had also lost the former 'interministerial' status conferred by the direct link to the prime
minister, free of ministerial connotation.
•No clever presentational device - whether ministre-delegue or committee nominally chaired by the 
prime minister - prevents other ministries thinking this "ministry" is just one of them'.62
The Conseil d'Etat's analysis of the ways in which prime ministers could delegate authority
for 'coordinating roles' found that political authority transferred fully only if:
'it was not just in principle but also in fact that they were acting in the prime minister's name. It 
can be observed in practice that as soon as the prime minister devolves certain functions to 
authorities which do not fulfil these conditions, the most express legal formulae have no effect'.63
That is, delegation could still be effective, but only providing prime ministers took care that 
the relevant policy actors knew that the agency had his or her full backing. The delegue 
Essig had witnessed this relationship as deputy delegue in 1972, when DATAR was first 
attached to a technical minister
57 Manesse (1998), p.45.
58 J.B. de Monvalon, Le Monde. 24 July 2003.
59 Biarez (1982), p.271.
60 Essig (1979), p.33.
61 Guichard Commission (1986), p.58.
62 ibid.
63 Conseil d'Etat (1986), p. 19.
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This change could have had damaging consequences...Our fears rapidly dissipated: first the minister 
received the same powers delegated from the prime minister; second, our minister was none other 
than Guichard.. he held a privileged place in the government'.64
However, Guichard himself no longer thought any ministerial position for DATAR was an 
effective option:
'Amenagement du territoire can manage without a minister but not without a prime minister1.65 
An empirical assessment of the effects of location
Despite these strong recommendations, doubt must remain, partly because so many political
leaders have not followed them, and partly because there has been no empirical evaluation of
the relationship between DATAR’s location and its impact. Such an exercise is not easy
since there are no appraisals of DATAR's work or data on which they might be based.
Official performance data consist of time-series of basic statistics (number of firms moving
into France, number of grant-aided projects, number of jobs involved) that are not set in
context (for example, against economic trends or inward investment in other countries).66
DATAR’s official 'history' and its intermittent reports do not evaluate (rather than merely
record) the outputs of its wide range of activities 67 The Guichard Commission of 1986
acknowledged this problem:
The "1960s policy", created and supported by a strong political will, achieved its objectives despite 
a few failures, though without it being possible to distinguish precisely what should be attributed to 
the policy itself and what to the spontaneous evolution that would have affected the territory in any 
case1.68
The decisions of Prime Minister Balladur in 1995 and Prime Minister Juppe in 1997 to 
create observatoires de Vamenagement du territoire to monitor policy implementation were 
not put into effect69 The Cour des Comptes has recently examined particular aspects of 
DATAR's work (its support of public-private associations, and its management of its budget 
and personnel), but it is interested chiefly in whether the correct administrative and financial 
procedures have been followed.70 Most texts on amenagement du territoire, whether official 
or by academics, are commentaries on DATAR's broad range of policies. A few academic 
studies analyse amenagement du territoire but they limit their assessment to a particular 
sector or problem: for example, Massardier's research is a sociological study of a
64 Essig (1979), p.32.
65 Guichard Commission (1986), p.59.
66 Lettre de la DATAR. 175, 2002.
67 Laborie, J.-P.; Langumier, J.-F., and de Roo, P. (1985) La Politique francaise d'am&iagement du territoire 
de 1950 £ 1985 (La Documentation fran9aise); DATAR (2002) Rapport d'Activitd 2001 (Premier ministre, 
Ministre de la rtTorme de l'Etat et d'amdnagement du territoire).
68 Guichard Commission (1986), p. 10.
69 In application of the 1995 LOADT, Art.9, a decree creating an Observatoire des territories was eventually 
published on 14 Sept. 2004: it refers only to 'collecting and publishing data useful to DATAR'.
70 Cour des Comptes (20011 Le Rapport Public 2000 (Joumaux Officiels).
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technocratic elite.71 The most comprehensive research, by Biarez, evaluates amenagement
du territoire 1963-80 within a larger study of local-central relations.72 It makes the most of
the statistics available when it compares regional wealth with DATAR's allocation by grants
by region to test the hypothesis that DATAR’s goal is to subsidise private investment and
reduce social unrest. Biarez confirms
'[DATAR's] lack of interest in any approach that would enable the results of its policies to be 
known. DATAR uses few indicators to determine the success or failure of an activity....
Observation is not continuous, and the validity of criteria and the usefulness of those chosen are not 
discussed'.73
However, DATAR is not alone in this regard in France, where 'despite the introduction of 
several autonomous structures attached to the Plan Commissariat, and recently to parliament, 
evaluation remains marginal'.74
A special metric was therefore developed to represent DATAR's effectiveness in its 
official role: to ensure that 'ministries modified their actions... to make them converge on the 
government's overall objectives...'.75 The variable to be measured has affinities with the 
terms 'power, influence, control and domination', which, as Dahl says, enjoy little 
consensus among scholars as to their meaning or how they may be measured. 'Concepts 
like these have proved to be notoriously difficult both to interpret and to employ rigorously 
in empirical work'.76 The 'reputational survey' methodology that Dahl developed to meet the 
empirical problem has remained a useful tool for assessing who has or had power over 
others to influence their decisions.77 The theoretical justification for using 'reputational 
power' rests on the assumption that those reputed by others to have power are more likely to 
be able to persuade them to accept their views. In their 'rehabilitation' of reputational power, 
Dowding, Dunleavy, King and Margetts note that 'reputations....are a key power resource 
for actors' in interactions with other players and in bargaining over decisions.78 That is, one 
measure for DATAR's effectiveness at persuading policy actors to modify their policy 
programmes is the level of 'power', 'influence', 'strength' or similar characteristic that 
witnesses judge DATAR to have at that time.
The survey described below uses a similar strategy to the reputational power analysis
71 Massardier (1996) and see Andrault, M. (1990) 'Amenagement du territoire et strategic industrielle', 
m£moire. IEP de Paris; and Bezes (1994).
72 Biarez, S. (1983a) Dix-sept ann&s d'am€nagement du territoire en France (1963-801: du r&quilibrage au 
com prom is social (Grenoble: CERAT).
73 Biarez, S. (19891 Le Pouvoir local (Economical, p.213. Andrault (1990), pp.250-7, concurs.
74 Chagnollaud, D. (2000) Science politique 3rd edn (Dalloz), p.270. Hayward, J. and Wright, V. (2002) 
Governing from the Centre: Core executive coordination in France (Oxford: OUP), p.58 give some of the 
political and bureaucratic reasons for this resistance to evaluation.
75 'Rapport au President de la R£publique', 15 Feb. 1963, reprinted in Alvergne and Musso (2003), p. 124.
76 Dahl, R. (19891 Democracy and its Critics (New Haven: Yale), p.272 and fn.
77 For example it is used by A.Fischer, S.Nicolet, P.Sciarini, in 'How Europe hits home: evidence from the 
Swiss case', Journal of European Public Policy. 11/3, June 2004, 353-78.
78 Dowding, K., Dunleavy, P., King D., and Margetts, H. (1995) 'Rational Choice and Community Power 
Structures', Political Studies. 43/2, 265-77, p.272.
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conducted by Dowding etal. These researchers used computerised techniques to search a 
large database of newspaper articles; they measured the influence of actors in terms of the 
number of times they were cited, using the Tact of being reported’ as a quantifiable measure 
of the actor's power resource.79 In the case of DATAR, the data came from two sources: 
academic texts and press cuttings. The latter comprised the folder compiled by the Institut 
dEtudes Politiques (Paris) of articles that refer to DATAR and a few other public actors 
responsible for amenagement du territoire.80 This evidence base and search method enabled 
DATAR's reputation to be given a rating according to the opinions expressed rather than the 
number of citations. First, for each year or time period, three items were listed that referred 
to DATAR's power and status in the government. Where possible the three included both an 
academic and a press opinion. For some years fewer than three comments were found; 
where there were more than three, the items were selected for the clarity of their meaning 
and to reflect any spread of views. DATAR's 'reputational power' was then given a rating 
according to the three comments.






'DATAR's preferences could be imposed by Guichard' 
The golden age of amenagement du territoire'.




'Rocard gives DATAR the role of selecting zones' 
'DATAR is seen as capable of conquering new fields'
Bezes (1994), p. 118 
Madiot (1993), p.39.
Credible 'Now DATAR is more closely linked to decentralisation Rigaud & Delcros (1984), p.202.
3
and planning it has a new future'.
'Plan-Contract negotiations give DATAR new credibility' La Croix, 28/6/84
Weak 'DATAR becomes a nurse [to sick firms] 1975-76' Audouin (1977), p.31
2 'Barre visits DATAR, tells it to reconquer the territory' La Croix, 24/4/80
Very weak 
1
'DATAR downgraded when Poniatowski is appointed and 
then Monod resigns'
'Minister M€haignerie manages to preserve DATAR'
Audouin (1977), p.31 
Le Monde ,7/4/87
Powerless 'DATAR in disarray 1981-82' Madiot (1996), p.6.
0 'Belin-Gisserot reports recommends DATAR should go' Les Echos, 8/7/86
Figure 3.2 lists the comments used as comparators for estimating DATAR's 
'reputation indicator', from the 'very strong' reputation in the 'golden age', when the 
delegue Guichard could 'impose DATAR's preferences' (but only if the prime minister and 
president agreed), and its 'powerlessness' in 1981 or 1986 when DATAR was 'in disarray' 
or likely to be abolished. These indicators were expressed numerically ('8 out of 10' for 
'very strong', 0 out of 10 for 'powerless'). Though the numbers are subjective they enable 
statistical assessments to be made (in practice the statistical findings were not sensitive to 
coding changes).
79 The ESRC 'Metropolitan Governance' project used a search of FT Profile to help decide the 'reputational 
power' of London politicians. The theoretical justification is in Dowding et al. (1995), pp.272-4.
80 Dossier de presse 506/01 - 'organismes charges de la politique de l'amenagement du territoire, 1974-...'.
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Figure 3.3 summarises the opinions expressed about DATAR that were used to 
estimate its ’reputational power indicator’ for each year or period. The results are plotted on 
a chart in Figure 3.4. Within the limits of the methodology it gives a first assessment of one 
aspect of the link between the political leadership and DATAR. The first decade, which is 
universally seen as DATAR’s ’strong' period,81 included times when it was attached to the 
minister for the plan or for infrastructure. Periods of relative weakness in the late 1970s 
include years attached to the prime minister. This evidence undermines the proposition about 
the prime importance of a direct tie between the prime minister and DATAR for both to be 
fully effective. More generally, attachments to the prime minister; his or her junior minister; 
the minister for the plan; and the minister for infrastructure, were all associated at different 
times with both a stronger and a weaker DATAR. Each location can be associated with better 
or worse outcomes, which must therefore depend on other or additional factors.
THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC CONTINGENCIES
The most frequent explanation given for DATAR's dramatic loss of reputation for power in 
the mid- 1970s is the oil crisis of the period. 'Amenagement du territoire was bom in the 
years of strong economic expansion, the 1960s, and was then confronted from 1973 with 
the crisis and a series of mutations that were poorly understood'.82 It was never the only 
explanation: Audouin at the time attributed the 'degradation' of DATAR's reputation to the 
appointment of Poniatowski as minister, who made DATAR seem even more of a party- 
political vehicle than it had been under the Gaullists.83 Elie Cohen's description of the 
'Monod doctrine' that the government adopted (to 'rescue' vulnerable firms with regional 
development funding while they were still viable), also portrays DATAR as an active 
institution at this time, but one diverted from its principal goals.84
Figure 3.5 tests the 'economic explanation' by correlating economic growth (the 
percentage change in 'real GDP' per annum) with DATAR's reputational power as estimated 
earlier. There is a close statistical connection in the first part of the 30-year period between 
the strong performance of DATAR and the economy until 1974, then their joint crisis, 
followed by recovery. In the second half of the period, the two seem to be unrelated. 
Although this simple methodology cannot settle the question definitively, the finding does 
help back up the argument of Serge Wachter, an academic researcher who had worked at 
DATAR, that:
81 'I knew DATAR when it was strong', was the immediate response of the first academics with whom I 
discussed this thesis (Chantal Lombard, Roehampton Institute; Simon Lee, Polytechnic of Central London). 
They meant the late 1960s and early 1970s.
82 O.Milhomme, Ouotidien de Paris. 24 April 1990. See also items for 1973-75 in Figure 3.3.
® Audouin (1977), p.29.
84 Cohen, E. (1989^ L'Etat brancardier: Politiques du d6clin industriel (1974-1984) (Calmann-LdvvL p.270.
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Figure 3.3 DATAR's reputational power: 1963-92




• The 1960s and 1970s were the golden age of amenagement du 
territoire (AdT), when a direct line joined DATAR to Matignon'...
• 'DATAR's preferences could be imposed by Guichard; in certain 
cases, at Matignon, even at the Elysee'.





Drevet (1991) p. 188
1966-68 8
• 'DATAR, run by Guichard.., benefiting from PM's authority- 
played big role in interministerial decisions, especially on budget'.
• 'DATAR is strong because of PM's support and interest... Can use 
threat of his arbitration to constrain ministries'.
• '1963 to 1973/74 the 2nd phase of AdT with creation of DATAR. 
Powerful Gaullism, technocratic ...AdTproclaimed a success'.
Quermonne (1967)
p.21
Pouyet (1968) p.73. 
Clout (1987) p. 186
• The delegue was [a] quasi-minister in the late 1960s'. Liberation 2/8/89
1969-71 8 • 'Political influence and importance because of Guichard, a noted 
Gaullist politician; Monod, close to Guichard, a potential minister1.
• 'Monod's role, knowledge of French society, gave such weight that 
he sometimes overshadowed sectoral ministers, cabinets, directors'.
Prud'homme (1974) 
p.40
Coulbois and Jung 
(1994) p. 15
1972 8
• '1972 the apogde of DATAR and Monod, when Pompidou ill'.
• 'New ministry of AdT is not perfection but political and technical 
progress at least'.
• 'A jgood effort at administrative coordination' •
Audouin (1977) p. 29 




• 'DATAR’s flamboyant period goes up to 1973'.
• The golden age of AdT lasted 10 years; until the mid-1970s. 
Harmed by slowing-down of economic growth and technical change'.
• The interministerial committee of amenagement du territoire of 
Dec. 1973 agrees to decentralise public bodies. They do not jgo'.
Le Monde 2/1/80 
Liberation 10/10/86
Le Monde 18/11/91
• 'After 1973 DATAR became less enthusiastic, more respectful of Le Monde 2/1/80
1974 1
directions from the PM's office during unemployment crisis'.
• 'DATAR came up against economic crisis; AdT a luxury'.
• DATAR degraded when Poniatowski appointed: Monod resigns'.
Quotidien 4/4/90 
Audouin (1977) p. 29
• 'Decline seems to start 1975: economic crisis; Giscard's policies'. Madiot (1996) p.5
1975 1 • 'Pillars supporting DATAR's action successively foundering since 
economic crisis of 1970s'.
Le Monde, 
29-30/3/87
1976 1 • 'DATAR becomes a nurse 1975-76'.
• 'It was unreasonable to attach DATAR to ministry of interior, 
which is apolitical ministry'. The attachment raised problems.
Audouin (1977) p.31 
Guichard 1976 in 
Madiot (1979} p. 49
1977 2 • 8 ministries 1967-78 - 'great uncertainty on AdT's place and role'.
• 'DATAR prepared 15th anniversary at a time, when after a little 
eclipse, it carried out some significant acts, rising in public opinion'.
Madiot 1979) p.50 
Essig (1978) p.277
1978 3 • Giscard supports DATAR, 'asks for national conference1. He says 
he wants to give AdT its 'second wind'.
• DATAR missions means has more important role than texts say'.
Speech at Vichy 
conference 6/12/78. 
Madiot (1979) p.56
1979 2 • 'Has lost role of regulating and organising space; tries to create jobs 
anywhere on anything; has become a vast rural nurse'.
• 'Ain department denounces role of DATAR in diverting jobs away'.
Josselin (PS) in 
Le Monde 3/2/79 
Le Monde 3/5/79
1980 2 • *Barre visits DATAR; says it is "an exemplary organisation"; 
small, innovative, active, tells it "to reconquer the tenitoiyV
La Croix 24/4/80
• Rocard takes 6 months to appoint D61egu£. 'DATAR breaks down' Le Monde 18/9/81
1981 0
and 'has an identity crisis'.
• 'Attali must breathe life back into DATAR'.
• 'DATAR in disarray 1981-82'.




Figure 3.3 DATAR’s reputational power contd
• 'DATAR still coordinator; but stress now is on regions' action'. Clout (1987) p. 188
1982 1 • 'DATAR staff go on strike, do not want to go to regions'.
• 'Rocard gives DATAR coordinating role for Plan-Contracts. 
Keeps ddldgud: chance of 2nd wind after stagnation of recent years'..
Le Monde 4/6/82 
Bodiguel & Quer- 
monne (1983) p. 181
1983 3
• 'Plan-contract negotiations give DATAR new credibility with 
ministries and regional politicians'.
• 'Now DATAR is more closely linked to decentralisation and 
planning it has a good future'.
• 'Plan-contracts the big moment within period of decline in 
DATAR’s interministerial role'.
La Croix, 28/6/84





• 'Ddlegud [not PM] gives taciturn press conference after Cl AT'
• 'DATAR "by-passed by government", appoints a separate deldgud 
for Lorraine industrial restructuring'...'What use is DATAR?'.
• 'MP says "not bad" that DATAR budget to go up 14% in 1985'.
Le Monde 19/4/84 
La Croix 28/6/84
Le Monde 25/10/84
• DATAR's 'control on Paris offices removed. Dirigiste AdT fails'. Liberation 15/12/84
1985 0 • 'AdT no longer exists'. (Guichard in Le Monde).
• 'No defender of regional policy in government, not even Defferre'.
Le Monde 2/12/85 
Tribune 4/9/86
1986 0
• "DATAR drifting, image tarnished'. 'Many in government 
majority ask whether to keep it, but Mdhaignerie believes in it'.
• 'Belin-Gisserot report recommends DATAR should go'.
• 'Public opinion fairly indifferent to DATAR in Sallois tenure'.
Le Monde 20/5/86
Les Echos 8//7/86 
Le Monde 7/5/87
• '[Minister for administrative reform] thinks DATAR could be Le Monde 13/1/87
1987 1
used to warn government of undue imbalance between regions'.
• Minister Mehaignerie manages to preserve DATAR'.
• 'DATAR the target of left and right. Needs a new credibility'.
Le Monde 7/4/87 
Le Monde 7/5/87
• 'DATAR still does not hold the same cardinal place in Le Monde 9/1/88
1988 1
government's interest... But no longer thinking of abolishing it'.
• 'Coup de grace: Budget so low senators abolished it in derision'.
• 'DATAR "confused" for several years., .stuck in the mud'.
Le Monde 16/12/88 
Le Monde 7/4/89
• 'D£16gud less than ministry director-general. DATAR sleeping for Liberation 2/8/89
1989 0
years; doesn't have position in government structure it should have'.
• 'Government takes months to appoint ddlegud minister wants'.
• 'AdT a bit stuttering over recent years'. (Minister Fauroux).
Le Monde 6/10/89 
Le Monde 11/11/89
• 'Assembly doubles DATAR’s budget Rocard: "A new phase is Le Monde 31/1/90
1990 2
beginning: AdT must mobilise the whole government".'
• '"Hasn’t DATAR lost influence for several years?" Ddldgud: 
"Only in appearances - does not know how to make itself known'.
• 'A third age for AdT - based on long-term vision'.
Le Monde 25/1/90 
Quotidien 24/4/90
• 'After census results Rocard in November 1990 gives DATAR the Bezes (1994) p. 118
1991 4
role of selecting zones for ministry relocation plans'.
• 'DATAR...rose in status during the early 1990s'.





• 'Government assigns coordination of relocation to a new Le Monde 27/5/92
"mission" attached to minister for public service, not DATAR'.
1992 0 • 'DATAR staff strike against move to Paris suburbs'. Le Monde 13/12/92
*Note: The 'reputational power indicator' (out of 10) is estimated from published opinions as cited, and with 
reference to the comparator quotations in Figure 3.2.
Sources: Press cuttings from the Paris IEFs 'dossier de presse' no. 506/01: 'Bodies responsible for 
amenagement du territoire ', and academic sources (full references are listed in bibliography). Some quotations 
are abbreviated to save space but they are faithful to the sense of the original.
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—6 -------GDP 1980 prices
-GDP 1970 prices 
-GDP 1995 prices
Source of data: Figure 3.3, INSEE, Comptes Nationaux (various years).
Notes. The GDP figures are for that year's percentage growth. There seems to be no 
published 'real GDP' series for the whole period examined.
The correlation coefficients for the relationship between DATAR's reputational power and 
GDP annual change over the three time-periods are given below.
GDP series r 2 N Significance level of r
1963-81 1970 prices 0.625 19 highly significant (1 in 1000 chance)
1971-89 1980 prices 0.328 19 significant (1 in 100 chance)
1978-92 1995 prices 0.009 14 not significant
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'the decline of [DATAR's] institutional power is, in many respects, independent of changes in the 
economic environment. Certainly, the context of crisis restricted the redistributive power of 
amenagement du territoire. But the appropriate responses were worked out and applied'.85
High levels of growth in the 1960s enabled political leaders and DATAR to conceive 
'redistributive' policies for amenagement du territoire based on developing several 
'metropolitan counter-magnets' to Paris. But there were policy alternatives that did not 
require strong growth, such as the contracts to improve small towns, that DATAR invented 
in 1975. Low levels of growth in the late 1980s did not stop ministers such as Chereque and 
Delebarre, who had been professional regional developers, promoting the policy 
energetically with programmes for industrial restructuring or administrative relocation to 
provincial cities. Indeed Chereque argued that economic crisis increased the need for long­
term amenagement du territoire programmes.86 Thus, there is no necessary connection 
between particular economic conditions and DATAR's reputation or impact. As Blondel 
suggests, the political leaders' own perspective and capacity to respond comes into play 
when they are confronted with events in the non-institutional environment.87 However, the 
coincidence of the oil crisis and the change of President in 1974 makes the two factors hard 
to disentangle without other evidence. Economic conditions and DATAR's links to the 
leadership were seen as twin conditions for its success.
The end of the period of economic growth brought a halt to industrial decentralisation, principal 
beneficiary of the policy of amenagement du territoire invented by Olivier Guichard with the support 
of Georges Pompidou and imposed thanks to the political authority of General de Gaulle.88
LEADERSHIP INTEREST: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In the last section, as in the last chapter, there were signs that the active interest of members 
of the political leadership could have an impact on DATAR, as they had on the DAT. The 
concluding part of this chapter is guided by a statistical test of the relationship between 
political leaders' interest in amenagement du territoire and DATAR's reputational power. It 
seeks to show whether DATAR's power depends on the leadership's own commitment to 
the policy, and hence, conversely, whether different leaders have a different impact on 
bureaucracies (both DATAR and those DATAR tries to coordinate), depending on their own 
aims.
The evaluation of leaders' interest in amenagement du territoire was based mainly on 
opinions, but also on actions almost certain to have been taken on their own initiative (for 
example, President's Giscard's creation of a new Planning Council chaired by himself). The 
relationship being examined is therefore that between a leader's reported intentions on
85 Wachter, S. (1989) 'Ajustements etrecentrage d'une politique publique', Sociologie du Travail. 31/1, 
51-74, p. 56.
86 Marcou, G., Kistenmacher, H. and Clev, H.-G. (1994) L'Amanagement du territoire en France et en 
Allemagne (La Documentation fran^aise), p.79.
87 Blondel (1987), pp.7-8.
88 T. Br6hier, Le Monde. 13 July 1993.
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amenagement du territoire and DATAR’s reputation for being able to coordinate that policy. 
For each president and prime minister over the thirty-year period (1963-92) statements were 
collected that indicated the leader's attitude to amenagement du territoire. Ten statements 
were selected for presidents, but only up to five for prime ministers, partly because of the 
number of actors involved, partly because many were not in place long enough or had 
enough interest in the policy for relevant statements to be made. In selecting the statements 
priority was given to the leader's own writings, speeches and actions, and then to authors 
who had worked with the leaders or interviewed them. Based on these statements, an 
'interest indicator1 was estimated for each leader. Figure 3.6 lists the statements used as 
comparators, from the 'strong' interest expressed by Pompidou to the 'no interest' shown 
by Chirac after his Gaullist party adopted a liberal economic policy in response to the Left 
gaining power in 1981.89




Strong Speech, 12/7/61: 'Activity is concentrated in certain regions, 
while held back in others., 'we must ..amenager le territoire, 
that is, remodel the structure and face of France'.
De Gaulle (1970) III, p. 329
4 'Pompidou was passionate about amenagement du territoire, 
especially as in his view, a coherent industrial policy ought 
to be decentralised'.
Roussel (1994), p. 151
Fairly
strong
PM Barre, April 1980: 'In early 19781 decided that, in the 
circumstances we found ourselves, a second wind had to be 
given to amenagement du territoire'.
Andrault (1990), p.222.
3 PM Cresson: 'I saw amenagement du territoire needed a new 
wind DATAR had got very good results for 15 years but 
then no longer had a well-defined role'.
Bezes (1994), p.72
Average Giscard speech 16/12/77: 'Farming is our oil...the whole of 
France needs a living, well-equipped countryside with 
modern living standards'.
Andrault (1990), p. 144
2 [Chirac in 1974] 'knew DATAR and regional development 
well because of his passion for the Corrfcze and Limousin; he 
was a precious arbiter for DATAR'
Essig (1979), p.89
Weak PM Mauroy in committee creates PAT grants 6/5/82 and 
decides 29/9/82 to devolve allocation to regions.
Remond (1999), p.97
1 President Mitterrand 21/6/82 asks Minister of Transport and 
DATAR to organise public works to create jobs
Attali (1993) p.388
None Fabius 1985 abolished DATAR's agrement procedure for 
licensing office building in Paris new towns
Bezes (1994) p.25
0 The new prime minister [Chirac] being in favour of its 
death, the fate of DATAR appeared sealed'.
Drevet (1991), p.215
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 collate the statements for each president and prime minister 
surveyed, and assign a quantified indicator, according to the balance of the comments. A 
summary of the findings is shown in Figure 3.9. These indicators were then plotted against
89 Derville, J. (1990) 'he discours des partis gaullistes', Regards sur l'Actualite. 165, 17-29, p.23.
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Figure 3.7 The commitment of presidents to amenagement du territoire: 1963-92
President and Evidence Source
Interest indicator*___________________________________________________________________________
D e Gaulle • Speech, 14/6/60: 'It is a matter of transforming our old France into a De Gaulle (1970)
1963-68  _new_jTOuntry.;-j§md_make i^tjnnari i^te_j n^tory;_p^ d^< i^sion  ^ .......... _..III?.J?.„225.__ j
• Speech, 8/5/61: The objectives to be decided by the Plan for the De Gaulle (1970)
whole country and each of its regions... need to take on for all French III, p.314
    ..................................
• TV speech, 12/7/61: 'Activity is concentrated in certain regions, De Gaulle (1970)
while held back in others.. In brief, we have to, as one says, amenager III, p.329
 .stmcj^re faeejaf Prajnce.^ _
• Press conference, 14/1/63: '[It means] a transformation of the human De Gaulle (1970)
condition...by social investment... in the whole nation...by the IV. p.64
_
4  • TV speech, 31/12/63: The IVth Plan will be executed and the Vth De Gaulle (1970)
established. Where it is a matter of... the amenagement of the whole IV, p. 154
. .jts.regions.;. .we.wiji continue to jadvance'.
• 'His interest in AdT appeared clearly only after the first projects took Charles and Cristini 
_„shaj>e; JXhen AdT' became a _..Q§^lP;£?,0
• Speech at Lille, 23/4/66: 'Our economic power depends on De Gaulle (1970)
developing all our regions. In each., it must be according to its V, p.30
character and capacities, in such a way the whole nation is coherent and
balanced. By marrying multiple diversities unity is achieved. As always
   ......
• Speech at Lyon, 24/3/68: The multi-century effort of centralisation De Gaulle (1970)
...is no longer needed - on the contrary it is regional activities that are V, p.271
likely to be the sources pf tomorrow's economic power'.
• Speech at Quimper, 2/2/69: 'Our Plan must amenage ..State action De Gaulle (1970)
over the whole territory..so that each region..has the will and receives V, p.378
S. .t.9. i.ts I.^ . .§.hare in the overall national
• There are three vital necessities for the nation: infrastructure and De Gaulle (1971)
_____________ development of the territory; creation of regions and., participation'_____ p.294_____________
Pom pidou • 'De Gaulle and Pompidou were passionate about this problem Guichard (1975)
1969-73 _tecause it was p o lit ic ^  ............................................._ p.90............................
• 'With de Gaulle I have no memory of the Elysee looking., at our Essig (1979) p.97 
dossiers. When Pompidou became President it was different. DATAR
 Hj^e^his f^avoimte c ......................................................................
• Oct. 1970 opens Lille-Marseille motorway: 'I want to emphasise it is Esambert (1994)
 P.-.LQ?..........................
• Held conseils restreints on AdT 11/12/69, 25/11/71, 6/12/73 and Archives Nationales
. , 9 ? i 9^1)9.2 _______________(1996) 2/53-63...__
4  • March 1971. Esambert writes in L'Expansion, at request of Esambert (1994)
Pompidou: the President 'is aiming for significant growth in a liberal p.28
_ framework with territorial bdanoe'.__________________________________________
• 'Pompidou was passionate about AdT especially as in his view a Roussel (1994)
...99.ll9^9.U.9 .^y?.kdM.P9!.i9y..9.V .^L^9.. .^. .^^S^A?.?.4':.................................. _p.l51..........................
• Spring 1971: 'When we told him that rural renovation policy was Michardfcre in
affected by ministries holding back their budgets, he said: "I see very 'Georges Pompidou'
.jy.9!L!h£L3.B.y.l£LR?.5.9.Y^^^
• Speech: Saint-Flour, June 1971: France must not become a dusting Esambert (1994)
of conurbations dispersed in desert, even if green and well-maintained'.___ P.-.141..........................
• Committed to AdT as PM. Then more concerned with industrial Flockton et al.
_ imperative. But nomina^ as Super-minister of AdT in l972.__(1989) p. 107
• Holds Conseil restreint 6I12J13 that agrees to put limit on new office Audouin (1977)






• On 25/9/74 set up Conseil central de planification (CCP) that he 
chaired, which decided to hold a complete review of AdT policy.
Lajugie et al (1979) 
pp.417-8
• Held 3 Conseil central de planification meetings on AdT by 1979, 
which issued new goals for AdT and instructions for projects.
Essig (1979) p.81
• At CCP 25/11/75: 'In period of crisis, AdT must be an economic Alvergne et al.
policy for country's global development'. He decides the 5 priorities. (2003} p. 198
• Giscard not at first as sympathetic as Pompidou to AdT but soon 
grasped the interest and then paid great attention.
Essig (1979) p.97
2 • Giscard says he is against planning and corporatist concertation, 
wants community of responsible individuals and participation.
Giscard (1977) p.42
• Giscard says 'Centuries of centralisation led to the overdevelopment 
of Paris, underdevelopment of certain provinces., need a powerful 
movement of decentralisation'.
Giscard (1977) p.82
• Vassy speech 16/12/77. Farming is our oil: all France needs a living, 
well-equipped countiyside with modem living standards'.
Andrault (1990)
_ .£J44 .... ..................
• Speech at Vichy national conference of AdT, 6/12/78. Wants different 
type of AdT* emphasising quality of life in rural areas.
Derville (1990)
p.21
• Mazamet speech 17/11/79 Ten year plan for Grand South West 'is Andrault (1990)
also necessary for France which must be able to count on the capacities 
of all its regions and capacities for work of Jill its citizens'.
p. 144
• As president of Auvergne rejected idea of planning for regional 





• In lei et Maintenant' (1980): 'France needed a strong centralised 
power to make itself., now needs decentralised powers not to unmake
Quoted by Favier 
& Martin-Roland
itself., criticises 'domination from Paris by colonial administration'.
• AdT not among '110 propositions' of 1981 manifesto (nor in 




• 'Michel Rocard, the rival, was the first Minister for the Plan and Brachet (1995)
amenagement du territoire: it was a way of marginalising him'. p.81fn
• De'le'gu6 the 16th on list of 22, in order of priority, of posts to be 
appointed within 6 months of election (not including prefects, banks).
Attali (1993) p.38
1 • March 1982 decentralisation laws (giving development powers to 
communes in competititon with each other) destroys spatial coherence.
Montricher (1995)
..........................
• Press conference 9 June 1982: 'territorial balancing' 6th aim Le Monde 11/9/91
mentioned; creates development grants, to be decided by regions
• 21/6/82 President asks Minister of Transport and DATAR to Attali (1993) p.388
organise public works programme to create jobs.
• 1/3/89 Conseil des Ministres on decentralisation of Paris ministries, Attali (1993a)
'When it comes to anti-Parisian outbidding, no-one to beat Mitterrand.' P. 181
• Speech at Chinon 12/9/91: proposes local development by 
communes (then denied by minister for local government).
Le Monde, 
22-23/9/91
• Deconcentration of administrative bodies in 1991-92 inspired by Attali (1993a)
Cresson and Mitterrand's dislike of Parisian elites. p.761
* The 'interest indicator' (out of 5) is estimated from the speeches, actions and comments summarised above, 
and with reference to the comparator quotations in Figure 3.5.
Sources: Full references are given in the bibliography. Some quotations are abbreviated to save space but 
they are faithful to the sense of the original.
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Figure 3.8 The commitment of prime ministers to amenagement du territoire: 1963-92






• 'Became interested in AdT because sensitive to need for France not to 
remain sick man of Europe. AdT needed urgent development'..
• In 1962 he made AdT a national priority... Gave it much care, 
supported by forecasting studies, directive and incentive measures.
• 'Overall, believed France not up- to-date, must industrialise, build 
infrastructure, launched an ambitious policy of AdT'.
• Speech to National Assembly 26/11/63 [Putting AdT into operation 
is] 'la grande affaire de la nation toute entiere'.
• 'DATAR strong because of PM's support and interest in the topic'. 















• At Sciences Po in 1939 Couve was very liberal, marked Delouvrier 
down for writing in favour of a type of planned economy.
• Couve 'had never shown any interest in the regions'.
• Ill-at-ease outside Paris'.
• In 1985 Le Figaro article demands 'Rueff-type rigour and free-market 
policies.
Delouvrier in 
Chenu (1994) p.49 
Guichard (1980) 
p. 435
Essig (1979) p. 134 






• From 1953 'plays the regional expansion card'; encourages Bordeaux 
regional expansion committee'; salutes creation of DATAR in 1963
• He saw in AdT a social project halfway between technique and 
politics'.
• 'On the first Conseil national d'amdnagement du territoire [1963-]'.
• 1 emphasised importance of AdT: concern to locate new industries in 
new regions, develop metropolises, Feduce weight of Paris region'
• Vlth Plan needed Chaban-Delmas's personal commitment to Plan and 





Essig (1979) p.71 
Chaban-Delmas 
(1997) p.442 





• No interest expressed. 'Particularly respectful of Presidential 
authority: the President's views a sure guide to his decisions'.
• 'Colourless, uninspiring, unimaginative'.






• Knew DATAR and regional development well because of passion for 
Corrdze and Limousin; a precious arbiter for DATAR: Monod his aide'.
• Instruction of 1/7/74 to SNCF: 'aim to fight devitalisation of market 
towns and country areas, no new closures of local passenger lines'.
• 20/4/75, Fourcade told 'Figaro' that Chirac was 'more interventionist 
and dirigiste than I am - has been affected by constituency sociology'.
• Letter to President 27/7/76 said government needed to give 'une 
impulsion vigoureuse et coordonnee' to political and economic action'.
• In 1980 Chirac was still saying he regretted France had moved so far 
away from treating the Plan as an 'ardent obligation'.
Essig (1979) p.89.









• In 1962 was on Normandy regional development committee; drafted 
Normandy regional plan.
• Had been on the Conseil national d'amSnagement du territoire.
• Speech 23/4/80: 'In early 19781 decided that in the circumstances we 
found ourselves a second wind had to be given to AdT'.
• April 1980: Official visit to DATAR; says it is 'an exemplary 
organisation'; small, innovative, instructs it 'to reconquer the territory'.
• 1987 presidential campaign speech: "will give preference to a strategy 




Essig (1979) p.71 
Andrault (1990)
p.222
La Croix 24/4/80 




Mauroy • Very active at running own regional and city development in Lille 
1981-83 and Nord-Pas-de-Calais in tandem with regional prefect
• Speech 15/4/81: 'When people talk about Mitterrand's term in 20 
years, will mention decentralisation, abolition of prefects, local 
government reform, direct election of regional assemblies'.
1 • 1982 laws devolve AdT to regions. Decides in committee to create
PAT grants 6/5/82 and decree 22/9/82 to devolve them to regions.
• Chaired AdT committee 6/5/82 but left press conference to Rocard. 
Chaired it 13/4/84 but left press conference to Attali, four days later.
 •Tellsm inistne^












Fabius • 1985 decided to abolish agr€ment (approval) for speculative office 
1984-85 building in Paris new towns (DATAR's main instrument).
0 • Opposed to regional tier and 'regional grands dues', which led him to
......................................
• 'DATAR was not his thing... He's never had a pronounced taste for a 
vision of France as a whole'. Guichard interview.
• The new prime minister being in favour of its death, the fate of 
DATAR seemed sealed'.. [Drevet was at DATAR in 1986].
• Lets Balladur reduce DATAR's budget substantially for 1987.
• Wanted DATAR's procedures examined, efficiency improved, and to 
let prefects and sub-prefects deliver the new AdT aims on the ground.
• Launches roads for backward France and TGV for winning France in
Rocard • Decided to put AdT under Industry with Chdr&que who had done good
1988-90 job in Lorraine; and gave Chereque a new development fund..
• Reintroduced agrdment for speculative office building. 'Prime 
minister putting new wind in sails for a rebalancing of Paris region'.
3 • Rocard: 'A new phase for DATAR is beginning'. Allows minister to
run a debate in National Assembly 29/5/90 to relaunch AdT.
• 1990 census results show massive growth of Paris: Rocard's AdT 
committee 1990 defines new aim to move 15,000jobs out of Paris.
Le Monde 13/2/03
Drevet (1991) p.215
Le Monde 19/9/86 
Le Monde 10/4/87
Le Monde 15/4/87 
Le Monde 12/2/88
Drevet (1991) p.216 





Le Monde 3 /8/85
Cresson to Favier et 
al (1999) pp. 100-3. 




Cresson to Bezes 
1 .19?£ i? ;80, ............
Cresson
1991
• Interventionist As Industry Minister reorganised its regional division 
and appointed expert so could respond better to DATAR
• Had already decided to steal the Right's AdT theme when a Paris 
commuter train crash made her agree to support relocation scheme.
• 'I saw AdT policy needed new wind. DATAR had got very good 
results for 15 years at start, but no longer had well-assigned role. Did 
not see how could be brought up to date. Problems had changed'.
• Audacious deconcentration of central administrative bodies. Inspired 
by a dislike of Parisian elites which she shared with President.
• If one wanted to give it [relocation] a push, it required the State 
.showed the exmnple,.othefwise j t j ^  ......................................
• 'From 1985 Bdrdgovoy talked like the liberals he had attacked'.
• In a context bound to be disastrous, he decided to keep to a rigorous 






Chevallier et al. 
(2002) p.398.
* The 'interest indicator’ (out of 5) is estimated from the speeches, actions and comments summarised above, 
and with reference to the comparator quotations in Figure 3.5.
Sources: Full references are given in the bibliography. Some quotations are abbreviated to save space but 
they are faithful to the sense of the original.
80
those for DATAR's reputational power, as shown in Figures 3.10 and 3.11. Although the 
assessments are subjective and individual indicators are vulnerable to error, the exercise is 
systematic and transparent.
Figure 3.9 Political leaders' level of interest in amenagement du territoire 1963-92
Level of 
interest
Strong Fairly strong Average Weak None
















In statistical terms, the data in Figure 3.10 show a close link between the president's 
reported interest and DATAR's reputed power. The correlation is 'highly significant', such 
that there is a 1 in 1000 chance of finding such a close link if there were no real correlation; 
and changes in the president's interest 'explain' statistically a high proportion of the changes 
in DATAR's reputation. In visual terms, Figure 3.10 shows that the stepped reduction in 
presidential interest throughout the 30 year period is accompanied by a general decline in 
DATAR's reputational power. In policy and political terms, DATAR looks stronger under 
the early Gaullists (committed to a national modernisation policy to which all regions must 
contribute),90 weaker under Giscard (against planning and budgetary expenditure but willing 
to agree a limited number of focused amenagement du territoire measures),91 and almost 
disappears under Mitterrand (DATAR was the very symbol of 'the obsessive domination 
from Paris of a colonial administration’.92). DATAR's strength within the administration is 
therefore not independent of the presidency; it seems to follow its demands closely. That is, 
different presidents seem to make a different impact on DATAR in a way that is well-related 
to their own level of commitment to amenagement du territoire.
Despite the stronger legal link between the prime minister and DATAR (the 
president's single formal power over DATAR is his counter-signature to the delegue's 
appointment), Figure 3.11 shows only a weak correlation statistically between the prime 
minister's reported interest in amenagement du territoire and DATAR's reputational power. 
Not only do variations in the prime minister's interest 'explain' statistically only a small
90 De Gaulle's speeches on 14 April and 8 May 1961, 14 Jan. 1963,27 April 1969, in De Gaulle, C. (1970) 
Discours et Messages (PlonV. Pompidou's speech of October 1970 in Esambert, B. (1994) Pompidou: 
Capitaine d'industries (Odile Jacob). p. 109.
91 Giscard d'Estaing, V. (1977) Towards a New Democracy, tsl. V.Cronin (French edn 1976) (Collins), p.42; 
Madiot (1979), p.73.
92 Favier and Martin-Roland (1990), p. 144.
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Source of data: Figures 3.3,3.7.
































  DATAR — -PM
Source of data: Figures 3.3, 3.8.
Note: A third graph (not shown) relating DATAR's reputational power to the 'joint 
commitment' of the two leaders (the sum of the interest indicators of the president and prime 
minister) produced a correlation coefficient less than that for the president alone.







highly significant (1 in 1000 chance) 
probably significant (1 in 20 chance) 
highly significant (1 in 1000 chance)
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proportion of the variation in DATAR's reputational power, but also the finding is only 
'probably significant'; that is, there is a 1 in 20 chance that this level of correlation would be 
found even if there were no real connection. The weak relationship between the prime 
minister's aims for amenagement du territoire and his or her impact on DATAR's efforts is 
likely to be related to the strong relationship found for the presidency: the president's wishes 
tending to dominate the outcome. On the one hand DATAR's reputation could remain high 
under Couve and Messmer, who were opposed to or not interested in planning but disposed 
to follow the wishes of President de Gaulle (for Couve de Murville)93 or President 
Pompidou (for Messmer)94. Premiers keen to promote amenagement du territoire initiatives 
could go ahead if the president were also keen or at least in accord with them, as Pompidou 
did in creating DATAR during de Gaulle's presidency, and Cresson did during Mitterrand's 
when deciding to move administrative bodies out of Paris (see Chapter 5). On the other 
hand, President Giscard seems to have been able to constrain Prime Minister Barre, who 
had been interested in regional economic development for twenty years and chose to bring 
DATAR directly under his authority because, he said:
'I had in effect, at the beginning of 1978, acquired the conviction that in the circumstances in which
we found ourselves, a second wind had to be given to amenagement du territoire\ 95
Although Giscard had in the first years of Barre's premiership respected Barre's economic 
competence, made him Minister of the Economy and let him 'exploit that territory', from 
1978 he was more suspicious of Barre's independence.96
It would seem that prime ministers are not as free as presidents to make an impact on 
DATAR and its activities in accordance with their own preferences, if the two leaders have 
different views on policy. The 'joint' commitment of the top leadership (as measured by 
adding together the interest indicators of president and prime minister), correlates well with 
DATAR's standing but less well than does the president's commitment alone. This finding 
tends to confirm that the president has a greater impact on DATAR's activities than has the 
prime minister, and that the interest of a prime minister cannot substitute for the absence of 
presidential interests. It is yet another piece of evidence that the legal tie to the prime minister 
is unimportant compared with the goals that political leaders, especially the president, have 
for the policy.
CONCLUSIONS
Blondel's condition for ensuring an effective transmission of policy between executive 
decision and implementation was that 'the links between the bureaucracy and the leader must
93 Hayward, J. (1993) The President and the Constitution1, in J.Hayward (ed.) De Gaulle to Mitterrand: 
Presidential Power in France (Hurst). 36-75, p.59. Couve de Murville was 'evasively and unswervingly 
reliable'.
94 The de!6gue Essig wrote: 'the President's views were a sure guide to his decisions' (1979), p.87.
95 Quoted in Andrault (1990), p.222; Barre's speech at DATAR, two years after the reorganisation, La Croix. 
24 April 1980.
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be close and effective'.97 Two contrasting interpretations of the nature of those essential 
links have been examined. The prevalent assumption since 1963 has been that DATAR's 
prestige and authority is dependent on its formal link to the leadership. It is usually argued 
that DATAR's direct attachment to the prime minister is crucial to persuading ministries to 
adopt the leader's goals. The implication is that the impact of the political leadership depends 
on the formal institutions above all else, and that the leadership’s 'positional' resources, 
which derive from the institutional environment, are more important than their 'personal' 
characteristics, such as their commitment to a particular 'cause' or their responsiveness to 
the non-institutional environment.
An assessment of the arguments and examples cited in favour of one location or 
another showed however that there was no 'single best solution'. In any case, prime 
ministers dealt directly with DATAR on issues that interested them even when they had 
attached it to other ministries; and they continued to chair the interministerial committees.
The 'positional' resources could therefore still be used wherever DATAR was located in the 
ministerial structures. A quantitative evaluation of the variations in DATAR's 'reputational 
power' showed it bore no consistent relationship to its place in the ministerial structure. 
DATAR could be attached to a technical minister and look relatively strong in its dealings 
with the rest of the bureaucracy, especially when the minister was technically or politically 
outstanding. It could be attached to the prime minister and look relatively weak.
The alternative thesis - that variations in the commitment of political leaders to 
amenagement du territoire could have an impact on DATAR's capacity to act effectively - 
was then tested empirically and systematically. A very strong link was found between the 
president's interest in amenagement du territoire (as reported and self-reported), and 
DATAR's reputed capacity to act effectively. A much weaker link was observed between the 
prime minister's interest and DATAR's reputational power, despite the traditional emphasis 
on the formal legal link. Though the inevitable subjectivity of the survey methodology must 
limit claims to validity, these results are supported by the concrete examples given and are 
consistent with well-understood patterns of power between the two members of the 
executive in the Fifth Republic.98 On the whole, the 'close and effective links' that Blondel 
thought necessaiy between leader and bureaucracy refer in the French case to the president, 
not the prime minister. In terms of the capacity of political leaders to make an impact on the 
efforts of bureaucratic institutions and policy implementation, presidents are in a much 
stronger position than prime ministers. Just as significantly, the relevant links seem to be 
those of personal commitment to a policy more than legal-positional ties of formal 
responsibility.
96 Servent, P. (1989) Oedipe £ Matignon ou le complexe du Premier ministre (Balland). p.51.
97 Blondel (1987), p. 168.
98 See Wright (1989), pp. 86-98, and Wright, V. (1993) The President and the Prime Minister 
Subordination, conflict, symbiosis, or reciprocal parasitism?1 in Hayward (ed.) De Gaulle to Mitterrand: 
Presidential Power in France (London: Hurst), 101-19.
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The analysis also supported Blondel's claim that political leaders can respond 
differently to similar changes in the non-institutional environment, with the statistical test of 
the relationship between economic growth and DATAR's reputational power. The 
apparently close link between a healthy economy and DATAR's powerful reputation until 
1973, that led some observers to use the oil crisis as the explanation of DATAR's later 
weakness, is called into question by the weak relationship between economic growth and 
DATAR's reputation after 1974. Rather there was evidence that some leaders saw economic 
problems as a constraint, while for others they were an incentive for countervailing action.
These conclusions seem to show that DATAR constitutes, in Blondel's terms, a 
'reliable button', in that its level of 'power' to influence bureaucratic action corresponds to 
the level of activity that the political leadership (especially the president) envisages in this 
domain. In other words, the political leadership seems to make an overall impact on the 
bureaucratic DATAR's activities and the eventual output from the wider bureaucratic system 
in proportion to its desire to make an impact. If the political leadership has no special interest 
in amenagement du territoire, it does not press the button, or at least does so without much 
insistence. It remains to be shown how this link between a political leadership's commitment 
to amenagement du territoire and DATAR's reputational power might be made concrete by 
leaders. If the formal position of DATAR within the ministerial structure is not of prime 
importance, the resources given to political leaders by virtue of their formal position are vital 
to steering DATAR's action. The following chapters therefore set out to demonstrate that 
political leaders can shape DATAR to match their own aspirations for it, and ensure that it 




RESPONSIVENESS, COMPETENCE AND LOYALTY: CONTROLLING 
DATAR
INTRODUCTION
The last chapter showed that DATAR's effectiveness was linked to the interest taken by 
political leaders in its affairs and, conversely, that leaders had an impact on DATAR that was 
linked to their interest in its work. This chapter and the next strengthen the validity of that 
conclusion by showing how that 'probable' relationship at the statistical level of principle is 
effected at the level of political-administrative practice.
Blondel thought 'the system' linking political leaders to the bureaucracy was 'often - 
perhaps mostly., simply unresponsive or only partly responsive’ to their needs.1 He thought 
four main factors made a difference to how well bureaucrats implemented leadership aims, 
of which three apply to DATAR itself (the fourth, links from DATAR out to other 
organisations, will be considered in the following chapter):
- 'competence*;
- 'administrative organisation - not too light or too heavy...';
- 'the links between the bureaucracy and the leader must be close and effective; civil servants must 
... be expected to be reliable., the fostering of loyalty of civil servants by a variety of means - but 
not at the expense of initiative taking - is a manifest requirement if bureaucracies are to provide a 
significant help to leaders in achieving their goals'.2
New leaders have 'two types of instruments' with which to improve these factors, according 
to Blondel: they can use personal mechanisms, such as their prestige and following within 
the bureaucracy to obtain greater loyalty and zeal; and they can use institutional mechanisms 
to restructure the bureaucracy, such as by attending to the 'recruitment and training of the 
personnel' and 'the organisation of the service'; but there would be 'inevitable trade-offs' 
between the various elements.3
As constituted in 1963, DATAR was the outcome of 'personal' and 'institutional' 
mechanisms that political leaders had employed to combine reliable orientation towards their 
interests with operational effectiveness. It was headed by a delegue, Olivier Guichard, 
personally close and loyal to the Gaullist leadership, technically competent in the domain and 
able to attract an enthusiastic team of colleagues; and DATAR was subject to formal 
leadership control on senior appointments and staffing budgets, yet flexible since, within 
those constraints, the delegue was free to determine recruitment, work programmes and
1 Blondel (1987), p. 150.
2 ibid. p. 168.
3 ibid. pp. 171-2.
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working practices. The decree of 14 February 1963 had left DATAR's structure undefined, 
but the first delegue described DATAR as an administration de mission, and DATAR 
continued to define itself in the same terms: 'DATAR is an administration de mission of 
interministerial character'.4 DATAR was expected by its founders to have the features of this 
organisational type, as described by Pisani: lightweight, project-focused, informal in 
working methods and interministerial in recruitment and function.5 While this bureaucratic 
model was capable of a speedy refocusing on a new leader's aims, by the same token it had 
relative freedom to evolve in some self-determined direction, pursuing its own projects.
How have different political leaderships been able to ensure DATAR evolved in the 
ways each intended? How have they balanced the 'inevitable trade-offs' between loyalty and 
competence? Have DATAR's activities adapted to the particular aims of each leadership? In 
short, have political leaders been able to ensure that DATAR's staffing and actions 
responded to their needs? These issues are explored through an analysis of the leaders’ 
capacity to choose as delegue someone loyal to them and their aims, and competent in 
carrying them forward through an agency responsiveness to leadership demands. It will 
assess the political leadership's powers to appoint the delegue, and evaluate the people 
appointed. The second part of the chapter scrutinises the ability of political leaders to make 
the impact they desire on DATAR as a bureaucracy. Three aspects of DATAR sum up its 
character as an administration de mission:6
- its 'light weight': how well can leaders determine DATAR’s staffing levels and the 
sources of its recruitment?
- its interdisciplinarity: how easily can leaders attract the top generalist officials 
reputed to be the most effective in persuading ministries to adopt the leaders' 
programmes?
- team working: a 'team spirit' was deemed essential in 1963 for an inter-ministerial 
approach to policy: has this characteristic been maintained, and are teams 
restructured to deal with the priorities of new political leaders?
CHOOSING THE DELEGUE
The political leadership's strong powers to appoint a delegue of its choice can be judged 
from the official rules for such appointments, as applied to DATAR, and then from evidence 
about the dozen delegues that served from 1963 to 2004 (Figure 4.1 lists them, together 
with variables explored later in this section).
The political leadership's powers to appoint
With the decree of 14 February 1963, political leaders gave themselves the positional
4 Guichard, O. (1965) Am&iager la France (Gonthier). p.6; www.datar.gouv.fr/, topic 'La DATAR'/'Lexique',
26 Nov. 2003.
s Pisani (1956a), pp.323-6.
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Figure 4.1. DATAR deq ues  1963-2004
Delegue 
-Date and 


















Olivier Pompidou SciPo -cabinets 5 years -Industry -chef de cabinet to De
GUI CHARD Prefect -Saharan Office Minister; Gaulle
14/2/63 14/4/62 -a Gaullist party -chief adviser to
,143).................. 'baron' Pompidou
Jdrome Couve ENA -cabinets 4 yrs -dir.cab to PM -friend and aide to
MONOD Courdes -DATAR 5 yrs Chirac Chirac;
24/10/68 10/7/68 Comptes -President of -conflict with AdT
,137)................. Suez-Lyonnaise Minister Poniatowski
Fran?ois Chirac ENA -no cabinets -DG shipping; -knew Chirac at SciPo
ESSIG Conseil -DATAR 12 yrs -DG Paris -brother a PS member
12/9/75 25/5/74 d'Etat Chamber of and later a PS minister
,141).................. Commerce
Andn6 Bane SciPo -cabinets 4 yrs -Mauroy cabinet; -dir.cab. to Chaban
CHADEAU Prefect -regional -President SNCF -worked closely with
27/4/78 25/8/76 development Mauroy when Nord
151)................. Regional Prefect
Bernard Mauroy ENA -cabinet of Plan -President GAN; -twin of J. Attali,
ATTALI Courdes Commissioner -President Air Mitterrand's adviser
14/10/81 21/5/81 Comptes -DATAR 6 yrs France
.138).................
Jacques Fabius ENA -cabinet 3 yrs -Caisse des -dir.cab. to Lang
SALLOIS Cour des Ddp6ts; -member of ex-PSU;
6/9/84 17/7/84 Comptes -DG Musses de 'imposed on Defferre',
,143)................. France Le Monde, 7/5/87
Jean-F. Chirac ENA -cabinets 7 yrs -DG of Nat Geog -Minister's 'right arm'
CARREZ Cour des Institute 1989; since 1978 in cabinet
6/5/87 20/3/86 Comptes -DG ONF 1994 and region.
.147)................. La Croix 6/5/87
Jean-Pierre Rocard ENA -cabinet of Plan -Prefect Seine-St -'osmosis with
DUPORT Admin. Commissioner Denis; minister who defended
4/10/89 9/5/88 civil -Paris planning -Regional Prefect his appointment'
,147)................. Ile-de-France Le Monde, 6/10/89
Pierre-Henri Balladur X, ENPC -cabinet 2 yrs -dir.cab Borotra -Radical noticed by
PAILLET Ponts et -Paris planning -director of a Pasqua'; took bribe for
2/9/93 29/3/93 Chaussdes building firm Pasqua; Le Monde,
,13?)................. 15/1/95,18-19/5/03
Raymond-M Juppd ENA 80 -cabinet 2 yrs -inspecteur-gdndral -false job for Chirac at
AUBERT Admin. -rural affairs de l'dquipement; Paris town hall 89-95;
15/11/95 7/11/95 civil junior minister -Pres.A.N. -icy relations with
(48) Cheques de minister, Le Monde
Vacances 5/6/96; 31/3/03
Jean-Louis Jospin ENSA -cabinet 1 yr -inspecteur-g6neral -spouse of Mitterrand
GUIGOU Professeur -DATAR 12 yrs de l'dducation chief adviser
23/7/97 2/6/97 des univ. nationale -minister wanted him
,..(57)..... ........... replaced Monde 8/7/01
Nicolas Raffarin ENST -cabinet 0.2 yr -DG of Paris -chef to Raffarin
JACQUET ENA -regional Chamber of -'proche de Raffarin'
24/7/02 6/5/02 Prefect development Commerce Monde 8/5/03
(50)
Sources: Data from Who's Who in France, Lettre de la DATAR, IEP press cuttings.
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resources to choose the delegue. The head of DATAR became one of about 500 
'discretionary' appointments they could make in a Council of Ministers. Although the 
president is responsible under the 1958 Constitution, Article 13, for making such 
appointments, the decree must be countersigned by the prime minister, and the sectoral 
minister and junior minister to whom DATAR is attached, if any; all four signed the decree 
appointing Pierre Mirabaud as delegue in 2004.7 The political leadership has a wide choice 
of recruits: the person selected does not need to be a civil servant.8 Ministers are free to 
dismiss the delegue at any time and have a number of means to ease a departure or reward 
loyal service. The 'discretionary' rules can be used to appoint a civil servant to a 'director' 
post in a ministry; for instance the delegue Francis Essig in 1978 was made head of the 
maritime transport directorate. An appointment can be made to a public body: Prime Minister 
Mauroy in 1981 arranged for Andre Chadeau, with whom he had worked closely at regional 
level, to be made President of the SNCF rail enterprise. The president can make 'outsider 
appointments' by the tour exterieur' to top administrative corps: the delegue Jean-Pierce 
Duport was made a prefect when he left DATAR in 1993 (the new minister of amenagement 
du territoire was also the Interior minister in charge of prefects). The tour exterieur 
procedure was extended to 'inspector-general' appointments in 1984: such appointments 
were offered to two departing dilegues, Raymond-Max Aubert in 1995 and his successor, 
Jean-Louis Guigou, in 2002.
Individual ministers can appoint staff to their cabinets by simple arrete (without 
needing presidential approval), and this provision has been used to facilitate appointments. 
First, a cabinet post can be used for a departing delegue until a new post is organised: Prime 
Minister Chirac in 1975 made his friend Jerdme Monod his directeur de cabinet when 
Monod left DATAR after conflict with his minister,9 and Chadeau was in Mauroy's cabinet 
for a few months until appointed SNCF president. Second, a minister's candidate for 
deligue can work from the cabinet until the departure of the incumbent Before Jean- 
Fran9 ois Carrez was appointed delegue in May 1987, he 'performed that role from his 
minister's cabinet from March 1986',10 as did Pierre-Henri Paillet for six months in 1993. 
Political leaders can expand these powers quite subtly; for example, President Pompidou 
reduced the term of these 'discretionary' appointments so that more frequent nominations 
could be made 'without drama',11 just as the Left later extended the range of tour exterieur 
appointments.
The need for leaders to use such procedures is in one sense witness to the constraints
6 Pouyet (1968), pp.60-7.
7 Decree of nomination of 20 Nov.2004, J.O. 21 Nov.2004.
8 Bodiguel, J.-L. (19941 Les fonctions publiques dans lTZurope des douze (LGDJ1. p.72.
9 Massot, J. (1979) ’Le Chef du Gouvemement en France1. Notes et dtudes documentaires 4537-8 (La 
Documentation fran^aise), p.216 fn.
10 F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 7 May 1987; also La Croix. 6 May 1987.
11 Massot, J. (19871 L'Arbitre et le capitaine (Flammarionl. p.292.
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imposed by a tenured civil service where careers are strongly protected by statute. The 
political leadership of 1959 adapted the existing discretionary procedure to add flexibility 
and incentives in a bureaucracy whose top posts were 'monopolised by certain corps', not 
for purposes of politicisation.12 But the use of these procedures by the Left in 1981, and by 
the Right in 1986, gave rise to accusations of 'witch-hunts’ that demonstrated the 'trade­
off, to use Blondel's term, between ensuring loyalty in particular posts and alienating other 
public servants. 'Politicisation gave new resources to those who already possessed social 
capital and could accept the risks, while the officials who had only their professional 
competence and savoir-faire, and went methodically and patiently up the grades, found 
themselves short-circuited'.13 Legislation was introduced in 1986 to restrict tour exterieur 
appointments.14 Lochak illustrated the 'structural politicisation' that had occurred:
’Bernard Attali, nominated in 1981, gave way in 1984 to Jacques Sallois, ex-PSU [Parti Socialiste 
Unifid] and directeur de cabinet to Jack Lang [a minister close to Mitterrand]; in May 1987 Sallois 
was replaced by Pierre Mdhaignerie's directeur de cabinet [Carrez], who would be replaced in his turn 
in October 1989. But.. these changes were made without haste, the government trying in general to 
offer fair compensation to the departing official'.15
Nevertheless, Sallois and Carrez were undermined as delegues by the mere expectation of 
their dismissal. Sallois 'knew his days were numbered from March 1986', when the Right 
won, and for nine months he had to 'work in double harness’ with his successor, Carrez.16 
Then 'the departure [of Carrez] was programmed for a long time'; he 'more or less 
disappeared from the scene six months before'.17 In 1997 Aubert simply 'put his post at the 
disposal of the minister', and 'in compensation would be appointed inspecteur-general de 
Vequipement' . 18
As Anne Stevens says, putting the issue of discretionary posts into perspective:
'many of these posts are not particularly prominent or sensitive, and ministers will usually fill them 
with competent people from within the career service, with little attention to their political 
orientation1.19
In the case of the deligue, four or five early appointments took this 'non-politicised' form. 
While Guichard's appointment was transparently political, his three bureaucratic successors 
demonstrated their allegiance 'to the government of the day', and the political preferences of 
two of them remain ambiguous. Bernard Attali had already held a senior post at DATAR for 
six years, and the press commented only on the family link to Mitterrand's economic
12 Bodiguel (1994), p.72.
13 Bodiguel, J.L. and Rouban, L. (1991) Le fonctionnaire ddtrond (FNSP), p.52.
14 Law of 23 December 1986. Baecque (1992), p.75.
15 Lochak, D. (1992) Les hauts fonctionnaires et I'altemance: quelle politisation1, in P.Muller (ed.) 
L'Administration francaise: est-elle en crise? ('L'Harmattanl. 35-58, p.51.
16 F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 7 May 1987; also La Croix. 6 May 1987.
17 F. Vey, Liberation. 2 Aug. 1989; F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 19 and 29 Sept. 1989.
18 F.Grosrichard. Le Monde. 10-11 Aug. 1997.
19 Stevens (1992), p. 129.
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adviser, Jacques Attali.20 Essig was warned by the first deputy delegue, Charles Frappart, 
that the delegue was 'a political post* (and later regretted not heeding the warning).21 Yet 
only when Left and Right alternated in power from 1981 did it became clearer that political 
leaders had strong powers to select the delegue, and on political grounds if they so chose.
The constraints within a multiple political leadership
For all the powers of the 'political leadership' as a whole to select a delegue, the need for 
agreement between two or more politicians (usually president, prime minister and minister), 
meant that the appointment process did not always go smoothly. Except during periods of 
cohabitation the chief players were the president and prime minister. Pompidou when prime 
minister told Mitterrand that: 'because the signatures of prime minister and president have 
equal value, the decision can be made only after the two highest governmental authorities 
agree'.22 Guichard's explanation of 'why he was nominated' shows why they agreed in his 
case:
'Neither of them told me precisely and it’s too late to ask them. But I think it's not too difficult to 
understand. The General was fond of me and I was very close to Pompidou, and they were passionate 
about this issue'....23
De Gaulle's only concern was about Guichard retaining his simultaneous position as chief 
adviser in Pompidou's cabinet.14 In Giscard's presidency, Essig's appointment was 
'arranged' between the departing delegue Monod, Prime Minister Chirac and the Minister of 
Interior and amenagement du territoire, Michel Poniatowski, who was Giscard's chief 
political adviser.25 In 1978 Prime Minister Barre, having decided to take direct control of 
DATAR, persuaded Essig this was 'an opportune moment to move on', and chose Chadeau 
to replace him.26 Mitterrand at first ruled that 'to appear on the agenda of a Council 
[Wednesday], a nomination must be proposed to the prime minister the previous Friday, and 
to the president on Monday'.27 Prime Minister Mauroy then talked over with Mitterrand or 
Jacques Attali each week the proposals for forthcoming appointments.28 In September 1981 
Mitterrand decided that, for a list of posts 'over which the State had some means of control’, 
a group of aides from the Ely see and the Matignon would decide which names to put to 
Mitterrand.29 If a name could not be agreed before the Council of Ministers, including
20 F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 16 Oct 1981; M.Cuperly, La Croix. 23 Dec. 1981: La Croix. 28 June 1984.
21 Essig (1979), p. 19, p. 14.
22 Massot (1987), p.293, quoting a debate at the National Assembly, 24 Apr. 1964.
23 Guichard (1975), p.90. Interviewed by G.Suffert
24 Charles and Cristini (1992), p.470, citing an interview with Guichard, 21 June 1989.
25 Audouin (1977), p.30, says arranged with Poniatowski, who would have persuaded Giscard. Essig (1979), 
p.33, implies arranged with Chirac. All three would need to sign the decree.
26 Essig (1979), p. 15.
27 Attali, J. (1993) Verbatim I: I: 1981-1983 (FavardL p.70; entry for 30 June 1981. The justice minister had 
asked for two nominations to be made the following day.
28 ibid. p. 107; entries for 11 and 17 August 1981.
29 ibid. p. 134; entry for 14 Sept 1981.
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during the 1986 cohabitation, the name was withdrawn from the agenda.30 In 1986
Mitterrand required Chirac to provide the people dismissed with a 'suitable' post at the same
pay level, even if not politically important.31
The Mitterrand system did not produce a delegue until October 1981, five months
after Chadeau left. Le Monde's regional specialist 'did not find M.Rocard's explanations
really convincing', especially as the minister for the Plan and amenagement du territoire had
quickly appointed a Plan Commissioner.32 It seems likely that Rocard, who was at political
odds with the rest of the government, had been unable to agree on the name. The decree
appointing Bernard Attali was eventually signed at the same Council of Ministers at which
Rocard presented an Interim Plan in which he did not believe, because he 'had had enough'
of being kept out of decision-making.33 The President had not in any case seen this post as a
priority. In the list of posts 'to be filled by the end of [1981], in order of relative urgency
and importance', the delegue was 16th of 23, not counting prefects, banks and the media.34
The next minister for amenagement du territoire had no say at all in the choice of
deligu£\ Sallois was:
'imposed on Gaston Defferre, a few weeks after the latter was made Minister of the Plan and 
amenagement du territoire. He had the gift of irritating the Mayor of Marseille, who progressively 
marginalised him'.35
But in the cohabitation government that followed, the President had no standing, Prime 
Minister Chirac had no interest in the topic and was reliant for his majority on the Minister 
for Amenagement du territoire, Mehaignerie, for whom the nominee, Carrez, had worked 
for many years. In Mitterrand's second presidency, Duport was named delegue only 'after 
months of shilly-shallying'. The minister had to 'defend his candidate tooth and claw', 
while the Elysee 'took pleasure' in sustaining 'numerous, hesitant manoeuvres' over the 
choice of Carrez's successor. Prime Minister Rocard had asked for an end to 'witch 
hunts',36 and also needed parliamentary support from Mehaignerie, who himself had not 
practised 'witch-hunts'. Carrez left 'when he could be appointed to an reasonable post'.37
The delegues Aubert and Guigou were appointed against the wishes of their 
ministers and never formed good working relationships with them. In 1995 President Chirac 
'personally asked Juppe to find an important post for Raymond-Max Aubert, forcing the 
hand a bit of both the head of government and the new minister for amenagement du
30 Massot (1987), p.293.
31 Meny (1992a), La Corruption de la R6publique (Fayard), p. 110.
32 F.Grosrichard. Le Monde. 18 Sept. 1981.
33 Favier and Martin-Roland (1990), p. 119, citing an interview with Rocard 18 Oct. 1989. In his entry for 14 
Oct. 1981 Attali mentions the Plan but not the appointment of his brother. Attali (1993), p. 172.
34 Attali (1993), p.38; entry for 2 June 1981.
35 F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 7 May 1987.
36 Circular, 25 May 1988 quoted in Lochak (1992), p.42.
37 F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 29 Sept and 6 Oct. 1989. Lochak (1992), p.48.
92
territoire... who probably had other candidates in mind'.38 Relations between the minister
Gaudin and the delegue were 'glacial'.39 In Jospin's government of 1997-2002, the
appointment of Jean-Louis Guigou was unwelcome to the minister, Dominique Voynet. Her
cabinet had numerous clashes with the delegue.40 The minister 'frequently asked Jospin to
replace him. In 2001 she went and he stayed'.41
Figure 4.1, listing the dates of appointment of delegues and the prime ministers who
signed their decrees of appointment, illustrates graphically (if sometimes misleadingly), how
a change of government led to a change of delegue and increasingly speedily after the new
premier was appointed. The correlation is misleading to the extent that delegues were not
replaced in four premierships: first, those of Chaban-Delmas and Messmer in the Pompidou
presidency - but Pompidou had already appointed Monod as deputy delegue in his own
premiership - and then those of Cresson and Beregovoy in the Mitterrand presidency.
Significantly, Cresson's past failure to make such appointments was seen as the major cause
of her weakness in 1991. She lacked
'supporters, networks and intermediaries in the top administration and the media from her own
party [because], unlike those Socialists who hoped to become president, she never applied
herself to getting her friends appointed to powerful posts in the top civil service, the top corps and 
public sector'.42
However, Cresson's government was an exception to the increasingly personalised
basis of appointments. For DATAR, only Chadeau was subject to what Lochak calls
'revenge politicisation', in which officials nominated by a previous government are evicted
precipitously, even if the post has no strategic value. Only Guichard's appointment was
'missionaiy politicisation', in which the political leadership puts in place a politically-
engaged person they trust to conduct a new policy. Mostly DATAR's politicisation is of the
type she calls 'clientelist':
'which is characterised by the fact that replacements are dictated less by suspicion of the incumbent 
than by the ... desire to satisfy the ambitions of one's friends, or, in some cases, to reward services 
rendered.... In most cases, appointing one's friends is not just to reward them, but also to be able to 
work with people one knows and can rely on1.43
That is, most delegues were appointed to supply the reliability that Blondel saw as one 
essential characteristic of a bureaucracy, or to reward services rendered. But there were 
’inevitable trade-offs' in the consequent disquiet within the bureaucracy as a whole, and a 
loss in DATAR's authority when there was rivalry between leaders on who could name their 
friend. There was probably also a loss of competence from restricting the recruitment pool; 
and it is to that issue we now turn.
38 F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 16 Nov. 1995.
39 Le Monde. 5 June 1996.
40 Personal experience of two conferences organised by the association Europa with and for DATAR that 
were taken over by the minister's cabinet: disputes over the roads and rail content of Plan Contracts.
41 B.J6r6me, Le Monde. 8-9 July 2001.
42 Favier and Martin-Roland (1999), pp. 17-18.
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Professional competence and personal lovaltv
’Competence' is the first of the four characteristics of the civil service that affect the impact 
of political leaders, according to Blondel.44 Within the limitations of this thesis the 
assessment of each delegue's competence for the post had mostly to be based on paper 
qualifications, even though, as Aline Coutrot says: 'they omit the role of personality, Olivier 
Guichard having to be put like any other prefect into the box marked "prefects".'45
Since the dilegue directs a team that provides interministerial coordination and 
prepares interministerial decisions, the characteristics required are similar to those of a 
directeur de cabinet. Directeurs are virtually always career civil servants, in mid-career at 
about 35 to 45 years of age.46 They are likely to have been trained at the Ecole nationale 
d'administration, ENA.47 About half the directeurs belong to the top grands corps recruited 
from those with greatest success at ENA. (Inspection des Finances, Conseil d'Etat or Cour 
des Comptes); a few to the top technical grands corps, recruiting from the highest-placed 
graduates of the Ecole polytechnique (Corps des Mines and Fonts et Chaus sees), and the 
rest to the corps of prefects, diplomats or administrateurs civils.48 Although ENA-trained 
staff made up a lower proportion of cabinet members in the 1990s than in the 1970s, they 
still filled most of the posts of directeurs,49 because grands corps members 'have a vast 
network of relationships across society' and 'an irreplaceable general competence'.50 While 
cabinets should include some who are there primarily because of their links with the 
minister, the criterion for choosing a directeur must be administrative expertise.51 Hayward 
and Wright reported the 'disastrous consequences' for Prime Minister Balladur of choosing 
as directeur a young, inexperienced official: 'It is an example of the "court politics" danger 
of choosing someone with whom one is comfortable rather than who is competent'.52 The 
main requirements are 'political skill and administrative authority, although in some 
ministries., specialist skills are also necessary'.53 From the 1980s about 40 per cent of 
directeurs de cabinet made explicit their political commitment;54 in the cabinets,
'politicisation has gained ground at the expense of technocracy'.55
Have political leaders been able to attract to their service a delegue with similar 
attributes? Figure 4.1 summarises the evidence on twelve delegues: their age at appointment,
43 Lochak (1992), p.55.
44 Blondel (1987), p. 168.
45 Coutrot, A. (1982) 'Les membres des cabinets...' in de Baecque, F. and Quermonne, J.L. (eds), 
Administration et Politique sous la Cinquieme R£publique (FNSP). 61-7, p.67.
46 Hayward and Wright (2002), p.46.
47 Schrameck, O. (1995) Les Cabinets minist£riels (Dalloz). p.34.
^Thuillier, G. (1982) Les Cabinets minist&'iels (PUF). p.33.
49 Rouban, L. (1998) La Fm des technocrates? (Sciences Po), p.27.
50 Suleiman, E. (1979) Les Elites en France: Grands corps et grandes ecoles (Seuil). p. 107.
51 Schrameck (1995), p.34.




the training institutions attended and corps, the years of experience in a cabinet and in 
DATAR's technical domain. The post offered on leaving DATAR and a later 'top job' are 
listed as a guide to the reward structure and the calibre of the person appointed, and finally, 
a note on personal links between delegue and political leaders, even if 'proche de' or 'ami 
de' does not always identify satisfactorily the basis of the closeness or the friendship.56
All delegues so far have been civil servants, which brings advantages for 
interministerial coordination, though Guichard had been a prefect for only four years and 
was appointed by the tour exterieur.51 Aubert had only a few years as a junior ministry 
official before becoming 'a political person' in the words of his entry to Who's Who in 
France. He had been a junior minister for a few months immediately before the posting, and 
while at DATAR remained the mayor of Tulle (chief town of Chirac's Correze). Until 1993 
the majority of delegues had taken the generalist high-achievers' route through the Institut 
d'etudes politiques (IEP) and ENA, although those bom earliest, Guichard and Chadeau, 
went only to the predecessor Ecole des sciences politiques. Paillet, appointed in 1993, was 
the only delegue to be trained at the Ecole polytechnique. Among those who followed him, 
two went to ENA relatively late (at 29 for Aubert and 26 for Jacquet rather than the 22 or 23 
of earlier delegues) as internal civil service candidates. Guigou did not go to ENA. That is, 
from 1993 the people selected have not had the classic IEP- ENA background that gives the 
greatest authority to a French civil servant and the best access to coordinating networks.
This finding is necessarily reinforced by a consideration of corps status, since that 
depends on educational prowess. Starting with Monod, five of the first six cMligues came 
from one of the three top grands corps, and the sixth, Chadeau, was at the highest level of 
the prefectoral corps. When Carrez was appointed in 1987 Le Monde emphasised the 
'continuity' of postings, 'the post of delegue having always fallen to a 'magistrate of the 
Cour des Comptes since 1981... not to mention the most illustrious of the Cour des 
Comptes delegues, Monod'.58 However, Carrez was the last of the delegues from the top 
three corps. Whereas Duport, administrateur civil hors classe, was presented by Le Monde 
in 1989 as part of 'the Jacobin technostructure and administrative intelligentsia', Aubert in 
1995 was 'an ephemeral junior minister in the Juppe government, RPR mayor of Tulle, 
close to Jacques Chirac, and had lost his seat in Correze', and Guigou in 1997 'the spouse 
of the justice minister and a professor of agricultural economics'.59
This decline in the level of conventional qualifications was accompanied by a similar
55 Luc Rouban, quoted in Hayward and Wright (2002), p.43.
56 Lochak (1992), p.37.
57 Guichard (1975), p.79.
58 F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 7 May 1987.
59 Le Monde. 6 Oct. 1989; J.Menanteau, Le Monde. 24 July 1997; F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 10-11 
Aug. 1997. Regional economic development is Guigou's specialism. His books are excellent and attract 
media attention to DATAR's work. He has persuaded ministers of all parties to adopt his paradigm of how 
France should develop. In formal discussion he is supercilious, but uses 'tu' to everyone. Yet the most
95
if uneven decline in relevant experience. Although it was possible to work in a cabinet 
without having or adopting appropriate sympathies,60 it is unsurprising that the first two 
delegues appointed by Left governments had been directeurs de cabinet to the Plan 
Commissioner but not to ministers. Their predecessor Essig had never served in a cabinet. 
Even so, the delegues appointed after 1993 had substantially less experience of cabinet work 
than those appointed earlier. Paillet's two years in a cabinet was as only chefdu cabinet, as 
was Jacquet’s three months. Aubert's cabinet service was in the ministry for overseas 
departements, which is not at the centre of affairs. In contrast, among the first seven 
delegues, Guichard and Monod had been members of the prime minister's and/or the 
president's cabinets; Chadeau was directeur de cabinet to Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas, 
and Sallois and Carrez had been directeurs de cabinets.
Although competence in a bureaucracy's technical area of business is not seen as 
essential (generalist skills being prized), in practice nearly all delegues had relevant 
experience. Some had already worked for DATAR (Monod, Essig, Attali, Guigou), or in 
the Paris region planning offices (Duport, Paillet), or developing the Sahara (Guichard) or 
Paris new towns (Chadeau) or in a regional prefect's office as secretaiy-general for regional 
affairs, SGAR (Jacquet). But again there is evidence of a decline in the level of expertise.
By 1967 Monod had prepared regional decrees, worked with Schumann in the ministry for 
amenagement du territoire, and helped Guichard design and then run DATAR: by 1995 
Aubert had been a rural affairs minister for five months. By 1976 Chadeau had been 'an 
enthusiastic sub-prefect' developing Paris new towns and 'an activist regional prefect' in the 
Nord Pas-de-Calais region:61 by 2002 Jacquet had been the SGAR in the Nord Pas-de- 
Calais and the Paris region. By 1981 Attali as No.3 at DATAR had organised the prime 
minister's comite interministeriel d'amenagement du territoire (CIAT, later CIADT), for six 
years: by 1997 Guigou had worked as No.3 at DATAR for 12 years as a technical expert, 
developing scenarios and plans. Only Sallois had no relevant expertise, but though DATAR 
dropped to its lowest point of authority while he was in charge (the minister was persuaded 
to give up its most important instrument, see Chapter 3), the probability is that both his 
appointment and the loss of authority derived from a common cause, the lack of enthusiasm 
for amenagement du territoire of the political leadership.
A last indicator of the relative competence of the different delegues is their 
subsequent career. Guichard, Monod, Attali and Duport seem to have reached the highest 
points in their diverse spheres: Guichard in politics, Monod in business, Attali in public
frequent comment I heard from academics and regional developers was that 'he only got the job because of his 
wife1.
60 Paul Delouvrier said 'top officials discovered under de Gaulle and Pompidou that the president was likely to 
stay, and therefore to get somewhere they had to give a little allegiance'; in Chenu, R. (1994) Paul 
Delouvrier ou la passion d'agir: Entretiens (SeuiO (1994), p. 129. A top transport official told me an 
interesting posting was cancelled in May 2002 because he 'could not, unlike some others, adopt appropriate 
political sympathies'. Hotel de Region, Limoges, 24 O ct2002.
61 Chenu (1994), p.263; Hayward, J. (1986) The State and Market Economy (Brighton: Wheatsheaf), p.l 19.
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corporations, and Duport in the prefectoral corps:; with Chadeau, Sallois and Carrez 
appointed to discretionary posts that others covet. Those appointed after 1989 seem unlikely 
to reach equivalent positions.
The final column in Figure 4.1 summarises the unavoidably incomplete evidence of 
affiliations between delegue and political leaders. Guichard had been de Gaulle's aide-de- 
camp for 13 years and then Pompidou's closest aide as his charge de mission, a post above 
the cabinet hierarchy.62 Monod had a close comradeship with Chirac at IEP, ENA and the 
Cour des Comptes, but pursued a non-political career and was already delegue when Chirac 
became prime minister. Though Chirac made Monod his directeur de cabinet when Monod 
was in conflict with his minister, and the following year recruited Monod as secretary- 
general of his new Gaullist party, Monod's technocratic style soon brought about his 
departure, and he is better described as Chirac's Eminence grise.63 Essig too knew Chirac 
from IEP and ENA but they were not close. Essig's brother was a career rail official and PS 
member who was later appointed SNCF president and junior minister by Left governments, 
but there is no evidence on Essig’s own political leanings. Chadeau had been directeur de 
cabinet to right-wing ministers of different strands, but also worked closely with the 
Socialist Mauroy before 1981, developing the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region.
The politicised system of appointments that appeared therefore to start and finish 
with Guichard did not at first seemed to restart with Bernard Attali in 1981. It was assumed 
that his appointment was due to his brother's influence in the Ely see and that DATAR's 
work would benefit from the family, not political, link.64 However, the brothers had 
different careers and personalities and, moreover, relations were poor between Jacques 
Attali and Beregovoy, then head of the Elysee Secretariat, which liaises between the political 
leaders.65 Nonetheless, DATAR's dealings with ministries improved during Attali's 
tenure;66 and the perception of close links was probably beneficial to DATAR. Of the seven 
delegues who followed Attali at least six had a personal or political connection to the 
leadership. Carrez and Paillet had already worked for the ministers who proposed their 
appointment, though in both cases differing from their ministers in their party politics 
( 'B a rriste ' Centrists\ Radical: Gaullist). Three dilegues who had personal and party 
connections to president or prime minister (Sallois, Aubert and Guigou) had poor working 
relationships with the ministers for amenagement du territoire who had played no part in 
their selection. For two delegues, the personalised links were taken to illegal extremes: 
Paillet admitted and was charged with collecting £500,000 from Alsthom in 1994 on behalf
62 Stevens (1992), p. 114.
63 Collovald, A. (19991 Jacques Chirac et le Gaullisme (Belin). p.226, pp. 103-4, based on interviews with 
Monod and Robert Poujade, 17 May 1985.
64 Hayward, J. (1983) Governing France: The One and Indivisible Republic. 2nd edn (Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson), pp.200-1.
65 Stevens (1992), p.74; Favier and Martin-Roland (1990), p.434.
66 La Croix. 28 June 1984.
97
of Pasqua, in return for awarding a permit to build in Paris.67 Aubert was charged with 
benefiting from a 'false job’ in Chirac's Paris town hall, 1989-95.68
In 1988 Le Monde judged the delegui to be 'one of the highest civil service posts'.69 
Subsequent nominations suggest that it is no longer one of those posts {Le Monde now only 
reports the decree appointing a delegue; there is no editorial comment). Whatever the 
criterion examined, there was a trend to a reduction in the qualities usually thought to give 
officials the best networks and reputation for effectiveness. For political leaders not 
particularly interested in amenagement du territoire (President Mitterrand, President Chirac) 
it could be appropriate to use the post to reward loyalty, but Prime Minister Bahadur and his 
minister Pasqua were strongly committed to the policy,70 and yet appointed less well- 
qualified candidates. Nevertheless, even if an unusual appointment such as Aubert's was 
unlikely to add credibility to DATAR's endeavours, it is witness to the capacity of a French 
president to impose the candidate of his or her choice. Political leaders seem to be choosing 
the person they want but, in Hayward and Wright's phrase: 'in danger of choosing someone 
with whom one is comfortable rather than who is competent'.71
STEERING DATAR'S RECRUITMENT AND ACTIVITIES
Through their power over the delegue's appointment, political leaders can exert influence 
over DATAR's activities. That control is reinforced by budgetary powers on recruitment but 
other facets of DATAR's operations are not so susceptible to formal command. The second 
part of this chapter therefore examines the leadership's capacity for steering DATAR's 
pattern of recruitment, and DATAR's responsiveness to changes in the leaders' policy 
priorities.
A light-weight and flexible administration
Some political scientists assert that bureaucracies tend to 'oversupply' public services and 
grow,72 and some of DATAR's opponents agreed: The young lightweight structure has 
become a fat old lady succumbing to Parkinson's Law... \ 73 Yet French political leaders 
have considerable power to control the number of staff DATAR employs, and French civil 
service rules provide substantial flexibility in recruitment to meet new areas of political 
interest74
67 Le Monde. 18-19 May and 25 June 2003.
68 F.Lhomme, Le Monde. 31 March 2003.
69 A.Faujas, Le Monde. 29 Sept. 1988.
70 The ideas for ’Gaullist’ amenagement du territoire in Pasqua, C and Sdguin, P. (1993) Demain la France. 
II. La Reconquete du Territoire (Albin Michel), were promoted vigorously by Balladur and Pasqua 1993-95.
71 Hayward and Wright (2002), p.48.
72 Niskanen, W. (19711 Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton).
73 M.Giraud, Le Monde. 29-30 March 1987. Michel Giraud was president of the Ile-de-France region.
74 Burnham, J. (2000) 'Human Resources Flexibilities in France’, in D.Famham and S.Horton (eds) Human 
Resources Flexibilities in the Public Services (Macmillan), pp.98-114.
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DATAR's in-house staff
The number of staff a ministry can pay is set out in the Finance Act agreed by parliament. 
Because DATAR is part of the prime minister's office, the prime minister, in negotiation 
with the amenagement du territoire minister, the delegue and, especially, the Finance 
Ministry, determines DATAR's 'budgetary posts'. Figure 4.2 gives examples from Jospin's 
last full calendar year and Raffarin's first full calendar year. The budget figures specify the 
number of tenured officials and non-tenured contracted staff working at DATAR in 
'budgetary posts', and the number of posts in these two categories to be abolished or created 
during the coming year. A comparison of the figures for Jospin and Raffarin shows that 
Raffarin was able to adapt staffing to his government's requirements, especially but not only 
through the use of contracts; there was a high turnover of posts in 2002-03, following the 
change of government, contrasting with the stability of 2000-01. (The overseas staff in 
Jospin's budget are in DATAR's 'Invest in France' agencies, whose status has long been 
criticised by other ministries: in 2001 they were transferred to a separate French Agency for 
International Investment).
Figure 4.3 gives more detail on the categories of staff in 2001 to show the flexibility 
there is within the budgetary posts. Only a third of the budgetary posts were filled by 
tenured officials based permanently at DATAR, difficult to dismiss or transfer. A smaller 
group of tenured officials in budgetary posts had been contracted to DATAR (detache) from 
their ministry or corps. Half the budgetary posts consisted of staff recruited on short-term or 
'indefinite' contracts, of which the latter could be terminated at any time. It is easier for 
leaders to vary the numbers of these last groups (in 1999 fewer tenured officials were 
detaches than in 2001 but many more were on 'indefinite' budgetary contracts). However, a 
third of DATAR's 'in-house' staff were seconded officials, 'put at DATAR's disposal' (mis 
a disposition), seconded by their corps or ministry; their salaries paid by their 'home' 
institution. These officials fill over half the senior posts (60 per cent in 2001; 'a majority' 
1963-8075). To attract these valuable officials the political leadership must demonstrate that 
the posting to DATAR will be of value in terms of individual or corps goals.76 That is, the 
recruitment of these staff is determined by the leadership's signals about its intentions for 
amenagement du territoire.
This evidence on the 'input' controls of the political leadership can be backed up by 
'output' figures. Figure 4.4 shows the number of staff at DATAR in relation to changes of 
prime minister and delegue. The information derives mainly from surveys by Souchon-Zahn 
and Massardier of DATAR's records on policy staff 1963-88 (charges de mission and 
above); and official figures on budgetary posts 1982-2004 (which include support staff but
75 Bodiguel and Quermonne (1983), p. 187.
76 ibid. p. 188; Suleiman, E. (1979), p. 182.
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Figure 4.2. Budgetary posts for DATAR approved in the budgets for 2001 and 2003
Prime Minister Jospin's last full year's budget: 2001
Budgetary posts Posts at Posts Posts Total posts to be
2000-01 31/12/00 abolished created provided 2001
Tenured officials 58 0 3 61
Non-tenured staff 55 0 0 55
Sub-total 113 0 3 116
Overseas staff 28 0 0 28
Total 141 0 3 144
Source: Loi de Finances initiate, Services de PM, V.Amenagement du territoire for 2001.
Note: Overseas staff moved in November 2001 to the French Agency for International Investment (AFII).
Prime Minister Raffarin's first full year's budget: 2003
Budgetary posts Posts at Posts Posts Total posts to be
2002-03 31/12/02 abolished created provided 2003
Tenured officials 68 4 6 70
Non-tenured staff 55 34 32 53
Total 123 38 38 123
Source: Loi de Finances initiate, Services de PM, V.Amenagement du territoire for 2003.
Figure 4.3. Categories of DATAR personnel. 2001
____________________ Budgetary posts_____________________
Tenured Non-tenured Total Tenured TOTAL
_______ officials______________contract staff budgetary officials in
Permanent Contracted Indefinite Fixed posts seconded to December
at DATAR to DATAR_______________term_________________ DATAR 2001
DATAR 43 14 20 24 101 42 143
Commissariats 3 0 4 5 12 12 24
Other offices 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
TOTAL 46 14 24 29 113 56 169
Source: DATAR, Rapport d'activite 2001.
Note: The 113 total budgetary posts do not tally with the 116 posts allocated in the budget outlined in 
Figure 4.2 because DATAR did not recruit the full complement of 116 in 2001.
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Figure 4.4. The number of DATAR staff 1963-2004
Prime
Minister
Delegue Total staff Charges
de
Turnover of charges and above 
Join Leave Net Average
mission change change
1963 Pompidou Guichard 35 15 34 3 31
1964 44 19 24 9 15 | 21 join
1965 54 21 14 10 4 j and 8
1966 56 21 15 8 7 j leave p.a.
1967 [Monod] 65 27 22 11 11
1968 Couve Monod c.100 c.40 13 12 1
1969 Chaban 11 16 -5
1970 14 17 -3
1971 17 9 12 \ 15 join
1972 Messmer 17 13 4 I and 13
1973 8 13 -5 i leave p.a.
1974 Chirac 17 13 4
1975 Essig 14 13 1
1976 Bane 22 10 12
1977 45 14 11 3
1978 Chadeau c.100 39 19 8 11
1979 16 14 2
1980
1 Budgetary c.50 15 16 -1
1981 Mauroy Attali posts c.50 13 15 -2
1982 183 49 35 13 22 I 32 join
1983 177 30 22 8 j and 22
1984 Fabius Sallois 150+ 40 24 23 1 j leave p.a
1985 c.150 38 29 9
1986 Chirac 16 28 -12
r....*........... .
! 14 join
1987 Carrez 16 19 -3 j and 23






















2002 Raffarin Jacquet 123
2003 123
2004 121
Notes: Monod acted as d&egue in 1967 (Marcellin was rmnistre-deldgue) and appointed delegue in 1968. 
Sources: DATAR staff and charges de mission: 1963-67 Pouyet (1968), p.60; 1968, 1978 Essig (1979), 
p.25, p.57; 1977 Madiot (1979), p.57; 1980 La Croix, 24/4/80; 1981, Monde, 16/10/81; 1982 Madiot 
(1993), p.40; 1983 Rigaud et al (1984), p.196; 1984 Laborie et al (1985), p.25; 1985 Madiot (1986), p.187. 
1990-2001 DATAR, Rapport d'activite 2000 and 2001; 2002-04 Loi de finances initiate 2003 and 2004.
Staff turnover Recalculated from Massardier (1996), pp. 148-85.
101
not the seconded charges whose salaries are paid by other public bodies).77
Massardier's figures for turnover in policy staff (in the last column of Figure 4.4) 
show the general correlation between changes in leadership and DATAR's staffing levels. 
There is a sharp increase of DATAR's numbers 1963-67 in de Gaulle's presidency and 
Pompidou's premiership (but not Couve's); slow growth in the Pompidou and Giscard 
presidencies; rapid expansion with the arrival of the Left government; and finally a sharp 
decrease during the Chirac premiership. Then, within this broad picture, there are years of 
high net change in the number of policy staff that usually match changes in political 
leadership or leadership commitment. Following DATAR's initial construction, the biggest 
net changes occur in 1967 (when Guichard is replaced by the ministre-delegue Marcellin), in 
1976 (when Barre took over from Chirac), in 1978 (when Barre took direct charge of 
amenagement du territoire and appointed a new delegue), in 1982 (after the change of 
political control and of delegue), in 1986 (when Chirac became prime minister) and in 1988 
(a presidential election, change of prime minister and a long-delayed appointment of a new 
delegue). The strong net increases in 1967,1976 and 1978 are linked to occasions when 
prime ministers and ministers showed interest in the topic; and the strong decreases in 1986 
and 1988 when prime ministers and presidents signalled their disinterest. In contrast, the 
expansion in 1971, when the 'technocratic' Monod started the forecasting studies, seems to 
be an exercise of bureaucratic autonomy.
Changes in budgetaiy posts are less easy to interpret because they do not include all 
seconded staff, and are highly susceptible to short-term budgetary strategies, such as the 
cutbacks of 1991 and the pre-election increases of 1992. Nevertheless it is clear that these 
figures too show an initial strong recruitment in 1982, in parallel with the process seen at 
Matignon and the Elysee, where leaders gave experience to groups new to power, put 
sympathisers in posts close to decision-makers, and rewarded campaigners with 'jobs for 
the boys'.78 This expansion was followed by declining numbers under the Fabius and 
Chirac governments, who both reduced DATAR's influence (removing regulatory powers). 
But it likely there was some recovery in numbers in 1990 after Duport's appointment as 
deligue, and the minister Chereque revived the forecasting studies. The smaller surge in 
1993 was initiated by the minister responsible for amenagement du territoire, Pasqua. 
'Pasqua wanted "shock troops" put in place [to] re-conquer the territory' and Paillet 
recruited more staff.79 When Balladur later prioritised budgetaiy savings, requiring DATAR
77 Marie-Fran5oise Souchon-Zahn's unpublished survey of 105 charges de mission 1963-80 is summarised in 
Bodiguel and Quermonne (1983), pp. 186-8. Massardier (1996) analysed DATAR's records of 518 staff at 
chared level and above, appointed 1963-88. Data was incomplete for 31 of the 518, and there were 
definitional problems, because some officials are appointed for part-time or short-term assignments. 
Massardier (1996), p. 154fn.
78 Prof. N. Wahl, LSE guest seminar, 22 Nov. 1983. Mauroy had 100 aides; most of his predecessors had 50. 
Wright (1989), pp.81-2.
791, de Gaulmva. Les Echos. 29-30 Oct 1993.
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to reduce its staff by 20 per cent,80 DATAR complied. Finally, there was an increase in 
budgetary posts after the change of government in 2002, with the new numbers maintained 
by Raffarin in his first full budgetary year.
Souchon-Zahn's work on the 1963-80 period seemed to demonstrate that turnover 
'tended to increase' when the delegue changed.81 However the more detailed later figures 
show this conclusion does not hold in 1975, 1984 or 1987. Rather, step changes are 
associated with changes in political leadership or commitment, and the change of delegue 
that is often associated with a high turnover is another consequence of the same cause, the 
change of political leadership. The political leadership not only has the legal powers to 
control DATAR's size but on the whole seems to have done so, the increase under Monod in 
1971 being an exception.
DATAR's external collaborators
DATAR's human resources extend beyond the 'in-house staff in two ways. First, under the 
terms of the 14 February 1963 decree the delegue can call on the services of experts. 
'Personalities', such as Philippe Lamour, Paul Delouvrier, Pierre Racine, Roger Gregoire 
and Marcel Long, were brought in to chair development missions and committees and write 
special reports. Massardier found that the use of such prestigious collaborators had declined, 
an evolution that he attributed to a decline in the prestige of DATAR itself.82 Second, 
DATAR contributes staff to 'parallel' institutions that organise redevelopment projects at 
local level, cutting across functional and territorial boundaries. Some critics see these 
institutions as strengthening the political leadership's control. For example, DATAR's rural 
development commissioners implement centrally-decided regional strategies and transmit to 
central decision-makers the views of important 'private groups that bring together the 
various social interests of the regions'.83 But others, such as the Cour des Comptes and the 
Guichard Commission, have criticised DATAR for 'paying for people not at its disposal'. 
The Guichard Commission listed 'seven structures under DATAR's more or less direct 
control':
’rural development commissioners, development project coordinators, industrial commissioners,
tourist development missions, economic action missions, conversion poles, and general secretariats
for regional affairs (SGARs...), as well as 21 offices abroad....'84
These agencies are more complicated for DATAR and therefore the prime minister, to 
supervise than are 'in-house' staff.85 However, all seven structures were appointed, created 
and funded by will of the political leadership: the commissioners and heads of missions are 
appointed in a Council of Ministers; DATAR's grants to associations are approved in a
80 Le Moniteur. 1 July 1994.
81 Bodiguel and Quermonne (1983), p. 186.
82 Massardier (1996), p. 155.
83 Biarez (1982), pp.272-3, p.277; Biarez (1989), pp. 185-6 reaffirms the same point.
84 Guichard Commission (1986), p.56 and p.56fn.
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CIADT, chaired by the prime minister; ’conversion poles’ are approved in the Council of 
Ministers or a CIADT, and the SGARs are 'economic divisions' of regional prefectures, 
mostly run by sub-prefects. As DATAR's minister reminded the Cour des Comptes, 'the 
allocation of the main headings of DATAR's budget is decided by the prime minister or the 
minister responsible for amenagement du territoire'.86 (The leadership's control of this 
funding is explored further in the following chapter).
In summary, wherever DATAR staff are employed, the political leadership can adapt 
the number and location of posts through the formal controls of budgetary law and 
ministerial decision-making; but its recruitment of higher-level officials and experts seemed 
to depend more on the signals it sends out about its level of interest in the policy. The 
leadership has instruments such as the Cour des Comptes that can draw its attention to 
imperfect practices that need to be corrected, as witnessed by DATAR's recruitment of a 
human resources specialist in 2001, responding to Cour warnings that DATAR was no 
longer a small team around a delegue.
An inter-disciplinarv organisation
Just as the delegue seems likely to be most effective if he or she has similar characteristics to 
those of a directeur de cabinet, DATAR is like a cabinet in needing the right balance of 
mobile grands corps members from ENA or Polytechnique if it is to succeed in using their 
networks to facilitate coordination.87
In 1966 just over half DATAR's charges de mission had attended ENA or 
Polytechnique. A third were from the top five administrative corps and another third from 
top technical corps. Every relevant bureaucratic institution was 'covered' by a charge 
competent in its domain: an ingenieur en chefdu genie rural dealt with the agriculture 
ministiy; sub-prefects were responsible for regional programmes, two ingenieurs des ponts 
et chaussees worked with the infrastructure ministry.88 Guichard had been able to build this 
organisation from a network of previous collaborators in the Office for Saharan 
Development89 and from those in the Conseil d'Etat and elsewhere who had heard that 
'something promising was going on'.90 Though the early recruitment was personalised, it 
was 'close to the administrative ideal-type’ for an administration de mission.91 But even this 
'promising' new organisation, known to have strong backing from president and prime 
minister, had been unable to attract a member of the Inspection des finances. Monod had 
wanted 'someone to pursue financial matters for DATAR, but the Finance Ministry refused 
to allow an inspecteur des finances to work for a conseiller referendaire from the Cour des
85 Cour des Comptes (1998) Le Rapport Public 1997 (1998). S .l. 'Associations subventionn^es par la 
DATAR': Le Rapport Public 2001 (2002) returned to the subject
86 Cour des Comptes (2002), Yves Cochet, para. 6745.
87 Hayward and Wright (2002), p.45.
88 Pouyet (1968), pp.62-4.
89 At least 8 of the 27 charges de mission recruited 1963-67. Massardier (1996), p. 130.
90 Roche (1986), p.70, Essig (1979), p. 19.
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Comptes' [Monod].92 How well therefore were subsequent political leaders able to ensure 
that staff at DATAR had the qualities to match their needs?
figure 4.5 compares figures compiled by Massardier on the educational background 
of charges de mission who were recruited in (approximately) the Gaullist presidency, the 
Pompidou and Giscard presidencies, and the first Mitterrand presidency.93 The proportion 
of charges who had been at ENA was much the same among those recruited in the 1970s as 
among those who arrived earlier, but in the 1980s it declined markedly. However, the 
absolute number of ENA graduates recruited per year, having risen slightly in the 1970s as 
DATAR continued to expand gently, was the same in Mitterrand's first term as under the 
Gaullists. The presence of recruits trained at Polytechnique increased both proportionately 
and in absolute numbers in the 1970s, partly no doubt because of Monod's forecasting 
studies but also because the political leadership gave amenagement du territoire a strong 
technical bias during this period (see Chapter 6 on roads planning). In Mitterrand's first term 
the proportion of Polytechnique recruits declined substantially but the number of 
polytechniciens recruited per year remained as high as in the 1970s. Staff levels at DATAR 
expanded hugely in the early 1980s with the arrival of the Left government (see figure 4.4); 
and a larger proportion of them than before had been educated in other ways (university, 
ministerial ecoles). That is, in the first Mitterrand presidency just as many ENA-trained 
officials were attracted to DATAR as had been attracted to the early DATAR, and even more 
Polytechnique-tramed officials were willing to serve. This type of recruitment, retaining the 
same capacity in terms of ENA and Polytechnique networks, yet offering additional posts to 
people with different training, matched the new political regime's desire to open recruitment 
to its own people without cutting back on traditional, proven arrangements.94
A similar overall picture is seen in the recruitment of staff from the top grands corps. 
Figure 4.6 gives figures derived from Massardier for director-level posts {delegue and 
deputy delegue); the charges de mission in Paris; and the charges in missions and 
commissariats. Although numbers are rather small, recruitment from the top grands corps 
for director-level posts seems similar across the three periods; the delegue (until 1987) and 
the deputy delegue (until 1982) continued to be appointed to DATAR from the grands corps. 
The overall number of charges from these corps also remains steady though recruitment 
from the administrative grands corps to missions outside Paris ceases, to be replaced by the 
technical corps. In total, the same number of top grands corps officials are recruited to 
DATAR in the 1980s as in the 1960s, though not at the level of the early 1970s, when Essig 
had to 'keep numbers down by pleading the smallness of the building to stem demand'.95.
91 Pouyet (1968), p.62.
92 Essig (1979), p.21.
93 The data rely on Massardier (1996), pp. 159-63, which uses these time-periods. But he emphasises the 
percentage changes, whereas for the purpose of this thesis, the absolute number is more important.
94 Pfister, T. (19881 La R^publique des fonctionnaires (Albin Michel), p.92.
95 Essig (1979), p.57.
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figure 4.5. Training of charges de mission at DATAR
Training establishment of charges 
de mission in Paris office
1963-70 1971-81 1982-88
ENA 14 (29%) 25 (32%) 15 (21%)
Ecole polytechnique 8 (17%) 21 (27%) 13 (18%)
Other grandes ecoles 3 (6%) 5 (6%) 4 (6%)
Other public service ecoles 4 (8%) 8 (10%) 11 (15%)
IEP (only) 13 (27%) 10 (13%) 10 (14%)
University 13 (27%) 10 (13%) 10 (14%)
Others 5 (10%) 8 (10%) 15 (21%)
TOTAL (N= 100%) 48 70 72
Notes: Following Massardier, the middle period, 1971-81, is longer than the others. 
IEP includes former Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques.
Source: Recalculated from figures and tables in Massardier (1996), pp. 159-63.
Figure 4.6. Grands corps membership of senior DATAR personnel
Corps membership of personnel 1963-70 1971-81 1982-88
Administrative grands corps
Director-level 3 4 4
Charges in Paris 5 7 4
Charges outside Paris 4 1 0
Total administrative grands corps 12 12 8
Technical grands corps
Director-level 1 5 2
Charges in Paris 6 12 8
Charges outside Paris 3 4 5
Total technical grands corps 10 21 11
Total grands corps members 22 43 23
Notes: Following Massardier, the middle period 1971-81 is longer than the other two.
The administrative grands corps are Inspection des Finances, Conseil d'Etai, Cour des Comptes. 
The technical grands corps are Mines and Ponts et Chaussees.
Source: Calculated from figures and tables in Massardier (1996), p. 152, pp. 170-71.
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The point about the stability of grands corps recruitment in the early 1980s needs to be 
emphasised because it contrasts with the decline in grands corps recruitment to DATAR in 
the second Mitterrand presidency.
Evidence on how far political leaders were still able to recruit grands corps members 
to DATAR at the end of the 1980s was sought from an examination of senior posts held at 
DATAR between 1986 and 1999. Figure 4.7 includes all posts that were held at some point 
1986-99 by an official whose corps membership is given in Bottin administratif. It indicates 
whether their predecessors and successors were of the same corps or no corps, or the post 
was vacant or abolished. It shows that recruitment of corps members declined overall. There 
is a stronger recruitment from the administrateur civil corps rather than the higher corps, but 
even this corps is rare at DATAR after 1997. Chirac’s DATAR in 1986 recruited two grands 
corps members and retained those already present. Rocard's government in 1988 similarly 
recruited two new grands corps members. But 1988 was the last year96 that there were 
officials from the Cour des Comptes (a corps that had always had one or two members at 
DATAR); it is also the last year that senior members of three top technical corps were 
present at the same time {Mines, Ponts, Tilecomms). By the same token, it is clear that 
bureaucratic corps did not control the appointment process. Of the 58 postings listed after 
1986, only 8 consisted of a corps member (or member of no corps) replacing a member of 
the same corps (or none). Other traditional bureaucratic norms were transgressed when a 
second 'No.2' was appointed by the Left government in 1990, demoted to ’No.3' by the 
Right government in 1995 and created delegue by the next Left government in 1997. 
Flexibility remains; eleven new posts (not just a name-change) were created in this period; 
and posts were not continued when a role ceased to be a priority.
Yet the explosion of appointments under the Balladur government 1993-95 reveals 
the most significant point. Political leaders promoting a more dynamic amenagement du 
territoire were able to attract corps members who, in this case at least, were less politically- 
identified. A deputy delegue arrived from the interior ministry, where he had planned the 
decentralisation laws under the Socialist Defferre, and the reorganisation of local authority 
functions under the Socialist Joxe, to oversee the drawing up of the Gaullist Pasqua’s bill on 
amenagement du territoire (LOADT).97 There were also small increases in recruitment from 
the technical grands corps in 2001 and 2002 as a new presidency approached.98 The 
willingness of senior officials to be seconded to DATAR varied with the political leadership.
The responsiveness of teams to leadership priorities
Guichard’s period as delegue-general of the Organisation for the Development of the Sahara 
had impressed on him the merits of a team-based system without internal divisions, that
96 In 2004 a Cour des Comptes official (by the tour ext£rieurl was appointed to DATAR as the 'No.3'.
97 Le Monde. 16 Feb. 1994; La Tribune Desfossds. 17 Feb. 1994; F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 3 Feb. 1995.
98 DATAR (2001) Rapport d'Activite 2000 (DATAR); DATAR (2002).
Figure 4.7. Corps appointments at DATAR 1986-99
About mid-year: 1986 1988 1989 1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1999
Prime minister Chirac Rocard Beregovoy Balladur Juppe Jospin
Delegui Cour des Comptes.................> Administrateur civil hors classe ..................... > Ponts Admin, civil Professor....... .................... >
Deputy ddlegud/directeur Professor C. Comptes Professor .. Prefect Admin, civil hors classe......... > Prefect
Directeur INSEE ...... Professor......... ..................... > [Vacant] No corps
Conseiller technique Sub-Prefect Sub-Prefect... Sub-Prefect Administrateur c iv il............> Sub-Prefect Admin, civil No corps
Conseiller au delegue Prefect.............. Admin, civil Prefect
Conseiller au ddigud Armaments...... ..................... > No corps
Relocation o f firms No corps Telecomms .... ...............> Mines Ponts No corps No corps Armaments
Infrastructure, plans Ponts............... ..................> P onts................... ................. > Local government corps.......> [Vacant] No corps
Rural development Rural engineer Agronomist [Vacant] No corps Rural engineer ..................... > [Vacant] No corps
Location factors M ines............. [Vacant] Contracted..... ................... >
Finance, Gen.Sec. C. Comptes Administrates* c iv il......> Administrateur c iv il.............> Sub-Prefect... .....................> Admin, civil INSEE
Europe, international Agronomist Administrateur civil hors classe..................... > Administrateur c iv il .................. ..................... > Admin, civil No corps
Studies, forecasting [Vacant] No corps......... INSEE........... Lecturer No corps
Act on AdT TPG [finance]
State action!services Administrateur civil..............> Admin, civil Lecturer
Institutions!regions Prefect Public Works
Economic action Administrateur civil No corps
Universities, research Lecturer
Note: Posts with slightly different titles but similar roles are combined together.
The posts shown are all those in DATAR's Paris office that at some point between 1985 and 1999 were held by an official from a senior corps. ©
Sources: Bottin administratif (various years), supplemented by Lettres de la DATAR.
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transcended sectoral boundaries." The founding myths still translate into DATAR's 
working practices. Because of the high proportion of secondments there can be no career 
structure, the diversity of backgrounds blurs status, and there is an informal relationship 
within teams.100 But if the teams that Pouyet thought were 'original' in French 
administration still exist, how well do they reflect the leaderships' priorities?
Figure 4.8 sets out the evolution of the team structure. Some changes would 
probably have taken place under any political leadership in response to changes in the 
environment (the addition of the service sector in the 1970s, a 'European' team in the run-up 
to the Single Market 1992). But there is considerable evidence of response to leadership 
demands, which shows in the substantial changes in structure when there is an alternation of 
political leadership (1978 to 1982,1992 to 1993,2002 to 2003). At a finer level, changes to 
individual teams match the political leadership's orientation on amenagement du territoire. 
For example, by 1978 had been added a 'rural team, focusing on country areas and small 
towns', to meet the goals Giscard defined in November 1975. The Paris Basin team was set 
up in 1990 in response to Prime Minister Rocard's alarm at census results for the region. Its 
report was published in 1992; a Paris region scheme agreed by ministers in 1993 and a Paris 
Basin plan signed by regional presidents in 1994.101 In 1993 Les Echos reported that 
'DATAR is adapting its structures to its new tasks',102 as the delegue reorganised the teams 
around Pasqua's priorities. In 1997 DATAR did not just adopt the vocabulary of 
'sustainable development' when Voynet became Minister for Environment and 
Amenagement du territoire, but organised the production of sustainable development plans 
for several public services - which a new minister was able to set aside in 2004.
Yet if DATAR's teams are linked to leaders' priorities, not all the leaders' priorities 
are covered by the teams. Journalists questioned why Bernard Attali's DATAR did not have 
an industrial team to come up with ideas for industrial restructuring,103 though it was among 
the top presidential concerns. In 2003 DATAR set up four teams that corresponded closely 
to most of the policy goals proclaimed by the premier in December 2002 ('promote wealth 
creation'; 'make metropolitan areas and regions attractive internationally'; 'enable all 
territories to participate in regional development'; 'give them the means of self­
development'). But the policies most dear to Jean-Pierre Raffarin (decentralisation and the 
trans-national associations he called 'petites Europes'), 'would be given to [un-named] 
members of staff to follow up'.104 Professional notions of amenagement du territoire also
99 Charles and Cristini (1992), p.470 citing interview with Guichard, 21 June 1989. Essig (1979), p.24.
100 Working with the ’public services' team 2001-03 it was not clear in discussion or behaviour, in or outside 
meetings, whether the university lecturer turned sub-prefect, a Banque de France official or a Post Office 
official was the team leader.
101 Lacaze, J.-P. (1994) Paris: Urbanisme d’Etat et destin d'une ville (Flammarion), p.344; Lettre de la 
DATAR. 153, Oct 1994.
1021.de Gaulmya, Les Echos. 29-30 Oct. 1993.
103 La Croix. 28 June 1984.
104 B.Jerome. Le Monde. 13 Feb. 2003; DATAR website, section 'L'organisation', 28 Feb. 2004.
Figure 4.8. The evolution of DATAR's teams
1967 Industrial decentralisation, foreign 
investment and aid to firms
Public works Regional action Studies
1978 Industrial team (firms) Urban team
(towns, offices, service sector)
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(country areas and small towns)
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Sources: 1967: Pouyet (1968), p.66; 1978: Essig (1979), p.61; 1982: Le Monde, 25 Dec. 1981; 1985: Laborie et al (1985), p.25; 1992: Madiot (1993), p.39; 1993: Lettre de la 
DATAR, 146, Nov 1993; 1996: Madiot (1996), p.23. 1998 Bottin administratif {1998); 2001-03, DATAR website, topic "L'organisation", various dates. ■—
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intrude: in 2001 the creation of the 'local productive systems' team and the expansion of the 
delegue's forecasting programme were surely facilitated by the departure of Voynet. On 
whole, however, DATAR seemed to adapt to the demands of a new leadership even when 
these changed frequently.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter set out to show how the political leadership was able to adapt and steer DATAR 
as a bureaucratic organisation that responded to its requirements. The analysis focused on 
the two structural elements that combine to give leaders the assurance of reliability, 
competence and a flexible responsiveness: the post of delegue, in which political leaders 
would need to marry loyalty with competent management of DATAR's activities; and the 
constitution of DATAR as an administration de mission whose varied and high-quality 
recruitment and informal working methods ought to enable it to ensure intermini sterial 
coordination while adapting quickly to new political demands.
The examination showed that the French political leadership has considerable power 
to appoint a loyal delegue from a wide recruitment pool. Despite the strong career protection 
rights of the French civil service there are many ways a new leadership can replace a delegue 
without undermining the loyalty of the bureaucracy as a whole or the willingness of able 
candidates to be recruited; this system seemed to operate satisfactorily for twenty years. The 
greatest constraint on the political leadership seems to have come from internal conflict 
within its multiple components (president, prime minister and minister(s) for amenagement 
du territoire), mediated by the party system. The most efficient nomination processes took 
place when there were fewer active participants (a valid argument for attaching DATAR 
directly to the prime minister). There was dysfunctional conflict between the delegue and 
ministers for amenagement du territoire whose views had not been respected. 'Structured 
politicisation' after 1981 soon led to a loss in DATAR's effectiveness during every period of 
transition between a new government and a new delegue. In choosing a delegue, political 
leaders make a 'trade-off, in Blondel's phrase, between competence and loyalty. The 
several indicators examined all pointed in the same direction: political leaders gave 
increasingly greater weight to personal links than to professional criteria. It fitted Lochak's 
category of 'clientelist politicisation', at best appointing people who could be relied upon, at 
worst satisfying the ambitions of friends or rewarding services rendered.
This conclusion was reinforced by the examination of the political leaders' powers 
over DATAR as a whole. Political leaders have direct and effective control of the number of 
staff paid from the prime minister's resources and whether they will be permanent additions 
to the bureaucracy or can be dismissed at will. However, almost by virtue of the type of 
policy domain, DATAR staff in the field are more difficult to control in formal ways; 
nevertheless, each field office was consciously created by the political leadership, and it is 
within their power to abolish them or curtail irregular practices. The recruitment of an 
important minority of senior staff is largely at the choice of seconding institutions and the
I l l
officials themselves, based on the value to them of work at DATAR; it is therefore related to 
the signals the leadership sends out about the future of the policy. This correlation could be 
seen in quantitative terms, with staff numbers and turnover rising and falling with the arrival 
of new political leaders with a greater or less commitment to amenagement du territoire.
The point was underlined by analyses of the recruitment to DATAR of the officials 
most able to network and persuade effectively: those trained at ENA or Ecole polytechnique, 
and especially members of the higher corps. Up to the start of Mitterrand's second term of 
office, the numbers of ENA and grands corps staff at DATAR did not change greatly in 
absolute terms, while the numbers from Polytechnique and the technical grands corps varied 
mainly in response to policy changes decided by political leaders. Officials were keen to 
work at DATAR and there was a rapid expansion after 1981 when the new leadership 
opened up recruitment to staff with different qualifications. But by the late 1980s there was a 
decline in the numbers of staff recruited from the higher corps. Nevertheless, the greater 
presence of these officials during the mid-1990s when Balladur and Pasqua revived the 
policy, showed that recruitment could be stimulated quickly in response to interest shown by 
the political leadership. Finally an examination of DATAR's evolving team structure showed 
that the agency adapted quickly to new demands by the political leadership, even if some 
effort went into rather technical work, and some themes of interest to ministers failed to be 
addressed.
Overall, it was demonstrated that the political leadership could use personal and 
institutional mechanisms in the manner asserted by Blondel to re-orient DATAR to its own 
needs. It was limited by the capacity of the grands corps to resist appointment, but so far 
this constraint has materialised only when the leadership itself was not interested in the 
policy. The major constraints on an effective response to policy demands were the conflicts 
within the leadership itself and the consequences of politicisation. First politicisation gained 
ground at the expense of technocracy; then from the mid-1990s political loyalty, friendships 
and reward took over from competence and authority as the major criteria in appointments. 
In a paradoxical way the personalisation of appointments is witness to the power of the 
leadership to make an impact on a bureaucratic agency, but the consequence of this short­
term action is a decline in the long-term credibility of the institution. Yet the brief return of 
the grands corps in the mid-1990s when political leaders were enthusiastic about this policy 
domain, showed that political interest and will make an impact on DATAR itself and its 
capacity to influence the bureaucratic environment on behalf of the political leadership.
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CHAPTER 5
STEERING POLICY THROUGH DATAR: THE USE BY POLITICAL 
LEADERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL TOOLS
INTRODUCTION
Blondel argued that there were four features of a public bureaucracy that governed its 
implementation of the leader’s goals, and which an active political leadership would try to 
improve. The impact of the leadership on three of those features - competence, organisation, 
reliability - was examined in the last chapter. The fourth feature was the linkage between the 
bureaucracy and the population. For the leader's aims to be carried out in society, not only 
should there be close links between the leadership and the bureaucracy but also the 
bureaucracy should 'be closely linked to the population'.1 The political leaders who created 
DATAR did not intend it to link them directly to the population in the manner of field 
offices, but DATAR had a 'target population' of public actors, whose actions it would steer 
on the leadership's behalf.
Those in Prime Minister Pompidou's office who designed DATAR
*had surveyed the principal decision-making nodes in the administrative and financial apparatus and
organised the necessary regulatory provisions'.2
The chief administrative instrument was the prime minister's committee, the comite 
interministeriel d'amenagement et du territoire (CLAT, from 1995 CIADT),3 and the delegue 
was given a place on other committees relevant to regional development. The main financial 
instruments were a fund, the Fonds d'intervention pour Vamenagement du territoire 
(FLAT),4 and new procedures to give DATAR oversight of ministries' capital budgets. If 
'bureaucracies... are the tools, the instruments par excellence, which leaders use and on 
which they rely',5 DATAR, together with its committees and financial powers, was the 
innovative bureaucratic tool that would coordinate the activities of ministries and deliver a 
more effective policy of amenagement du territoire.
This chapter evaluates the use made by political leaders of these administrative and 
financial tools and the constraints to their action. First, with respect to the administrative 
tools: what evidence is there that different political leaders have been able to ensure that these 
committees meet their particular needs? Have political leaders been able to create and abolish
1 Blondel (1987), pp. 168-9.
2 GrdmionJP. (1976), p. 124.
3 Comitd interministeriel d’amenagement et de ddveloppement du territoire.
4 Subsumed in 1995 into a new Fonds national d'amenagement et de d^veloppement du territoire (FNADTl.
5 Blondel (1987), p. 167.
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other committees in this policy domain, and modify their purpose or membership to suit 
their own programmes, or do committees take on an institutionalised existence?6 Second, 
with respect to the financial tools, how easy has it been for the political leadership to control 
the size and use of funding allocated to amenagement du territoire programmes? Have new 
leaders been able to create, abolish and modify development funds in relation to their own 
priorities? How well has DATAR been able to impose the leadership's priorities for regional 
development on ministries' spending? Overall, has each political leadership been able to 
create, use and adapt to its own goals the administrative and financial resources it derives 
from its legal and constitutional position, and through which DATAR drives the political 
agenda for amenagement du territoire?
THE ADMINISTRATIVE TOOLS
This section assesses political leadership's use of that conventional administrative device, 
the interministerial committee. It examines the organisation of the principal committee in this 
domain, CIAT/CLADT, to judge whether it was an efficient tool, and show whether different 
political leaders have been able to use it as they intend. It matches the frequency of CIAT 
meetings to the levels of leaders' interest in amenagement du territoire for further evidence 
that it is leaders' will that drives CIAT. The last part of this section shows how other 
interministerial committees whose interests concern amenagement du territoire respond to the 
varying concerns of leaders.
Operating the committees CIAT and CIADT
CIAT was not only the crucial committee for amenagement du territoire but was 'without 
contest the most important of the committees created by decree' [in any domain].7 The 
importance of CIAT for Massot stemmed from the size of FIAT, the direct legal force of its 
decisions over administrative bodies (it does not prepare decisions: it enacts them),8 and its 
methodology, which was so effective that it was adopted as a model by interministerial 
committees run by the government secretary-general.9
Prime Minister Debre introduced CIAT in 1959 as an informal meeting to discuss 
conflicts between the Ministers of Construction, Finance and Industry, and found it 
sufficiently useful to establish it formally the following year.10 He chaired the meetings, 
which were organised by Jerome Monod, his cabinet staff member for administrative reform 
and amenagement du territoire, and it discussed reports presented by the Minister of 
Construction. Under Georges Pompidou's organisational arrangements (designed by Olivier
6 Of 32 'permanent' interministerial committees serviced by the prime minister's office in 1985 only 11 met 
that year, 4  had met for the last time in 1984,2 in 1983...and 7 had never met or were considered to be no 
longer functioning. Conseil d'Etat (1986), p.42.
7 Massot (1979), p. 151.
8 Conseil d'Etat, 4 June 1993. The ENA association had challenged CIAT's power to move ENA to 
Strasbourg.
9 Massot (1979), p. 152.
10 Decree of 19 Nov. 1960. Debr6 (1988) p. 177, lists 10 CIATs he held 1959 to 1962.
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Guichard, Monod and Pompidou’s directeur de cabinet), DATAR became responsible for
preparing and organising CIAT meetings and for seeing that the decisions it took were
followed through by ministries.11 The decisions were presented as a list of actions {relive de
decisions) that were directions to ministers from the prime minister; in practice they ratified
agreements DATAR had already organised between the participants, or ’formalised’
decisions already taken by the prime minister.12 Figure 5.1 gives examples of decisions
taken in CIAT meetings, 1963 to 2003.
In 1963 CIAT had a core membership of the prime minister, ministers of interior,
finance, industry and agriculture, and the delegue; other ministers were invited for particular
topics. Figure 5.1, listing a few decisions made at different CLATs, shows their wide scope.
They fall into three categories: first, administrative decisions about government
programmes, such as the decision in 1966 to create interministerial organisations for
planning metropolitan areas (OREAMs); second, financial decisions, whether about a sum to
be assigned to a sectoral policy, or a subsidy regime; and finally, 'the prime minister settles
any dispute that has arisen between DATAR and ministers’.13
In the 1960s and early 1970s CLATs were an administratively -efficient tool. Their
decisions could have far-reaching consequences for a town or region, but they were dry and
technocratic. They produced a rileve de decisions of two pages.14
The First two delegues, Olivier Guichard and Jdrome Monod, developed a working method that was 
particularly effective. DATAR prepared CIAT's agenda and dossiers carefully, giving the relevant 
ministries the right amount of information and taking the prime minister into their confidence. The 
prime minister met the deligue a few days before CIAT and was thus fully aware of the dossiers and 
any political or technical problem. He made his decision in practice at that point. The delegue gave 
the prime minister an element of choice without going outside the draft agreement [with ministries]. 
He selected some dossiers on which DATAR was ready to accept strategic withdrawals to save the 
face or the position of the minister concerned. Thus during the committee sessions the prime 
minister really had the feel of Tiands-on' government and taking clear decisions. The often sterile 
game of interministerial conflict was in most cases replaced by agreements that enabled action to 
take place with the power of a government decision behind them.15
Political control ofCIATs
With such attention paid to the efficient organisation by DATAR it might seem that the 
control of CIAT was in the hands of bureaucrats. When Pompidou's chief political aide, 
Guichard, was delegue, it was clearly political will that prevailed. But the vignettes offered 
by the delegue Francis Essig of other prime ministers in CIAT seem to show they too put 
their own political stamp on decisions. Pompidou's successor, Maurice Couve de Murville, 
'was really exacting', and sent back for further study several dossiers that DATAR thought 
well-prepared.16 Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Prime Minister 1969-72, was more interested in
11 Decree of 14 Feb. 1963, Art 3.
12 Massot (1979), p. 152.
13 Madiot (1979), p.48.
14 Essig (1979), p.91.
15 Rigaud and Delcros (1984), p. 197.
16 Essig (1979), p.86.
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Figure 5.1 Meetings and decisions of CIAT and CIADT
Date D ecisions or Frequency o f m eetings Sources
31/7/63
23/12/63
Agreed new aerospatial activity would be sited in SW France 
Agreed to relocate pensions administration out of Paris





Agreed to fund aerospace centre at Toulouse
Named 8 regional metropolitan cities; Languedoc mission budget
Relocation of Ecole Polytechnique to Palaiseau
Lanversin (1970) p.381 
Madiot (1979) p. 132 
Audouin (1977) p. 169







Agreed to create OREAMs (Metropolitan area planning bodies) 
Created the interministerial land property group (GIF)
Set up an interministerial group on Paris region basin 
Created mission for developing Corsica
Agreed regional parks; grants regime (double session with 28/11) 
Adopted CGP report on Plan rationalisation
R&nond (1977) p.7 
PLF 1967,1, p.51 
PLF 1971,1, p.85 
Madiot (1986) p.234 
PLF 1968,1, p.90 






Approved Fos development plan and report on Aerotrain
Awarded FIAT to Navibus; relocated State body to Toulon
Agreed trial of Aerotrain
Approved New Town of Le Vaudreuil
Relocated 3 Hautes Ecoles to Rennes
Audouin (1977) p.77 
PLF 1968,1, p. 131 
PLF 1969,1, p.32 








OREAM draft plan for Lyon; agreed Imprimeries to go to Douai
Agreed Breton Road plan, and 3 rural renovation zones
Approved OREAM draft plan for Nord
Created industrial conversion zones
Created industrial zones of Fos and Lorraine
Corsica; Pays Basque; Alsace; OREAM Marseille and Lorraine
PLF 1969,1, p.39 
PLF 1969,1, p.32 
PLF 1969,1, p.39 
PLF 1969, II, p. 193 
PLF 1970,1, p. 124 





Plans for C6te Aquitaine and 'metropolitan countermagnets' 
Savoie; Lyon-Mediterranean canal; road schemes 
Rural renovation; roads in Auvergne mining area; Corsica 
RN10 to Bordeaux; relocation of officials to Toulouse
PLF 1970,1, p. 124 
PLF 1970,1, p. 124 
PLF 1971, II, p. 157 







Nord; Lorraine; water supply; local airports
Road schemes; regional observatories; natural parks (with 26/5)
OREAM Rhone-Alpes, OREAM Picardie-Sud
Examined OREAM Lorraine draft plan
Approved draft Loire OREAM plan
C6te Aquitaine Plan; funds for experimental projects
PLF 1971, II, p. 157 
PLF 1971, II, p. 157 
PLF 1971,1, p.89 
PLF 1971, II, p. 156 
R6mond (1977) p.60 






OREAM Centre; regional observatories, Imprimeries to Douai 
1972 regionalised budget; scheme for network of major roads 
Fos, OREAMs to go to Regional Prefect; OREAM Alsace
PLF 1973,1, p.6 
PLF 1973,1, p. 166 
PLF 1973,1, p. 166 





Took decision of principle on Valbonne-Sophia-Antipolis 
OREAMs Normandie, Aquitaine; villes moyennes 
Invited Minister of Finance to develop Lyon as financial centre 
Examined OREAM Aquitaine
PLF 1973,1, p. 167 
R6mond (1977) p.99 
Monod (1974) p.29 




Paris; agreed contrats de villes moyennes for some towns
Agreed more villes moyennes contracts
Mountain commisioners; central ministries to plan relocation
Audouin (1977) p.2G3 
Audouin (1977) p.203 






Villes moyennes; decisions on Valbonne-Sophia-Antipolis 
Created Mission for development of Plateau of Valbonne 
OREAM Nord {'double session' with 30/7}
Villes moyennes, Valbonne
Funding for Massif Central within mountain policy
Laborie (1985) 103 
Madiot (1986) p.241 
R6mond (1977) p.52 







Announced Contrats de pays; 3 of 4 National technical institutes 
OREAM Seine-Normandie
Marseille OREAM; Fos 'grands chantiers'; villes moyennes 
Decided development charters for Massif central, Corsica 
Massif Central grants
R6mond (1977) p.52 
Remond (1977) p. 100 
R6mond (1977) p.42 
Madiot (1979) p. 120 
Audouin (1977) p.65
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Figure 5.1 Meetings of CIAT/CIADT contd
Date Decisions or Frequency of meetings Sources
23/2/76 OREAM schemes for border regions; villes moyennes Remond (1977) p. 149
25/6/76 Access channel to Le Crotoy; GIRZOM; 22 mF for Massif Central Remond (1977) p.52




Prefect can modify OREAM area; Regionalised contrats de pays 
Agreed motorway network scheme
Rural one-stop shops; mountain programmes Jura and Alpes du Sud
Remond (1977) p.27 
Quinet et al (1980) p.72 
Madiot (1979} p. 174
13/2/78 Regional Prefects can ask Breton commissioner for grants Madiot (1979) p.212
18/7/78 Relocation aid for service sector; contrats depays; industrial zones DATAR Documentation
22/2/79 Massif Central; rural funds; mining zones; aid to relocation DATAR Documentation
no meeting in 1980
19/11/81 Reform of regional aids; tertiaiy decentralisation (SNCF to Lille) DATAR Documentation
6/5/82
20/12/82
Paris agr6ment; State-region programmes; transport 
Census results; sensitive zones; regional action; relocation aids
DATAR Documentation 
DATAR Documentation
18/4/83 New AdT goals; road network; Grand Sud-Ouest, FIAT DATAR Documentation
27/7/83 Regions' proposals for Plan Contracts; tourism; mountains; culture DATAR Documentation
22/12/83 Plan Contracts; Auvergne technological pole DATAR Documentation
13/4/84 Road plan; waterways; Plan Contracts; mining zones DATAR Documentation
5/3/85 Conversion poles; Plan Contracts; EC funds, enlargement; FIAT DATAR Documentation
no meeting in 1986




Contract priorities fcwr Regional Prefect; priority road projects 
Set additional objectives for Regional Contracts 
Pre-draft Regional contracts; TGV via Amiens; motorways
Chain (1997) p. 150 




Authorised signature of Regional Plan Contracts 
Signed lie de France and Dom-Tom Contracts
Chain (1997) p. 150 
Chain (1997) p. 151
late 89 [CIAT on Corsica prepared by DATARJ Le Monde 15/1/90
17/6/90
5/10/90
Roads budget (conflict between transport and finance ministers) 
Grant regime for private-sector relocation; administrative relocation
Dunn (1995) p.281 
Madiot (1996) p. 164
5/11/90 Urban charters; mining zones; Sophia; relocation; CNAT Lettre DAT AR, 142
14/5/91
3/10/91
Approved national TGV plan [published 2/4/92]
Administrative relocation; regional universities; Plan-Contracts
Carrie (1992), p.71 
Le Monde 25/10/91
7/11/91 20 bodies to be relocated from Paris, including DATAR and Plan. Le Monde 12/11/91
28/11/91 Rural CIAT; regional universities; public services in mountains DATAR, Lettre 142
29/1/92
23/7/92
More relocation of 14000 jobs; aids to civil service mobility 
Procedures for preparing Regional Contracts
Madiot (1996) p. 138 
DATAR, Lettre 142
10/2/93 Coast, ports, research, rural development, TGV-Est; Contracts DATAR, Lettre 142
12/7/93 At Mende: Relaunch of AdT; LOADT; relocation; Contracts DATAR, Lettre 144
30/6/94
20/9/94
A 'CIAT rural' on 'points publics' (one -stop -shops)
At Troyes: Paris basin; jobs; redeployment of public services
Madiot (1996) p. 189 
DATAR, Lettre 153
CIADT - no meeting in 1995 or 1996
10/4/97 CIADT at Auch: adopts draft schema national; pays; FNDE; defence DATAR, Lettre 159
15/12/97 Agree to renew LOADT, service schemas, Region Plan Contracts DATAR, Lettre 161
15/12/98 Contracts: rules for prefects; modernise public services; job creation DATAR, Lettre 164
23/7/99 At Arles: 1st budgets for Plan Contracts; aid to individual sites DATAR, Lettre 167
28/2/00 At Nantes: Coastline; storm damage and oil slicks Senate (2003), p. 11
18/5/00 Service schemas; rail schemes; relocation out of Paris DATAR, Lettre 169
9/7/01 At Limoges - cable-intemet; schemas; Pyren6es rail tunnel study DATAR, Lettre 172
13/12/02 Metropoles; high-speed internet; individual regional measures DATAR, Lettre 179
26/5/03
3/9/03
Defence and other restructuring; minister of agriculture's plans 
Rural policies: small towns, mobile telephones, airline fund
DATAR, Lettre 178 
DATAR, Lettre 178
18/12/03 Plan Contract reform; metropoles; transport; internet; 50 projects DATAR, Lettre 179
Notes: The sources refer to the date, and one or more decisions at that CIAT; other decisions derive from 
other sources in the table. PLF: Projet de Loi de Finances. Full references are in the bibliography.
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the 'big picture', and left preparation to his cabinet, which settled 'practically everything' 
before CIAT met. He allowed ministers scarcely any time for discussion but he left 
implementation to them, rarely intervening in details.17 With Pierre Messmer, 1972-74, 
there was much more debate around the table, and prime-ministerial advisers were subjected 
to the same critical questioning as ministers; then the decision was made with 'particular 
respect to presidential authority: for him the President of the Republic's goals were a sure 
guide to decisions'.18 Jacques Chirac in 1974 demonstrated an 'aggressive political will'. As 
an experienced minister who already knew the dossiers he was able to assert himself as 
patron. He worked closely with his strong cabinet but did not always take their advice.19 
Raymond Barre from 1976 behaved like Pompidou in CIAT; he was intellectually interested 
in the dossiers, explained them to the committee 'in his professorial way', but once he had 
made the decision, 'every one understood they had no choice but to execute it'. Barre was 
always suspicious of 'courtiers'; he thought about issues and made up his own mind.20
By 1978 the CIAT agenda was longer, the briefs thicker and the relev e de decisions 
sometimes 70 pages.21 The 'core membership' of CIAT had expanded to ten ministers.22 
The policies had changed too: for example, instead of the few grand projets of the 1960s 
there were many contracts with small towns. DATAR was negotiating more at local level, 
and that led to even more decisions for CIAT (even where a minister's signature would have 
sufficed), because field officials pressed for a 'decision in CIAT', since it had a 'quite 
different effect among local people: it was a sign of the attention the whole government was 
giving their area'.23 Although CIAT was thus improving the 'links with the population' in 
Blondel's terms, it was less efficient. The load was therefore reduced by devolving some 
decisions to regional administrators and preparatory meetings of cabinet advisers, reserving 
only major or disputed decisions for CIAT. Yet 'decisions were then taken without direct 
political authority'.24 Schrameck argues that pre-meetings of cabinet members could often 
lead to a ministerial committee becoming a formality, with ministers sending their directeur 
de cabinet in their place, and the prime minister sending another minister to chair the 
committee.25 Barre stopped holding CLATs after February 1979, even though he still 
demonstrated his support for an energetic amenagement du territoire, telling DATAR staff to 
'go out and re-conquer the territory'.26






22 Decree of 17 June 1975, in Madiot, Y. (1986) Amenagement du territoire: recueil de textes commentes 
(UTEC), pp. 104-5.
23 Essig (1979), p.89.
24 ibid. p.91.
25 Schrameck (1995), p.63.
26 La Croix. 24 April 1980.
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politically significant. Decrees appointing the minister for amenagement du territoire gave 
them the authority to chair CIATs, and 'this practice became frequent'.27 Nevertheless Pierre 
Mauroy chaired at least six of the seven held during his premiership, 1981-84. Michel 
Rocard, as the minister, 1981-83, held press conferences after CIATs, but when Mauroy 
took responsibility for amenagement du territoire in 1983 he left the press to the delegue.28 
Under Laurent Fabius there was one CIAT in two years, and regional development 
decisions were made in Councils of Ministers: for example, in 1984 the Minister, Gaston 
Defferre, agreed to relax the conditions under which firms obtained DATAR's permission 
(agrement) to build in Paris;29 and in 1985 he presented a report on industrial restructuring 
to a Council that increased its funding.30 Chirac did not hold a CIAT in 1986, while in 
1987, like Mauroy and Fabius before him, he held CIATs mainly to discuss State-Region 
Plan Contracts (discussed below in the section on funding), which the Planning Reform Act 
of 1982 required to be approved in CIAT. One confirmation that political leaders control 
CIAT decision-making can be seen in the agreement by a Chirac-chaired CIAT to keep the 
new Instituts Universitaires de Technologie approved in a CIAT held under Fabius but to 
site them in different towns.31 As under Fabius, other decisions that would formerly have 
been made in CIAT were made by decree in the Council of Ministers.32
In the second Mitterrand presidency Rocard as Prime Minister returned to the 
practice of three CIATs a year. At the CIAT of November 1990, Rocard asked ministers to 
provide by July 1991 a plan for relocating 5 per cent of their staff outside Paris, and 
suspended all authorisation for expansion within Paris until the plans were approved.33 
Ministers did not produce the plans, just as they had not produced them following similar 
CIAT decisions in 1973 and 1981.
Cresson's relocation CIATs
Michel Delebarre, minister for amenagement du territoire in Edith Cresson's government, 
1991-92, was committed to regional development but also wanted to use the publicity of a 
CIAT to make his political mark.34 Cresson was reluctant to hold a CIAT because ministers 
had not produced the relocation plans. Cresson and Delebarre agreed to 'faire un coup' by 
announcing ministries' relocation plans for them.35 Their cabinets quietly prepared a list of 
candidates for each ministry. At her first CIAT in October 1991 a few moves were
27 Madiot (1993), p.36. The comment seems to refer to Cresson's last CIAT and both Beregovoy's.
28 F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 19 April 1984.
29 Le Monde. 15 Dec. 1984.
30 Le Monde. 29 Nov. 1985.
31 DATAR (1990), p. 126.
32 E.g. Decree of 25 July 1987 re-centralising the award of the prime d'amenagement du territoire that a decree 
agreed in CIAT, 6 May 1982, had decentralised to regions. Le Monde 28 July 1987.
33 Bezes (1994), p.62.
34 Favier and Martin-Roland (1999), p. 103. Delebarre was a regional geographer, chief development adviser 
to Mauroy in Lille and mayor-developer of Dunkerque.
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announced, to increase pressure for more.36 The full lists were not published, to give each
ministry the chance to substitute its own candidate before the next CIAT. The November
CIAT named 20 public bodies that would form the first stage of 30,000 posts to leave Paris
by the year 2000.37 They included some 'symbolically important' institutions, such as ENA,
the Plan and DATAR itself.38 Ministers at the CIAT did not oppose the prime minister. 'No
provincial minister could be against. All provincial ministers had asked for something for
themselves'.39 The political self-interest of ministers overcame
'administrative inertia, conflict with the grands corps and civil service trade unions, family and 
financial constraints on officials, and the old Jacobin power reflex - in a word, conservatism - which 
had prevented this policy of redeploying public bodies from really taking off.40
DATAR did not officially organise Cresson's 'relocation CLATs'. The DATAR charge who 
ran the 'decentralisation committee' (the interministerial body responsible for planning 
relocation, see below), helped Cresson and Delebarre's cabinets, but without approval from 
DATAR. He 'saw the chance to relocate administrative bodies [which had long agreed to 
move but] that had proved difficult to dislodge with normal procedures and without the 
visible protection of political actors'.41 Unsigned lists of administrative bodies were sent to 
Matignon from DATAR; and the minister's cabinet received faxed pages of the government 
directory, Bottin administratif, with entries marked with crosses. The DATAR charge 
stopped participating during the few days before the November CIAT when final 'political' 
choices of locations were made 42 Nevertheless, 'people were annoyed with DATAR'.43 
The delegui said:
'We regretted the change to past practice....We did the prior technical work, on the administrative 
bodies that DATAR identified as able to move. But the definitive decisions were made by Edith 
Cresson and Michel Delebarre and their directeurs de cabinet.**
Unlike the DATAR of the 1960s DATAR did not want to seem an authoritarian 
institution or risk conflict with ministries. Cresson's CIATs showed the limitations of the 
bureaucratic agency, DATAR, for making an impact on policies that affected the personal 
lives of other bureaucrats. Delebarre's directeur de cabinet said DATAR did what it could 
but it needed the 'acceleration from the political level [which] came from the cabinets and the
35 Bezes (1994), p.96, p.81, p.67. This section owes much to primary research on the relocation of one 
particular administrative body by Philippe Bezes
36 The mayor of Clermont-Ferrand hoped 'to obtain satisfaction' at the CIATs of November and December. 
J.P.Rouger, Le Monde. 25 Oct 1991. The leaders of Roubaix, Lorraine, Bretagne, Limousin, disappointed in 
November, hoped for something in December. F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 17-18 Nov. 1991.
37 In the light of past failures, the achievement of the target by 2004 was a success.
38 F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 8 Nov. 1991. ENA half-moved. DATAR and the Plan did not move.
39 A Matignon adviser to Bezes (1994), p. 127.
40 F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 17-18 Nov. 1991.
41 Bezes (1994), pp.89-90.
42 Bezes (1994), p.90, p.92, p. 119.
43 DATAR charpg de mission, interviewed by Bezes (1994), p. 129.
44 Bezes (1994), pp. 128-9.
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political will.45 Once the prime minister had ruled in CIAT, minister's cabinets and even 
'Budget officials totally hostile to the policy' felt unable to dissent with the decision, one 
saying: 'An administration in the end is there to execute a government's decisions'.46
Subsequent changes to the Cresson programme showed the political ownership of 
CIAT decisions. A CIAT in Beregovoy's government approved transfers but added various 
measures to help families move.47 Edouard Bahadur’s government ’kept the goals in terms 
of the principle and the numbers’ but looked at each case afresh ’on its geographic, political 
and legal merits', with the aid of the prefects. Its CIATs of July 1993 and September 1994 
’altered the programme significantly' while increasing the number of officials transferred.48 
The CIAT (by then CIADT) held by Alain Juppe in 1997 confirmed the programme and 
added new candidates, but decided to use private sector firms to help spouses find work.49 
Lionel Jospin's CIADT of December 1997 agreed to 'maintain promised figures on posts' 
but make negotiations more transparent and add measures to help spouses integrate. The 
first CIADT of the Raffarin government in December 2002 confirmed the numbers but 
changed the locations to 'a more strategic focus on the regional metropolitan areas' favoured 
by a renewed Gaullist amenagement du territoire.50 Thus each political leadership used 
CIATs in its own way to adjust a policy on which there was broad agreement
The creation o f CIADT
The Balladur government of 1993-95 conducted a thorough reform of the institutions and 
procedures of amenagement du territoire, that culminated in the 'Pasqua Act' of 4 February 
1995, the Loi d'orientation pour Vamenagement et le developpement du territoire (LOADT). 
Article 33 requires the 'establishment of a committee chaired by the prime minister to be 
responsible for managing FNADT', a fund created by the Act (see below). CIADT was 
created by a decree that also abolished CLAT.51 The 'core membership' was widened to 14 
ministers, and the Government Secretary-General was made responsible for drawing up the 
releve de decisions and sending out instructions to ministers, as it does for other 
interministerial committees. CIADT did not meet for two years, but was only one of many 
articles of LOADT that were implemented late or not at all.52 Jean-Claude Gaudin, the 
minister of amenagement du territoire, had prepared a rural support plan, but Juppe did not 
want to agree to it formally because of its funding implications.53 The first CIADT took
45 ibid. p.90.
46 ibid. p. 130, p. 139.
47 F.Grosrichard, Le Monde, 27 May 1992.
48 Andr€ Rossinot, minister for the public service, in Courrier Picard. 15 and 16 April 1993: Lettre de la 
DATAR. 144, August 1993, www.citep.gouv.fr/transferts.htm.
49 La Lettre de la DATAR. 159, May 1997.
50 www.citep.gouv.fr/transferts.htm.
51 Decree of 21 April 1995.
52 M.Valo, Le Monde. 3 Feb. 1995, F.Valletoux, Les Echos. 21-22 June 1996.
53 Juppd wanted 'cheap, geographically-focused, spectacular measures', said Gaudin, quoted by F.Grosrichard, 
Le Monde. 28-9 July 1996.
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place just before the 1997 parliamentary elections, when Juppe announced Gaudin's plan
and six other spending programmes for implementation ’in the summer' [i.e. after the
elections].54 The first CIADT of the new Left government in December 1997 agreed to
overturn the Right's LOADT but disagreed openly about its replacement. The session was
'characterised by a fight for supremacy between the Minister for Amenagement du territoire
and her Interior and Public Service colleagues'.55 Jospin then held so few CIADTs that
DATAR was unable to organise the spending of FNADT within each financial year. The
Cour des Comptes confirmed that political leaders determined when CIADTs met:
'DATAR does not control the timetable for CIADT, whose meetings are held so late that they lead 
to the first grants hardly ever being allocated until the second semester, and thus part of each year's 
budget is regularly deferred to the following budgetary year'.56
CIAT had been an efficiently-organised operation in the 1960s and early 1970s, that prime 
ministers used in their own way. It had changed by the late 1970s to a tool that was less 
efficient in administrative terms though it still delivered the political goals of the leadership, 
and with closer ties at local level. In the 1980s and again in the late 1990s prime ministers 
called CIATs more rarely, and sometimes asked a minister to chair them. Yet prime 
ministers and ministers for amenagement du territoire could still use them to great effect at 
times to promote their own political goals. Overall, it seems that throughout the decades, 
political leaders made use of CIATs as they thought fit, but without the full and open 
cooperation of DATAR where moving bureaucrats (including itself) out of Paris was 
concerned.
A tool o f presidents and prime ministers
Yves Madiot asserted in 1993 that 'the frequency of [CIAT] meetings is variable and 
depends on the place of amenagement du territoire in governmental policy'.57 There is no 
record of CIATs before 1978.58 However it was possible to establish the dates of 90 per 
cent of meetings, leaving only a small element of uncertainty about 1963-65 (see Figure 5.1 
and notes to Figure 5.2). Figure 5.2 charts the relationship between the numbers of CIATs 
held each year for thirty years with the 'interest indicator' for each president as assessed in 
Chapter 3. Figure 5.3 repeats the exercise for the prime ministers. Figure 5.2 shows that 
there is a very close link between the president's interest in the policy and the number of 
times that CIAT meets; there is only a 1 in 1000 chance of finding this level of correlation if 
the president's interest were irrelevant. The correlation is so strong that several errors in
54 La Lettre de la DATAR. 159, May 1997.
55 Manesse (1998), p. 138. Voynet wanted regional plans; Ch£v£nement wanted a national plan, Le Monde 20 
Jan. 1999. 'Pasqua, Ch6v£nement, meme combat', said Pierre Sadran, ASMCF conference, Cardiff 2-4 Sept. 
1999.
56 Cour des Comptes (2002), 'Les difficult^ de gestion de la D616gation h Tam€nagement du territoire et h 
Taction r£gionale' (DATAR), paras 6650-833, S.IIIC.
57 Madiot (1993), p.36.
58 DATAR's Documentation Centre relies on CIAT press releases which did not start until 1978. Many 
thanks to the Documentation Centre for supplying copies, 8 Sept 1992.
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assigning quantitative values would not call this link into question. In contrast the statistical 
relationship between the prime minister's interest and the holding of CIATs, while still 
significant, is much weaker, despite CIAT being a tool that is legally in the hands of the 
prime minister (see Figure 5.3). It seems CLATs are much more likely to be held when the 
president is interested in amenagement du territoire, and that the interest of the prime 
minister has a smaller effect.
First, prime ministers without a strong interest in the policy nevertheless have 
reasons to hold CIATs/ CIADTs, such as to decide Plan-Contracts or to spend FLAT/ 
FNADT by the year end or before an election. Second, the president's level of interest 
dominates that of the premier (except during cohabitation). The periods when the frequency 
of CLATs diverges most from the prime minister's level of interest are the premierships of 
Couve de Murville (1968) and Messmer (1972-73) and the second half of Barre's 
premiership (1978-80). Couve de Murville and Messmer held more CIATs than would have 
been expected (but still less than their immediate predecessors), because both de Gaulle and 
Pompidou promoted regional development strongly at these times, and Couve was 'a 
passive and impassive tool of the presidential will'59 while, for Messmer, 'the President of 
the Republic's goals were a sure guide to his decisions'.60 In contrast Barre was more 
interested than Giscard in the policy. He created a number of instruments for amenagement 
du territoire but by decree in Councils of Ministers (where the President is present), perhaps 
because Giscard was more suspicious of Barre's economic strategy after 1978,61 but 
probably because CIAT was now less efficient.
During Mitterrand's presidency, the frequency of CLATs was closer to the wishes of 
his prime ministers, as Figure 5.3 indicates, but Mauroy and Fabius responded to the 
President's policy preferences too when they focused in Councils of Ministers on industrial 
strategies; and Rocard and Cresson had his support when they promoted in CIAT the 
relocation of Parisian officials.62 Prime ministers were free to use CLAT/ CIADT as they 
themselves decided only during cohabitation. Thus Essig's observation in 1979 that de 
Gaulle's 'successors presidentialised amenagement du territoire' because Pompidou and 
Giscard decided the major aims in Conseils restreints (Pompidou) and the Central Planning 
Council (Giscard),63 applies just as much to Mitterrand, even though he had little interest in 
the policy as a whole. But whether the president or the prime minister decides a CLAT 
should be called, it is the political leadership, not DATAR, which decides if it will be useful. 
CLAT and CIADT are no different from other interministerial committees described by 
Schrameck:
59 Hayward (1983), p. 108.
60 Essig (1979), p.87.
61 Servent (1989), p.51.
62 Favier and Martin-Roland (1999) p. 100, p. 103, quoting interviews with Cresson, 18 Nov. 1993, and H. 
Vedrine, 27 Feb. 1993. See also Attali (1993a) p.761; and Bezes (1994), p.88, citing several witnesses.
63 Essig (1979), p.81.
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'Some of the prime minister's interministerial committees are held at regular intervals and have a 
quasi-institutional form. They often reflect the government's policy priorities and can therefore 
become rarer or not meet at all when those change'.64
Other committees, commissions and groups
The delegue is ex officio chair, secretary or member of many committees and councils. 
Ministers also appoint the delegue to public bodies sponsored by their ministry, such as the 
SNCF and the Post Office. More unusually, ministers with an interest in DATAR’s work 
have helped it set up organisations outside the ministerial framework. For example, Debre's 
'total support as Foreign Minister' enabled Monod to create Invest in France Agencies 
abroad in 1969, 'in the face of hostility from the Quai d'Orsay';65 Guichard as Minister in 
1974 helped DATAR set up the Association Bureawc-Province to find office space outside 
Paris for ministries; and Rocard as Prime Minister in 1989 set up the Centre de rencontres et 
^initiatives pour le developpement local (CRIDEL), steered by a committee chaired by 
DATAR. By 2000 DATAR was part-funding 64 such bodies, of which the largest were 
Entreprises, territoires et developpement, the Invest in France Network and eight regional 
development associations.66 The range of non-traditional 'links to the population' that 
ministers were able to create through DATAR, against the norms of the incumbent 
bureaucracy, are testimony to the political leadership's powers.
More conventionally, DATAR has or had a major role in 39 interministerial 
committees and councils, listed in Figure 5.4 (funding committees are dealt with separately 
below). The evolution of two very different examples - the decentralisation committee and 
the consultative body for amenagement du territoire - illustrates the considerable leeway 
political leaders have to create, modify and abolish interministerial committees and councils.
When DATAR was set up, Prime Minister Pompidou appointed it to the two comites 
de decentralisation (one for public bodies, one for industrial firms) that encouraged 
relocation out of Paris and/or awarded the agrement to move into or build premises in Paris. 
The first was set up in 1955 and run by the DAT. The second was added by de Gaulle in 
1958 and run by DAT but from the Plan Commissariat. In 1963 Pompidou made DATAR 
secretary of both committees, and in 1967 he combined them into one, which he moved to 
DATAR. The agrement was DATAR's most powerful bargaining tool (for example, 
awarding the agrement for a small extension in Paris if the applicant built a second larger 
establishment in Toulouse...) , but was always under challenge from Parisian Gaullists, 
Communists and business.67 While the Right governments resisted this pressure, the Left 
weakened the agrement constraints in 1982 and 1984, and in 1986 gave the Paris Region
64 Schrameck (1995), p.63.
65 Essig (1979), p.245; Monod,J. and de Castelbajac,P. (2001) L'Amenagement du territoire. 10th edn (PUF)
(2001), pp.57-8.
66 Cour des Comptes (2002). S.II.A. These 11 received 85% of DATAR's grants to associations. I am 
grateful to Louis Guillaume, assistant director of DATAR's London agency in November 1989, for factual 
information.
Figure 5.4. Interministerial committees and councils in the amenaqement du territoire domain
Committee or council Purpose DATAR's role Other information Creation Changes
PM Pompidou
Comitd de decentralisation 
(pre-DATAR)
To plan decentralisation of State 
bodies, and award agrement
D616gud on committee; advises 
on agrement (Paris permit)
Secretariat at CGP from 1963; 





Comite interministeriel des pares 
nationaux (pre-DATAR)
To organise bodies to run national 
parks
PM committee; DATAR to 
organise management bodies
National Parks Act 22/7/60; 
Not meeting in 1980s
D.31/10/61 1985 to 
Nat. Council
Comite des investissements 
Strangers (pre-DATAR)
Authorises foreign investments in 
France
DATAR a member and 
'associated with its work'




Comite national pour les 
probl&mes de l'eau
Ministry of Interior, then DATAR 
to organise 'water boards'
Staff attached to D£16gu6 1965 
Secretariat in DATAR
Supervision transferred with 
boards to Min. Environment
D. 6/7/61 1971
wound up
CNAT Commission national de 
1'AdT replaced Cons. Construction
Consultative body on national 
plan for AdT. Reconvened 1970.
Attached to CGP; D£l€gu6 the 
Vice-President






GCPU Groupe Central de 
Planification Urbaine
Defines policy on conurbations, 
approves OREAM plans
Attached to DATAR and 
secretariat at DATAR






GIF Groupe Interministeriel 
Foncier
Decides which urban development 
zones can have public funds
Chaired by Ddldgu6 on industrial 
zones; Minister Infra, on urban
Responsible to Min. for Plan 






d'amenagement du bassin parisien
Promotes overall policy for Paris 
basin to disperse growth
DATAR a member 1967-71 produced development 




Commission interministerielle des 
pares naturels rdgionaux
Parks to help development, 
tourism, protect environment
Policy initiated by DATAR; 
Attached to Ddldgu6




Comite central de renovation rurale Advises Rural Renovation 
Commissioners
Committee and rural 
commissioners at DATAR
Took over from Min. of Ag. 
Superseded by CIDAR 1979
D.24/10/67 1979
to CIDAR*
Groupe central de conversion Advises Industrial Conversion 
Commissioners
Committee, commissioners at 
DATAR; attached to Min AdT
Officials from 2 ministries, 
CGP, DATAR
D. 24/10/67 n.d.
Comite de decentralisation Committee for public and private 
sector offices locating in Paris
DATAR a member. It reports to 
Min AcTT and CIAT







GCVN Groupe central de villes 
nouvelles
Manages credits of FNAFU etc 
and CDC funding
Managed by Sec. Gen. of VN at 
DATAR then at Infrastructure
Attached to Infrastructure in 





Groupe interministeriel pour l'amd- 
nagement du plateau de Valbonne
Mission Valbonne to develop it 
created in CIAT of 10/7/74
Attached to DATAR. 1 staff 
member full time
Coordinates ministries in 





Fig 5.4. Interministerial committees and councils, contd
PM Messmer
GIVM Groupe interministeriel des To draw up special AdT grants of Set up by Ddtegu£. Chaired by Officials from DAFU, 1973 1982
villes moyennes (VM) Min Infrastructure for VM Deiegue DATAR, relevant ministries
PM Chirac
CIASI comite intermin. d'amen. 
des structures industrielles
Gives FDES grants to firms in 
trouble, or about to be
Chaired first by Deiegue, then 
Industry. Secretary at Tresor






Commission de l'amenagement du 
territoire et du cadre du vie
Report on draft aims of 7th Plan, 
voted by Parliament 27/6/75
Attached to CGP; deputy- 
Deiegue the vice-chair
Chaired by official: 33 
officials, banks, firms, TUs
1975 1975
Conseil d'administration du 
Conservatoire de l'espace littoral
Improvement, protection and land 
management of coastline
Attached to DATAR until 1986, 
DATAR still on the board
Min AdT, Politicians, 





Conseil interministeriel pour le 
promotion de l'emploi
Resolves administrative problems 
for firms taking on staff




Groupe interministeriel des services 
publics en milieu rural
To propose measures for reducing 
closure of rural public services.
DATAR's idea to set up; 
proposed departmental cttees
D. 16/10/79 set up committees 
of services, chaired by prefects
Cabinet
8/2/78
1979 to local 
councils
Comite de l'amenagement du 
territoire (of Han)
To consult and prepare AdT 
aspects of VUIth Han (1981-85)
A CGP commission; DATAR 
official is rapporteur




CIDAR Comite interministeriel de 
developpement et d'amen. rural
Policy on rural diversification - 
funds to Plan contracts 1984
DATAR is secretary; chairs 
preparatory official committee






CODIS Comite ministeriel ..des 
actions de developpement industriel
To determine future economic 
sectors for priority action
D6tegu6 a member Did not meet after 1980; then 





Groupe interministeriel permanent 
pour l'amenagement des banlieues
Help ministries to take inner 
suburbs into account in policies
D6tegud a member; Secretary at 
Urban Development Fund







CIRI comite interministeriel de 
restructuration industrielle
Gives FDES grants to industrial 
firms in difficulty to help adapt
Dfitegud is a member; 
Secretariat at Ttesor






CIALA Comite interministeriel des 
aides k la localisation des activites
Awards PAT grants for relocation 
of non-tertiarv sector activity
Chaired by D6l6gu6; Secretariat 
at DATAR
Staff from Tresor, Industry, 





GCVN Groupe central de villes 
nouvelles
Prepares CIAT decisions on each 
New Town, proposes measures
Managed by SecGen of VN at 
DATAR 1984-93






CIV Comite interministeriel pour 
les villes & comite de gestion
Coordinates policy for urban 
solidarity. Urban Social Fund
D6tegu6 on cttee of Ministers; 
Min Urb. & DATAR organise
PM/Min Urban: 15 Ministers, 





Fig 5.4, Interministerial committees and councils, contd
PM Fabius
Conseil national de la montagne Advises on spending of FIDAR 
and FIAM in mountain zones
Secretariat at DATAR Initiated by Rocard 1983: PM 





Comite de decentralisation Public and private applications to 
locate in Paris or move out.
DATAR a member, advises on 
dossier with Region Prefect







CIV Comite interministeriel des 
villes
Coordinates policy for urban 
solidarity; urban contracts
Deiegue on cttee of Ministers; 
run by Delegation h la Ville
PM/Min Urb: 15 Ministers, 
DATAR; DIV
D. 20/10/88 extant 
in 2003
GIDEL Groupe interministeriel sur 
le developpement local
CRIDEL created by DATAR as 
network on local development
Deiegue chairs GIDEL 
and organises CRIDEL
GIDEL: 23 officials; CRIDEL 





CNAT Commission national 
d'amenagement du territoire
To advise, report on sectoral and 
EU policies linked to AdT
Supposed to meet twice a year 
but scarcely met at all







Observatoire interministeriel des 
restructurations d'activites
To monitor and prepare firms' 
restructuring and relocation
DATAR to organise Under PM's authority CIAT
20/9/94
n.d.
Groupe d'orientation strategique To increase attractiveness of 
France to foreign investors
DATAR organises and provides 
secretariat; set up 1996
Brings administrations 






CNADT Comm. nat. de l'amdn. et 
du developpement du territoire
Advise on implementation of AdT 
by State, local authorities and EU
DATAR runs secretariat and 
publishes CNADT opinions
PM: 52 members, politicians; 





Observatoire de l'amenagement du 
territoire (public interest body)
To evaluate AdT policies, with 
'comite de finances locales'
DATAR to organise and fund 
(in LOADT, Art 9).






CNADT Comm. nat. de l’amen. et 
du developpement du territoire
Advise on implementation of AdT 
by State, local authorities and EU
DATAR runs secretariat and 
publishes CNADT opinions
PM/AdT; 70 members, elus, 





CITEP Comite pour 1'implantation 
territoriale des emplois publics
Prepare and execute relocation 
policy for public bodies
DATAR is a member of the 
interministerial committee
Ministers for Public Service 





Notes: *An asterisk means the committee is replaced by a later committee listed or by the following bodies:
ETD - Entreprises, Territoires et Developpement - an association created and funded by DATAR from 1989.
AFII - Agence fran^aise pour les investissements intemationaux - a public body combining DATAR staff abroad with Ministry of Economy staff.
Sources: Conseil d'Etat (1986); Essig (1979); Houde (1989); Laborie, Langumier and de Roo (1985); Lanversin (1970); Madiot (1979,1986,1993,1996); Manesse (1998); Maus 
(1992); Perrin, Pouyet and Raffi (1968); Teneur et di Qual (1962); DATAR, Lettre de la DATAR and Rapport d'Activitd (various years), ww.citep.gouv.fr, www.etd.asso.fr, 
www.archives.premier-ministre.gouv.fr.
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Prefect equal weight with DATAR in the committee.68 Rocard in 1990 restored the agrement 
because of the resulting office-building and population boom. From 2000 the agrement for 
private companies was determined by the Paris Region prefect. In 2001 the Jospin 
government merged the decentralisation committee (no longer dealing with private firms), 
with the Mission pour Vimplantation territorial des emplois publics that was set up by 
Delebarre in 1992 to implement the relocation projects of 1991; it became the Comite pour 
Vimpkmtation territoriale des emplois publics, and helps public sector bodies plan their 
relocation from Paris. Within its own sector, the changes in this bureaucratic committee 
reflected well the views of different political leaders on amenagement du territoire.
The Conseil national d'amenagement du territoire (CNAT) is unusual among the 
committees listed in figure 5.4 because it always included ’civil society’ as well as officials. 
CNAT was created in 1965 to replace the Ministry of Construction's advisory body that had 
clashed with the Plan Commissariat (see Chapter 2). It was set up at the Commissariat with 
the same chair as before, and the delegue as vice-chair, to advise on the regional aspects of 
the national plan. It was reconvened briefly under Giscard, wrote a report on the Seventh 
Plan and stopped meeting: Giscard was 'a convinced anti-planner'.69 Rocard in 1990 
approved its re-establishment, and Cresson issued its decree of application in 1991. 
Members had scarcely been appointed when the Balladur government decided in 1993 to 
replace it with the Conseil national d'amenagement et du developpement du territoire 
(CNADT) in the Act LOADT, not passed until 1995. Its decree of application was issued by 
Juppe and members appointed, but the Act and therefore CNADT was rescinded by the 
Jospin government A new CNADT, with a different membership, finally started work in 
2001 under the Limousin regional president, the Socialist Robert Savy, but the 
governmental change in 2002 was inevitably followed by his replacement with the only 
right-wing regional president, Adrien Zeller. Whereas changes to the comite de 
decentralisation responded to policy changes and local pressures, changes to 
CNAT/CNADT were driven by what Lochak called 'revenge politicisation' (see Chapter 4).
Of the 39 committees listed in Figure 3.5 less than a quarter remained in their 
original format by 2003, one indication of the political leadership's capacity to adjust 
committees to their own needs. Only seven of the committees were so constrained in their 
activities that they just stopped meeting or show no signs of having met. But it is notable 
that these included the two 'observatories' that might have gone some way to evaluating 
DATAR's - and ministers’- actions.70 Nevertheless, political leaders showed they were not 
limited by an institutionalised continuity when they expressly wound up another seven
67 Madiot (1996), p.691.
68 F.Fressoz, Liberation. 15 Dec. 1984; P.Pujas, Tribune de l'Economie. 4 Sept. 1986.
69 Green,D. (1980) The Budget and the Plan' in P.Cemy and M. Schain (eds) French Politics and Public 
Policy (Methuen). 101-24, p. 103.
70 As noted in Chapter 3, the Observatoire des tenitoires set up by decree on 14 Sept. 2004 will 'collect and 
publish data useful to DATAR'.
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committees, reconstructed 13 under another format, or transferred four to bodies outside 
central government.
THE FINANCIAL TOOLS: FUNDS AND BUDGETS
The political leaders who created DATAR expected its financial powers to be the vital 
weapon in amenagement du territoire. 'In the end, the delegue*s effectiveness will depend 
on the financial means at his disposal and on the role he plays within the funding bodies 
involved in regional expansion'.71 The financial means consisted chiefly of the prime 
minister's budget for amenagement du territoire. Its main element was the fund FIAT/ 
FNADT but DATAR played a role in other funds created to encourage the type of 
development that leaders sought Yet DATAR's main role was expected to be its orientation 
of ministries' spending patterns. Each of these instruments and activities is scrutinised in 
turn to see how well they fulfilled the leadership's expectations of making an impact on 
amenagement du territoire through DATAR.
The prime minister's budget for amenagement du territoire
Because DATAR is part of the prime minister's office, DATAR's annual budget is the 
' amenagement du territoire' chapter of the prime minister's budget The minister responsible 
for amenagement du territoire negotiates this budget ’and proposes it to the prime 
minister'.72 Figure 5.5 sets out the budgetary headings within which the delegue must 
work. The budget for staff and other administrative costs sets one limit on DATAR's 
activity. Its programme budget consists of the fund FNADT, the capital grant PAT {prime 
d'amenagement du territoire) that is awarded to firms to set up in assisted areas, and its 
support to the 'Invest in France' agencies. In both the current and capital grant sections, 
FNADT is divided between the amount that DATAR has agreed to contribute to State- 
Region Plan Contracts, and a rather larger amount that is allocated in CIADT. As Figure 5.5 
shows, the government can change DATAR's income substantially both in total (dropping 
by 25% in the two years between the 2.2bnF under Balladur in 1995 and 1.7bnF under 
Juppe in 1997), and between its elements (the Juppe budget preserved DATAR's 
administrative budget and drastically reduced its programme budget; while Raffarin's budget 
imposed a reduction in staffing while increasing capital grants). The government can also 
amend each figure during the year. While most likely when there is a change in political 
leadership or economic conditions 73 an arrete removed lOOmF in May 2001 from the 
380mF allocated to FNADT’s contribution to Plan Contracts on the grounds that the 
Contracts were not being implemented quickly enough.74
71 Rapport au President de la R6publique. 15 Feb. 1963, cited in Pouyet (1968), p.73.
72 Senat, Commission des Finances, (2003) [Besse Report], 17, Le Fonds national d’amenagement et de 
developpement du territoire (FNADT) (Sdnat), p.29.
73 Basld,M. (2000) Le Budget de l'Etat 5th edn (La Decouverte), p. 15
74 Arrete of 31 May 2001, cited in Sdnat (2003) p.33.
Figure 5.5. The prime minister’s budget for amenagement du territoire
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(million francs)
Year budget voted 1995 1997 2000 2003
Prime Minister at the Balladur Juppe Jospin Raffarin
time of budget vote
DATAR staff costs 59 57 58 41
Equipment, research 38 34 43 48
Agencies abroad [funded from another budget] 18 -
Total





FNADT current 412 294 459 338
grants
AFII agencies - - - 50
Total





FNADT 1425 1155 943 984
capital grants 
PAT 343 155 420 295
grants to firms
Total
capital grants 1768 1310 1363 1279
TOTAL budget 2277 1696 1942 1755
Sources: Loi de Finances initale (LFl) 'Services du Premier ministre. V.Ame'nagement du territoire'. 
credits de paiements. (various years).
Notes:
FNADT: Fonds national d'amenagement et de developpement du territoire
AFII Agence frangaise pour les investissements internationaux (DATAR staff abroad).
PAT Prime d'amenagement du territoire.
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It is tempting to argue that, given these controls, the political leaders’ budgetary
allocation must reflect their policy intentions:
'Since the beginning of the 1980s it has seen significant variations which are explained by the 
relative interest or disinterest in amenagement du territoire: 1981, 1983 and 1986 are 'black years' 
for the policy in this respect'.75
The increase in 1991 is significant and reflects the political will to relaunch amenagement du 
territoire'.16
However the budgetary figures are to some extent a mirage. The depute Jean-Pierre 
Kucheida (PS, Pas-de-Calais), a specialist on the amenagement du territoire budget, called it 
’ mystificateur et trompe Voeil.77 The reasons are best explained with reference to 
Figure 5.6 on the evolution in DATAR's funding. The budget is presented to parliament as 
two sets of figures. The credits de paiements (budget voted) are the sums parliament votes to 
DATAR to cover that year’s spending. The autorisations de programme (budget 
authorisations) specify the maximum sum that DATAR can that year undertake to spend (that 
year or in the future) on multi-annual grants or projects.78 The difficulty of tracking 
DATAR's actual spending in any year from which year's credits is such that only rarely do 
parliamentarians or the Cour des Comptes establish the details.79 
In 2003 Senator Besse of the Senate Finance Committee
'deplored the fact that 'budgetary authorisation' in the case of FNADT does not mean very much.
Not only is the division of its budget mainly decided by the prime minister, but also a sizeable 
proportion is traditionally postponed into subsequent years'.80
The data in the 'Besse report' show that the annual variations in the credits voted for 
FNADT 1997 to 2002 made no difference to DATAR's actual annual spending. Its 'dormant 
budget authorisations', built up from delays in expenditure, enabled it to spend consistently 
about 1500mF each year (and have up to 2000mF available to spend). Between 1995 and 
2000 DATAR spent each year only two-thirds of the budget voted to it.81 When Jospin's 
government increased the FNADT budget in 2000 and 2001, DATAR 'seemed not to know 
how to spend it'; and although the government reduced its budget mid-year in 2001 by 
250mF and in 2002 by 300mF, DATAR still spent up to the level originally specified in the 
Finance Act82
However, political leaders determine this behaviour to a large extent. The National 
Assembly's rapporteur for trade and industry in the 1994 budgetary debate asked for CIAT
75 Mazet (2000), p.84.
76 Madiot (1993), p. 52.
77 A.Chaussebourg, Le Monde. 24-25 Oct 1993.
78 Baste (2000) p.99.
79 Rapport Kucheida, A.N. 1353, (1990) cited in Madiot (1996), p. 113; Cour des Comptes (2002); S£nat 
(2003).
80 Sdnat (2003), p.28.
81 Cour des Comptes (2002), S.II.
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isations de programme (AP) as amended by supplementary or cancelled credits. Madiot (1993), p. 
pport Kucheida, AN, 1353 (1990), p. 13. 
r (1) but in 1980 francs. Madiot (1996), p.38.
I) AP and credits de paiements (CP): LFI, 'Services du PM, V.amenagement du territoire', and 
Rapport Annuel, various years.
963-72: Projet de loi de finances initiale (LFI), 1971,1972;
1970-79: Biarez (1989), pp.215-6; 1976-85: Madiot (1986),p. 199; 1994: Madiot (1996),p.43. 
i LFI, 1995-97: Manesse (1998), p. 113; 1997-2003: S£nat (2003) 17, p. 15.
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to be placed directly under DATAR as the only way to speed up spending.83 That would 
however reduce the leadership’s ability to control decisions, to announce funds and not 
spend them, or to make political capital out of awards. Political leaders held up spending by 
not calling CIADTs in some years (1995, 1996), and late in the year in others (1998, 1999, 
2001,2002). The first meeting of CIADT to decide spending from the 2001 round was so 
late that 'grants were not paid until 12 December 2001 (current) and 8 January 2002 
(capital); that is, the 2001 credits could not in fact be spent in 2001'.84 The Raffarin 
government in 2002 'took account of the structural deferral of credits related to delayed 
implementation of operations subsidised by FNADT',85 and cut DATAR's budget for 2003 
severely. There is not even a reliable connection between the budget as presented to 
parliament and the leadership's commitment to spend it, as the delegue confirmed in 2003 
when he explained that DATAR's (smaller) budget:
'matches engagements cleady identified for 2003, not a 'flag-waving1 budget (budget d'ajfichage)
whose sole concern is to make it appear there are more credits than in the previous year'.86
Although there is little value therefore in assessing the link between the political 
leadership's aim for amenagement du territoire and the level of budgetary funding, other 
studies of the budgetary process suggest it is determined by political leaders, even if their 
directeurs de cabinet and financial advisers, using information supplied by Ministry of 
Finance officials, conduct the negotiations. The specific outcomes on amenagement du 
territoire are consistent with the general strategies reported by Robert Elgie, Jack Hayward 
and Vincent Wright.87 President Mitterrand's announcement, following his Budget 
Minister's advice, that the budget deficit would not exceed 3 per cent imposed (along with 
macro-economic indicators), the sharp decrease in ministerial budgets for 1983 that 
amenagement du territoire shared. The 1985 budget was similarly 'budgeting by Presidential 
fait accompli fiat'.88 Chirac's cohabitation budget of 1987 was also one of cuts for 
amenagement du territoire after Finance Minister Balladur negotiated with the minister, 
Mehaignerie 89 In 1990, Industry and Amenagement du territoire was among a group of 
ministries that Prime Minister Rocard, 'in coordination with the Finance Ministiy and the 
presidency', decided would be inflation-proofed or suffer decreased expenditure (Figure 5.6 
shows amenagement du territoire suffered decreased expenditure).90 Finally, in 1997, 
President Chirac's announcement that he was committed to a 3 per cent maximum budget
83 A.Chassebourg, Le Monde. 24-25 Oct 1993.
84 Sdnat (2003), p.35. Personal experience confirms the observation. DATAR offered a research contract in 
May 2001 but had to delay signing until December 2001. The research was thus not delivered in 2002 but in 
2003, when DATAR's budget was cut back and we were 'lucky to be paid'.
85 Project de Loi des Finances 2003: Amenagement du territoire.
86 I^ttre de la DATAR. 176, 2003.
87 Elgie,R. (1993) The Role of the Prime Minister in France. 1981-91 (Macmillan); Hayward and Wright
(2002), pp. 169-80.
88 Hayward and Wright (2002), p. 171.
89 ibid. p. 174.
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deficit had the same impact on ministers' budgets as had Mitterrand's announcement in 
1983. The negotiations were conducted by Prime Minister Juppe,91 and the budget proposed 
for amenagement du territoire was reduced drastically.
In general, parliamentarians do not constrain the political leaders seriously on the
budget.
'Provided it is willing to set aside about 0.05 per cent of the budget to make a number of minor but
politically popular concessions to its own parliamentary supporters, the government can secure the
legitimation of its budget by parliament'.92
The budget legislation for 1989 posed the greatest challenge in recent years. Rocard did not 
have majority support in the National Assembly and tried to work with it rather than use the 
executive's powerful voting procedures. In the Assembly the government had to withdraw 
the vote on 'industry, tourism, trade and amenagement du territoire\ because deputes 
objected strenuously to the amount for amenagement du territoire, despite the Minister 
offering an additional 215mF for three funds, and accepting a Centrist amendment for 
another 50mF. Deputes were persuaded to vote for the budget as a whole with another 
increase of 75mF. However Senators remained opposed to the amenagement du territoire 
budget, even after much negotiation by cabinets, and it approved the budget as a whole only 
by abolishing completely the amenagement du territoire chapter 'in derision'.93 For the 
1990 budget, the government had to resubmit to the Assembly in Januaiy 1990 a budget for 
amenagement du territoire that was twice that originally proposed.94 Nevertheless, in both 
1989 and 1990, following mid-year amendments, the budget had still declined in real terms 
from the previous years (see Figure 5.6, centre column). Thus, even in the difficult 
conditions of a minority government, political leaders were able to determine DATAR’s 
income, and delay expenditure, but not always control the year in which it was spent.
FIAT. FNADT and other funds for regional development
The relationship between the leadership's interest in amenagement du territoire and its 
capacity to influence its funding is more easily seen in the changes to funds than in the 
overall volume of funding. FIAT was for thirty years the chief financial instrument Early 
DATAR staff emphasised that FIAT was its 'war chest' {tresor de guerre). It could persuade 
a ministry to make a different decision; for example, it supported in 1964 the establishment 
of an Ecole nationale superieure d'aeronautique in Toulouse that helped the city become the 
centre of a modem industry.95
'DATAR owes a large pent of the results it has achieved to the fact that it prepares [CIATs] and
90 ibid. p. 175.
91 ibid. pp. 176-8.
92 Hayward (1983), p. 194.
93 Le Monde. 11 Nov., 20-21 Nov., 13 Dec, 16 Dec. 1988.
94 Le Monde. 31 Jan. 1990.
95 Perrin,F., Pouyet,B., Raffi.G. (1968) 'L’amenagement du territoire en France'. Notes et etudes 
documentaires. 3461 (La Documentation fran9aise), p.57.
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notably to the fact that it submits to this committee proposals for the use of funds from FIAT’.96
It was a 'stock of funds not already earmarked' that DATAR used to persuade ministries to 
start a project: 'If you undertake to build this port, we will pay part of the first tranche'.97 
But FIAT increasingly substituted for ministries' programmes, such that by 1981 about 80 
per cent of its annual credits were already committed before the start of the budgetary year.98
The stability of the FIAT budget 1970-81 (see Figure 5.6), and thus its decline 
through inflation, shows the 'withering on the vine' typical of a budget ministers find 
difficult to tell recipients they have abolished. However, it does not demonstrate a lack of 
power among leaders over the budget they assign to amenagement du territoire, since they 
have created other funds to target their favoured aims. Figure 5.7 lists two dozen funds 
created since Claudius-Petit introduced FNAT in 1950 (see Chapter 2), and summarises 
their purpose, level of funding, and the role of DATAR and other actors in their creation and 
control. Examples of the evolution in two sectors, rural and urban renovation, illustrate the 
roles played by political leaders and the problems of ministerial coordination that they used 
DATAR to resolve.
In 1967, with Pompidou as Prime Minister and Michel Debre as Minister of Finance, 
several changes were made to give DATAR stronger powers. They included Pompidou's 
appointment of commissioners to 'renovate' certain rural zones 'under his authority'.99 A 
Fonds d'action rurale (FAR) was created which the Ministry of Agriculture would 
distribute, advised by the commissioners. However, in 1971 President Pompidou was 
advised by his cabinet that 'certain technical ministries were holding back funds for rural 
renovation'. He invited the commissioners to dinner to hear the problems and told them a 
Fonds de renovation rurale (FRR) would be created.100 It was funded partly from the prime 
minister’s budget and partly from that of the Ministry of Agriculture, but DATAR organised 
its expenditure, with decisions made in CIAT. When Prime Minister Barre took 
responsibility for amenagement du territoire in 1978 he grouped various rural funds, 
including FAR and FRR, into a new Fonds interministeriel de developpement et 
d'amenagement rural (FIDAR) for 'fragile rural zones'. It was funded from the prime 
minister's budget for amenagement du territoire, allocated by an interministerial committee, 
CIDAR, chaired by the prime minister or minister of agriculture, and managed by DATAR 
and regional prefects. In 1986 Prime Minister Chirac transferred budgetary responsibility for 
this fund to the Ministry of Agriculture but only after 'after a trial of strength' between
96 Baecque, F.de and Holleaux, A. (1982) 'Les problemes pos£s par la diversity de Torganisation des 
administrations centrales1. Etudes et documents du Conseil d'Etat. 14, p. 101.
97 Monod and de Castelbajac (1980), p.33.
98 Cour des Comptes (1982), cited Madiot (1986), p. 198.
99 Decree of 24 October 1967, Article 1, Michardfcre (one of the commissioners) in Georges Pompidou. Hier 
et Aujourd'hui: T^moienages (1990) (Neuilly: Breet), p.260.
100 Micharddre, ibid. p.260
Figure 5.7 Specialised funds significant for amenagement du territoire
Funding Body Purpose Role of DATAR Budgetary source Creation Changes
    and others________________and/or_control_____________________________
PM Pompidou (some existing pre-DATAR)
FDES Fonds de developpement 
economique et social 180mF 2002
Loans to firms, local authorities 
for restructuring, relocation
D6l6gu6 on main board; vice­
chair of two sub-committees
Special Treasury account run by 





FAD Fonds d'aide b la decentralisation 
38mF 1976: 25mF 1983, 0mF1988
Grants to firms to locate outside 
Paris (paid from RAT 1977-80)
Run by DAT, then DATAR; 
grants decided in CIAT
50% PM's budget, 50% from 





FNAFU (ex-FNAT) Fonds national 
pour l'amenagement fonder et urbain
Funds to buy land for industrial 
renovation, eg.EuroMediteranee
Equipement runs, D61dgu6, 
Finance, Interior on board
Special Treasury account run by 
Ministry of Equipement
D. 14/2/63 wound up 
1999
SCDC Societe Centrale d'aide au 
Developpement des Collectivites
Facilitates capital development 
proiects bv local authorities
DATAR a shareholder; 
(replaced SCET, run by CGP)
Shareholders: Caisse des Depots, 
mutual banks, DATAR ministries
1967 extant 
in 2003
FAR Fonds d'action rurale For rural development 
initiatives
DATAR's rural commissaires 
give advice on how spent





FRR Fonds de renovation rurale 
50mF 1978, 61mF 1979
Funds various projects by 
DATAR's rural Commissioners
Managed by DATAR 
grants decided in CIAT







FDA Fonds de decentralisation admin­
istrative 57mF 1976, 23mF 1986
Grants to encourage Paris 
administrations to move
'At the disposal of DATAR' Minister of Finance's 'common 






GIRZOM Gpe intermin... restructur­
ation des zones minides 170mF 1992
Committee plans infrastructure 
improvement in 3 mining areas
Ponts et Chauss6es, DATAR, 
prefects. Decided in CIAT
PM & 5 ministries 1972-5; PM; 






FSAI Fonds special d'adaptation 
industrielle 3bnF total
For steel, shipbuilding or textile 
zones
DATAR chaired management 
committee
n.d. 8/9/78 wound up 
1981
FIDAR Fonds intermin. de ddveloppe- 
ment et d'amen. rural 420mF 1992
Groups funds for rural areas - 
later added to Ran Contracts
PM or Min of Ag chairs; 
DATAR, Prefects organise
PM/AdT budget to 1986 then 
Min. Agriculture and Prefects
D.3/7/79 1995 to 
FNADT
PM Maurov
FIM Fonds industriel de modernisation 
5bn in 1984
Research to finance research and 
innovation in conversion poles
D616gu6 on FIM board (and on 
on ANVAR board)
Chaired by Minister of Industiy. 





FSGT Conseil d'administration du 
Fonds special de grands travaux
Funds for rail, roads, energy 
conservation
Chair Ponts-et-Chauss6es 
DATAR represents Min AdT
Under Min Econ and Finance in 
Act 3/8/82 - but Transport ran it
D. 13/8/82 wound up 
1987
u>os
Figure 5.7 Specialised funds, contd
FIBM Fonds d'industrialisation du bas- Aids reconversion of mining DATAR not involved Managed by Ministry of Industry 1984 extant in
sin minier lOOmF 1990, 40mF 1995 zones (created by Fabius) 2001
PM Fabtus
FIAM Fonds intermin pour l'auto-d£vt 
en montagne 40mF 1985,35mF 1992
Funds projects on a variety of 
themes in mountainous areas
PM's Conseil de la Montagne 
advises; DATAR manages
Budget of Min AdT except 






FRILE Fonds regionalism d'aide aux 
initiatives locales ....260mF 1994
Subsidises local job creation 
ideas by groups of communes
DATAR manages at centre, 
and Prefects at field level







FAD Fonds d'aide k la decentralisation 
lOOmF 1992, 127mF 1994
Grants to Firms and their staff 
locating outside Paris
Managed by DATAR - Cl ALA 
- Entreprises et Territoire
PM's budget, 50% comes from 






FDPMI Fonds de developpement des 
petites et moyennes industries
Gives aid to modernise in 
DATAR's 'PAT' areas
DATAR involved as part of 
Plan Contract negotiation






FGER Fonds de gestion de l'espace 
rural 500mF 1995, 140mF 1998
Grants to communes for 
farmers' conservation projects
Managed at department level; 
DATAR has no official role
Minister of Agriculture's budget, 





FPTA Fonds de perequation des 
transports aeriens 21mF 2001
Support regional air services 'in 
the interest of AdT'
Air Minister chairs: MPs, 
local elus, Deiegue, officials
Special Treasury account, Air 





FITTVN Fonds d’invt des transports 
terrestres .. voies nav. 4340 mF 2000
Fund roads, TGV, canals, to 
serve "hard-to-reach places"
Transport Minister chairs: 
officials, including Deiegue
Special Treasury account, budget 





FNDE (1) Fonds nat. de devt des 
entreprises [TbnF expected 1997-991
Guarantee loans, risk capital to 
small firms in priority zones
"Successive Ministers for AdT 
wanted it but not operational"
Special Treasury account from 
privatisations: Tresor opposed
Act 4/2/95 not funded
PM Jospin
FNDE (2) Fonds nat de devt des 
entreprises 200mF 1998
Guarantee loans, risk capital to 
small firms in priority zones
Secretariat at DATAR; 
Commissariats to operate
BDPME (Bank for small & 





FIATA Fonds d'intervention .. aero- 
ports.. .transport aerien 463mF 2003
Inter-regional airlines and 
airports for AdT and safety
Implementing measures 
decided at CIADT, eg. 3/9/03
Special Treasury account managed 





FGMN Fonds de gestion des milieux 
naturels lOOmF 2003
To fund rehabilitation of natural 
habitats and quality of life
Discontinued by Raffarin's 
ecology minister






Sources: DATAR, Rapport d'Activitd and La Lettre de la DATAR, various dates; Ministry of Finances, 'Les Bleues' (various dates); 
Madiot (1979, 1986,1993,1996), Manesse (1988); Mazet (2000); Teneur and di Qual (1972).
138
Balladur [Minister of Finance] and Mehaignerie' [Amenagement du territoire].101 Agriculture 
was one of only two budgets that Chirac dealt with personally that year, 'out of personal 
interest and because they were politically sensitive'.102 Mehaignerie too was interested (an 
ingenieur en chefdu genie rural, and son and brother of a farmer), but he was also being 
asked to accept serious cuts in other parts of his portfolio.
As under Pompidou it was difficult to persuade the Agriculture Ministry to fund rural 
development In 1988 Prime Minister Rocard introduced the Fonds regionalise d'aide aux 
initiatives locales (FRILE) to encourage small communes to group together to promote 
economic development. Half its funding was to come from Amenagement du territoire, 40 
per cent from Employment and the rest from Agriculture, but the Ministry of Agriculture did 
not pass its contribution to regional prefects, and there were calls to put FRILE into one 
ministerial budget, preferably that of amenagement du territoire, and allow DATAR to 
coordinate its expenditure.103 The large-scale reform of amenagement du territoire in 1995 
incorporated FIDAR and FRILE into the larger FNADT fund organised by DATAR.
Yet earlier political leaders had already met the problem of coordinating funds from 
multiple sources. Pompidou's first Prime Minister, Chaban-Delmas, agreed after a visit to 
the Nord to provide a single budget for modernising miners' houses. The programme was 
being funded from FIAT and five ministerial budgets and 'if one did not give its contribution 
the whole project seized up'.104 He set up the Groupe interministeriel pour la restructuration 
des zones minieres (GIRZOM) at DATAR but left office before creating the fund. From 
1972 to 1975 CIAT agreed an annual budget with contributions from each ministry, but 
'they always competed with other ministry demands'. Chirac in April 1975 'renewed the 
promise'; and created a special chapter in the prime minister's general budget. It was shared 
out between ministries in CIAT until 1979, but there were long delays between CIAT 
authorising the expenditure and the field offices receiving the funding.105 There was no 
CIAT meeting in 1980, and in 1981 GIRZOM renewed its pleas for a single budget. In 1983 
Pierre Mauroy, Prime Minister and minister for Amenagement du territoire, mayor of Lille, 
agreed to a Fonds du groupe interministeriel pour la restructuration des zones minieres. The 
sums were allocated to DATAR, which redistributed them through the State-Region Plan 
Contracts. This fund too became part of FNADT in 1995.
By 1994, with the creation of other funds, FLAT represented less than half the 
funding for amenagement du territoire allocated from the prime minister's budget FIAT was 
worth 864mF; FIDAR, FRILE and the GIRZOM fund, together with the Fonds d'aide a la 
decentralisation (FAD) which helps firms and their staff leave Paris, and the 'mountain 
fund', the Fonds interministeriel pour Vauto-developpement en montagne (FLAM), came to
101 F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 19 Dec. 1986.
102 Hayward and Wright (2002), p. 174.
l(B Madiot (1993), p.53, p.60.
104 GIRZOM (19811 Rapport d'activitd 1972-80 (DATAR1. p. 14.
105 ibid. p.73.
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over lOOOmF. There were other active funds too (see Figure 5.7). Although each had 
enabled political leaders to promote their own particular concerns at some stage, their 
division into separate small envelopes reduced DATAR's capacity to respond to changing 
political priorities and added complexity that baffled those the funding was designed to help.
As part of the fundamental reform of amenagement du territoire, the 'Pasqua Act', 
LOADT, created a new fund FNADT which combined FLAT with five other funds managed 
or part-managed by DATAR. However, parliamentarians still wanted to know how much 
was spent on their particular concerns and constituencies. Pasqua was able to incorporate 
into FNADT the mountain fund FLAM and the rural fund FIDAR only by agreeing to consult 
mountain representatives on FNADT expenditure.106 DATAR was unable to dissolve FIAM 
into FNADT until 2002 because it was obliged to published a separate tally of 'notional 
FLAM' spending. Moreover, Pasqua was pressurised during the passage of the bill to 
introduce new funds, such as the Fonds de gestion de Vespace rural (FGER), for 'rural 
management'; though his successors were able to nullify it in practice by funding it poorly 
and making the qualifying conditions highly restrictive.107
Political leaders have treated FNADT like FIAT by funding it less and less well, and 
instead continue to create in a variety of statutory ways (law, decree, arrite, circular, CLAT) 
the targeted funds that attract media attention, sometimes using new resources (such as 
airport taxes and motorway tolls, see Figure 5.7). Of the 24 listed in Figure 5.7 ministers 
reformed nine and abolished eight. Another six, mostly recent, remain in substantially the 
same form: only one, in 1996, was successfully opposed by the Ministry of Finance, and 
was eventually set up in a different form by a different government (the Fonds national de 
developpement des entreprises, FNDE). It seems that leaders have a good capacity for 
funding policies to which they are committed, can reduce the budgets of those of their 
predecessors, and abolish those they see no need to retain.
Control of ministerial budgets
The justification for putting weak levels of funding in DATAR's hands in 1963 was that the 
political leadership ambitiously decided that public capital spending (schools, hospitals, 
roads...) would be directed towards regional development. It had arranged for the delegue to 
monitor ministries' draft budgets by region and report to CLAT 'on whether the proposed 
investment programmes fitted with the aims of amenagement du territoire'. 108 DATAR and 
the nascent regional prefects would monitor implementation at regional level. A prime 
minister who wanted to coordinate public investment at regional level to help development 
had in DATAR, CLAT and the regional prefects a system which could in principle achieve it. 
This objective was never implemented effectively on the national scale. However, after 
decentralisation in 1982 the State-Region Plan Contracts agreed in CLAT/CLADT went some
106 Manesse (1998), p. 112.
107 ibid. p. 115.
108 Decree 14 February 1963, Art 1.
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way to producing a similar effect with similar agents.
In the mid-1960s DATAR liaised between ministries and the Plan Commissariat 
while budgets were being prepared, and then in June 'it was associated with the Ministry of 
Finance's drawing up of the final draft budget.109 DATAR had an informal right, 'secured 
by Guichard', to attend the budget minister's meetings with sectoral ministers: it was 'the 
first time civil servants from outside the Rue de Rivoli' [Ministry of Finance] had attended 
such talks.110 The delegue would give advice during the arbitration conducted by the prime 
minister,111 who would settle 'any conflict between the geographic considerations of 
DATAR and the sectoral concerns of the ministries',112 before DATAR drew up the report to 
CIAT. By 1968 officials were more likely to 'think geographically', and less likely to 
consider only their own sector or 'where they had got to on a dossier'.113 The Ministry of 
Construction had divided its housing budget between the eight regional cities and had 
allocated 90 per cent of its total budget by region; the Ministry of Education divided 62 per 
cent of its budget in 1966 compared with 54 per cent in 1965. But the Ministry of Public 
Works had managed to regionalise only 'new spending' on urban infrastructure; continuing 
programmes had not been regionalised.114
However, DATAR was by 1969 no longer in close contact with ministries as they 
drew up their budgets. DATAR still attended the budget meetings in the Ministry of 
Finance,115 but ministries regionalised their budgets without DATAR.116 In 1980 Monod 
and de Castelbajac acknowledged that 'administrative practice had not entirely lived up to the 
ambitions of the decree-makers'.117 First, bureaucratic divisions did not want DATAR’s 
interventions; for example, they did not let DATAR know of amendments they made during 
the year.118 But, second, the 1960s was a period of intense reform to French regional 
administrative structures which local-national politicians as well as officials were resisting 
(see Chapter 7). Though de Gaulle wanted further regional reform, Pompidou saw the 
political challenge and drew back.119 Third, 'rational' budgeting had intensely political 
implications. Essig, in charge of this dossier at the time, explained that where politicians 
wanted equal provision, as in education, DATAR would look to see 'whether the
109 Lanversin (1970), p.200.
110 Essig (1979), pp.26-9; and Pouyet (1968), p.87.
111 Lanversin (1970), p.200.
112 Monod and de Castelbajac (1971), p.38, (1980), p.32.
113 Pouyet (1968), p.88; Essig (1979), p.26.
114 Pouyet (1968), p.89.
115 Essig (1979), p.27.
116 Lanversin (1970), p.200.
117 Monod and de Castelbajac (1980), p.32.
118 Lanversin (1970), p.200,
119 Machin.H. f 1977) The Prefect in French Public Administration (Croom Helm), pp.59-60, Grdmion,C. 
(1992a) TLe cheminement des id6es de region et de decentralisation sous la Ve republique', in L.Hamon (ed) 
(1992^ La Region de De Gaulle k nos iours (Maison des sciences de l'homme), 17-41, pp.29-33. Gremion,C. 
(1987) 'Decentralization in France1, in G.Ross, S.Hoffmann and S.Malzacher (eds) The Mitterrand 
Experiment (Polity). 237-47, p 240.
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administration was catching up in lagging areas or accentuating the advantages of those
already favoured'.120 Yet the Plan Commissariat's regional team in 1962 had found that 'to
remedy the accumulation of under-investment in some regions, no new schools should be
built in Paris, Aix, Montpellier or Toulouse. Nearly all expenditure should be concentrated
in the industrial zones of Northern and Eastern France',121 an idea that would not have been
popular among the Paris elite and right-wing politicians. Fourth, in the late 1960s, Giscard
as Finance Minister rejected the idea of 'Rationalisation of Budgetary Decisions' because it
would jeopardise the Ministry's position as arbiter between ministries' budgets.122 In all,
DATAR's close supervision of ministries' budgets would have met political as well as
bureaucratic constraints.
Only 30 per cent of central government's civil capital expenditure was ever allocated
by region, ministries arguing that most spending was 'national' not 'regional'.123
'Confronted with strong administrative forces, DATAR... had difficulty making ordinary
capital expenditure match the priorities it had decided with the regions'.124 Nevertheless,
DATAR found it 'could fairly easily make ministries take into account the major projects that
the government decided'.125 Reforms that Prime Minister Pompidou introduced in 1966-68
with Debre as Finance Minister, such as the setting up of the OREAMs to develop regional
cities, the Group interministeriel fancier that decided which urban projects would be eligible
for public funding, the Languedoc-Roussillon and Fos projects that were provided with
block budgets,126 and the rural and mining area commissioners in particular zones, were all
ways to direct and monitor expenditure in ways that political leaders intended.
However, these innovative projects gave DATAR an centralist, authoritarian image,
and the new political leaders in the early 1980s did not see a useful role for DATAR in the
decentralised system. Regionalised budgets disappeared in 1984. The Chirac government in
1986 rejected DATAR's oversight of budgetary preparation:
DATAR no longer attends the budgetary conferences and no longer has the right to oversee the 
deconcentrated budgets of ministries. After the regionalised budget disappeared, DATAR remained 
associated with the budgetary process by helping to draw up ministers’ lettres plafonds but was kept 
outside this procedure during the preparation of the 1987 Finance Bill'.127
Yet the State-Region Plan Contracts that allocate ministry spending in the regions through 
negotiation with regional councils provide the political leadership with an efficient tool. 
'Contractual planning appears as a means of mobilizing the regions behind state policies
120 Essig (1979), p.26.
121 Roche (1986), p.68.
122 Ashford,D.E. (19821 Policy and Politics in France: Living with uncertainty (Philadelphia: Temple).
123 Madiot (1979), p.67.
124 Monod and de Castelbajac (1980), pp.32-3; and see Biarez (1989), p.183.
125 Monod and de Castelbajac (1980) ibid
126 Racine, P. (1980) Mission impossible? L'amenagement touristique du littoral du Languedoc-Roussillon 
(Montpellier: Midi Libre), p.57.
127 Guichard Commission (1986), p.57.
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rather than as a mechanism to provide state support for autonomous regional policies’.128 
DATAR in 1973 had ’initially conceived... the institutional technique of 
contractualization',129 with its ’contracts with small towns'. By 1975 it had suggested that 
'reciprocal contracts' could be effective instruments in a decentralised state.130 DATAR 
influenced the Goux Commission that designed post-1981 Plan procedures, with Monod a 
Commission member and DATAR officials on six working groups, three as rapporteur.131 
The Minister for the Plan and Amenagement du territoire, Michel Rocard, and the delegue, 
Bernard Attali, are given the credit for having invented and put the Plan Contracts in 
place.132 Rocard gave DATAR the coordinating role on Han Contracts.
The political leadership, especially the prime minister, plays a leading role by 
defining negotiating procedures, national priorities and draft and final Contracts in CIATs 
for each round of five-year Contracts.133 For the first round (1984-88), Mauroy appointed 
Jean Le Garrec, a personal friend, as junior minister for the Plan, to oversee negotiations 
and check that agreements matched the government's industrial priorities.134 DATAR and 
the prefects advised regional councils on procedures, with DATAR explaining the proposals 
made by central ministries. Even after the negotiations were complete, prime ministers could 
adjust individual decisions: thus, for instance, Fabius moved to Grenoble a Synchroton 
Mauroy had agreed would be built in Strasbourg.135 In the cohabitation of 1986-88, Chirac 
agreed there would be a second generation of Contracts (1989-93) and he set out revised 
procedures in CIAT in 1987. Regional prefects were to be the main negotiators, with 
DATAR confined to the central level; it was to organise CIATs and arrange interministerial 
meetings for prefects; and put draft proposals to ministries (in which it used FLAT/FNADT 
to push State aims for regional development). Once the Contract came into effect DATAR 
was to monitor expenditure.136 Chirac identified and set out four priority sectors for the 
Contracts; but when Rocard became Prime Minister in 1988 he was able to add another two
128 Balme,R. and Bonnet,L. (1995) 'From Regional to Sectoral Policies', in J.Loughlin and S.Mazey (eds) 
The End of the French Unitary State? (Cass'). 51-71, p.70.
129 Balme and Bonnet (1995), p.53.
130 Charlet, C. (1976).’Les equipements collectifs et la decentralisation1, in Debbasch, C. (ed.) La 
Decentralisation pour la renovation de l'Etat (PUFL 207-18, pp.211-16. Christian Charlet was then charge de 
mission at DATAR.
131 Goux Commission [Commission de reforme de la planification] (1982) Rapport au Ministre d’Etat: 
ministre du Plan et de l'amenagement du territoire (La Documentation fransaise).
132 F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 29 Sept 1988.
133 Act of 29 July 1982 on Planning; decree of 21 Jan. 1983.
134 Favier and Martin-Roland (1991), pp.60-68, p. 119; Madiot (1996), p.66.
135 Favier and Martin-Roland (1990) p.554. Strasbourg appealed to the Conseil d'Etat, who decided a State- 
Region contract was a real contract and that the decision would need to be contested elsewhere. CE, Ass. 8 
Jan. 1988, Pontier, J.-M. (1998) Les Contrats de plan entre l’Etat et les regions (PUFL pp.21-2.
136 Chain, P. (1997) 'Les Contrats de Plan Etat - Region', in Voisard, J. and Lavallard, F. (eds) Dvnamique 
de l'investissement public. 1 (Paris: GERI/ La Documentation fransaise), 139-60, pp. 147-8, p. 151. Chain 
was charg6 de mission at DATAR at this time.
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that reflected the Left's priorities.137
The preparation of the third generation of Contracts (1994-99), took place under the 
three short-lived premierships of Cresson, Beregevoy and Bahadur. They all held CIATs to 
specify or re-specify objectives and give negotiating instructions. Bahadur and Pasqua made 
the 'third generation of Plan contracts a more energetic instrument of amenagement du 
territoire' by varying the State's contribution according to regions' GDP and 
unemployment.138 They defined in CIAT a 'hard core' of specific projects to try to focus 
expenditure. But this 'unilateral' decision upset some regions, who had to be given 
additional grants before they would sign contracts.139 The Juppe government was then 
'unilaterally' able to decide to spread the five-year State funding over six years, arguing it 
would bring the timetable in line with the six-year European Union funding programme that 
started in 2000.
State-Region Plan Contracts have therefore enabled the political leadership to claw 
back some of the financial power ostensibly decentralised to territorial authorities. Central 
government provided only 44 per cent of the 1989-93 Contracts (when annexes and VAT 
paid by regions were taken into account).140 Further, the promise of 'matching funding' and 
FNADT from DATAR encourages regions to 'adapt to' the government's main objectives; 
these prevailed in 75 per cent of the funding of the 1994-99 Contracts, according to the 
dilegui at the time.141 Thus, if Contracts, which currently combine 15 to 20 per cent of the 
State civil (capital and current) budget and 25 to 30 per cent of the regions' (capital and 
current) budget,142 are 75 per cent targeted on the political leadership's aims, they achieve a 
control over the regional destination of expenditure as good as the 30 per cent of the State 
civil capital budget (current spending was never covered), that DATAR was able to 
'regionalise' in practice. In summary, although the political leadership no longer tries to use 
DATAR to organise the territorial distribution of ministerial budgets 'at source', the Plan 
Contracts, determined in CIATs, using the regional prefects and DATAR as negotiators 
(and, in effect, regional politicians as monitors), have become an effective alternative.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has continued the inquiry into the political leadership's ability to make an 
impact on the actions of bureaucracies, in this case focusing on the way leaders can use 
administrative and financial tools to adjust policy delivery through DATAR. It was 
established that CLAT/CIADT, nominally and normally chaired by the prime minister, was
137 DATAR (1990), p. 146.
138 Madiot (1996), p.67; Mazet (2000), p.79; Lettre de la DATAR. 151, 1994. The 'corrective effect' was in 
the event reduced by subsidiary annexes to individual Contracts, www.datar.gouv.fr, 'Dossiers CPER'.
139 Balme and Bonnet (1995), p.69.
140 Plan Commissariat figures, cited by Madiot (1996), p.66.
141 R-M. Aubert, quoted in Billet, J. (1997) 'Nature et mise en oeuvre des procedures de contrat de plan Etat- 
r£gions' [CES report) Probfemes economiques. 2529, 4-8, p. 7.
142 www.datar.gouv.fr. 'Les grands chiffres des contrats 2000-2006'. 16 Dec. 2003.
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for at least a decade (the Gaullist and Pompidou presidencies), an efficient and effective tool 
for a leadership that wanted to take a small number of 'heroic' decisions at central level. In 
the early 1970s CIATs became less efficient in technical terms, even if it translated into 
effect a growing linkage between the political leaders and the local population that Blondel 
thought essential. CIAT was dealing with more and smaller-scale policies, involving more 
ministers, that were the choice of a different political leadership. When CIAT failed to meet 
in 1980, it at least demonstrated that CIATs met when political leaders determined they 
should. Yet CIAT remained an effective forum for highly political interministerial decision­
making and especially for decisions most likely to be resisted by bureaucrats, as the CIATs 
of Cresson and Delebarre showed. Whether CIATs were held or not depended on three 
factors: the political leadership's interest in amenagement du territoire; its desire to take 
decisions that had legally to be taken in CIAT; and its wish to spend - or to not spend - FIAT 
or FNADT. Although there was a statistically-significant link between the prime minister's 
commitment to the policy and its holding of CIATs, the president's interest was a stronger 
influence, even though CIAT/CIADT is an instrument legally in the prime minister's hands. 
Prime ministers with no interest in the topic, but working to a president who was interested, 
held CIATs that implemented his policies, while presidents who were not interested in the 
policy as a whole but in specific elements took the relevant decisions in Councils of 
Ministers at which they could be present.
While most political and media attention focuses on CIAT/CIADT, partly because of 
its membership, partly because of the significance of its funding decisions, scrutiny of other 
interministerial and inter-organisational bodies showed the facility that presidents, prime 
ministers and ministers have to create administrative institutions that help promote their 
aims. Examples were given of a number of 'agencies', 'associations' and 'commissioners' 
that ministers had introduced outside the traditional ministerial framework to fill gaps in 
implementation left by French public bureaucracies and administrative law. But more 
conventional committees and councils were also shown to respond to the changing demands 
of the political leadership, two-thirds having been modified substantially, transferred to 
bodies outside central government or simply abolished. A few show no signs of having 
been established and to that extent leaders may have encountered resistance, while others, 
including those with a membership from civil society, were frequently reconstituted because 
of the central leadership's desire for political control.
It was demonstrated that political leaders have strong and effective power to specify 
the resources that will be devoted to amenagement du territoire. First, like the staffing 
budget examined in the previous chapter, the financial budget that the prime minister and the 
minister for amenagement du territoire negotiate for DATAR is not only finely detailed but 
can be amended during the year. Budgets were determined by prime ministers and budget 
ministers working within constraints set by the president (apart from during cohabitation). 
But if DATAR's annual income was strongly constrained by the political leadership, with a
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subsidiary political intervention by parliament, control over its expenditure was more
complex and erratic. Yet the chief cause was leaders' own failure to make spending
decisions, leading DATAR to build up a backlog of unspent funds.
The fairly consistent decline in FLAT since 1963 and the similar if more variable
decline in FNADT are explained by the creation by leaders of new funds focused on their
own objectives, and breaking free of older funds that had become tied to past programmes.
Examples of the funds for rural development and the rehabilitation of miners' housing
showed not only the recurrent coordination difficulties when budgets came from multiple
sources, but also the capacity of some leaders to devise solutions when their interest was
engaged. In quantitative terms, the impact of political leaders on funds was similar to their
impact on committees; of the two dozen examined, they were able to abolish a third and
modify substantially another third. A quarter, mostly recent, continued unchanged until
2003 at least. Only one was so opposed that it failed to materialise, and it was eventually set
up in a different format by another government. The early efforts of political leaders to use
DATAR to re-orient ministries' annual budgets were soon abandoned for more focused
forms of expenditure planning that could take better account of political criteria. If the State-
Region Plan Contracts developed in the 1980s give national political leaders only a partial
control of public spending in each region, they are equivalent in outcome to the best the
more ambitious reforms achieved in practice, and they are better-coordinated across
ministries and more closely-linked to the population.
In Blondel's analysis of the relationship between the bureaucracy and the political
leadership he was fairly pessimistic about a political leadership's decisions being followed
by good implementation, because
'from the point of view of leaders, the "system" is often inefficient, badly structured and badly 
organized. This is ...often, perhaps mostly - because the system is simply unresponsive or only 
partly responsive. This lack of responsiveness, in turn, is due largely to the fact that we do not 
know how to make the system effective. There are thus manifest limits to the degree in which 
leaders are able to rely on institutions, arrangements and organizations around them to have the 
desired impact'.143
However, this chapter has shown that the well-understood traditional formulae of 
interministerial committees and targeted funding can be used veiy effectively by political 
leaders, supplemented by a wide variety of area -based or programme-specific solutions, 
such as commissioners, planning agencies, block budgets and contracts with local and 
regional authorities. Although DATAR, the central State's organiser of these projects, was 
not originally seen as a useful partner in the Left's decentralised system, political leaders 
have been able to adapt DATAR and the traditional and newer tools it deployed for their 
predecessors so that it continues to steer public policy on their behalf.
143 Blondel (1987), p. 150.
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CHAPTER 6
CASE STUDY 1: ROADS PLANNING AND FUNDING 
INTRODUCTION
The two-fold concern of the thesis is with the empirical difficulties that political leaders 
experience in coordinating bureaucratic institutions and the theoretical argument that political 
leaders find it difficult to make their mark on policy, such are the institutional constraints. 
Previous chapters have dealt with that concern in relation to the leadership's capacity to alter 
the organisational design and operation of the bureaucracy itself. It was demonstrated that 
presidents, prime ministers and ministers for amenagement du territoire were, to varying 
extents, able to use administrative-legal and financial tools to adapt DATAR's staffing, 
funding, working arrangements, decision-making committees and implementing agencies 
towards a better fit with their own aims for DATAR and its promotion of their policy goals.
However, as explained in Chapter 1, the assessment of the political leadership's 
ability to affect the workings of the bureaucracy needs to be carried through to the eventual 
outcome, and in particular to the role of the bureaucracy in 'helping or hindering' the 
leadership's efforts. As Blondel observed,
'whether political leaders appear to "make a difference" to the type of policies which are
followed...is in many ways the central question of political activity'.1
Blondel adopted a conceptual analysis of a leader's 'potential impact', because of the 
difficulties of evaluating leaders' actual actions (too many to count, variable in importance, 
implemented by ministers and bureaucrats, and intertwined with the rest of the 
environment). 'Lists of separate actions of leaders do not provide the answer, because they 
are too concrete and too embedded in their context'.2 However, by selecting a narrow sub­
policy such as the planning of the network of major roads, an empirical exercise becomes 
more practicable. In methodological terms, roads planning and funding is a policy area that 
political leaders asked DATAR to coordinate with their goals for amenagement du territoire; 
and it is also an area in which the significant decisions are made at the top and on identifiable 
occasions; thus it is feasible to explore the contributions of significant players to each 
decision, within the wider context.
In more theoretical terms, despite the banality of roads policy (in contrast to the 
regionalisation issue considered in the next chapter), this technical domain poses a strong 
challenge to the political leadership. Indeed banality and technicality can signify a policy 
domain that professional bureaucracies have defined as theirs, and in which political
1 Blondel (1980), p. 15.
2 Blondel (1987), p.81.
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intervention, such as the introduction of regional development criteria, is likely to be 
resisted.
'Decisions high on the national political agenda are those discussed in public, in the media, and by 
the nation's top political leaders....Issues low on the political agenda are treated in relative 
obscurity, often by career government officials according to standard operating procedures, with little 
political oversight or interference, and in close consultation with affected interests'.3
Baumgartner argues that elite actors gain by persuading other interested parties that an issue 
is 'technical'; for example, Hall showed that in France 'economic policy was successfully 
portrayed [by the elite civil servants] as a technical question best left to the experts'.4 Studies 
of policy-making in France that demonstrated a technocratic dominance were those in which 
there was little partisan and public debate, such as economic planning, nuclear power or 
weapons procurement. Political leaders could still make an impact if their attention were 
drawn to an issue, for example, by opposition in parliament or a public demonstration that 
made it 'political'.5 Roads planning was therefore likely to be a ’theoretically-interesting' 
policy domain in which there were varying levels of conflict between a technical bureaucracy 
’in charge' of the policy, and a changing political leadership.
The chief bureaucratic plavers
Given the specialised nature of the domain, the bureaucratic actors chiefly responsible for 
the policy and their interactions with the political leadership and DATAR are introduced 
below before embarking on a more synthetic analysis.
The Fonts et Chaussees
Thoenig and others have shown that the technical corps of the Fonts et Chaussees held a 
quasi-monopoly over road planning and funding at central level in the Roads Directorate of 
the Ministry of Infrastructure (ex-Public Works), and in the departements. Their position on 
an issue such as a national road network or road tolling could be changed by political leaders 
only with* difficulty and after repeated attempts. The corps found numerous objections on 
technical grounds, and its opposition was strengthened if the career goals of the corps were 
affected. The example of the motorway network illustrates the general pattern. The corps 
opposed the Tolled Motorways Bill presented in 1952 and 1954 by Transport Ministers 
Antoine Pinay and Jacques Chaban-Delmas, arguing that motorways were expensive, would 
not be used, would pose surfacing problems and favoured rich men's transport; and that 
tolls were undemocratic (it also feared that such major investments would be decided by 
national political leaders, taking away the decisional and fee-earning power for the corps at 
local level).6 Though short lengths of untolled motorway were built, ’tolls remained a ’taboo
3 Baumgartner, F. (1996) The many styles of policymaking in France', in J.Keeler and M.Schain (eds) 
Chirac's Challenge: Liberalization. Europeanization and Malaise in France (Macmillanl. 85-10, p.86.
4 Baumgartner (1996), p.87, p.89; Hall (1986).
5 As Baumgartner found for French education policy (1996), p.90, p.87.
6 Thoenig, J.-C. (19731 L*Ere des technocrates: Le cas des Ponts-et-Chauss£es (Editions d'Organisations),
pp.60-1.
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of the Roads Directorate’.7 Only when Prime Minister Pompidou in 1963 set up the Caisse 
nationale des autoroutes, to offer loans and advise the private sector on building tolled 
motorways to link regional cities, was there a change in corps strategy; it and the Roads 
Directorate of the Ministiy of Infrastructure moved to take control, the Roads Director 
chairing the Caisse nationale des autoroutes and the committee of the Caisse des Depots that 
funded it.8 In 1969 with both President Pompidou, advised by his cabinet and DATAR, and 
Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas wanting a Taster motorway programme... to encourage 
activity... within the framework of amenagement du territoire,9 the political leadership 
agreed to build motorways through private-sector contracts. The Infrastructure Minister, 
Chalandon, 'removed the obstacle of the Roads Directorate’ by offering the corps a fee to 
inspect motorways.10 Fonts et Chaussees engineers soon held the top posts in the private 
constructor, Cofiroute, and its parent company.
The Fonts et Chaussees has had administrative responsibility for roads for three 
centuries. The grand corps, educated at Ecole Polytechnique and further selected for the 
Ecole Nationale des Fonts et Chaussees, staffs senior posts in the Infrastructure Ministry as 
well as serving in cabinets and other public bodies such as DATAR. The work in local 
offices is organised by the next highest 'Ponts' corps, the Travaux Publics (Public Works). 
During most of the period covered by this thesis these officials designed, managed or 
inspected roads infrastructure. They were close to local politicians, for whom they carried 
out road improvements for a fee distributed within the corps. They opposed projects 
proposed by DATAR to the political leadership, such as the Breton expressway, because 
they did not respond to the professional criterion: meeting current traffic demand.11 From 
the 1960s the Ponts were challenged for their traditional ’career opportunities' in public and 
private industry by the administrative grands corps, and younger members guided the corps 
to take over the urban development being promoted by the DAT in the Ministry of 
Construction. They supported the combining in 1966 of Construction and Public Works into 
the Super-Ministry of Infrastructure, which President de Gaulle instigated in order to have a 
single 'overseer' of all large national infrastructure projects.12 They helped the political 
leadership deliver coordinated development in regional cities, while 'nibbling away' at the
7 Randet (1994), p.87. Randet was head of the DAT, DATAR's predecessor, at the time.
8 Thoenig (1973), p.61.
9 Esambert (1994), p. 109; Essig (1979), p. 100; Chaban -Delmas, J. (1997) M£moires pour demain 
(Flammarion), p.442; Archives Nationales [Pompidou] (1996) 5 AG2/182-5. Conseil restreint 27 Nov. 1969.
10 Randet (1994), p.87; M6ny, Y. (1974) Centralisation et decentralisation dans le d£bat politique francais: 
1945-1969 (Pichonl (1974), p.269.
n Essig (1979), p.31, p.85; Jardin, A. and Fleury, P. (1973) La revolution de l'autoroute (Favardl. p.xxiv; 
Thoenig, J.-C. (1987) L*Ere des technocrates: Le cas des Ponts-et-Chauss6es. 2nd edn (LHarmattan), 
pp.303-5.
12 Chevallier (1992), p.563; Pisani, E. (19741 Le G£n£ral indivis (Albin Michel), p. 142; Suleiman, E.
(19741 Politics. Power and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press), p. 174fn, p. 177.
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efforts of DATAR and the Plan Commissariat to coordinate this activity at national level.13 
Well-integrated into local society,14 the Fonts could call up support from the local political 
milieu,15 or from road lobbies.16 The Roads Directorate was the only central division to 
disobey Prime Minister's Cresson's instruction to ministries to leave negotiations on the 
1994-99 State-Region Plan Contracts to DATAR, the prefects and the regions (see Chapter 
5).17 The Roads Director went to war against anything that threatened his sector's 
autonomy'.18 According to Olivier Guichard, delegue 1963-67, and minister of 
Amenagement du territoire and Infrastructure, 1972-74:
The ingenieurs des Fonts do admirably what they know how to do, tarmac. But., it didn't occur to
them to ask themselves why they were doing it.... But when it has been decided that a bridge should
be built here and not there... who can oppose it when technical people made the decision?...'.19
The Plan Commissariat
A  special feature of French transport funding has been its incorporation within medium-term 
national and regional investment planning, for which the Plan Commissariat was primarily 
responsible. Created by General de Gaulle immediately before he left office in 1946, the 
Commissariat was an interministerial administration de mission like DATAR, but a more 
persistent attempt than with DATAR was made to keep the Commissariat politically- 
autonomous of government so that it could negotiate a national investment plan that would 
be widely accepted.
The first three 'Modernisation and Infrastructure Plans' (1947-61) gave no place to 
roads.20 The Plan Commissariat 'found it difficult to break into the closed world of 
transport',21 and were impressed with the arguments of Louis Armand of the SNCF and 
Pierre Masse of Electricite de France that priority should be given to rail electrification.22 
The Fourth Plan (1962-65), was 'the high-water mark of French planning,23 and the first to 
make provision for roads and regions. Yet 'the project to regionalise funding in the Plan 
failed' (as noted in Chapters 4 and 5, dividing planned investment by region would expose 
technical problems with the 'sums' at national level, and the existing disparities between the 
North-East and Paris would raise political questions).24 President de Gaulle had ambitions
13 Thoenig (1973), pp.71-3,p. 101,p. 129.
14 Courrier Picard. 31 Aug.2003, reported on the farewell speech by mayors of the canton of Albert for 'their 
[sic] TP official’. 'Despite your sensitive position between the State and the flus. you (tu) always made sure 
our paperwork was carried out correctly. We really appreciated your work, and are sad to see you go'.
15 Thoenig (1973), p. 119, p.97.
16 The General Secretary of the Conseil National des Transports observed, 31 May 2002, that 'the road 
transport companies are always the noisiest lobby in the CNT'.
17 Cour des Comptes (1998), p. 140, p. 161.
18 Thoenig (1973), p.76.
19 Guichard (1975), p.97.
20 Jardin and Fleury (1973), xxiv.
21 Thoenig, J.-C. and Despicht, N. (1975) Transport policy', in J.Hayward and M.Watson (eds) Planning. 
Politics and Public Policy (Cambridge: CUP), 390-423, p.395.
22 Cohen S.S. (1977), pp.99-100, p. 110.
23 Green (1980), p. 121.
24 Roche (1986), p.23, pp. 65-70.
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for the capital and supported Paul Delouvrier, delegue-general of the Paris region, who 
persuaded the Commissariat to increase the funding for Paris.25 The Plan Commissioner, 
Masse, assured the National Assembly there would be no differences in objectives between 
regions, and that the 'Fourth Plan was not aiming to stop the growth of Paris'.26
Almost simultaneously with the Fourth Plan, the DAT published a rival Plan national 
d'amenagement du territoire in which tolled motorways linked regional cities.27 Prime 
Minister Pompidou replaced the DAT with DATAR and attached the Plan Commissariat 
directly to his office. The Fifth Plan (1966-70), had a more 'scientific' version of the DAT 
scheme, the Plan Commissariat having accepted DATAR’s proposal with its 'technical 
criteria' and 'precise numbers'.28 The Plan Commissioner now argued that 'the motorway 
network should structure the regional cities and link them to the European Community'.29 
DATAR and the Plan Commissariat were 'on better terms' during the drawing-up of the 
Sixth Plan (1971-74, extended to 1975);30 and DATAR also worked with Fonts urban 
planners using the 'rationalised decision-making' techniques developed by Fonts 
economists. Together they decided that new roads in Paris would lead to more jobs and 
more congestion.31 Despite this analysis, the Sixth Plan prioritised radial roads into / out of 
Paris;32 and Paris received a third of the Sixth Plan provision for motorways.33 President 
Pompidou had decided in a Cornell restreint of October 1970 that the priorities for Paris 
were radial roads; 'Pompidou distrusted the planning apparatus and economic advice'.34 His 
successor, Giscard, was 'a convinced anti-planner',35 and set up his Central Planning 
Council 'to control the Plan Commissariat'.36 He did not favour motorways for Paris and 
revised downwards the provision for Paris roads in 1974-75.37 The Seventh Plan (1976- 
80), consisted of a few dozen specific actions. While one Priority Action Programme 
(PAP5) targeted links to the West and the Massif Central that Giscard and DATAR wanted, 
the 'roads to open up disadvantaged regions' were those that suffered most from budgetary 
problems'.38
25 Delouvrier in Chenu (1994), pp.271-3; Massd (1986), p.206.
26 Massd speech of 29 May 1962, reproduced in Bauchet, P. (1964) Economic Planning: The French 
Experience (Heinemann), pp.381-95.
27 Conseil Supdrieur de la Construction (1962), I, p.8.
28 Randet (1994), pp.82-5; Delouvrier in Chenu (1994), p.273.
29 Massd (1964), reprinted in Mass£, P. (1968) 'L'Amdnagement du territoire: projection g^ographique de la 
socidt6 de l'avenir', in J.Boudeville (ed.) LTJnivers rural et la planification (PUF), 63-88), pp.79-85.
30 Essig (1979), p.70.
31 Lojkine, J. (19721 La Politioue urbaine dans la region parisienne (Mouton). pp. 121-2.
32 Lojkine (1972), p. 123.
33 Jardin and Fleury (1973), p. 102, p.229.
34 Ozenda, M. and Strauss-Kahn, D. (1985) French planning: decline or renewal?', in H.Machin and 
V. Wrieht (eds) Economic Policy and Policy-making under the Mitterrand Presidency (Pinter). 101-13, 
quoting Gruson, p. 105.
35 Green (1980), p. 103.
36 Bodiguel and Quermonne (1983), p. 178.
37 Marchand, B. (1993) Paris: Histoire d'une ville: XlXe-XXe si&cle (Seuil). p.328.
38 Quinet, E. and Touzery, L. (1986) Le Plan franyais: mvthe ou ndcessite (Economica) p.60, p.81.
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The Eighth Plan (1981-85) gave up any pretence of quantified investment planning, 
and in any case was replaced by the Left in 1981 with an Interim Plan and Interim State- 
Region Contracts, which were negotiated between regions and ministries independently of 
the Plan Commissariat and DATAR. Roads investment was the largest element in these 
regional contracts, as it was in all rounds of State-Region Plan Contracts. In the Ninth Plan 
(1984-89) the impressive-sounding Mini- Multisectoral Dynamic -Transport econometric 
model enabled the effect of transport infrastructure on other sectors to be taken into 
account,39 and favoured the TGV. The Plan Commissariat had worked out that 'on any 
conceivable basis, motorways were more economic than the TGV but the TGV won'.40 In 
the Tenth Plan (1989-92), the 'first objective' for amenagement du territoire was to improve 
links to the European core from Paris and 'European-scale' regional cities, and again 
favoured the TGV 41 Despite the apparent technical advances , the Tenth Plan, 'like its 
recent predecessors... [was] 'primarily an extended elaboration on the priorities already 
announced by the government'.42
The Plan Commissariat, like DATAR, was nearly abolished by Chirac in 1986 but 
'caution triumphed'.43 However, 'the existence after 1982 of a new category of territorial 
authority, the region, changed the givens of planning'.44 Whereas the authority of National 
Plans continued to decline, and with it the Plan Commissariat, regions continued to press for 
State-Region Plan Contracts, for which DATAR is chief negotiator at central level. The Plan 
Commissariat and National Plans were superseded in practice by DATAR and State-Region 
Plan Contracts. Although political leaders often propose reforms to make the Plan 
Commissariat more effective at planning and evaluating public expenditure,
'its role has become like that of planning: blurred and uncertain.... The Commissariat remains in
existence for reasons that have more to do with symbols than with practical State action'.45
The Finance Ministry
The power of the financial bureaucracy is well-known,46 but a particular conflict of interests 
between the Ministry of Finance and the Plan Commissariat on transport needs to be noted. 
Until the 1980s much infrastructure spending was 'provisionally planned'47 in the Plan
39 'Planifier Aujourd'hui' (1989) Cahiers Franyais. 242, p.85.
40 Peter Holmes, to LSE Government Department seminar, 1 Dec. 1983.
41 Plan Commissariat (19891 France. Europe. Xth Plan 1989-92 English language version] (La 
Documentation fran9aise), p.80, p.69.
42 Hall, P.A. (1990) The State and the Market' in P.A. Hall, J.Hayward, H.Machin (eds) Developments in 
French Politics (Macmillan). 171-87. p. 183.
43 Machin, H. (1989) 'Economic planning: policy-making or policy preparation?' in P.Godt (ed.) Policy- 
Making in France: from de Gaulle to Mitterrand (Pinter). 127-41, p. 136.
44 Pontier (1998) p. 11.
45 Madiot (1996), p.27.
46 The relations between French bureaucratic groups and financial and economic policy for much of the period 
covered is summarised in Stevens, A. (1980) The higher civil service and economic policy-making', in 
P.Cemy and M. Schain (eds) French Politics and Public Policy (Methuen). 79-100, and Green (1980).
47 Green's term, (1980), p. 103.
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Commissariat. But, while the macro-economists of the Plan Commissariat tended to favour
growth led by investment (in rail), the budget officials tried to curtail spending to restrain the
subsequent inflation.48 Political leaders who wanted to spend on roads were therefore likely
to meet resistance from both the Finance Ministry and the Plan.49 Finance Ministry officials
were in ministerial cabinets, on committees drawing up road programmes, in the motorway
funding agency, and on the working group on the ’rationalisation of transport decisions’. It
argued about budgets for the road plans political leaders had decided, and then amended
them according to budgetary and economic contingencies, such as in 1990-92 when the road
improvement budget depended on the state of the currency and unemployment.50
'In France the Finance Ministry has always intervened positively to the point of practically 
dispossessing the spending ministries of many of their powers...'51
Such claims need to be evaluated more systematically alongside the efforts of 
political leaders.
THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The aim of this comparative analysis is to show that political leaders have a considerable 
capacity to define and implement policy instruments in a ’technocratic' arena, and to specify 
more closely the conditions in which leaders intervene effectively. A four-stage framework 
for comparing the impact made by political leaders on policy instruments within the context 
of the institutional and non-institutional environment was developed in Chapter 1 (see Figure 
1.1) from Blondel's conceptual scheme:52
- first, the ways in which political leaders use the positional resources offered by the 
Constitution and its conventions, and the configuration of the party system;
- second, the influence of bureaucratic organisations that might help or constrain 
leaders in this domain;
- third, the leadership's use of financial and contingent opportunities, such as crises 
or honeymoon periods; and other less tangible factors, such as 'prevailing ideas';
- fourth, the opportunities and constraints during implementation, especially the 
leadership’s ability to oversee execution and continued funding.
Data collection and analysis
Evidence on each of these items was sought for the 36 instruments for road investment with 
a potential impact on amenagement du territoire that were launched after that policy was 
initiated in 1944 (See Figure 6.1). Some are ’one-off events, such as legislation to allow 
motorways to be built. Yet even the road network, with its appearance of steady evolution,
48 Green (1980), p. 104.
49 Cohen S.S. (1977), pp.99-100.
50 Le Monde. 11 Dec. 1991; Bauchard, P. (19941 Deux ministres trop tranquilles (Belfond). p.52; Merlin 
(1994), p.46.
51 Hayward (1975), p.8.
52 Blondel (1987), pp.4-8.
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T1 Pleven to 
Pinay
FSIR Road Fund and 1st Road Plan 1951-52
Presic entCoty 1954-58
T2 Mendes to 
Faure
Act on tolled motorways 1954-55
T3 Mendes to 
Faure
Ilnd National Plan - DAT initiative 1954-55




ent de Gaulle 1959-69
T5
Debie
1st National Roads Programme 1959-60
T6 Roads in IVth National Plan 1962-65
T7 DAT's 2nd Plan of Amenagement du territoire 1962
T8
Pompidou
Caisse nationale des autoroutes 1962
T9 Roads in Languedoc-Roussillon (& Fos) mission 1966
T10 Creation of Super-ministry of Infrastructure 1966
T il Vth Plan inter-metropole road network 1966-70
T12 OREAM bodies to develop regional metropolises 1966
T13 Breton expressway scheme (Plan breton) 1968-69




Act on tolled motorways by concessions 1969
T15 2nd National Road Network 1971 1969-71
T16 Vlth Plan: competition and solidarity 1971-74
T17 Paris-Strasbourg motorway 1972
President Giscard c'Estaing 1974-81
T18 Chirac Conseil central de planification 1974-76
T19 Revised VHth Plan: reduce territorial imbalance 1976-80
T20 Barre National motorway programme 1978-83 1977
T21 Rationalisation of Transport Decisions Group 1978-80
Presic ent Mitterrand 1981-95
T22
Mauroy
Interim State-Regions Plan Contracts 1981-82
T23 Transport Act 1982 (LOTI) 1982
T24 FSGT Fund for transport and energy projects 1982
T25 1st State-Region Plan Contracts 1984-88 1983-84
T26 Motorway and national road plan 1983-84
T27 Massif Central and Breton expressways 1984
T28 Chirac National Road Plan - increase competitiveness 1987
T29 Rocard 2nd State-Region Plan Contracts 1989-93 1987-88
T30 Cresson National Road and Motorway Plan 1992
T31
Balladur
3rd State-Region Plan Contracts 1994-99 1993-94
T32 Acceleration of motorway programme 1993
T33 Paris Basin Charter and Contract 1994
T34 National Plan of AdT and road plan 1995
Presic ent Chirac 1995-
T35 Jospin 4th State-Region Contracts 2000-06 1998-00
T36 Sustainable transport service plans 1999-01
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is a product of discrete actions by political leaders, when they re-define the map of strategic 
roads in a Council of Ministers or DATAR's interministerial committee CIAT/CIADT, 
chaired by the prime minister. In accordance with a methodological strategy suggested by 
Miles and Huberman for this type of qualitative research, the evidence was organised into a 
database for each instrument, operationalising Blondel's four analytical themes:53
- first, the constitution, date, president and prime minister (indicators for the political 
leadership's constitutional powers and the party systems);
- and the actions or views attributed to the president, prime minister, minister for 
amenagement du territoire and the roads minister, in relation to the road instrument;
- second, the actions or views attributed to DATAR, the Ponts et Chaus sees, the 
Plan Commissariat;
- third, funding (sources or outcomes or problems), and the technical paradigm 
ruling in the domain of the instrument examined;
- fourth, other significant issues especially those concerning implementation, such as 
the views or actions of the Ministry of Finance or parliamentarians; and economic or 
political crises;
- in addition, evidence on the output of the instrument, both in terms of fulfilling the 
stated intentions for roads and in terms of the impact on amenagement du territoire.
A sample of this database is shown in Figure 6.2, and Figure 6.3 lists the sources used.54 
The information from each database was condensed into Figure 6.4 to enable data to be 
compared more easily, and to show the additional information that supports the quantitative 
analysis but which there is not space to discuss. In addition, each instrument was evaluated 
succinctly in terms of the issues raised at the start of the chapter:
- how well did the output match leaders' announced intentions for the instrument?
- how well did the road tool fulfil the leaders' aims for amenagement du territoire? 
To facilitate and guide the qualitative interpretation a 'quantivised' analysis was first
made of the information in Figure 6.4, as suggested by Ragin.55 In Figure 6.5 a 'tick' (V) 
was assigned when the action (or expressed preference, or funding, or technical paradigm) 
favoured the introduction of the instrument, 0 when there was no known input or action, 
and a 'cross' (X) when the action or other factor was unfavourable. The 'star rating' in the 
final columns relates first to the match between the leaders' expressed aims for the 
instrument and its outcome, and, second, to the practical impact of the instrument on 
amenagement du territoire.
53 Miles, M. and Huberman, A. (19941 Qualitative Data Analysis 2nd edn (Thousand Oaks: Sage), pp. 173- 
94.
54 A 37-page print-out and/or computer file of the full database with conventional bibliographical referencing 
could be provided.
55 See Ragin, C. (19871 The Comparative Method (Berkeley: University of California), chapter 8.
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Figure 6.2 Example of roads planning database
T i l Vth Plan Road network to link regional cities 1966-70
Fifth
Republic






Major objective of Vth Plan: transport investment to enable a 
locality to be developed, intensify regional action and AdT. 






Formal role to ensure coherence of Plan investments with AdT 
objectives, coordinate annual infrastructure spending. Vice­
chair of CNAT, regional Plan and funding committees.
In 1968 2 staff at DATAR liaised with Ministry of Equipment. 
CGP accepted DATAR’s proposal of a more elaborate version 
of DAT's 1961 scheme, supported by CNAT study on 
transport and location 'technical criteria'. 'Monod [had learned] 











Wanted grandeur of France served through grandeur of Paris: 
favoured quality of technical performance: motorways, 
peripheriques, new towns. Asked "What will you need to 




Role of PM 
and AdT 
minister
Put Plan and AdT under himself as PM in 1962 to limit CGP. 
Gave Guichard FIAT, free of Ministry of Finance, to finance 
sections of motorway etc. Approved roads to develop 
metropoles d'equilibre in CIAT 1964. - End 1964 Delouvrier 
showed Pompidou Paris motorway plan. PM didn't want to 










Report to de Gaulle 27/4/66. Harms AdT to give Paris public 
transport infrastructure subsidies. Some large projects 
underway not based on cost-benefit research. Dismissed by PM 





Ponts 'saw red' when regions created by decree March 1964, 
and had to respond to prefect
Roads Director against anything harming the autonomy of his 
sector. But regional prefect relied on Ponts to decide road 
investments. Motorway projects decided centrally, but on 









Masse [original text in 1964]) was pro- metropoles and said 
must define motorway network to match, structure the Mets & 
link to EU. Masse said CGP agreed to tolls (a) because only 
solution Minister of Finance [Pinay] likely to accept and (b) 






Funding DATAR's FLAT by 1970 had given one-third aid to roads. 
January 1966 Debre, Minister of Finance made 'solemn visit' 
to DATAR -  said would help industrial conversion, reduce 
burden of unproductive areas




Other issues DATAR's annex to budget now to show credits allocated to 
each programme region.




Vth Plan concentrated investments on 'nationally-important 
motorways' -  around 6 of 8 metropoles, plus Nice, but not in 
the 2 least prosperous (Toulouse, Nantes). CGP pressurised to 
add more 'Mets' e.g. Nice. Delouvrier persuaded Plan to 







Figure 6.3 Roads planning database sources
Most information cited in the roads planning database came from the texts listed below; the 
full bibliographical details are at the end of the thesis.
Other information came from:
- Published and unpublished information from DATAR, such as Lettre de la DATAR, 
DATAR's press cuttings, DATAR's records of CLAT agendas.
- Legislation, Finance Bills, Debates in the National Assembly.
- Le Monde, Les Echos, Le Courrier Picard, and IEP Paris dossiers de presse.
- Own records of seminars and meetings at LSE, DATAR, Conseil National des Transports.
Books, articles and reports cited in roads planning database:
DATAR Perrin etal (1968) Merlin etal (1990) Hayward (1982)
DOCUM ENTS 'Planifier1, Cahiers Monod (1974) Holmes et al (1988)
Bonnafous et al Fran5ais (1989) Monodetal (1971) Jardin et al (1973)
(1993) Touzery (1982) Monod et al. (1980) Julienne (1996)
DATAR (1973a) Morand & Racine Keating etal (1986)
DATAR (1977) OTHER (1987) Labasse (1966)
DATAR (1986) PRIM ARY Pasqua et al (1993) Lacour(1983)
DATAR (1990) TEXTS Pisani (1974) Lagroye (1973)
Guigou (1993) Attali (1993) Quinet etal (1986) Lajugie (1964)
Laborie et al (1985) Aubert in Billet Racine (1980) Lajugieetal (1979)
Marcou et al (1994) (1997) Roche (1986) Lanversin (1970)
Randet(1994) Bloch-Lain^ (1962) Savy (1996) Lojkine (1972)
Rdmond (1977) Carr£re (1997) Sudreau in Randet Machin(1989)
Chaban-Delmas (1994) Machin et al (1985)
OTHER (1997) Ullmo (1975) Madiot (1979)
OFFICIAL Delouvrier in Chenu Vaujour (1970) Madiot (1986)
DOCUM ENTS (1994) Madiot (1993)
Archives Nationales Givaudan in Costa SEC O N DARY Marchand (1993)
(1996) (1988) TEXTS Meissel (1995)
Biays etal (1992) Debrd (1988) Allen etal (1970) Mdny (1974)
Chain (1997) De Gaulle (1971) Andrault(1990) M6ny (1987)
Charles et al (1992) Drevet(1991 Ashford (1982) Noin (1998)
Chevallier (1992) Esambert (1994) Audouin (1977) Pontier (1998)
Cons, supdrieur Essig (1979) Bauehard (1994) Pouyet(1968)
Construction Faucheux (1959) Benko(1987) PrudTiomme (1974)
(1962) Faure (1982) Bougeard (1994) Quermonne (1967)
C.Comptes (1992) Fournier (1993) Cohen, S (1977) Rod win (1970)
C.Comptes (1992) Fmppart (1965) Dupuy et al (1987) Roussel (1994)
C.Comptes (1999) Giscard d'Estaing Dupuy (1988) Rousso (1986)
C.Comptes ( 1999a) (1977) Estrin etal (1983) Rousso (1987)
C.Comptes (2001) Gravier(1972) Favieretal (1990) Suleiman (1974)
Coulbois et al Gruson in Ozenda et Favieretal (1991) Suleiman (1980)
(1994) al (1985) Favier etal (1999) Thoenig (1973)
[Goux] (1982) Guaino (1998) Gervaise et al Thoenig (1987)
[Guichard] (1986) Guichard (1975) (1997) Thoenig et al (1975)
Gr&nion, C (1992) Lacaze (1994) Green (1980) Toulemonde et al
Hodd6 (1992) Langumier (1986) Grdmion, P (1976) (1994)
Meriin (1982) Massd (1964) Gr&nion, P et al Williams (1972)
Merlin (1994) Massd (1986) (1975) Yvert (2002)
[Quinet et al] (1980) Mass£ in Rousso Hansen (1968)
Quinet(1982) (1987) Hayward (1966)
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INSTRUM ENTS L e a d e rs ' In p u t B u re au c ra tic  In p u t P o licy  p r o c e s s O u tp u t
DAT o r  DATAR P r e s id e n t PM M in iste r fo r 
A dT
M in ister fo r 
R o a d s
P o n ts  ro le  a n d  
v iew
C G P ro le  a n d  
v iew
T ech n ica l
p a ra d iq m
F u n d in g O th e r I s s u e s M atch  to  
le a d e r s 'a lm
Im p a c t o n  A dT
T1 1951-52 - FSIR  R o ad  F u n d  & 1 s t  R o a d  P lan 0 0
'R elations with No in terest, and Pro-AdT PM V .keen on  AdT A greed FSIR a s TP did not w ant Preferred  rail P on ts  plan Special funds S trong ro ad s L eaders Little or no
C G P not no  pow ers in th is a g re ed  FSIR, ex bu t c h o se  no t to Min, th en  s igned  to  lose  local spending; could b a se d  on Paris- organ ised  but lobby entering introduced tool output, on ro ad s
organ ised , field tran sp o rt ta k e  actions in d e c ree  a s  PM power; P on ts no t en ter C orps focused  traffic gradually parliam ent but no  ou tpu t or AdT a sp e c t
harm ed m inister PM conflict with C G P preferred  rail world. and  growth ab so rb ed  Into
im plem entation' a g re ed  plan fo recasts general b udget
T2 1954-55 - A c t o n  to lled  m o to rw a y s 0 0
No form al role Pro-DAT w hen 2 PM s h ad K een Tsp-and-A dT minister Said A gainst - might M otorways a W ould u s e M Ps red u ced  Act Bill s o  reduced Bill so  reduced
on ro ad s a t Construction, specia l voting prom oted  Bill, especially  for local undem ocratic; have  diverted P on ts  taboo private funds, to  exceptional th a t no longer th a t no  u s e  for
bu t no  pow ers pow ers -bu t still developm ent; next R o ad s  m inister a lso  abou t lo ss funds  aw ay from but th a t p o sed circum stances; w hat le ad e rs local
h ad  to  give in to a sk e d  P o n ts  for P lan of local control C G P priorities 'public serv ice ' no t local u se w an ted developm ent a t
M Ps by C orps problem s th e  tim e
T3 1954-55 - llnd  C G P P la n  - DAT In itia tive * 0
Late DAT Pro-DAT w hen Prom oted M inister n o t 2  active ro a d s Said  'ro ad s  are 'A period of C G P thought R o ad s  had F aure  d e ­ L ead ers  able to 'P lan  road  funds
initiative in 1955 a t C onstruction, industrial involved in m inisters, one rich m en 's am enagem en t- regional p lans la rg e st reduction em p h asise d c h o o se  a not divided in
to  p e rsu ad e bu t no  pow ers relocation and persuad ing k een  on AdT transport1; infrastructure could divert Plan of funding from Plan different option line with
Minister of Plan transpo rt M inister of conflict with AdT c lass ic  conflict of spend ing  from its llnd plan aim s industrial
coordination F inance. officials pow ers' goals relocation'
T4 1958-61 - R o a d s  In lllrd  C G P P lan 0 0
V ice-chair C G P A s PM, c rea ted Supported  AdT Active Min, keen K een on ro ad s R an C G P cttee; C oordinated N eed to re spond Gaullist National L eaders  did not 'M aps did not
regional c ttee th e  C G P c ttee; Min, a sk e d  C G P on AdT, a  form er an d  local in field V a n ted regional plans. to  traffic growth, expansion  policy p lan n ers  worried ach ieve find place*.
(C G P chaired); re s ta r ts  Plan, a s to  regionalise c lo se  a ide of developm ent, to  s treng then Found it difficult catch  up bu t F inance congestion institutional R o ad s  no t in
on F inance P resid en t left it P lan  in 1961 P res , friend of a sk ed  PM for existing network’ to en te r transport Germ any, Italy cu tbacks h inders growth ch an g e  in C G P C G P P lan s  till
funds c ttee to  PM PM funds world IVth
T5 1959-60 - 1st N a tio n a l R o a d s  p ro g ra m m e * 0
DAT on R oads A pproved ro ad s A greed  p lans, M ust hav e W an ted  m ore 'Tolls a  taboo  of C G P on R oads ’N eed s of AdT F unds controlled Political desire Mixed output 'N ew  n e tw o rk ..
Com m ission bu t especially  in bu t lifted toll a g reed funds & free th e  roads Com m ission. not taken  into by R o ad s no t to s top  Paris reflected b a se d  on
with F inance Paris restriction to C om m ission an d  roads. F inance divisionision'; M ass6  gav e  tolls acco u n t b e ca u se division; F inance expansion  and different goa ls  of existing traffic,
an d  C G P to fund te lecom m s appoin ted  DAT. Ministry said delayed a s  com prom ise of th e  ro ad s re fused  funds ro ad s  tw o-w ay political le ad ers no t voluntary
o v e rsee  P on ts Pro  AdT build with tolls m otorw ays backlog* geography’
T6 1962-65 - R o a d s  In IVth C G P  P la n * 0
V ice-P res of First w an ted Supported  C G P An active Strong support P on ts  tried to CG P ran C G P sa id  could First tim e D elouvrier had Mixed output. More ro ad s
regional P lans ro ad s  for R egional division prom oter, tru s ted  to  Delouvrier's m ee t traffic regional p rocess, no t allow Finance Ministry w orked out PM w anted investm ent but
com m ittee econom ic with F inance a n d  by D ebr6 an d  d e  infrastructure dem ands; TP m et problem s, regional ad ap ted  policy to quantified P aris change: P res no t a llocated  on
m odernisation, C dC  staff. Gaulle spend ing  in prioritised their no road  options' differences; nor help C G P n e e d s  in IVth an d  R o ad s  Min AdT grounds
then  P aris Paris local ro ad s slow  P aris and  Vth P lans pro- P aris
Note: Star rating on match of output with leaders' announced aims for the instrument, or impact on Amenagement du Territoire: 0 to ** in order of increasing impact.
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A dT
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v iew
C G P ro le  a n d  
v iew
T ech n ica l
p a ra d ig m
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Im p a c t o n  A dT
T7 1962 - D A T s 2 n d  P lan  o f  A dT 0 *
W rote Plan, m et No known D ebr6 did not H ad it draw n up Not officially S tarted C G P reluctant to P o n ts  'w an ted  to DAT m et C G P Bloch-Lain6 DAT o u t of top No direct im pact
CG P, criticised intervention know ab o u t it? u nder friend involved. But econom ic ad d  regions; streng then w eekly to w an ted  rail am d lead er 's  control b u t called
'short-term ism ' Pom pidou 's Lam our, a sk e d sa m e  minister division to  draw would show  up existing network- d iscu ss  urban road  in one though Minister effective
of R oads reaction  w as  to for its publication w ho did n o t w ant 'roads ' part of its s tatistics a  new  argument* investm ent ministry to  help for AdT in favour a ttention to
division invent DATAR toll ro ad s C G P Plan problem s AdT problem
T8 1962 * C a ls s e  n a tio n a le  d e s  a u to ro u te s * *
No input. DAT in N one known. But U sed  CNA Trying w ithout A s P aris  District W hen lost M ass6  p roposed P o n ts  prioritising Funding by CDC P aris  h ad  high PM ab le  to  s e t CNA funds first
d isg race  after in favour in P aris  form at to  avoid s u c c e s s  to P res id en t m onopoly, took tolls to  D ebr6 - re sp o n se  to (Bloch-Lain^) proportion of up new  tool, but u s e d  for Paris-
published  2nd m otorw ays confrontation co n stru c t a supported  Paris over m otorways a s  ro ad s  without traffic dem and an d  CNA chaired  S ta te  b u d g e t a t u s e  partly Lille, to help Lille
P lan  of AdT with P o n ts  on Ministry of AdT ro ad s an d  chaired  CNA funding n e e d s by P o n ts th is tim e eg. for diverted from his c a r  p lant
tolls and  Plan peripherique aim s
T9 1966 - R o a d s  In L a n g u e d o c  m is s io n * * **
H ead of m ission A pproved D ebr£ appo in ted  friend a s  m ission A Minister w ho P on ts  built roads A rival project to A 'm ission ' or Block budget, Only period 1962 S ch em e fully in "A com plete
u sed  co n tac ts  to efficient head , th en  Pom pidou a s  PM a n d prom oted  P aris w here  mission C G P’s  local special purpose not sectorally  - 74  D ebr6 not tu n e  with netw ork of ro ad s
b y p ass  P on ts structure , Minister of AdT s igned  d e c ree investm ent. He decided  from project; CG P vehicle then  in divided an G iscard  the leadersh ip 's built-would do
and  F inance finance, an d  the w a s  b y passed . m ission funds kept outside this vogue adm instrative M inister of w ish es sa m e  again"
project one innovation. Finance (M onod)
T10 1966 - C re a tio n  o f  S u o e rm in is trv  o f  In f ra s tru c tu re * *
No input His initiative to Hostile to creation  of S u p er­ W anted  long P on ts  w anted  to Not known P residen t DATAR lost Local politicians Mixed output. R em ove urban
c rea te  • a  real m inistries. S e p a ra te d  public term  planning of take  on new thought proximity so m e  urban did no t like lo ss P re s  w an ted planning from
'overseer* of tran sp o rt off w hen  Pisani left transport, land, roles; R o ad s in c rea se s funding pow er to of posts, local change: PM did DATAR b u t a
large national finance eng ineers efficiency Infrastructure advice no t a n d  m ade good outcom e
infrastructure against m erger ministry tem porary
T11 1966-70 - V th P lan  ro a d  n e tw o rk  to  link  re g io n a l c i t ie s * * *
Formal role to Kept C G P in A pproved sch em e . Took over Plan T hree Coordination by S upported Regional FIAT g av e  1/3 D elouvrier L eadership Action in so m e
s e e  P lan  m et being. 'But very an d  AdT to  c h ec k  C G P / F inance. su cce ss iv e Regional Prefect m etropoles, but cap itals ' now aid to  roads; p e rsu a d e d  C G P ach ieved  w hat AdT m etropo les
AdT goals: strongly G ave  DATAR FIAT, f r e e  of m inisters - w ho relied on also  Paris scientific F inance M inister an d  R o ad s w an ted  including but a lso  Nice,
checked  b udge t sup p o rted  the Finance Ministry’ , to  fund approved  inter- P on ts  advice infrastructure 'm etropoles supported  AdT M inister to  fund mixed aim s on P aris
p lans peripherique* m otorway sec tio n s urban ro ad s cfequilibre' P aris Paris
T12 1966 - OREAM b o d ie s  to  d e v e lo p  re g io n a l m e tro p o le s * * * *
O rgan ised No known A greed  OREAM s in CIAT. P isan i's  link of P o n ts  a n d  ex- C G P eclipsed  by DATAR 'a  norm - DATAR worked M ayors of L eadership Limited funding
ClATs to  ag ree intervention R eluctan t to  s p en d  on P aris  roads. R o ad s  and DAT organ ised DATAR in setteri on with F inance  an d  m etropo les freed ach ieved  w hat but enab led
plans, financed A rbitrated S ta te - region and Construction OREAMs to OREAMs econom ic growth m inistries to  s e e of departm en ts w an ted  including sh o rt leng ths
them , central Ministry-DATAR d isp u tes  in CIAT. he lped  OREAM reduce  DATAR, b e ca u se  h ad and w here  m oney mixed a im s on around  m ost
coordinator S e t up  centra l G CPU C G P pow er funds, realistic m odernisation s p en t P aris m etropo les
Note: Star rating on match of output with leaders' announced aims for the instrument, or impact on Amenagement du Territoire: 0 to ** in order of increasing impact
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INSTRUMENTS Leaders' input Bureaucratic input Policy process Output




Ponts role and 
view
CGP role and 
view
Technical
p a rad ig m








1968-69 - Breton expressway schem e (Plan breton)
G uichard 
p e rsu a d e d  PM 




again  in sp ee c h  
in Brittany 1969
A greed  1965 - B reton, sa id
no outcom e. A transpo rt 
'm easu re  for im portant for
Brittany' in J u n e  AdT; w orked 
1968 with PM
Four m inisters 
1965-69, so m e  
pro-AdT, so m e  
pro-Paris.
1969 - Act on tolled motorways by concessions
W orked with W anted  car- H ad introduced B ettencourt, For property
P re s id e n ts  driven, industrial 1954 m otorway helpful to  developm ent,
adviser, to  g e t econom y; he lp ed  bill to  help DATAR but not
road  links to  DATAR regional driving force R o ad s Division'
m etropo les developm ent he re
R o ad s division 
said  'it w a s  folly'




M inisters Plan & 
AdT 1967-69 
p u sh ed  it.
C ost-benefit of 
motorway poor;
S om e funding 
from  DATAR's
an d  Brittany *had FIAT, p lus FSIR 
right to  m odem  decided  by
rail'
M asse  h ad  P res: No m ore 
p roposed  tolls to  counting c a r s ' ;
R o ad s  minister
M inister h ad  to 
prom ise M Ps
Built under 
p re ssu re  from 
Bretons, C hirac- 
G iscard, M auroy
A ccelera ted  2 
ro ad s  to  w e st
'lifted obstac le  of m otorways, later D ebr£ - a s  ro ad s  Ponts: 'G ot M- ro ad s  would help and  M etropoles
1969-71 - 2nd national road plan
'In c lo se  liaison W anted  ro ad s  t o  W an ted  Formally his a n d  U pset DDE
with P o n ts ' on help AdT a n d  tran sp o rt to  help PM 's priorities traditional w ays,
which provincial industry'. Took AdT. D ecided to  w ere  now in Cut Paris
ro ad s  to  fund decision in list funded  roads , com m and  m otorw ays
C onseil
1971-74 - Vlth Plan: competition and social solidarity
On be tte r te rm s  
with C G P. Wth 




W an ted  roads, 
including P aris  
rad ia ls
Pro-P lan , R e- G u ic h a rd , then
co n cen tra ted  B ettencourt
funds  M inister of p e rsu a d e d  M Ps
P lan  & AdT to  a c c e p t Plan
deco n cen tra ted
'C entral 
fiefdom s' took 





Drew up a s  
asked , but later 
critical: "no 
figures to justify'
R an  C G P 
transpo rt cttee. 
RCB officials 
ag a in st Paris 
radials.
w ithout funding 
n e ed s
w ays w e w an ted ' w este rn  regions
No role but fitted RCB prom oted 50%  of FIAT
Plan sp irit 'A  by a  P o n ts  group w ent to  ro ad s
signal to private working with DATAR w anted ,
investors' C G P an d  bu t not enough
DATAR funding
C G P and  
regional unit in 
opposition. 
P re s se d  to  add  
m ore cities
PriorityR o ad s cost- 
benefit appraisa l investm en ts in 
now  to  include 
AdT
but o ther ro ad s  
m ore
G iscard  a t 
F inance 
opp o sed  
com pletion da te  
for Plan
DATAR 'alw ays 
h ad  p roblem s
1972 - Paris-Strasbourg motorway
U sed  A nnounced  on No intervention Im portant th a t
Presidential visit v is it 'M otorw ays known. Unlikely G uichard Min of
to  acce le ra te  an  ap p rec ia ted  by (P aris-to- R o ad s  an d  AdT
AdT decision local 6 lus‘ B ordeaux h is  during





No known role. 
Additional to
through tow ns of operation typical p lanned
2 transpo rt 
m inisters'
of AdT’ investm ent
Nice
Decision political P res id en t 
'bu t a lso  b a se d  exam ined  
on transport a n d  p rog ress ', found 
AdT stu d ies ' new  funds
Vlth P lan  se rv ed  m aking its 
P a ris  m ost & co n ce rn s  prevail'
R oad  thought 
useful a t tim e of 
EC growth to 
anch o r region 
into F rance
S ch em e fully in 
tu n e  with 
leadersh ip 's  
w ish es  after 
hesitation
AdT policy 
ag reed  and  
im plem ented 
after hesitation
Political 
leadersh ip  
ach ieved  their 
cong ruen t 
p u rp o se s
M atched AdTs 
goals  though still 
favoured  growth 
regions
Political 
leadersh ip  
ach ieved  their 
cong ruen t 
pu rp o se s
‘T ransla ted  
be tte r than  
p re d e ce sso r  a  
desire  for AdT'.
Mixed output 
reflected 
different goa ls  of 
political lead ers
R egional p lans 
h ad  little AdT 
impact;
politicians ad d ed  
tow ns
"Presiden t’s  will 
prevailed. 
M otorway built 
two y e a rs  
sooner"
DATAR go t a  
one-off policy 
decision it really 
w an ted
T18 1974-76 - Conseil central de planlflcatlon
A dvised on AdT. S e t up  an d  
R an CIAT which chaired  i t  
d ecided  22  m F D ecided 'rural' 
for M assif AdT policy in it 
Central
Held CIAT to 
ag re e  fu n d s  for 
M assif C ; 
an n o u n ced  
Brittany ro a d s
C h an g ed  AdT 
from urban  
netw ork  to  rural 
support
H ad prom ised  
Breton roads; 
M inisters s top  
defending 
Ponts/rail
Still trying to  P la n o n C C P . G ave attention M ore funds  to  G iscard  led 1975
m ee t traffic But G iscard anti- post-73  to  life- rural a re a s , budget
dem and  Plan, u sed  C C P quality* - 'vivre sm all tow ns, a n d  arbitration not
to  control C G P au  pays' ‘p a y s ' PM an d  DATAR
A tool for making 
P res id en t's  will 




officially no t 
m uch involved
Note: Star rating on match of output with leaders' announced aims for the instrument, or impact on Amenagement du Territoire: 0 to ** in order of increasing impact.
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T19 1976-80 • R e v ise d  Vllth p la n : r e d u c e  te rr i to r ia l Im b a la n c e ** *
Not 'chef de  file1 His goa ls  for C hirac -no Fourcade , technician, 'resto red S aid  PAP5 Main plan not P o n ts  w an ted PA P5 spend ing R oad  spend ing Political S om e output
for transpo rt AdT: 'sp read known input. DATAR's 'active, daring im age '- let (a c c e s s  to regionalised. ro ad s  to  m ee t in M assif C entral down by 50% leadersh ip 's  will useful to AdT
PAP5. CNAT econom ic B arre w an ted  a DATAR decide  roads . F ourcade d isadvan taged G iscard  - Barre traffic dem and b u t not Brittany though M assif prevailed though DATAR
played no  role activities over Plan for Nation, an d  liberal Icart w ere  stronger regions) m arginalised no t iso lated in 1976-80. C entral funded not m uch
territory' no t S ta te ag a in st P o n ts unim portant CG P regions. involved
T20 1977 - N a tiona l m o to rw a y  p ro g ra m m e * *
N egotiated  a G iscard  anti-car 'B ehind liberal F ourcade  a  technician keen to P on ts  a t DATAR No known input ’[DATAR] tried to  D ep en d s  on S om e leading Political R oad  p lans now
CIAT with P o n ts  and  m etropoles; rhetoric, a reb a lan ce  P a ris  a n d  w eaker unab le  to  return: integrate F inance, CNA, P o n ts  w an ted  to leadersh ip 's  will decided  in CIAT.
to  decide road but left m ore to powerful prac tice regions; Full support to  DATAR on 'h ad  fought regional dev t into CdC. R oad co n q u er w ider prevailed but Funding limited
program m e B arre in CIAT of dirigism e'. roads, v e rsu s  PM an d  in ministry road R oads ' s p e n d  halved world of AdT th en  limited by AdT output
ministerial a rb itrag es  on ro ad s policy* calculations.' from 1978 finance
T21 1978-80 - R a tio n a lisa tio n  o f  T r a n s p o r t  D e c is io n s  G ro u p * * **
3 DATAR No role. Did not S e t up  a s  PM & Icart a  liberal M inister of R o ad s director: C G P had  small 'Obliged to R o ad s A ppraisal Issu e  ra ised  by Political AdT now
officials with 5 like RCB w hen Econom y Infrastructure- AdT. Group on to ’No econom ic rep resen tation  in consider AdT am e n d ed  1980 G uillaum at leadersh ip officially
F inance/P lan F inance  Minister minister, introduce fair com petition, im pact from Group im pact though to  include AdT - Com m ission on ach ieved  their (sceptically),
and  19 published  a s  PM a ccep ted  recom m endations and roads, limited no ev idence of not d one  1974 fair road-rail congruen t conside red  in
T ransport and  AdT published  report redistribution' any im pact1 com petition p u rp o se s road  s c h e m e s
T22 1981-82 - In te rim  S ta te -R e g io n  P lan  C o n tra c ts . * 0
No part in P u t R ocard  in a C haired  ClATs No ministry E ach region P o n ts  officials N o role in 'TP w ant DATAR lost role M otorways a D eliberately poor No AdT input to
organising cupboard  (the on regional con tacts . G ave negotia ted had  m ost input Interm im tsp decisions on of budgetary paradigm  for coordination 1981-2
con tracts. Lost Plan). W ants con trac ts; put DATAR th e independently on negotiating contracts. At its legal technical oversight local leaders. within political investm ent
b udge t role P lan  & AdT friend in ch arg e coordinating role with the  ministry ro ad s  con ten t w e ak es t b a se s , w ant leadersh ip decisions
a tta ch ed  to  PM but late resu lts'
T23 1982 - T ra n s p o r t  A c t (LOTI) ; * * * *
On National G ives opinion on C haired  CIAT Act gives AdT o n e  of his 4 P o n ts  econom ist No known P o n ts  p ra ise AdT to  b e  ap a rt Im poses  wide Political AdT m inisters
T ransport alt bills from 5/82 with AdT m inister a  formal objectives in w rote th e  Bill, position or locus DATAR 1971 of the  co sts - consultation, leadersh ip m ust now a g ree
Council and M arch 1982; contribution to approval role for prom oting the including AdT for intervention m ap 'balanced benefits CNT, regions, ach ieved  their to  all large
advisory role on w an ts  urban tran sp o rt a s  1st road  s c h e m e s Bill criteria. a c c e s s  to  all appraisal no t ju s t Parisian congruen t transpo rt
pro jects transpo rt item regions elite pu rp o se s decisions
T24 1982 - FS G T  - F u n d  fo r  t r a n s p o r t  a n d  e n e r g y  p ro je c ts * * **
D elegue a  B oard A sked  for W an ted  for Le G arrec , PM 's A sked by Unlikely to  object No known S een  a s  a  job A bout 1.3bn F a D elors opp o sed Political F unded  TGV
m em ber of projects: electoral re a so n s  friend, s e t  it up. P res id en t to to new  funds position or locus creation schem e , y e a r  of which 2nd  tranche: leadersh ip Atiantique &
FSGT, an d T ranspo rt and but keen  on Im plem ented carry ou t so m e provided for road  for intervention but ro ad s  w ere 400m F to  main Sum  red u ced ach ieved  their ro ad s  thought
d isb u rses  the DATAR to urban well by Defferre a sp e c ts and  rail s c h e m e s need ed roads, 50m  to after arrival of congruen t good for AdT a t
funds execu te redevelopm en t including TGV e s ta te  ro a d s C hirac pu rp o se s th e  time.
Note: Star rating on match of output with leaders' announced aims for the instrument, or impact on Amenagement du Territoire: 0 to ** in order of increasing impact
E gure 6A Roads planning data meta-matrix
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T25 1983*84 - 1 s t  S ta te -R e o lo n  P lan  C o n tra c ts  1984-88 ** *
Pivot of No known role No known role in m ost con tracts, No known input Thought DATAR Guillaume saw P o n ts  derided DATAR u sed P o o rer regions U nbalanced H elped AdT
negotations, bu t keen  to  help bu t keen  to  help Lorraine. C haired 'took care  to only limited role 'reg ions' dem and FIAT to  push now funding funding reflected a im s in so m e
ClATs, checked Lorraine (partly ClATs, w an ted  decentralisation , m atch regional for intervention for roads, aim s, but S ta te  ro ad s goals  of political reg ions m ore
ministry b u d g e ts  for votes). appo in ted  friend a s  junior m inister with national in m arket airports a n d Lorraine got o th e rs  h ad  free leadersh ip than  o thers
s tra tegy econom y cana ls ' la rg est su m s
T26 1983-84 - M o to rw ay  a n d  n a tio n a l ro a d  p la n * *
Drew up  jointly A sked for PM is M inister in for AdT with Le Said  financial Drew m ap with No known P on ts  say C utbacks in D ecree  ag re ed  it Tool th a t le ad ers F o c u ses  on inter-
with Pon ts. All projects: Ganrec, CFDT, friend, h is  junior rigour m ean t he DATAR. Issued position or locus DATAR 1971 b udge t from but m ap  not w an ted  but not u rban roads; but
s c h e m e s  now T ranspo rt and m inister. D iscu ssed  road  plan in could not m ake a s  'adm inistra­ for intervention m ap 'balanced 1984 w hen published till , published/ well- no t 'unprofitable'
decided  in DATAR to ClATs, app roved  it ju s t befo re  h e his d o ssie rs tive gu idance' in a c c e s s  to  all B eregevoy a t 1986 (No funded roads
ClATs. execu te re s ig n s  in 1984 m ove 1986. re g io n s .. . ’ F inance funding?)
T27 1984 - M ass if  C en tra l a n d  B re to n  e x p re s s w a y s ** * *
D eveloped old No known Inpu t M auroy a g re ed  a t  CIAT to  fund PC F m inister No known input No known input P arad igm  is TGV Wholly S ta te 2 .2m F in S c h em e folly in M ore s p e n t on
plan, o rgan ised but likely to  h av e M assif C entral expressw ay . then  rep laced  by b ut still ro ad s  to financed though Brittany, MC, tu n e  with ro ad s  for AdT
CIAT which a g reed Im plem ented  by Defferre a s Quil&s (friend of M assif Central, national M idi-Pyrenees in leadersh ip ’s even  though
a g reed  it M inister for AdT M itterrand) Brittany transpo rt b udge t tw o y e a rs  1984- w ishes o ther b u d g e ts
reduced 85 cu t b ack
T28 1987 - N ationa l ro a d  p la n  - in c re a s e  c o m p e ti t iv e n e s s ** * *
P ublished  1984 C ohabitation - F unded  from M inister of Infrastructure and  AdT. R oad division Very w eak. AdT policy MinFin Balladur Limousin, Midi-P Tool th a t PM W hat DATAR
m ap In 1985. No known Input privatisation, O rdered  G uichard R eport which adopted C hirac nearly differentiating only a g reed sa id  'right to a w anted , over­ w an ted  for AdT
O rgan ised  CIAT and  s e e m s  very tolls. Prioritised recom m ended  road  program m e. evaluation abolished , but le s s  betw een reluctantly if m otorway' - not ruled F inance
to  approve  plan. unlikely. ro ad s  to  help M inister prom oted  m otorways, including AdT 'caution regions; m ore regions co ­ road  su b jec t to m inister
F rance  in EC TGV etc. benefits trium phed' abou t growth funded annual bud g e ts
T29 1987-88 - 2 n d  S ta te -R e g io n  P lan  C o n tra c ts  1988-93 | * * *
O rgan ised  4 No known in p u t C hirac m ade R egional D elebarre  w an ts S om e R oads C G P fading, *Xth P lan logic' of C ontracts  fund P refec ts  play New political H elped AdT
ClATs. Liaised S arcastic  abou t ro ad s  1st industrial ro ad s  but P o n ts  want; CIAT main "One Europe" 80%  S ta te s tronger role le a d ers  ab le  to aim s mainly in
with prefects, R ocard 's priority: R ocard developm en t h is F inance ag a in st o thers  query link decision site ', governed road roads. Main than  DATAR at inflect tool M assif C and
with C G P on planning a d d ed  regional main in terest to  developm ent C G P s e t  up con trac ts ro ad s  b udget R egional level tow ards  their Brittany
evaluation developm en t evaluation cut. own priorities
T30 1992 - N a tio n a l ro a d  a n d  m o to rw a y  p lan i * * * *
P ublished P o n ts  W an ted  all C re ss o n 's D elebarre  (ex­ Quifos, X-Shell, P o n ts  ag ree  fast- Issued  report C om ptes re p o rt B6r6 not k een  to R oad  bud g e ts S ch em e in tu n e Plan in line with
reports  of dT citizens a t  *30 initiative for jo b s ro ad s  minister), w an ted  long- transit sy stem s show ing im pact transpo rt a c c e s s fond, - bu t so m e re s to red  to with leadersh ip 's old AdT aim s,
p rob lem s from m inutes from and  AdT, s ig n ed  k een  to  m ake h is term  transpo rt p roduce 2-tier of ro ad s  on AdT developm ent link ro ad s  a re  job - a p p e a s e  strikers w ish es ju s t a s  paradigm
fas t transit TG V s fa s t road'. on la st day  a s m ark policy-making localities m odest, excep t unclear support e tc  Nov 1991 changing
PM urban a re a s program m e
Note: Star rating on match of output with leaders' announced aims for the instrument, or impact on Amenagement du Territoire: 0 to ** in order of increasing impact.
Figure 6.4 Roads planning data meta-matrix
INSTRUM ENTS L e a d e rs ' In p u t B u re au c ra tic  in p u t P o licy  p r o c e s s O u tp u t
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M in iste r fo r  
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v iew
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T31 1993-84 - 3 rd  S ta te - re g lo n  P lan  C o n tra c ts  1994-99 * * **
Central C ohabitation • 2  Socialist PM s P a s q u a  th e T he ministry th a t R oads  the  only C G P had  to  work T he S ta te - P rovided 80% Finance ministry C ontracts  75%  in V ariable S ta te
coordinator. No known input held ClATs. driving force, b u t d e leg a ted  the division to with DATAR on im posed aim s road  funds. d o es  no t give tu n e  with funding to
C hecked an d  s e e m s  very Balladur CIAT followed up le a s t b u d g e t to disobey PM 's evaluating included P o o rer reg ions DATAR leadersh ip 's regional ro ad s
b u d g e ts  s p e n t unlikely fixed to ta ls  for prev ious m inister reg ions circular to leave expenditure developm ent & w ere  given m ore ad eq u a te w ishes on an  AdT b asis
prefects. talks to  DATAR AdT statistics
T32 1993 - A c ce le ra tio n  o f  m o to rw a y  p ro g ra m m e ** *
No known input - C ohabitation - D ecided to P a s q u a  k een  to P o n s  g av e  go- Builds tolled No input; still no t M any groups U se  of CNA and 'A re sp o n se  to S ch em e in tune AdT policy
even  turning No known input com plete com plete a h e a d  to  an m otorways evaluating ro ad s  su g g es t 'private' powerful road with leadersh ip 's DATAR once
aw ay from road an d  s e e m s  very netw ork in 10 sch em e ; im prove (ex?) AdT road in stead  of links according to  AdT diminishing m otorway and  public w orks w ishes w anted . Now
e m p h asis  apart unlikely y e a rs  no t 15 a c c e s s sc h e m e  under th a t help AdT criteria re tu rns for AdT co m p an ies  hid lobby' asking  w hether
from  EU links Ju p p 6 m ore of new  roads true  co st b e s t  value
T33 1994  - P a r is  B as in  C h a r te r  a n d  C o n tra c t ** **
A sked 1965 C ohabitation - Balladur s igned P u rsu ed  by P S No in te res t D6l6gu6 and No inpu t An eng ineers ' DATAR u sed Coordination S ch em e in tu n e Effective
co lleague  for No known input a t 2  C lATs in th en  P a sq u a , show n. Not a t R eport au thor [P refects m ore netw ork to reserv e  Plan easie r: led by with leadersh ip 's introduction of
Report, u sed and  s e e m s  very 1994. Jupp6 R PR  P aris cerem ony  to sign had  both b een important] d e co n g e s t Paris, C ontract funds political allies, w ishes long-w anted and
ch an ce  given to unlikely con tinued  a t lead er and th e  con tract P on ts  p lanners link reg ions to for P aris  Basin and  Ponts-AdT planned  sch e m e
im plem ent it CIADT 1997 Interior minister in P aris  region EU con trac t officials
T34 1995 • N a tiona l P lan  o f  A dT  a n d  R o ad  P lan 0 0
Coordinated Cohabitation - Balladur P a s q u a D elayed Plan - Approved C om m issioned Scepticism  on LOADT would M Ps ad d ed  'pork- P rogram m e A p lanned
d e b a te  on A c t , No known input su p p o rted  it, p rom oted 45 sa id  o n ly 'b e s t Boiteux R eport Boiteux R eport structuring role Introduce funds barrel' provisions so m e  Right ’system atic ’ AdT
technical input an d  s e e m s  very then  h e  and min. a c c e s s  but va lue ' projects, to  incorporate on  rational of transpo rt but from tolls to  pay governm ent w anted , but netw ork never
and  w rote the unlikely Ju p p 6  s low ed  it th en  P o n s including social non-m arket transpo rt 'hand icapped for AdT ro a d s reluctant to  fund G ree n s  re jected put into force
m aterial down. delayed grounds values decisions w ithout if
T35 1998-2000 - 4 th  S ta te -R e a lo n  P lan  C o n tra c ts  2000-06  ] * *
Central No known input No in te re s t M inister w anted W an ted  to  keep R o ad s  division C G P sec re ta ria t Too much R o ad s  still a s Right-wing National political Policy DATAR
negotia tor but bu t no t likely A djudicated a t nego tia tions run up spend ing  on sa id  'm ayors for advisory em p h asis  on large an  e lem en t P res id en ts  of le ad ers w an ted  for so m e
conflict with AdT rare  CIAT by regions; rail road, a s  well a s w ant tarm ac'. CNADT and ro ad s  - im pact in R egional reg ions object to unen thusiastic regions; now
m inister's m eetings m ore th an  ro ad s rail. O ther P on ts evaluation on AdT C ontracts paying for S ta te and  divided. moving to o ther
cab inet differed unproven serv ices policies
T36 1999-2001 - S u s ta in a b le  t r a n s p o r t  s e r v ic e  p la n s i 0 0
Little role No known input In CIAT ch o se W an ted  g reen W an ted  to  keep S om e drew  up C om m issioned Too m uch G overnm ent Local 6 lus delay, National political R esp o n d s  to
co m pared  with bu t no t likely serv ice  s c h e m e s  decen tra lised up sp end ing  on p lans and. 2 nd  Boiteux e m p h asis  on mainly relying on w ant roads. le ad ers traffic dem an d  in
ministry an d  th e and  rail not p lan s  a n d  no road, a s  well a s approved; R oads R eport on ro ad s  - im pact reg ions to  pay Incoming unen thusiastic 1999, d o e s  not
reg ions National P an road  growth rail. still w an t roads transport on AdT for ro ad s m inister s c ra p s and  divided. modify d em an d
decisions unproven P lan s  sc rap p ed
Note: Star rating on match of output with leaders' announced aims for the instrument, or impact on Amenagement du Territoire: 0 to ** in order of increasing impact.
Figure 6.5 Roads planning instruments in date order
R o ad s  p lann ing  in s tru m en t
























T1 1951 FSIR Road Fund & Road Plan 0 0 V 0 V X X X 0 V 0 0
T2 1954 Act on Tolled Motorways 0 0 V V V X X X V? X 0 0
T3 1954 llnd CGP Plan - DAT initiative V 0 V 0 V X X X X 0 * 0
PRESIDENT DE GAULLE
T4 1958 Roads in lllrd CGP Plan V 0 V V V X X X 0 X 0 0
T5 1959 1st National Roads programme V 0 V? V V X V X X X * 0
T6 1962 Roads in IVth CGP Plan V X? V V X X V X V X * 0
77 1962 DATs 2nd Plan of AdT V 0 0 V 0 0 X X 0 V 0 *
T8 1962 Caisse nationale des autoroutes 0 0 V 0 0 X V X X X * *
T9 1966 Roads in Languedoc mission V V V V 0 0 0 V V V * * * *
T10 1966 Creation of a Superministry 0 V X X V V 0? V 0 X * *
T11 1966 Vth Plan road network V 0 V yl V V V V V V * * *
T12 1966 OREAM development bodies V 0 V V V V 0 V V X * * * *
T13 1968 Breton expressway scheme V V V V V X V X V V * * * *
PRESIDENT POMPIDOU
T14 1969 Act on Motorways by concession y/ V V 0 V V V V V 0 ** * *
T15 1969 National roads plan V V V V V 0 0 0 V X * * **
T16 1971 Vlth Plan: competition, solidarity V X 0 V 0 V X V X X * *
T17 1972 Paris-Strasbourg motorway V V 0 V V X 0 V V V ** * *
Notes: V = input favouring the instrument, X = opposition to it; 0 = no input, ? = less certain or varying.
Star rating on match of output with leaders' announced aims for the instrument, or impact on AdT: 0 to ** in order of increasing impact.
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R o a d s  p la n n in g  in s tr u m e n t
























T18 1974 Conseil central de planification V V 0 V V X X V V V * * * *
T19 1976 Revised Vllth Plan 0 V 0 V >/ X 0 X V V * * *
T20 1977 National motorway programme V 0 V V V X 0 V 0 V * *
T21 1978 Rational Transport Decisions V 0 V V V V V V V V * * * *
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
T22 1981 Interim State-Region Contracts 0 0 V V V V 0 V V V * 0
T23 1982 Transport Act (LOTI) 0 V V V V V 0 V V V * * * *
T24 1982 FSGT Transport projects V V V V V V 0 V V X irk * *
T25 1983 1st State-Region Plan Contracts V 0 V V 0 V 0 X V X * * *
T26 1983 Motorway and main road plan V V V V V V 0 V X X * *
T27 1984 Massif Central, Breton roads V 0? V V 0 0 0 V V V * * * *
T28 1987 National roads plan V 0 V V V V 0 V V X * * * *
T29 1987 2nd State-Region Plan Contracts V 0 V V V V 0 V V X * * *
T30 1992 National road and motorway plan V V V V X X X X V V * * * *
T31 1993 3rd State-Region Plan Contracts V 0 V V 0 X? V V V X * * * *
T32 1993 Acceleration of road programme 0 0 V V V V 0 X V V * * *
T33 1994 Paris Basin Charter & Contract V 0 V V 0 V 0 V V V * * * *
T34 1995 National AdT Plan and road plan V 0 X V X V V V 0? X 0 0
PRESIDENT CHIRAC
T35 1998 4th State-Region Plan Contracts V 0 0 X? V V V X V X * *
T36 1999 Sustainable transport plans 0 0 0 V 0 V? ? X 0 X 0 0
Notes: V = input favouring the instrument, X = opposition to it; 0 = no input, ? = less certain or varying.
Star rating on match of output with leaders' announced aims for the instrument, or impact on AdT: 0 to ** in order of increasing impact.
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Drawing conclusions from the comparative table
Figure 6.5 shows that the leaders' roads instruments resulted in strong outcomes in just over 
half the policy tools (20 of 36 with **), such as the 1969 Act to build motorways through 
public-private partnerships. About a quarter made some impact (10 of 36 with *), such as 
the roads provision in the Fourth Plan; while only a sixth seemed to have no direct impact (6 
of 36 with 0), including the Plan national d'amenagement du territoire of 1962. In four of 
the ten cases where some impact was made (*), the outcome simply part-fulfilled leaders' 
aims; for example, political leaders agreed the National Motorway Programme of 1977 but 
in later years insufficient funding was given to complete it on time. But in the other six cases 
the rather mixed outcome reflected leaders' mixed views; for example, Prime Ministers 
Debre and Pompidou wanted the Fourth Plan to provide for nationwide development, but 
the Roads Minister was also President of the Paris Region District and mayor of a Paris new 
town; he supported the Paris Region delegue-general, who persuaded President de Gaulle to 
give priority to Paris.56 Thus, altogether, the political leadership saw outcomes that matched 
well its common and/or mixed aims in about two-thirds of cases (26 of 36, comprising 20 
with the best outcomes, and six whose mixed outcome reflected mixed intentions).
Critics could argue that, even if outcomes matched the leaders' aims, leaders were 
not the primary causal agents. Yet there is evidence to the contrary in Figure 6.5. In the 
group of 20 instruments whose outputs matched leadership intentions very well (those with 
**), all were favoured by the President or Prime Minister, mostly both. In the group of six 
with poor outcomes (0) only half were favoured by either the President or the Prime 
Minister, and one was opposed. In the group of 10 instruments that partly met the leaders' 
aims, the level of leadership support fell in-between these extremes. If the outcome of the 
instruments were mainly related to factors other than leadership action, a more random 
relationship would be expected. Furthermore, in at least seven cases there is primary 
'triangulated' evidence that the instrument was personally adopted by ministers (T4, T5, T9, 
T10, T12, T14, T30). As one example: the Plan Commissioner Masse and Prime Minister 
Debr6 both say that the Roads Minister, Buron, wanted a larger State budget in 1960; Buron 
asked Finance Minister Pinay and Masse to dine, and they agreed on inter-urban tolls as the 
only mutually-acceptable source of funds; and Masse proposed the tolls to Debre.57 Sources 
on six further tools insist on the personal nature of the president or prime minister's 
initiative, even if it chimed with officials' views (T il, T15, T17, T18, T19, T24). The 
Fonds special des grands travaux of 1982 is an example: President Mitterrand wrote to 
Prime Minister Mauroy asking for various measures, including a transport fund to be run by 
DATAR and the Transport Minister. Attali said that the President had been working on the 
letter for a week, to ensure that budgetary rigour did not halt all reform.58
56 Delouvrier, in Chenu (1994),p. 271.
57 Mass6 (1986), p.203; Debr6 (1988), p.64.
58 Attali (1993), pp.387-8. Entry for 21 June 1982.
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Moreover, the link between the inputs of bureaucratic actors and outcomes is much 
weaker than the link between leadership support and outcomes. About a third of the 
instruments that matched the leaders' goals veiy well did so despite active opposition by the * 
Ponts and/or the Plan Commissariat. For instance, the Breton expressway scheme that was 
opposed by the Ponts was nevertheless agreed in CIAT in 1968, the Roads Minister Galley 
saying that his officials (services) thought 'it was folly' but he guaranteed it would be 
done.59 Five successful tools offended the 'technical paradigm' of the technocrats (T13,
T19, T25, T32, T30), including the regional councils’ demand for roads in State-Region 
Plan Contracts.60 Four tools had strong outcomes despite opposition by the Finance 
Ministry (T15, T24, T28, T29), including Mitterrand’s Ponds special des grands travaux 
and whose second tranche of funding the Finance Minister Jacques Delors had also 
opposed.61 Nonetheless bureaucratic groups played a significant role in determining 
outcomes. If leaders' aims were fulfilled in a third of projects despite bureaucratic 
opposition, two-thirds of those with partial or poor outcomes had been opposed by one or 
more bureaucratic actors; and all instruments with very weak outcomes were not funded 
adequately.
However, less than half the instruments were really helpful for amenagement du 
territoire, and a quarter seemed to be unhelpful. Although some roads policy decisions had 
not been directed at amenagement du territoire goals all could have been; and this relative 
lack of success reveals the relative difficulty or unwillingness for leaders to ensure that the 
roads instruments they approved were coordinated with their official policy on amenagement 
du territoire (there was often a conflict within the leadership over whether helping poorer 
regions should be at the expense of Paris). Nevertheless, Figure 6.5 seems to show that 
DATAR made a difference to outcomes for amenagement du territoire. No instruments 
before 1962 had any identifiable impact on amenagement du territoire, even though some 
had that specific intention. The first really successful instrument was DATAR's 'Languedoc- 
Roussillon' project to which ministers gave a block budget to develop its roads as the 
mission decided (as seen in the previous chapter).62 The later instruments in which DATAR 
played no role nearly always had poor outcomes for amenagement du territoire (T10, T19, 
T22, T32, T36).
Thus the influence of bureaucratic actors is not negligible but the columns of Figure 
6.5 show the greater importance of the support of two or three political leaders. Given the 
wealth of evidence on their personal intervention in decisions, it would be perverse to claim
59 Frappart, C. (1965) 'Amenagement du territoire et choix dconomiques', reprinted from Moniteur des 
Travaux Publics et du Batiment. 2 May (la Documentation fran9aise), pp. 6-14 (Frappart was deputy ddiegue 
at the time]; Essig (1979), p.31, p.85; Gravier (1972), p.221.
60 Quinet and Touzery (1986), p.68.
61 Favier and Martin (1990), p.438; and Attali (1993), p.721, entry for 1 July 1983.
62 Racine (1980), p.57.
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that political leaders were not mainly responsible for the substantial impact of instruments 
decided in their name.
EXERCISING POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
A qualitative analysis within Blondel's conceptual scheme for comparing political leaders, 
guided by the general assertions from the quantitative analysis, helps to identify the 
conditions under which the leadership exercises its preferences in the roads planning and 
funding process, and in particular the role of the bureaucracy, including DATAR.
The positional resources of political leaders
Constitutional arrangements made a difference to the formal capacity of leaders to enact
instruments but they made little practical difference. Fourth Republic parliamentarians,
pressured by roads officials, rejected the Tolled Motorways Bill in 1952, and in 1954
amended it, restricting tolls to 'exceptional circumstances'.63 Prime Minister Debre was able
to use the stronger decree powers of the Fifth Republic to lift the restriction, but the Ponts
still delayed tolled motorways.64 His successor, Pompidou, created the Caisse nationale des
autoroutes as a way to implement them without open confrontation.65 But that 'provoked
new quarrels',66 and it is difficult to find other examples of leaders in the Fifth Republic
introducing roads instruments using different legal powers from their Fourth Republic
predecessors. Road programmes were approved by decree in both Republics; and funds
such as Mitterrand's Fonds special des grands travaux were created by a parliamentary Act
as had been the Fonds special d'investissement routier in 1951.67 Though the Fifth
Republic's executive had stronger support from new rules on parliamentary votes, in
practice a favourable configuration o f the party system was the principal advantage for the
political leadership in parliament. Even so, ministers must have felt the Fifth Republic's
legal-constitutional resources were insufficient, because Roads Minister Chalandon, when
preparing the 1969 Motorway Concessions Act, gave the Ponts et Chaussees the kind of
'compensation' that Meny saw as a sad example of 'La Corruption de la Republique' .
'When Albin Chalandon wanted to remove the resistance of his Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Ingenieurs des Ponts et Chaussees to the privatisation of motorway construction and maintenance, 
he used a procedure of unimpeachable legality: he required the companies awarded the concession to 
pay 0.5 per cent to the State engineers for their supervision and monitoring work'.68
The new Constitution and the party system configuration made more difference where it 
concerned relationships within the executive, and which leader's views on roads policy was 
likely to prevail. In turn the political balances of power affected whether DATAR or another
63 Thoenig (1973), p.60; Jardin and Fleury (1975), xxii; Dunn, J. (1995) The French Highway Lobby, 
Comparative Politics. 27/3, 275-95, pp.281-2.
64 Decree of 4 July 1960.
65 Thoenig (1973), pp.61-90.
66 Jardin and Fleury (1973), p.83.
67 Law of 30 Dec. 1951 and decree 22 Dec 1952; Loi 82-669 of 3 Aug 1982.
68 Mdny (1992a), pp.221-2.
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bureaucratic actor was more likely to make an effective input to the decision. Presidents 
made no documented input to roads policy in the Fourth Republic, or in periods of 
cohabitation in the Fifth. In the Fifth Republic, the prime minister is 'in general charge of the 
work of government' (Article 21), which has 'the administration at its disposal' (Article 20). 
Not only DATAR, but all instruments decided in CLAT/CIADT or supported by the prime 
minister's budget or FIAT/FNADT (roads plans, regional city development plans, most road 
projects in the provinces, State-Region Plan Contracts), are the prime minister's tools, that 
can be used to secure adhesion of technical ministries. However, in roads planning as in 
other areas, presidents made their own interpretation of the constitutional conventions on 
'who does what', depending on their interest in a topic and their inclination to trust the prime 
minister.69
De Gaulle wanted the 'massive development of transport networks for economic 
modernisation'.70 But he especially 'favoured the peripherique and the motorways for the 
quality of their technical performance that served France through the grandeur of Paris', and 
had asked Delouvrier 'What will you need to complete all that?'.71 Pompidou as his Prime 
Minister and Minister for Amenagement du territoire had taken direct responsibility for the 
Plan Commissariat, DATAR and the Paris Region in order to coordinate major infrastructure 
spending, and had decided in CIAT to use Fifth Plan funding to develop roads linking 
regional cities. But Delouvrier showed Pompidou the new Paris plan that de Gaulle had 
approved, and 'although the Prime Minister did not want to spend money on them he 
accepted he had to'.72 Pompidou as President decided the motorway programme and the 
detail of motorway contracts in conseils restreints, using technical information sought by his 
cabinet from the Ministry of Infrastructure.73 His first Prime Minister, Chaban-Delmas, too 
wanted this policy to help amenagement du territoire (he had introduced the 1954 
Motorways Act for that purpose).74 Though the President ordered the Roads Minister 
Chalandon to bring private capital into the motorway companies, Chalandon, who had 
ambitions to use motorways to help property development, was more than willing to 
agree.75 A Council of Ministers chaired by the President also agreed in 1971 which roads 
would form the National Road Network (non-motorway roads to link regional cities). 
President Giscard used his own small Central Planning Council (prime minister, two 
ministers and the Plan Commissioner), to supervise the Plan Commissariat,76 and called in
69 This analysis fits that for other domains, see Massot (1979), (1987); Massot, J. (1988) 'La pratique 
pr£sidentielle sous la Ve R6publique', Regards sur l'Actualite. 139, 27-37; Elgie (1993); Hayward (1993).
70 De Gaulle, C. (197D M&noires d'espoir. II. L'Effort (PlonL p. 133.
71 Hodd6, R. and Toussaint, J.-Y., 'Dessin de ville ou dessin de capitale? ', in Institut Charles de Gaulle 
(1992), 520-39, p.531,p.535.
72 Roussel (1994), pp. 152-3; Delouvrier in Chenu (1994), p.272.
73 Conseils restreints of 29 Nov. 1969, 11 Dec. 1969, 25 Nov. 1971. Archives Nationales (1996), 5AG2/63, 
183 and 197; Esambert (1994), pp. 108-9.
74 Chaban-Delmas (1997), p.442.
75 Dunn (1995), p.284. Randet (1994), p.87.
76 Bodiguel and Quermonne (1983), p. 178.
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technical advisers such as DATAR’s delegue Essig, when he chose. 'It was the place par
excellence at which decisions were taken'.77 It issued his priorities for the Seventh Plan
(1976-80), including 'roads to open up disadvantaged regions'.
The technical ministers had fewer political or institutional powers than had presidents
and prime ministers and it was conceivable that roads ministers would be strongly pressured
to carry out sectoral goals. Certainly, some prime ministers and presidents thought that
would be the case. In the CIAT that decided the Breton expressway, Prime Minister
Pompidou is reported as saying:
’Gentlemen, we are going to conduct high politics today; one of our provinces is in despair... we 
must do something dramatic (font un coup) ... I am sure you are going to repeat what your officials 
(services) say., too expensive, not economically sound, etc. but I will decide anyway and you will 
do it’.78
Essig thought that if the prime minister had not adopted that tone the Plan breton would have 
been 'sanitised by the over-frequent administrative trench warfare'.79 Mitterrand too worried 
that the inexperienced Left ministers would let officials take control. He ruled that ministers 
were not to read out notes in Councils of Ministers; and in 1982 he complained that in large 
Conseils restreints everyone except Defferre repeated the opinions of their cabinet.80 The 
more successful early instruments were those that by-passed the roads minister, such as the 
block budget for the Languedoc mission.81 In 1991 Cresson's television announcement of a 
massive road project that 'could generate 80,OCX) to 100,000jobs’, was received with 
surprise by the minister.82
Yet, within the parameters set by the President and the Prime Minister, roads 
ministers with particular concerns could make their own contribution to policy. For 
example, in 1978 Jean-Pierre Fourcade, a 'technical' minister (a former finance official), 
responsible for both infrastructure and amenagement du territoire, re-energised 
amenagement du territoire, and a four year national motorway programme was agreed in 
CIAT, which was from then on die site for such decisions. Five road instruments with very 
successful outcomes for amenagement du territoire were introduced and/or implemented by 
Ministers of Infrastructure and Amenagement du territoire committed to regional 
development (Guichard, Fourcade, Mehaignerie). In contrast, but equally showing the 
impact that could be made by a minister, their market-orientated successor, Bernard Pons, 
slowed down the drafting of the national road plan required by the 1995 Act on 
amenagement du territoire. He instructed the Roads Directorate to retain only the few
77 Hayward, J. (1982) 'Mobilising Private Interests in the Service of Public Ambitions: The Salient Element 
in the Dual French Policy Style?', in J.Richardson (ed.l Policy Styles in Western Europe (George Allen & 
Unwin), 111-40, p. 123.
78 Essig (1979), p.85. 8 May 1968.
79 Essig (1979), p.85.
80 Attali (1993), p.34, entry of 27 May 1981; p.246, entry of 9 Feb 1982.
81 The minister was Jacquet, President of the Paris District Council, a strong supporter of Paris roads. 
Delouvrier in Chenu (1994), p.271.
82 Cresson on 'Cinq', 8 Dec. 1991 quoted Le Monde. 10 Dec. 1991; A.Faujas, Le Monde. 11 Dec. 1991.
170
schemes with the best cost-benefit ratio, and kept his more interventionist junior minister, 
Gaudin, away from transport projects and their funding.83
Thus, although sectoral ministers are more constrained in their actions by 
constitutional conventions and the party system than is the prime minister, whose input and 
impact is in turn constrained by the president, each member of the political leadership has 
some capacity to amend policy to his or her particular goals.
The influence of bureaucratic organisations
DATAR was more effective than the DAT had been at promoting political leaders' intentions 
when they perceived the interest of adding amenagement du territoire concerns to roads 
policy. The DAT urban planners in the Ministry of Reconstruction had no official role or 
practical competence in relation to national roads. At the urging of their Minister, Claudius- 
Petit, they had developed the idea of regional cities as counterweights to Paris that was to be 
very influential, and then that of roads to link them together.84 Their relations with the Plan 
Commissariat [in charge of infrastructure spending] were not organised',85 and in 1955 they 
failed to persuade the Minister of Finance and the Plan to include their proposed regional 
transport networks in the [few] Second Plan regional programmes.86 In his 1958 
government, General de Gaulle, probably prompted by the Minister of Construction, 
Sudreau, put the DAT on the Plan Commissariat's regional plans committee where its 
transport maps again made no impact.87 In 1959 Debrd included the DAT with Ministiy of 
Finance and Plan Commissariat officials on a Roads Commission to supervise the drawing 
up of a programme by the Public Works engineers. The engineers were asked to include 
projects with the best costs-benefits ratio but also motorways in Brittany and the Massif 
Central.88 The engineers' scheme 'corresponded faithfully to the distribution of existing 
traffic': Brittany and the Massif Central were not on the list89 In 1962, with the Plan 
Commissariat's Fourth Plan as well as the Ponts giving priority to meeting traffic demand in 
the Paris region, DAT published its Plan national d'amenagement du territoire that included 
motorways connecting eight regional cities,90 but with no legal or practical means to bring 
them about
In contrast, DATAR had some input into three-quarters of the instruments introduced 
after it was created (22 of 28), and of these virtually all had good outcomes in terms of 
fulfilling leaders' aims for roads (17 successful and 4 partly so), though not quite as good in 
terms of amenagement du territoire (14 successful and 7 partly so). More significantly, the 
interventions were generally in support of the leadership; but in five cases one or two leaders
83 Tribune de rEconomie. 2 May 1996; F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 5 Dec. 1996.
84 Minist&re de la Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme (1950a) L’Amanagement du Territoire: ler rapport, p.21.
85 Lanversin (1970), p.61. As seen in earlier chapters they were conflictual.
86 Randet (1994), p.81.
87 Randet (1994),p.81.
88 Jardin and Fleury (1973), p.xxiv.
89 Monod and de Castelbajac (1971), p. 100.
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did not favour the instrument, and these cases were those where the instrument was least 
successful: for example, the national road plan of 1995 was developed by DATAR for 
Bahadur's government, but was not supported by Bahadur’s successor. But these 
exceptions demonstrate, if that were needed, that political leaders were not constrained by 
DATAR's advice. For de Gaulle and Debre, Paris was simply more important than 
amenagement du territoire.
In the 1960s and 1970s DATAR's intervention often took on a rather hierarchical 
form, helping political leaders overcome bureaucracies. Pompidou's announcement on a 
visit to Metz that the Paris-Strasbourg motorway would go through Metz and two years 
early, 'thanks to new funds and loans decided by the government', was one of several 
instances when DATAR 'took the opportunity of an official visit to snatch a definitive 
ruling' in favour of a route it wanted; and although 'generally' the announcement was 
prepared with ministries, Essig 'admitted':
'that, in certain cases, the dynamism of DATAR, aided by the President's or Prime Minister's
advisers' concern for the success of their boss's visit, could lead to these stages being skipped'.91
The block budget for the Languedoc mission was organised at the top by its president, 
Pierre Racine, conseiller d'Etat and close colleague of Debre for 20 years, while Debre was 
Finance Minister. This budgetary sum, not previously allocated by sector, was an 
administrative innovation. Racine 'was given exorbitant decision-making and financial 
powers';92 he would simply ring up ministers about what he needed.93 When DATAR was 
attached to a Minister of Infrastructure, 'the arbitration of the minister was often required'; 
and if that failed, 'the minister very often let us defend our own position in meetings with 
the Prime Minister'94
However, from the Chaban-Delmas premiership onward, DATAR could work 'in 
close liaison' with Infrastructure engineers, for instance in selecting the roads that would 
compose the National Road Network Scheme of 1971.95 But the Road Director later 
dismissed this scheme as 'no more than a list of routes of national interest with no costs- 
benefits figures',96 and one engineer was unable to return to his ministry after serving at 
DATAR, 'because he had fought the Ponts' roads policy'.97 DATAR was also on better 
terms with the Plan Commissariat during the Chaban premiership when the agencies were
90 Conseil Sup&ieur de la Construction (1962), I, p.8
91 Essig (1979), pp. 100-1.
92 Mdny (1974), p.243.
93 Essig (1979), p.65.
94 Essig (1979), p.75.
95 Jardin and Fleury (1973), p. 115, p. 117. DATAR (1972) 'Les grandes liaisons routines, histoire d'un 
schema', Travaux et Recherches de Prospective. 31 (La Documentation fran5aise).
96 [Quinet, E.] (1980). Minist&re de l'economie et des finances. Ministere des Transports. La coordination des 
infrastructures de transport: dtude interministdrielle de rationalisation des choix budggtaires (La 
Documentation fran^aise), pp.27-8.
97 Essig (1979), p.60.
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attached to the same minister.98 DATAR and the Roads Directorate negotiated the National 
Motorway Programme of 1978-83 jointly, despite their different priorities; one trying to 
integrate into the calculations the presumed effects on development, the other evaluating in 
terms of current or potential traffic 99 DATAR and the Plan Commissariat served on the 
working party of transport officials, chaired by the Roads Director, that discussed the 
rationalisation of transport budgetary decisions, at the request of Prime Minister and 
Minister for the Economy, Barre. DATAR had no role in the Interim State-Region Contracts 
of 1981 that contained large sums for roads (apart from organising the CIAT that agreed 
them), but its practice in negotiating local development contracts made it an obvious central 
coordinator for subsequent rounds of Plan-Contracts (see previous chapter).
Road tools that had successful outcomes were only half as likely to have been 
opposed by the Ponts as those that failed fully or partly to meet leaders' aims. The same 
finding applied to the impact on amenagement du territoire. But the ambiguous outcomes of 
some instruments demonstrated that the Ponts' common professional norms did not preclude 
internal divergence. While the 'young Turks' treated as career opportunities the new Super- 
Ministry of Infrastructure that 'took over' the DAT, or DATAR's agencies developing 
regional cities, or tolled motorways,100 the Roads Directorate and the field officials saw 
them as a diversion from their traditional monopoly.101 At the same time as Guichard was 
expressing his exasperation with Infrastructure officials keen to tarmac, Ponts economists 
were lobbying for a costs-benefits approach that included amenagement du territoire 
criteria.102 Guichard did not worry about 'being excommunicated by the administration [for 
his criticism]... In all the grands corps there are people who think the same'.103 The Ponts 
hampered national political leaders most in the 1950s and 1960s when they were reluctant to 
abandon their local discretion. In a second phase, some sections realised that joining in 
could be an advantage. In a third phase most agreed that road-building could be combined 
effectively with amenagement du territoire. Then Ponts economists showed that fast roads 
did not help economic development.104 But they were ignored by national and local leaders. 
In short, though the Ponts, as a specialised bureaucracy, is a dominant force within its own 
sector, it could be persuaded, overcome or even set aside by political leaders as easily as 
were the 'sustainable transport service plans' they had drafted with great difficulty to help 
the Minister for Amenagement du territoire and the Environment,105 when a different 
leadership took office.
98 Essig (1979), p.31, p.70.
99 Essig (1979), p.75.
100 Georges Pdbereau, the young leader of the Ponts' association in 1964, became director of DAFU (ex- 
DAT) in 1966, and was director-general of CGE, building the new motorways, by 1972.
101 Thoenig (1973), pp.67-8.
102 Ashford (1982), p.75; Jardin and Fleury (1973), p.64.
103 Guichard (1975), p.98.
104 Merlin, P. (1994) 'Les transports en France', Les Etudes de la Documentation franyaise.
105 Official from DAEI-SES, Infrastructure Ministry, at CNT, 12 Oct 2001.
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Many early instruments that failed to match leaders' aims well or address 
amenagement du territoire were those the Plan Commissariat had opposed. Its statistical 
weaknesses made it reluctant to give the Plan a regional dimension.106 Its worry that road 
congestion would slow expansion encouraged it to increase investment for Paris.107 From 
1966 most instruments that succeeded did so with little or no intervention from the Plan 
Commissariat. For Pompidou and Giscard, unlike for General de Gaulle, planning was not 
'an ardent obligation'. 'Mitterrand's decision to stigmatise Rocard by appointing him 
Minister for the Plan' signalled the future for national planning in his presidency.108 Some 
thought the influence of the Plan might be transmitted from within the bureaucracies by left- 
wing Plan officials who were in decision-making positions after 1981, but others thought 
they would take on the practical short-term goals of their new roles:
'planning will continue to have severe problems of politico-administrative effectiveness as well as
of sustained economic impact'.109
Financial, technical and contingent constraints and opportunities
Nearly all roads instruments depended on financial resources, and the most common reason 
for poor or delayed outcomes was inadequate funding. Typical of Fourth Republic problems 
was the absorption into the general budget of the fonds special of 1951 that came from fuel 
duties.110 In the Fifth Republic the weakest source of funding was ministerial budgets, 
which can be revised at any time. During the second Mitterrand presidency, the national 
roads budget was cut in June 1990 after a conflict in CIAT between Delebarre (Roads), and 
B6r6gevoy (Finance),111 because of the Gulf War, the rising cost-of-living index and a weak 
capital market, then partly restored in November 1991 to appease demonstrating road 
hauliers and construction companies,112 and further supported by a jobs programme in 
March 1992. It is for this reason that regional councils demand motorways (funded through 
concessions and tolls) rather than dual carriageways (vulnerable to annual ministerial 
budgets).113
Political leaders sought to persuade the finance minister to 'find' additional 
budgetary funds, or to introduce new sources of funds for programmes they were intent on 
implementing. Pompidou as Prime Minister in 1963 asked Finance Minister Giscard for the 
fund FIAT (see Chapter 5) to be included in the prime-ministerial budget, so that DATAR 
could subsidise motorway sections independently of the Finance Ministry.114 From 1984
106 Ullmo (1975), p.37.
107 Jardin and Fleury (1973), p.xxvi.
108 P.Fabra. Le Monde. 11 Dec. 1981.
109 Ozenda and Strauss-Kahn (1985), p. 112, followed by comment of Jack Hayward, p. 116.
110 Dunn, (1995) p.280; Thoenig (1973), pp.60-2; Jardin and Fleury (1973), p.xxi,p.xxii.
111 Dunn (1995), p.281.
112 Le Monde. 11 Dec. 1991.
113 Discussion with Claude Husson, AdT adviser to the President of Limousin, at DATAR, 1 June 1999.
Communes also receive a percentage of road tolls, increasing the attraction of motorways to them.
114 Guichard interviewed in Roussel (1994), p. 152.
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FIAT was used to orient roads expenditure in State-Region Contracts.115 When DATAR 
arranged for Pompidou in 1972 to announce an early completion of the Paris-Strasbourg 
motorway, the advance funding was raised by borrowing against future toll income; and two 
decades later Prime Minister Balladur (in 1972 Secretary-General of the Presidency) used a 
similar financial procedure for his ’accelerated motorway programme'. The Fonds special 
des grands travawc of 1982-85 came from supplementary fuel tax; and DATAR's delegue 
was made a board member of the fund and responsible for disbursing it. Some of this 
funding went to improving roads in ’industrial restructuring zones', but most to the TGV 
Atlantique which Mitterrand (and DATAR at that time) wanted.116 In 1986, despite protests 
from Balladur as Finance Minister, Prime Minister Chirac used privatisation proceeds and 
Paris tolls to build motorways for 'la France en retard, and the TGV for ’la France qui 
gagne'.111
However, by the time Balladur announced his ’accelerated motorway programme’ of 
1993, the technical paradigm had changed: experts had become sceptical about the 
development value of fast roads.118 Yet national leaders continued to fund them, for instance 
in State-Region Plan Contracts, because of the pressure on them from local interests. 
Regional presidents announced ’officially’ that they would not sign the 1989-93 contracts if 
the government did not make offers at the high end of the range on roads.119 In the fourth 
round of State-Region Contracts, despite the efforts of the Green Minister for Amenagement 
du territoire and Environment, Voynet, roads were still as large a proportion of the Contracts 
as in previous rounds.120 Overall, however, political initiatives that matched the dominant 
technical paradigm were more likely to be adopted. Three-quarters of the instruments that 
fitted the contemporary professional view led to successful outcomes for leaders, and a 
quarter succeeded in part.
Crises and honeymoon periods had a weak and inconsistent effect on roads policy. 
Though Prime Ministers de Gaulle and Debre in the 1958-59 inter-Republic transition were 
able to put the DAT onto interministerial committees on roads investment its impact there, if 
any, was limited. The political crisis of May 1968 certainly helped Prime Minister 
Pompidou, Minister for Amenagement du territoire Marcellin and DATAR overcome 
opposition to the Breton road plan, but President de Gaulle had to re-announce the project a 
year later, and its implementation relied on later leaders. Responses to economic crises also 
depended on the leader, but were always small-scale or short-term. While Mitterrand, and
115 DATAR put one-third of HAT 1963-70 towards road projects. In the first round of Plan-Contracts, 1984- 
88, 10% of the State's share came from HAT.
116 DATAR (19861 Rapport d1 Activity 1984-85 (Minisfere du Plan et d'amdnagement du territoire), p.21.
117 Chirac interviewed in Le Monde. 12 Feb. 1988.
118 Bonnafous, A.; Plassard, F.; Vulin, B. (19931 Circuler demain (Tour d'Aigues: L'Aube/DATAR); Carrere, 
G. (1992) Transports Destination 2002 (Ministfcre de l'Equipement et des Transports); Cour des Comptes
(1992) La Politique routi&re et autoroutifere (Joumaux Officiels).
119 F.Grosrichard. Le Monde. 18 Nov. 1988.
120 Article by D. Voynet, Le Monde. 8 Sept. 2000; Cour des Comptes (1999a), Il.iii.
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later Cresson, were stimulated by economic problems to add new projects, Rocard and 
Beregevoy cut road budgets. In the roads policy domain contingent events are less 
significant than the reaction to them of individual political leaders.
Implementation and persistence
The implementation of transport instruments can be difficult, because although the French 
President enjoys a relatively long term it is still short in terms of road-building or 
amenagement du territoire. A quarter of the road instruments promised good outcomes for 
roads-and- amenagement du territoire but were not implemented effectively, even if some 
leaders made up for earlier weaknesses. For example, the Fourth Republic’s Tolled 
Motorways Bill of 1952 at first failed to pass, was reintroduced in 1954, but neutered by 
parliamentarians; and only with Chalandon’s Act of 1969 was the full value of the Bill 
restored. But combining road policy for amenagement du territoire was relatively consistent 
in the Gaullist period because Pompidou was committed to it as Prime Minister, and as 
President appointed ministers of like mind, and therefore implementation was usually good. 
Much seemed to depend upon the interest and persistence of individual leaders: the detegue 
Essig was surprised to find that even Fourcade, a Minister of Infrastructure and 
Amenagement du territoire with ’an extraordinary knowledge of his dossiers', monitored 
only those Seventh Plan programmes which he had personally negotiated out of those for 
which he was nominally responsible.121 The most frequent difficulty was with ensuring 
continuity of funding; investments with the least economic return (inevitably in the 
peripheral or isolated regions) were those most likely to be delayed: for example, the last 
Mauroy government of 1984 was still making a special effort to fund the Massif Central and 
Brittany expressways that Pompidou had started to implement in 1968. More recent 
instruments have met problems directly stemming from changes in political leadership 
(Balladur to Juppe, Juppe to Jospin and Jospin to Raffarin), showing the ease with which 
new leaders can replace or annul the roads instruments that their predecessors have just 
enacted.
CONCLUSIONS
The aim of the chapter was to show that political leaders can ’make a difference' to road 
planning and funding; and to examine the opportunities and constraints they meet in the 
policy process, especially with regard to bureaucratic institutions and DATAR in particular. 
A preliminary analysis of the functions of the specialised bureaucratic organisations in road 
planning and investment, and some of their interactions with political leaders over particular 
instruments, indicated that the Fonts et Chaussees (especially the Road Directorate), the Plan 
Commissariat and the Ministry of Finance were typical of bureaucracies that
121 Essig (1979), p.35, p. 120.
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'are an important element in the process by which leaders can see their goals realized; but the 
constraints and hurdles are numerous and cannot be overcome easily, let alone rapidly'.122
The statistical exercise showed that just over half the instruments enacted matched 
very well leaders’ published intentions for the instrument, though slightly fewer had good 
outcomes for amenagement du territoire. While far from the constitutional ideal, this 
outcome contradicts more pessimistic assumptions of what leaders can achieve in practice 
within the constraints of bureaucratic systems. Furthermore, another group of instruments 
had mixed outcomes because political leaders themselves were not united in their 
aspirations. The outcome depended much more on the input of the president and/or the 
prime minister than whether bureaucratic groups opposed or supported the aims. Moreover, 
the relationship was not purely statistical; there was some good primary evidence that 
political leaders were personally engaged in initiating, developing or negotiating 
instruments.
A qualitative assessment of the political leadership’s actions was then made within a 
framework, derived from Blondel, that focused around four aspects of the leaders' 
institutional and non-institutional environment: their positional resources, the actions of 
bureaucratic institutions; the leaders’ financial resources, the fit’ of their instrument to the 
prevailing technical paradigm, and other 'contingent' circumstances; and the opportunities 
and the constraints of implementation.
Although it was clear that political leaders were more likely in the Fifth than the 
Fourth Republic to bring their policy action to a successful conclusion, the difference did not 
seem to relate to any difference in the executive's formal powers to enact roads instruments. 
Indeed Debre's early use of the stronger decree-making power, to facilitate motorway 
building, did not stimulate the Road Directorate to build motorways; Pompidou's 
introduction of a potential 'rival' motorway-builder was much more effective. However, the 
change in the party system (or its better discipline) after 1958, helped a motorway law that 
did not pass in the Fourth Republic to pass in the Fifth. The change in Constitution and its 
conventions made more difference in determining who took decisions. Apart from periods 
of cohabitation, the goals of a president who chose to intervene took precedence over those 
of the prime minister; for example, President de Gaulle's relatively rare expressions of 
preference in this domain, on roads spending in Paris, had to be accepted by Prime Minister 
Pompidou even though he had prepared other priorities with DATAR. Presidents Pompidou 
and Giscard (in Chirac's premiership) 'presidentialised' this domain by specifying road 
instruments in small Councils they controlled, and by calling in technical advice when they 
chose. However, from Barre's premiership onwards, road networks were decided in CIATs 
chaired by the prime minister.
Both the quantitative and qualitative analysis demonstrated that instruments to which 
the interministerial DATAR made some input nearly always succeeded in achieving its
122 Blondel (1987), p. 172.
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leaders’ aims (unlike those involving the DAT), though DATAR was given no role in a 
quarter of policy initiatives that could potentially have helped amenagement du territoire. In 
the first (Gaullist) decade, roads projects proposed by DATAR that fulfilled the leadership’s 
goals for amenagement du territoire were often achieved by political leaders 'simply' over­
ruling or bypassing Fonts or Finance officials who might have objected to the instrument 
(the Breton scheme, the Strasbourg motorway, the Languedoc and Fos block budgets, for 
example). Relations with the Plan Commissariat were poor, mainly because planning in a 
regional framework posed technical, economic and political problems for the Commissariat. 
In a second period (the Giscard and Mitterrand presidencies), there was more collaboration 
between DATAR and some Fonts engineers on preparing roads schemes (though there was 
more scepticism at the top of the Roads Directorate), and between DATAR, Fonts 
economists and the Plan Commissariat on developing evaluation techniques that took 
account of amenagement du territoire. By the 1990s DATAR, Fonts economists and others 
had shifted to a new technical paradigm that assumed that amenagement du territoire was a 
valid criterion when preparing roads projects (and comparing them with rail alternatives), 
but that more tolled motorways were not the best way to help regional development. When 
Cresson and Balladur continued to promote such roads they demonstrated that political 
leaders can ignore both the paradigm and their official bureaucratic advisers.
Finally, the analysis looked at the non-organisational constraints and opportunities in 
the policy environment. Leaders were more likely to see their initiative implemented quickly 
if it had 'ear-marked' funds, not from a ministerial budget vulnerable to general cutbacks or 
different priorities under new leaders. DATAR's fund FLAT was conceived by Pompidou to 
counter this problem, but other solutions included the block funds to DATAR's missions, 
and Mitterrand's Fonds special des grands travaux, run by DATAR. Mitterrand's reminder 
to his ministers that they had agreed on this fund was evidence of the problems of 
implementation even after a decision was made. For this reason crises in the economic and 
political environment rarely contributed to successful instruments. Though the May 1968 
events encouraged ministers to overcome their officials' doubts and agree to DATAR's 
Breton expressway, its completion required the assent of many other leaders in other 
environmental conditions. Economic crises encouraged some leaders to extend roads 
programmes to create jobs and reduce political tension, but others preferred to cut back road 
budgets, prioritising other goals, which demonstrated yet again that leaders always retained 
the capacity to take a different approach to similar stimuli.
The flowchart shown in Figure 6.6 synthesises the findings in this chapter.123 It 
traces the main connections in the network of influence on roads planning and funding at 
successive stages in the policy process. If DATAR, together with its interministerial
123 The idea of the flowchart derives from Miles and Huberman (1994), pp.222-8. They use it to model a 
network of variables with causal connections between them, drawn from multiple case analyses of projects to 
change teaching practice.
Figure 6.6 Flow chart tracing the interplay between political leaders and the roads planning environment













































- conseils des ministres
- regional contracts
Notes: Solid arrows represent stronger influence than dashed arrows, but influence varies, e.g. with 'cohabitation'. 
The diagram includes only the main links and roads tools relevant to the regional policy agenda
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location, its negotiating and decision-taking prime-ministerial committee, CIAT, and its 
bargaining fund from the prime minister's budget, FIAT, are replaced on the chart by the 
DAT, responsible to the minister for amenagement du territoire alone, the central weakness 
in the pre-1963 arrangements becomes clear. In the early years of amenagement du territoire 
the DAT lacked DATAR's administrative and financial resources; and political leaders 
interested in the policy were not able to give sustained support in the face of oppositional 
parliaments; thus the DAT's efforts to negotiate policy instruments had little impact. 
Bureaucratic groups, sometimes with the support of dual-mandate politicians, had a much 
greater influence on the outcome. A similar pattern could be seen in some later instruments 
that political leaders did not try to coordinate, such as the Interim State-Region Contracts. 
Outcomes in these cases too were dominated by sectoral bureaucratic organisations because 
of the absence of a coordinated input from the political leadership.
Yet, where DATAR could negotiate a tool on the political leadership's behalf to the 
mutual satisfaction of bureaucratic and local actors, the political leadership did not have to 
intervene assertively to make its aims succeed. Some decisions negotiated in this way were 
approved in CIAT or a Council of Ministers for legal reasons or to gain political publicity, 
but in effect the prime minister ratified an agreement DATAR had prepared for the 
leadership, perhaps working closely with the minister for amenagement du territoire. 
Examples were the road plans and programmes in the 1970s and 1980s which 
instrumentalised the technical paradigm of the day. The negotiation of State-Region Plan 
Contracts from 1984 followed a similar pattern, though DATAR increasingly shared the 
negotiating task with Prefects. The 'quietness' of this conventional policy-making process 
did not mean that political leaders do not 'make a difference'. The outcome reflected their 
individual goals, but their intervention was low-key because negotiated on their behalf by 
DATAR.
Political leaders could however adopt a more active, 'voluntarist' approach, asking 
DATAR to prepare reforms that would shift roads policy towards regional policy objectives 
quickly. Decisions were taken in a peremptory fashion, perhaps without consulting the 
technical bureaucracies or even their ministers. Instruments might avoid using ministry 
officials in implementation, or incite them to conform; for example, using local expectations 
raised by a Presidential announcement during a visit 'to the provinces', or the threat of rival 
service-providers. This pattern was prevalent in the 1960s and early 1970s, when Gaullist 
leaders keen to promote amenagement du territoire were trying innovative ways rather than 
repeating actions that had not worked well in the past. This way of proceeding was to some 
extent copied by the 'Gaullist' partnership of Balladur and Pasqua in the 1990s. The main 
problem was ensuring that 'top-down' decisions were carried through to implementation. 
But where the issue in the past was one of bureaucratic groups un-persuaded of an 
instrument’s value, now it is one of project reversal by an incoming government
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Finally, political leaders can play a veiy personal role in initiating instruments that 
bring together roads and regional planning, using DATAR only marginally or not at all. 
Thus President de Gaulle, inspired by Pisani, introduced the Super-Ministry of 
Infrastructure; Giscard set up his Central Planning Council and used it to develop and 
announce his aims for amenagement du territoire; and Mitterrand proposed a public works 
programme for DATAR and the transport minister to implement, and insisted it was done. 
Presidential actions seem to have a higher chance of success than those of prime ministers, 
partly because of their longevity in office. If the president and prime minister have 
conflicting objectives, as President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Pompidou did on Paris, 
then the outcome can be mixed and reflect the balance of political power within the divided 
leadership. The thesis deliberately does not treat the psychological aspects of leadership, 
because it is more concerned to show that even ’grey and indistinct office-holders’124 have 
more power to change the institutions than is often thought. But the evidence and the 
analysis make clear that some political leaders were more likely than others to spot and seize 
opportunities in pursuit of their aims. They showed that there were many ways to overcome 
the constraints posed by bureaucracies and other institutions.
124 Blondel (1995), p.303.
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CHAPTER 7
CASE STUDY 2: REGIONALISATION
INTRODUCTION
This case-study, like that in the previous chapter, examines leaders’ efforts to implement 
their aims within their environment, and especially with regard to bureaucratic institutions, 
including DATAR. A case-study on regionalisation was chosen because it contrasted with 
the first. Roads planning is 'of specialised scope’ in Blondel's term, whereas Blondel would 
categorise innovation in regional administrative and political structures as an ambitious aim 
of 'moderate scope'.1 Roads planning was a component of DATAR's operations: the 
regional structure was the institutional context to all the operations of the Delegation a 
Vamenagement du territoire et a Vaction regionale. Regionalisation was for 25 years 'above 
all a reform of the State, which was organised at regional level'.2 It sought to change 
institutions, meaning not only the formal organisational structures, but also the customary 
relationships between the political and bureaucratic actors who operated them.
A second contrast to the roads planning case was the apparently radical nature of the 
'step changes' in the regionalisation process, such as in 1964 when a 'Prefect of the Region' 
(prefet de region) was made responsible for regional economic development, coordinating 
the work of ministry field offices, and consulting with the new regional body, the 
Commission de diveloppement iconomique regional (CODER). It was the first time 'the 
Region' existed administratively as a noun.3 Decentralisation of political power in 1982 to 
the regional councils that had succeeded the CODERs seemed even more radical. However, 
while political and administrative historians of regionalisation agree that 1964 and 1982 are 
high points, their texts show dozens of incremental moves, adding to (or subtracting from) 
the institutional presence of regions before 1964, between 1964 and 1982, and indeed after 
1982.4 The analysis in this chapter therefore does not compare a small number of 
outstanding events but a larger number of mostly less dramatic reforms undertaken by a 
multiplicity of leaders; these reforms are listed in Figure 7.1.
1 Blondel (1987), pp.92-3.
2 Giuily, E. (1992) ’Historique de la rdforme Defferre', in Hamon (1992), 115-25, p. 116. Eric Giuily was one 
of Defferre's two aides responsible for preparing and piloting the Act of 1982 through parliament.
3 Monier (1965), p.79.
4 Inter alia: Aubert, J. (1977) 'L'administration du territoire', in B.Tricot et al. (eds.) De Gaulle et le service 
de l'Etat (Plonl. 281-322; Bodineau, P. and Verpeaux, M. (1997) Histoire de la decentralisation 2nd edn 
(PUF); Bourjol, M. (19691 Les Institutions rggionales de 1789 £ nos iours (Berger-Levraultl: Dayries, J and 
Dayries, M  (19821 La Rationalisation 2nd edn (PUF); Gr6mion,C. (1979, 1992a); Huguenin, J. and 
Martinat, P. (19981 Les Regions entre l'Etat et l'Eurooe (Le Monde); Monier (1965); Rdmond, B. (1999) La 
Region 3rd edn (Montchrestien); Schmidt, V. (19901 Democratizing France (Cambridge: CUP).
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Figure 7.1 Political leaders and regionalisation instruments 1944-1986
PM Tool Date
VICHY STATE
R1 Darlan Vichy regional administration 1941-44
LIBE NATION GOVERNMENT
R2 De Gaulle Regional commissioner 1944-46







R4 Schuman Creation of regional IGAMEs 1947-48
R5 Marie to 
Queuille
Regional reform under IGAMEs 1948-51
R6 Queuille 
to Faure
Economic regionalisation reforms 1948-52
R7 Pinay to 
Laniel
Rejection of regional administration 1952-53
Presk ent Coty 1954-58
R8 Mendes Official expansion committees 1954-55
R9 Faure Regional action programmes 1955
RIO Faure Economic programme regions 1955
R ll Faure Preparation of regional action programmes 1955-56
R12 Mollet Relaunch of regional administrative reforms 1956-57
R13 Mollet DAT regional plans 1957-58








R16 Regional administrative boundaries 1960-61
R17 Regional coordinating prefect 1961
R18 Official regional expansion committees 1961
R19
Pompidou
Regional administrative reform 1962-63
R20 Reform of regional committees 1963
R21 Introduction of CODERs 1964
R22 Prefect of the Region 1964
R23 Implementation of 1964 reforms 1964-66
R24 De Gaulle’s socio-economic regions 1966-68





R27 Act on EPR regional bodies 1972
Presi< ent Giscard <i'Estaing 1974-8
R28 Chirac Promise then halt to regionalisation 1974-75
R29 Barre Blois programme 1978
R30 Bonnet Bill, Barre decrees 1980
Presi< ent Mitterrand 1981-95
R31
Mauroy
Defferre Act 1982 1982
R32 Planning Reform Act 1982-83
R33 Implementation of Defferre's reform 1982-86
R34 Fabius Election of regional councils 1986
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A third contrast with the roads case study is the uneven role played by DATAR. 
While the DAT in the Ministry of Reconstruction was associated from 1944 to 1962 with the 
majority of the steps in regionalisation, its efforts were mostly unsuccessful. But the very 
failure of the Ministry to coordinate regional planning effectively across field services drew 
the government's advisory body on administrative reform, the Comiti centrale d'enquete sur 
le cout et le rendement des services publics, to recommend strongly that the government 
should reform the administration within the regional planning framework.5 DATAR and its 
delegue, Olivier Guichard, were 'driving forces' behind the creation and design of the 
CODER, on behalf of General de Gaulle, as well as participating in the initial preparations 
for the regional administrative reform.6 DATAR and its minister, Michel Rocard, were not 
invited to help prepare the 'Decentralisation Act' of 2 March 1982.
The final contrast is in the identity of the groups that were important throughout the 
regionalisation process. While many public bureaucracies were involved in the reforms, the 
corps of prefects was always the most important institution for political leaders to consider, 
for its role as the territorial representative of the government and for its links to local political 
leaders. In the words of Article 72 of the 1958 Constitution:
'In the departements. .. the Government delegate is responsible for the interests of the nation,
supervises the administration and ensures the observance of the law.7
The other important group was not a formal bureaucracy but the locally- elected politicians, 
the elust and especially those who were the leading players in a departement (department), 
often by virtue of their national party and/or parliamentary role. The attitudes and actions 
with respect to regionalisation of these two groups (and the DAT/ DATAR), need therefore 
to be outlined.
Institutional actors: the prefects, elus. the DAT and DATAR
After the 1789 Revolution the provinces and their intendants were replaced by departments 
and Commissioners to create national unity and equality. Napoleon replaced the 
Commissioners in 1800 with a system of prefects to organise local and State affairs. A few 
radical leaders tried to introduce administrative regions to implement new State roles, 
especially economic development, but were always opposed by the prefects.8 Whether in the 
1850s or the 1940s the prefects objected to regional bodies 'because they put a screen 
between them and the government in Paris'.9 They were 'attached to the department
5 Report of July 1958: Monier (1965), pp.38-9; and see Machin (1977), p.50, p.63.
6 In Catherine Grdmion's reputational survey, 21% cited Guichard as an important actor in the reform, 11% a 
DATAR chargd de mission. The minister of administration reform's directeur de cabinet received 17% and no- 
one else more than 6%. Grdmion, C. (1979), p.321; Grdmion, C. (1979), p.321.
7 Pickles, D. (1972) The Government and Politics of France. I (Methuen). Appendix II.
8 Le Clfere, B. and Wright, V. (1973) Les Prefets du Second Empire (FNSP). p. 107; Chapman, B. (1955)
The Prefects and Provincial France (Allen & Unwin), pp. 14-17, p.32.
9 Bodineau and Verpeaux. p.83; Lectere and Wright, 1973, p. 107.
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structure and to the traditional equality of prefects'.10 By 1940 the only regional bodies were 
the 17 'Clementel' chambers of commerce, deriving from emergency committees set up by 
Clementel, Minister of Commerce, in 1917. According to DATAR's delegue, over two 
hundred regional theorists had since 1800 proposed grouping departments together but 'not 
even the most famous of them could impose their plan'.11
The first Regional Prefects were introduced in 1941 under the full powers of 
Marshal Petain. Petain had started to reconstitute the historic provinces, and his head of 
government and Minister of Interior, Admiral Darlan, pre-empted him by introducing 18 
administrative regions, headed by Regional Prefects, with assistant intendants for civil order 
and economic development.12 DGEN, the infrastructure directorate which housed the new 
DAT division, appointed officials to this new tier, but the intendants were too burdened with 
wartime problems to consider economic development.13 The prefects thought Vichy 
regionalisation 'seriously threatened the corps... The Regional Prefect.. .aroused the 
hostility of ordinary prefects'...He 'was a brash political upstart'.14 General de Gaulle 
replaced the Regional Prefects with Regional Commissioners (none were prefects) to ensure 
order at Liberation, but the restored department councils were hostile to the Commissioners: 
'they did not like their lack of accountability to an elected assembly'.15 Their representatives 
in parliament voted down the Commissioners' budget; and the posts were abolished after de 
Gaulle went in 1946. The prefect remained as executive head of a department, even though 
the Fourth Republic Constitution, Articles 87 and 89, said that role would transfer to 
department presidents (chairs). There were many political and pragmatic reasons why 
'neither the politicians, the chairmen, nor the Government want the reform but none 
considers it tactful to say so in public'.16
However, during the 1947-48 national strikes the Interior Minister, Jules Moch, 
persuaded parliament to let him appoint eight 'inspectors-general of the administration on 
special mission' (Inspecteurs- g6neraux de Vadministration en mission extraordinaire, 
IGAMEs), to restore order;17 and his immediate successors made the IGAMEs the prefect of 
a chief town in his zone but with no authority over the prefects of the other departments. In 
1952-53, Interior Ministry circulars and decrees confirmed that IGAMEs would not lead 
groups of departments nor coordinate a regional conference of field officials.18 The
10 Grdmion, C. (1979), p. 135.
11 Guichard (1965), p. 197.
12 Paxton (1972), p. 199.
13 Damette, F. and Scheibling, J. (19981 La France: permanence et mutations (Hachettel. p.214.
14 Chapman (1955), p.57.
15 Bodineau and Verpeaux (1997), p.83.
16 Chapman (1955), p. 175; e.g. communists might run departments; an onerous local role would hamper 
business or national work; a strong local political figure would challenge parliamentarians for their jobs.
17 ibid. p.61.
18 Mdny (1974), p.354; Lemasurier, J. (1954) 'Les Inspecteurs gdndraux de 1’administration en Mission 
extraordinaire', Revue administrative. 7/40,377-82, p.380.
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prefectoral corps 'condemned the regions and regionalism to defend the departments',19 it 
being assumed that if regions were introduced, departments would be abolished.
Then in 1954, Prime Minister Mendes-France launched an economic regionalisation 
that implied an administrative regionalisation, and which those looking back see as initiating 
the 1982 political regions.20 Prefects were asked to select regional committees to be 
consulted on the Plan Commissariat's regional action programmes, PARs (lists of capital 
projects). In a policy some called 'incorporating the periphery', the political leadership 
wanted to ensure only one committee spoke for each region, while keeping the goodwill and 
energies of new local actors.21 A group led by the Plan Commissariat and the DAT was 
asked to delineate the regional boundaries. Tom between arguments for 9 'European-size' 
regions (preferred for amenagement du territoire) or 47 'large departments' (the preference 
of Jacobins who thought 'regions would pose political problems for Paris)22, the group 
proposed 19 regions, based on the Clementel divisions. However, 'to pacify some cities and 
bureaucracies', a total of 22 'programme regions' was announced in 1956 (two Normandies 
to satisfy Caen and Rouen; Socialist Arras and Lille in Nord-Pas-de-Calais divided from 
Communist Amiens in Picardie; a separation of Besan^on and Dijon)23 Ministries were 
asked to modify the areas covered by their field offices to fit PAR regional boundaries, but 
few obeyed. Prefects would not work with the IGAMEs responsible for drawing up the 
PARs.24 The elus complained that the IGAMEs were selecting the voluntary regional 
expansion committees and not the departments' own committees, and numerous department 
committees were then 'approved'.25 DAT started to draw up regional development plans 
(plans d'amenagements regionaux), to concentrate PAR 'actions' on its development target 
areas but was unable to persuade the Plan Commissariat or ministries to use them.26
In September 1957 an interim report of the Comity centrale d'enquete .. .was heavily 
critical of the 'Ministry of Reconstruction's incapacity to coordinate amenagement du 
territoire' . 27 In July 1958 its main report said that amenagement du territoire needed and was 
the opportunity for reforming administrative action at regional level: the Prefect in the central 
city of a region should have the IGAME's coordinating powers, and all ministries should 
adopt the PAR-region boundaries.28 In the last days of the Fourth Republic Prime Minister 
de Gaulle issued decrees that would require ministries to harmonise their regional field
19 Mdny (1974), p.347, p.352.
20 For example, Michel Rocard (2001) Entretien avec Judith Weintraub (Flammarion), p.84.
21 The term is Jack Hayward's in Hayward (1986), Chapter 7. Groups had set up with diverse and overlapping 
boundaries, all claiming to represent their area. Monier (1965), p.57.
22 Debre, M. (1956) 'Problemes 6conomiques et organisation administrative', Revue franpaise de Science 
Politique. 6/2, pp. 301-314, p.308.
23 Clout (1972), pp.31-5.
24 Monier (1965), p.30, p.62.
25 M6ny (1974), pp.319-20.
26 Pouyet (1968), p.36.
27 ibid. p.36.
28 Report of July 1958: Monier (1965), pp.38-9.
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boundaries; and a prefect in each region to coordinate an 'Interdepartmental Conference' 
(CID) of field officials.
In 1958 'the majority of prefects were strongly opposed to any kind of regional 
reform'.29 The Senate, elected by local elus and representing rural interests more than the 
urban business interests and academics in the expansion committees, set up a group in 1959 
to veto the reforms.30 Prime Minister Debre in 1960 made the CIDs responsible for 
executing the regional plans,31 but the prefects boycotted the CIDs.32 Debre asked the 
Interior Minister to designate individually the prefect in the largest town of each region as 
'coordinating prefect',33 but these prefects then found themselves unable to coordinate the 
technical field services who still reported directly to their Paris office.34 Once the Algerian 
crisis was over, President de Gaulle turned his attention to administrative reform. In 1962 he 
appointed a Minister for Administrative Reform, who studied rival proposals from the 
Interior Ministry, DATAR and the Plan Commissariat. Guichard at DATAR tried hard but 
failed to implement de Gaulle's wish for a strong role for economic and social regional 
committees. DATAR then proposed the CODERs, which combined members of the 
expansion committees with local ilus in one consultative body. Prime Minister Pompidou 
approved the CODER plan, but President de Gaulle accepted the suggestions of the Interior 
Ministry to make CODERs smaller and weaker vis-a-vis the prefects.35 De Gaulle agreed in 
a Council of Ministers the decree instituting the 'Prefect of the Region', though he knew 
that:
'it was not without some apprehension that [the prefects] envisaged the changes to be introduced in 
the long-established balance of local appointments and practices, as well as in the ranks of their own 
hierarchy'.36
The implementation of the 1964 reforms did not bring the renewal of elites and the 
'rational' regional spending that DATAR wanted, but re-established at regional level the 
traditional local networks of solidarity - and rivalry - and traditional patterns of 'sharing out' 
public expenditure.37 Pierre Gremion judged that the 'winner of the [1964] administrative 
reforms was the Minister of Interior', because it controlled the implementation; yet the 
prefects too were constrained by historic ties, and nominated to the CODERS more of 'their'
29 Machin (1977),p.53.
30 Roig, C. (1964) 'L'administration traditionnelle devant les changements sociaux', in IEP Grenoble, 
Administration traditionnelle et planification r^gionale (Colinl. 11-84, pp. 15-16.
31 A decree of 31 Dec. 1958 unified the Plan Commissariat and the DAT plans under the control of a Plan 
committee, with the DAT as vice-chair.
32 Gremion, C. (1979), p. 135.
33 ibid. p. 137, citing a cabinet member.
34 Roig (1964), p.32; Bauchet (1964), p.57.
35 Gremion, C. (1992a), pp.36-7.
36 De Gaulle (1971), II, p.369.
37 Gremion, P. and Worms, J.-P. (1968) 'La concertation r^gionale, innovation ou tradition', Amenagement 
du territoire et developpement regional [1965-66], 1 (Grenoble: IEP), 35-60, p.51.
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elus than business people and academics.38 De Gaulle pursued the idea of socio-economic 
representation of regions, asking Guichard (Minister for Amenagement du territoire and 
regionalisation) and Jean-Marcel Jeanneney (Minister for Regional and Senate Reform) for 
referendum proposals. The latter's were chosen by de Gaulle but rejected in 1969 by 
Senators and the electorate. In 1972 President Pompidou introduced instead the two-tier 
etablissements publics regionaux (EPR), made up of a regional council mainly of ilus (some 
chosen by the prefect), and an economic and social committee. They were restricted to an 
advisory role on economic development, the President being caught between the 
conservatism of many parliamentarians and the aspirations raised in the CODERs and 
revealed in electoral campaigns by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber.39 In the Giscard 
presidency, DATAR was asked to draft a list of new regional powers, which was adopted 
by the Blois 'Common Programme of the Right', and dropped after the 1978 parliamentary 
elections.
Yet reform-minded regional prefects were already observing that they had to take
account of the wishes of important regional politicians.40 Some opposition leaders (Le
Pensec, Mitterrand, Mauroy, Defferre) proposed bills to strengthen the EPRs or elect them
directly, and though the Barre government rejected the bills it extended regions' legal
powers, and allowed some regions to extend their practical power. Within a year of
President Mitterrand’s election, and under Prime Minister Mauroy, Defferre's Act of 2
March 1982 had transferred power to the regional councils on existing boundaries.
DATAR's minister, Rocard, was persona non grata in Mitterrand circles during the
preparation of the Act, and had little to do with i t41 Deputes and senators, as local elus,
wanted to retain prefectoral supervision as their guarantee against risk and local pressure,
but Defferre was adamant about the transfer of power 42 and
'though the reform was not perhaps adopted cheerfully within the Interior Ministry, it was accepted 
without argument, and the prefectoral corps in particular...'played the reform game' without 
argument once parliament had decided it, as is normal in a Republic'.43
The elections to regional councils that would turn them into political entities were 
continually postponed because of the Left's poor showing in local elections,44 during which 
time the chair of the department became the 'new strong man', supplanting the prefect's 
executive role - while appointing former prefects as chief financial aides.45 Mitterrand and
38 Gremion, P. (1976),p. 129; Gremion and Worms (1968), p.54.
39 Machin (1977), p.61; Essig (1979), p.113; Phlipporineau, M. (1981) La Grande affaire: Decentralisation et 
regionalisation (Calmann-Levy), p.69.
40 Philip, O. (1976) 'Deconcentration et Decentralisation', in C.Debbasch (ed.) La Decentralisation pour la 
renovation de l'Etat (PUF). 15-30, pp.25-7.
41 Favier and Martin-Roland (1990), p. 119; Gremion, C. (1987), p.245.
42 Favier and Martin-Roland (1990), p. 146; Gremion, C. (1987), p.244.
43 Giuily (1992), p. 124. Eric Giuily was one of Defferre's two chief assistants on the reform.
44 Douence, J.-C. (1995) The Evolution of the 1982 Regional Reforms: An Overview', in J.Loughlin and 
S.Mazev (eds) The End of the French Unitary State? (Cass). 10-24, pp. 12-13.
45 Favier and Martin-Roland (1990), p. 148
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Prime Minister Fabius agreed to hold the 1986 parliamentary elections using proportional 
representation within departmental constituencies to 'reduce the defeat',46 and to hold the 
regional elections at the same time with the same electoral system, leading regional 
councillors to pay more attention in the following years to their departmental clientele than to 
the needs and the political identity of the region as a whole 47
THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A similar four-stage analytical framework to that used in Chapter 6, based on Blondel's 
conceptual scheme, can be applied to regionalisation:
- the positional resources and constraints of the Constitution and its conventions, and 
the configuration of the party system;
- the actions of the bureaucratic organisations and other policy actors affected by 
changes to regional institutions;
- the leadership's use of institutional and contingent opportunities to help decide the 
instrument; and
- the constraints exerted during implementation by such factors as the duration of the 
leadership's mandate.
Data collection and analysis
Figure 7.1 listed the 34 projects of the political leadership identified as contributing to the 
regionalisation process from Vichy to the election of regional councils in 1986.48 (Some 
very short-lived governments with the same personnel, 1948-51 and 1952-53, made 
successive increments - or attempted to - with the same aims, and these are grouped 
together). For each project, the evidence was compiled into a database around Blondel’s 
main analytical themes:
- the constitution, date, president and prime minister (indicators for the political 
leadership's constitutional powers, party systems and duration of mandate);
- the actions or views attributed to the president, prime minister, and ministers for 
amenagement du territoire, the interior, the economy and administrative reform;
- the actions or views attributed to DATAR, the prefects, other officials, the ilus, 
and other regional groups;
- the environmental context, especially economic or political crises;
- and in addition, the outcome in terms of the institutional development of regions.
A sample of this database is shown in Figure 7.2. Figure 7.3 lists the sources used.
46 Chevallier (2002), p.323.
47 ibid. p.325.
48 Aubert (1977); Bodineau and Verpeaux (1997); Bouijol (1969); Dayries and Dayries (1982); Gremion,C. 
(1979, 1992a); Huguenin and Martinat (1998); Monier (1965); Remond (1999); Schmidt, V. (1990).
189
Figure 7.2 Example of regionalisation database
R25 Regional referendum  of 27 A pril 1969 1968-69
Fifth
Republic
PRESIDENT: De Gaulle: 8/1/59-28/4/69
PM: Couve de Murville; Interior: Marcellin; Reform and





De Gaulle wanted referendum on socio-economic representation, 
in regions and Senate; referendum proposals prepared by 
Jeanneney and Guichard; Jeanneney's option chosen, and fails.




Prepared brief questions; had wanted two separate referendums; 
but later thought President right to have one. Held a large survey 
of regions. Was with de Gaulle at Quimper 2/2/69 when President 
promoted regions.
Guichard ('but not certain colleagues') wanted elus and group 
representation on equal terms (except on budget), 'to inspire 






President After pari, elections 7/68, asked Tricot to brief him (Tricot)
In 7/68 wrote to PM: "Jeanneney is to prepare referendum"; chose 
J's project because detailed, would not need an Act (J. 1992:93). 
"De Gaulle absolutely insisted: regions to have full power over 
decisions, but regional prefect to prepare dossiers and execute 







PM Told NatAss. that only a State-selected prefect, not elected 
regional assembly could be effective, ensure general interest (H). 
Advised President not to hold the referendum (Tricot 1990:143 ). 







Couve and Marcellin wanted to resist public disorder, and 





In NatAss. 11/12/68 referred to Clemenceau's regional project to 
remove old structures. Transform society by decentralisation and 
participation by socio-professional groups, not elected executive. .
Remond
1999:13-14;
Prefects 'Prefectoral corps apprehensive., on changes to be introduced in 
the long-established balance of local appointments and practices, 




Elus Local notables opposed to regional reform and also anti-region (G) 
80% of notables wanted prefect to exercise regional powers (H); 
PS notables said would reduce role of departments, groups would 







Regionalists said proposals inadequate, undemocratic: these were 





Referendum delayed while Guichard organised his regional 





Regionalisation proposed on 27/4/69 was really wanted by voters, 






Guichard thought CODERs the "indispensable counterweight to 
implementation by State regional administration" - as a transitional 
phase - but could not persuade regional people of the idea; 1969 




Figure 7.3 Regionalisation database sources
The texts used in compiling the database are listed below (full bibliographical details at end of thesis). 
Other information came from:
- Official reports by DATAR or other French sources.
- DATAR's unpublished records of CIATs.
- Legislation, expose de motifs, and Debates in National Assembly.
- Le Monde, Les Echos and IEP Paris dossiers de presse.
Books, articles and reports used in compiling the regionalisation database:
DATAR Guichard (1975) Grdmion, C (1987)
DOCUM ENTS Guigou (1986) Gremion, C. (1992a)
DATAR (1964) Hamon (1992) Gremion, P (1976)
DATAR (1971) Jeanneney (1992) Gremion, P. and Wor
DATAR (1986) Lemasurier (1954) (1968)
Kotas (1997) ' Massd (1986) Gourevitch (1980)
Laborie et al (1985) Monier (1965) Guesnier (1986)
Randet(1994) Monod et al (1971) Hansen (1968)
Monod et al.(1997) Hayward (1983)
OTHER OFFICIAL Philip (1976) Hayward (1986)
DOCUM ENTS Phlipponneau, (1981) Hourticq (1963)
CSC (1962) Pisani (1956) Hourticq (1973)
Charles et al (1992) Pisani (1998) Huguenin al (1998)
Chevallier (1992) Rocard (2001) Kuisel (1985)
Foulon (1975) Roche (1986) Labasse (1966)
Gr&nion, C (1992) Tricot (1977) Lacour(1983)
Tricot (1990) Lajugie (1964)
OTHER Trorial (1976) Lanversin (1970)
PRIM ARY Limouzin (1988)
TEX TS SECONDARY TEXTS Machin (1977)
Antoine (1960) Alexandre (1972) Madiot (1979)
Attali (1993) Allen etal (1970) Madiot (1993)
Aubert(1977) Andrault (1990) Manesse (1998)
Aubry (1988) Ashford (1982) Marx (1997)
Auriol (1970) Balme(1995) Massardier (1996)
Auriol (1971) Bauchard (1963) M6ny (1974)
Baecque (1964) Bauchet (1964) Mbny (1976)
Bloch-Lain6 (1962) B6darida (1985) M6ny (1987)
Bloch-Lain6 (1977) Berstein (1985) Paxton (1972)
Bloch-Laind (1986) Biarez(1983) Pickles (1958)
Bloch-Laind and Gruson (1996) Bodineau et al (1997) Pogorel (1986)
Camous (1973) Chapman (1955) Pouyet(1968)
Carr£re (1977) Chevallier (2002) Pouyet et al (1964)
Chaban-Delmas (1997) Clout (1972) Quermonne (1963)
Charlet (1976) Damette (1969) Quermonne (1964)
Dautiy in Avril (1993) Damette (1998) Quermonne (1967)
Debr6(1956) Dayries (1982) R&nond (1999)
Debr6 (1988) Debbasch (1976) Rigaud et al (1984)
Debr£ (1996) Delcamp (1993) Roig (1964)
De Gaulle (1971) Deloye (1997) Rousso (1986)
Essig (1979) Douence (1995) Sfez(1979)
Giscard d'Estaing (1977) Dreyfus (1990) Shennan (1989)
Giuly (1992) Durrieu(1969) Watson (1983)
Gravier (1956) Estrinetal (1983) Williams (1972)
Gravier (1964) Favier et al (1990) Worms (1966)
Gravier (1972) Flockton et al (1989) Y vert (1990)
Guichard (1965) Grdmion, C (1979)
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The information in each database was then summarised as Figure 7.4, to compare data more 
easily, and to indicate the evidence that backs up the analysis that follows, but which there is 
not space to discuss in the chapter.49 To guide the qualitative analysis a 'quantivised' 
version of the information in Figure 7.4 was drawn up in Figure 7.5, similar to the 
methodology of the previous chapter. In Figure 7.5 each cell is coded as a 'tick* (V), 0 or a 
’cross’ (X), depending whether the action or view of the actor favoured stronger regions 
(V), there was no input from the actor (0), or opposition to regionalisation (X). Where there 
was a clear division within a group of officials or ilus to a proposed measure (such as 
between rural and big-city mayors), or the actor changed his mind (President Giscard in the 
face of differing electoral pressures), the ’division' symbol (-f) was assigned. Events that 
might have provided a stimulus for political leaders were categorised as ’system’ changes 
(such as the first 'alternation' of power of the Fifth Republic in 1981), 'major' crises 
(decolonisation in 1954-55), or the merely 'electoral' threat. Finally, for each instrument, 
the outcome in terms of regional change in the short-term was summed up in a phrase in 
Figure 7.4 and a 'star rating' assigned. Projects were rated 0 to *** depending on the 
'amount of change', bearing in mind Blondel's distinction between managing (administering 
day-to-day problems), adjusting (modifying aspects of policy) and innovating (new policies 
within the policy domain),50 or X if it reversed the regionalisation process.
Drawing conclusions from the comparative table
Of the 34 leadership initiatives 1946-86 shown in Figure 7.5, only two were explicitly 
intended to halt or reverse administrative regionalisation: the abolition of the Commissioners 
in 1946, and the assurances in 1952-53 that the prefects would not lose powers to the 
IGAMEs. Of the remaining initiatives, all were intended to strengthen the regional level and
i - * ' - ,
three-quarters (24 of 32) succeeded, although less than a quarter (7 of 32) consisted of 
innovatory or radical change. This spread of outcomes is related to the political leadership's 
level of support for regionalisation; that is, the leadership made an impact on regionalisation 
in proportion to its collective aims. First, nearly all instruments that achieved most change (6 
of the 7** or ***), such as the appointment of Regional Prefects in 1964, were supported 
by a majority of the leaders. Of those that did not succeed in increasing power at regional 
level (such as the regional referendum of 1969), less than half were supported by a majority 
of leaders (3 of 8 with '0'). Those that made modest changes, such as the creation in 1960 
of the Interdepartmental Conference of field officials, fell midway between: two-thirds had 
been supported by the majority (11 of 17*). But there were idiosyncratic exceptions, in 
particular the regional council elections of 1986 undoubtedly strengthened the region by 
legitimising it, even though the departementalist President, Prime Minister and Interior 
Minister chose an electoral system that strengthens departments within the region.
49 A 35-page print-out and/or computer file of the whole database can be made available.
50 Blondel (1987), p.95.
Figure 7.4 Regionalisation data meta-matrix
R eg io n al p ro je c ts L e a d e rs ' In p u t B u re a u c ra tic  In p u t O th e r a c to r s
DATAR/ M in ister 
A dT
P r e s id e n t PM M in ister o f  
In te rio r
M in ister o f  
E co n o m y
P re fe c ts O th e r o ff ic ia ls E lu s R eg io n a l a c to r s C ritica l r e s o u rc e s O u tc o m e
R1 V ichy re g io n a l a d m in is tra tio n S y s te m *
1941- A ppoints staff to W ants provinces, C re a te s  R egional A sked  m inistries to W an ts non- Regional P refec ts M any ministries, Councils would E xpansion W artim e regim e Vichy survived
1944 regions; provincial governors, Prefects , for o rder align boundaries bureaucratic a re  political eg  Beaux-Arts d isp lace 3rd R ep com m ittees start; im posed  structure m ost in adm in,
econom ic e lites  to councils in an d  econom y on provinces region to help upstarts  • a  th rea t a d ap t to  new 'pa ls ' of M Ps/ Brittany given for order, food econom ic
advise Constitution im plem ent S ta te to  C orps fram ew ork S en a to rs official s ta tu s m odernisation,
adm inistration policies planning
R2 R eg io n a l C o m m is s io n e rs S y s te m *
1944- A ppoints regional W an ted  R egional C om m issioners to W an ts  p re fec ts  to P refec ts  a re  25% M ost m inistries D epartm ent 6lus Suspicion  of Liberation tactic  to Vichy broke Ice
1946 staff, G ravier res to re  order, did n o t h av e  90 prefects; re s to re  unitary from corps. reconcen trate hostile to regional c ttees . k eep  down PC F for regional
repo rts  on w an ts  o rder an d  an  efficient territorial s ta te Com m issioners pow ers 1944; Com m issioner; no t Breton an d  keep  out US- reorganisation
industrial sca le not p refec ts  but P refec ts  ju s t go- accoun tab le  locally regionalists led adm in for o rder in
relocation, AdT top res iste rs be tw eens su p p re ssed autom obile ag e
R3 A b o litio n  o f  re g io n a l a d m in is tra tio n 0 X
1946 PC F m inister M ade budgetary 50% pre fec ts  from Many retain P ra ised  dept; M oselle s e ts  up De Gaulle R egion sm elt of
s a c k s  regional provision for old corps. A gainst regional s truc tu res red u ced  C om m ­ m odernisation para ly sed  by sulphur; D ebr6 -
staff. DAT fo c u ses C om m s bu t pari CR - sc ree n but with variety of issioner b u d g e t in com m ittee parties  in 1945 d an g ero u s  for
on urban planning re fu sed  it; po s ts pre fec ts  from boundaries 12/45, th en  to  zero w hen p e ac e national unity
abo lished  5/46 m inisters in 3/46 res to red
R4 C re a tio n  o f  re g io n a l IGAME " "  ........... M ajor *
1947 G ravier's  book: Auriol adv ised Interior M inister again st G e ts  INSEE in C ondem ned Cioson, h e ad  of M Ps will fund Region too  large S ev e re  strikes Crisis u se d  to
d eco n cen tra te  for m inisters: deconcen tra tion  to prefect; in s trikes IGAME regions reg ions to  sav e C en su s , w an ts IGAMEs provided to  b e  controlled u sed  by M och to res to re  regional
econom ic b a lan ce streng then p e rs u a d e s  pari to  fund 8 IGAMEs to a g re ed  by Pari d e p t  IGAMEs region like CODER no adm in reform by e lus' p e rsu ad e officials but
an d  civil virtues d ep artm en t p refect coo rd ina te  p re fec ts  - th en  a g re e s w ere 'reg ions in of 1964 nor a ttack  on traditional parliam ent limited by
w ould b e  city prefect disguise ' p refects p ro c e ss e s prefects, M Ps
R5 R eg io n a l re fo rm  u n d e r  (GAME I I 0 *
1948- Pro-AdT Minister. Q ueuille m ak es  dep-IGAM E p refec ts, A sks IGAMEs to IGEN officials C o n s e c ra te s ... 40  pluri-dept field G ravier book D epartm ent G overnm ent
1951 P lan n e rs  w ant an d Bidault give IGAMEs bigger regional co n su lt p refec ts  in ad o p t IGAME adm inistrative serv ices  by 1950; stim ulates in ad eq u ate  but s ta r ts  regional
ad o p t IGAME role, Queuille (PM & Interior M inister) regional m eeting regions; Bloch- regionalism  of s ad helps re s istan ce  to 'regional p ro tec ted  by adm inistrative
regions g ives m inistries pow er to  d e leg a te  to Lain6 w an ts  links (Vichy] mem ory ch an g e Poujadism ' in Constitution reform  under
IGAMEs to  groups social groups IGAME
R6 E c o n o m ic  re g io n a lis a tio n  re fo rm s I 0 it
1948- Gravier en co u rag e s  M inister to  aid Q ueuille PM a n d  MinFin, then  Pleven Econom ic officials Given no  control C alsse , Ministry of Politicians a re Initiative from C om m ittees
1952 regional econom ic groups; o rgan ise en co u rag e s  AdT Minister. Then w ork with Min AdT; over SEM Industry help im portant in local groups; form sen s itise  public
informal assoc iations; s e t  up regional Q ueuille PM an d  Min Interior, m akes 1951 Act on SE M s developm ent regional com m ittees but not CNER, p ressu rise and  m inisters on
m issions law on SEM regional developm ent for regional devt m issions d evelopm ent in their initiative governm ent relocation, AdT,
co m p an ies SEM s regions
NOTE changes of column headings relating to ministers from page 4 onwards.
Star rating: 0 to *** in order of level of institutional change towards regions; X = move away.
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Regional projects Leaders' Input Bureaucratic Input Other actors
DATAR/ Minister 
AdT




















Rejection of regional administration
S om e links with P inay (PM an d  Min Fin) c o n ce n tra te s  G ives pow er to
Brittany b u t on budget; circular o f M inister Interior p refects, not
otherw ise no role. (B rune) tells p re fec ts  th a t IGAME IGAME, to 
PM anti-planning w ould no t h e ad  group of d ep artm en ts  coord inate  devt
funds
M ost p refec ts  com plain ab o u t IGAMEs C G P s e n d s  Vichy settlem en t -
'not extra-ordinary*; but p refect P isani G ravier to  CELIB, Vichy M Ps
sta r ts  departm ent com m ittee to  s a y s  m atch local to  am n estied  3/53
mobilise local econom ic developm ent C G P goals
Breton com m ittee 
com ple tes  Plan, 
p u s h e s  regional 




w a s  re jected
Official expansion committees
'AdT -industrial PM w an ts  econom ic p ro g re ss  by m odem  S tate . M oved
conversion  p o s ed  P lan  to  Min Econ. S e t up group of econom ic advisers,
adm in coordination D e cree s  to  approve  one  rep resen ta tive  com m ittees, keep  
p roblem s' goodwill of local ac to rs, s e t  up  regional dev t SEM s,
Strong role on 
econom ic AdT; to  se le c t c ttees,
D ecree  on regl a ttend  m eetings
SEM s; IGEN given with field h e ad s  
a  role
Prefec ts  and  IGEN Hierarchical T olerated  MF while "B retons a s
Major
Regional Action Programmes (PARs)
W ants 10 P arises; S a y s  m ust develop  u n d er-u sed  D e cree s  on PA R s & funds - do not P isani s a y s  AdT
but lacks regions, an d  Plan. "Did practical s ta te  for w hat territory, w ho d raw s up; n e ed s  reform  of
re so u rc e s  an d  reform; en ab led  S ta te  dev t aid  to b e  c re a te s  SDR banks; National Coucil of S tate, adm in, 
pow ers on AdT given to  regional dev t no t ju s t industrial com m ittees, 'first try a t co h eren t taxes, habits,
conversion" app ara tu s ' boundaries
Economic programme regions
C G P -DAT group 
define 19 
[Clem entel] 
regions. 'No tim e 
for study*.
R adicals 
im plem ent 
econom ic 
regionalism  like 
C lem entel
C re a te s  SDR 
banks in large 
regions, do not 
help w eak es t 
regions.
Preparation of regional progs (PARs)
’U nsuited to  AdT'. 
No role in C G P 




com m ittes to  b e  
consu lted  on 
SD R s
Econ m inister a sk s  IGENs a sk e d  to
IGAMEs to  help 
o rgan ise  LA 
consultation
Relaunch of regional administrative reforms
C lose relations 
with national 
CNER organ ised  
by Pflimlin
Fixed b o rd e rs  for 
22  PAR reg ions 
around  d ep ts . Did 
no t w an t reg ions
PAR an d  IGAME 
z o n e s  aligned. 
IGAMEs m ade  top 
p refec ts
consu lt c ttees . 
Pflimlin re jects  
DAT's p lans
Prefects , IGEN to 
en cou rage  
regional c ttees ; 
SDR can  lend to 
firms
officials do  n o t like h e  took 
reform, know all responsibility for 
the  tricks (C haban) colonies
influential in 
d e c re e s  a s  
G ra v ie r"
"Regional action of 
MF, Faure , Mollet, 
resu lt of crisis, but 
pragm atic"
O ffers regional 
com m ittees role 
to  avoid 
e x c e sse s , keep  
goodwill
IGAME: IGEN 
conflict on plans, 
p refec ts  reluctant, 
job g o e s  to  C G P
Say difficult to 
consult c tte es  
b e ca u se  role 
defined re a  
d ep artm en t
P refec ts  ignore 
IGAME. C orps 
w arns  prefec ts  of 
risks from regions.
Min Fin s ta r ts  
PAR; IGAME and  
IGEN argue; C G P 
left to  do it
Top C S  groups 




C G P control from 





decreed , bu t 30 
field serv ices  did 
not comply
Think ab o u t 
'quere lles  d e  
d o c h e r1 on funds, 
not the  future
19 reg ions 
ch an g ed  to  22  to 
pacify rival tow ns 
an d  adm inistration
C G P m ake little 
co n tac t with e lu s  
for fe a r of regional 
d em a n d s
Major
Expansion c tte e s  F au re  voted  
chaired  by special econ, 
'cum uls': Pflimlin, social pow ers: 
Faure , C haban , u sed  to  m ake the  
Pleven d e c re e s
M endes F, F au re  




F aure  voted  
specia l econ, 
s o d a l pow ers: 
u sed  to  m ake the  




Public W orks, 
d esigna te  
regional official
PA Rs, S D R s 
d ep en d e d  on e lu s  
o r group  taking 
initiative, and  
re so u rc es
A ppeals  for 
coordination 
be tw een  C G P 
and  DAT n ev er 
s u cc e ed e d
D epartm ent p res id en ts  com plain th a t 
regional expansion  com m ittees 
approved. L eads  to  approval of m any 
com m ittees c re a ted  by departm ents.
Regional reform  
outside 
revolutionary 
period, and  
pragm atic
"IGAME res isted  
by prefects, 
offidals, PARs 
left to  C G P '.
CD
O
NOTE changes erf column headings relating to ministers from page 4 onwards.
Star rating: 0 to *** in order of level of institutional change towards regions; X = move away.
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Regional projects Leaders' input Bureaucratic input Other actors
DATAR/ Minister 
AdT






















C C E C R S P report s a y s  DAT unab le  to  
coordinate  multi-admin action on AdT. 
DAT a s k s  for regional developm en t 
p lans in 8/57 housing  law
EEC  Treaty  P refec ts , IGENs, serv ice  chiefs learn  'Structural reform s
a s s u m e s  habit of m eeting to  draw  up joint n eed  reso lu te
'E u ropean -size  position on PAR; bu t departm en t and  political will'
regions" central adm ins k eep  pow er on (R acine, 5/57)
execution
Breton MOB 'E conom ic or
d e m an d s  financial functional
autonom y an d  regionalism  not
e lected  council adm inistrative
regionalism '
C C E C R SP 




Relaunch of regional administrative reforms
C G P an d  DAT 
p lans fused; Min, 
PM appoin t 3 
Regional 
com m issioners
Region to  a id  F influence a s  well a s  Interior M inister appo in ts  Reform 
own d e v e lo p m en t;a sk e d  Boulloche G roup which p ro d u ces  -a fte r c h an g e s  
an d  Mollet (& B-Lain6) to  p ro p o se  d e c ree  on regional harm onisation, 
efficient adm inistrative regrouping prefect to  run coordinating CID
Som e IGAME/ 
P refec ts  w ant 
regions; s trong 
P refect role in 
AdT. M ost not
Interdepartmental Conference - CID
No input A s PM, m ade  W an ts S ta te - run C h a te n e t aim  to  MinFin's cu t-backs P refec ts  resisted
d e c ree  to  c re a te  la rger dep ts, run im prove d e p ts  not a n d  Gaullist CID; will a cce p t it
CID; bu t sa id  "Vive by officials, b u t n o t h av e  regions; then  expansion  are  in only if chair and
la C reuse" to  rival p re fec ts  rep laced  with Frey conflict site  ro ta ted
C C E R SP '58: AdT P etits  no tab les 
n e e d s  coord. subord ina ted  to 
Prefect; all S ta te  AdT/ “m ade
M inisters to  u se  22  allies in 
reg ions restructuring"
C S  ob s tac le s  led  S e n a te  (of rural 
PM to  shelve  g ran d s  no tab les)
departm en t reform s e t  up  group to 
veto  reform s
R egional c tte e s  
consu lted  on 




fo rces  gain 




De G aulle voted  
full pow ers 6 /58  to 
solve Algeria
PAR p lans 
a g re ed  by Plan, 





A lgerian crisis led 
PM to  restrict 





s ta r ts
Regional administrative boundaries Major
DAT on M airey 'T e m p ted  by W an ted  econom ic
boundary  provinces" w hen  regions, no t MP
C om m ission. D ebr6 writing 1958 /m etropole-led
Constitution federalism
M airey boundary  com m ission w anted  
large  d ep ts  or Euro-regions. Minister 
sa id  o n e  too  old an d  o ther too  young. 
S o  22 reg ions rem ained
Regional coordinating prefect
Plan  for 8 Euro- S a y s  R egional Insists Interior O ne  p refec t to
regions. M inister P refec t to  b e  h e a d  M inister nom ina tes  h a v e  regional
did n o t appo in t of econom ic a n d  C hairs  o f CID econom ic  role:
regional ch iefs social region w h ere  p re fec ts  d ep t p re fec ts  to
re s is t k eep  pow ers
Official regional expansion committees
Econom ic dev t PM told CNER th a t c t te e s  in CID a re a s  
n e e d s  p lan s  w ould b e  recogn ised , so  CNER would
developed  with p re s s  adm in for CID; w an ted
com m unity, till com m ittees to  b e  m ore
au tonom ous leg itim ate ,represen tative  of TU s
IGEN lose role to 
P refec ts  once 
P refec ts  decide 
have  to  accep t 
reform
Bloch-Lain6 
w an ted  regional 
groups for 
dem ocratic
U pset by CID, 
a tta ch ed  to  dep ts  
and  to  equality of 
prefec ts
Som e p refec ts  
favourable to
D ebra 's  staff D ep ts a ssu re d  th a t PM n e e d e d
(M onod..) ac ted  trad  offices no t d e c ree  for May
from  own id e a s  harm ed  by con ference  of




regions, bu t o th e rs  Agriculure n am e  
boycott CIDs regional head s .
Prefects, IGEN C G P said
asked  to  g e t com m ittee to  give
regional c tte e s  s e t  view s on regional, 
up quickly bu t not S ta te  Plan
for AdT"
After 1959 
ch an g e s  m ade  by 
o rd e rs  /circulars, 
no t parliam ent
regional
com m ittees
PM sig n s  le tters 
d esp ite  Algeria 
ba rricades  
"B usiness m ust go 
on".
Harm onisation 
on 21 Tegl action 
a re a s ' but no 
capitals. Admin 
given 6  m onths
D ebr6 and  Vth 
could acc ep t IV s 
reg ions b e c a u s e  
no t ideological
"CID collegiality 
a  good first 
m ove, since  




Rivalries m ean t CELIB re fused  B retons s tarted
m any/ no  c tte e s  in d e c ree  rules. K ept direct action; their
so m e  reg ions  both expansion  M Ps p re s se d
c tte e  an d  £1us' admin,
c ttee
Revival of 
d e c ree  to  
approve regional 
com m ittees and  
consu lt
CD4*
NOTE changes of column headings relating to ministers from page 4  onwards.
Star rating: 0 to *** in order of level of institutional change towards regions; X = move away.
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R eg io n a l p ro je c ts L e a d e rs ' In p u t B u re au c ra tic  In p u t O th e r  a c to r s
DATAR P r e s id e n t PM, Min. P lan  
a n d  A dT
M in ister o f  
In te rio r
Min. A dm in 
R eform
P re fe c ts O th e r o ffic ia ls E lu s R eg io n a l a c to r s C ritical
r e s o u rc e s
O u tc o m e
R19 R eg io n a l a d m in is tra tiv e  p ro je c t 0 *
1962- P u s h e s  for large A ppts Min Ad R egionalises A ppts d irecteur d e  S aw  project a s A few coordin­ C G P found Political c la ss  m ore Regional unity DATAR and
1963 m et-regions. Main Reform: p refec t to budget, ta k e s  on cab in e t favourable improving ating p refec ts regional p lans hostile to  d e  G aulle rare; departm en t Minister s ta r t to
planning link with b e  regl chef; DATAR an d  CG P; to  regional reform  co h eren ce  of w an ted  CID/CAR difficult u s e d  only after 1962 a  solid adm in prep are
regions g ro u p s to  be staff m onitor adm in and s treng thened W est, E ast, P aris referendum reality coord inated
re p re sen te d reform econom ic policy regional action
R20 R efo rm  o f  re g io n a l c o m m itte e s o 0
1963 W ants controlled W an ts  b e tte r socio - A ppts friend W an ts re p re s ­ W ants c tte e s  with Som e coordin- C G P a ss e r ts  th a t C ttees  w ere CNER favoured P res id en t's  an d
consultative eco n  represen tion G uichard  to entative c ttee, no t planning role, m ore ating prefec ts c tte e s  a  w ay to 'philately socie ties ' DATAR plans, DATAR's
regional institutions a t  regional level DATAR, main new  body • or e lu s  rep resen tative , no t w anted c re a te  new  Gaullist , o r political th en  saw  would C om m ittee option
reform er of region would ob ject new  body represen ta tive local elites opposition lead  to  political for reg ions fails to
b od ies com m ittees control b e  accep ted
R21 In tro d u c tio n  o f  CODERS 0 * *
1964 D esigned  CODER; A greed  CODER PM a g reed A gainst regional Liked DATAR W anted  w eak C G P sa id  CODER G rand 6 lus on G uichard s p e n t a First official
put u n d er prefect; bu t am en d ed : k eep  G uichard  plan: not institution; would proposal; add ed regional body of will en d an g e r Plan; c tte e s  fea red  link y e a r  visiting chef- regional body -
let expansion c tte es ; CODER to rival plan of Min bring political CODER pow ers, local e lus; to will d isappoint to  CO DER would lieus 'idea  of with exclusive
c tte e s  die b e  m uch sm aller Int, Admin Reform, prob lem s c tte e s  to  rem ain inform n o t consult region lead  to  c ttee CO D ER s bom consultation rights
unfunded C G P cap tu re th en '
R22 P re fe c t  o f  th e  R eg io n 0 * *
1964 Not m uch in te res t A greed  provisions A g rees  regional F avoured  regional W anted Told by PM to tell LA divn of Min Int W ere  told: "not a Regionalising "Region" u se d  a s
in prefectoral in C onseil: P refec t p refec t to  s tay  a s reform; bu t regl fundam ental elus, g roups  th a t & C G P sorted  out new  adm in tier", P lan  a  se rio u s noun for first tim e
reform to b e  regional dep artm en t p refec t p refec t to  s tay  a s reform: strong AdT to  b e  through planning articles "k e ep s  ch arac te r of challenge  to (not a s  adjective)
patron d e p t prefect. pow ers to  regional regional action without conflict local councils” P refec t an d  h is
prefect no tab les
R23 Im p lem e n ta tio n  o f  1964  re fo rm s 0 0
1 9 6 4 - Did no t g e t political D eterm ined to  deco n cen tra te , n o t "W inner of reform" C reated Circum scribed by S e t up regional C om m ittee T reason  of Trad departm en t
1966 aim, but decen tralise .T o ld  P refec ts  to  confine by 1968, b e c a u s e  interministerial existing relations: offices; bu t dep t regionalist spirit notables: Left netw orks re­
experience  let it com m ittees to  'studies", and  CODER to  controlled m ission to  monitor pu t dep t 6lus on office re fu sed  to rep laced  by "esprit fought for dep t e stab lish ed  a t
insert itself in consultation  execution execution CODERS 'de leg a te ' to  it d e  clocher" w hen Gaullist region level
provinces he lped  regions
NOTE changes of column headings relating to ministers from page 4 onwards.
Star rating: 0 to *** in order of level of institutional change towards regions; X = move away.
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Figure 7.4 Regionalisation data meta-matrix
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R24 D e G a u lle 's  s o c io -e c o n o m ic  r e g io n s M ajor . . . . . .  ....
1966- M inister w an ts W an ts socio -econ D e G aulle 's  pro ject [Jean n en ey Only 2  of 22 R ocard, Je a n "Admin can n o t Functional 'Conseil d e s De G aulle
1968 budget, AdT regional a ssem b ly will fail. A greem en t against; a  rushed regional prefects Moulin, DATAR, ignore C hirac and regionalism m inistres held in w ithdraw s it on
decentralised . a n d  re ferendum  - to  e lections in s tead tex t - would fail] w ant a  sep a ra te Pisani vaunting C h ad em a g o r in brought m ore middle of Paris Pom pidou 's
C onsu lts  regions a b an d o n ed deptl p refect regionalism Limousin". regional d em an d s insurrection’ advice
widely
Min A dT PM In te rio r
R25 R eg io n a l re fe re n d u m 0 __ 0
1968- M inister to  p ro p o se  W an ts  referendum "Not against" but F ea red  public 'C lem enceau ' W ant to  keep  old P S  w an ts  to  keep R egionalists sa id R eferendum G uichard though t
1969 referendum  Q; on eius-socio -econ not for. W an ts disorder, so  gave regional project to b a lance  of appts, w an t role of dept. reform delayed; gave CO DER should
DATAR m ak es a ssem b lie s; and p refec t to  execu te , key role to rem ove ou tdated m ethods; a n d  own G rands no tab les inadequate ; S en a to rs  tim e to b a lan ce  adm in but
su g g estio n s p refec t to  execu te . n o n -e lec ted  council P refec ts adm in divisions ranks. w ant p refect to  run undem ocratic; cam paign could no t im pose
should  vo te  no idea
DATAR A dT
R26 R eg io n al d e c o n c e n tra tio n E lec to ra l . o  . . .
1970 Back to adm in L earns lesson . W an ts  reg ional­ Rural C om m - Jun ior minister: Not ab le  to control P aris  adm in re s ist S e n a te  ab le  to 16 reg ions w ant to  Servan -S ch reiber No d e ­
deconcen tra tn ; O verru les PM. isation: g av e  adm in issioners  u se region m ust not field officials DATAR’s  transfer p e rsu ad e  th e  local try C h ab a n 's re lau n ch es centralisation,
a s s u m e s  will hav e Functional d e ­ and  fin-ance regional funds a s becom e a  S ta te  - of responsibility to e lu s  th a t should regionalisation regional idea  in m ore pow ers to
econom ic reg ions concen tration  - pow ers to  Regl DATAR not dep t b reak  up F rance R. Prefects. no t have  reg ions experim ent byelections R egional P refec t
Union of D epts Prefects. d e c id es
R27 A ct o n  E P R  re g io n a l b o d ie s  (C R  + C E SR ) E lec to ra l * *
1972 No role in Act. D raw s up  with his PM an d  regional No role. S om e city- C autious reform er New ex-ENA Regl INSEE helps Reform  h ad  to C O DER did n o t J J S S 's  cand idacy R eg ions now
Im plem ents i t  11 adv isers: w an ts d em a n d s  pu sh  Act planning Frey a sk e d  to  write P refects DATAR s e t  up p le a se  both satisfy, but fo rces  reform, but econom ic
regional m issions. trad  e lu s  to  tak e on re lucan t OREAM s a  narrow  law. appointed, regional econom ic centrist S e n a te m aintained h a s  to  go  through q uangos: cen tre -
sh o ck  of P residen t; Frey; en la rged  to in te rested  in regl observato ries n o tab les  an d aspirations. Pari left prom ise
m odernisation traditional e lu s reg ions econ devt Gaullists political reg ions
DATAR I In te r io r  & A dT
R28 P ro m ise  th e n  h a l t  to  re g io n a lis a tio n E lec to ra l 0
1974- W ants reg ions to 3/75  s a y s  w an ts 3/75  s a y s  will R egional P refec t J J .S S  appointed Philip: M ust w ork with local e lus even P S  introduce Elus on Council C orsican  riots;- Councils the
1975 s te e r  d ecen t­ regions. 11/75 decen tralise ; 3/76 given p re fec ts’ bu t PM soon  a sk ed if not on CR. E lected  CR should regional Bills; rep re sen t D epts. regionalists lose rep resen ta tive  of
ralisation; s a y s  region n o t to s a y s  CR will no t b e  pow ers on dep t P re s  to  sa c k  him decide bu t no t execu te  (or will no t b e Faure , G aullists M any CR hostile in 1973 elections d epartm ents,
p ro p o se s  Plan rep lace  o ther tiers real au thorities funds given power) w an t b igger role for to  CESR . m ore than
C ontrac ts reg ions regions.
NOTE changes of column headings relating to ministers from page 4 onwards.
Star rating: 0 to *** in order of level of institutional change towards regions; X = move away.
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R29 B io ls  p ro g ra m m e E lec to ra l it
1978 P ro p o se s  new T alks of N egotia tes  Blois L ecanuet a sk s Som e regional Bloch-Lain& still P ressu r ise  to Hostility b e tw een  Econom ic crisis: EPR  econom ic
regional pow ers; decentralisa tion  - P rogram : w an ts DATAR: reflect on p refects  annul Regl w an ts  m etropoles inc re a se  CR funds. d e p ts  or main m ore pow ers to developm ent role
Issu e s  regional th e n 1972 Act to  b e reg ion 's  econom ic regional in ferences Council acts. policy. P aris  too S e n a te  bill on tow ns in so m e region. S ervan - grow s, so m e
Scenario tried  for 10 y e a rs a n d  social role to of G uichard report O thers let them large reg ion 's  own reg ions S chreiber develop  political
first grow overstep  law econom ic plan p re ssu re identity.
R30 B o n n e t Bill, B a rre  d e c r e e s PM a n d  A dT o *
1980 "DATAR a n d  Regl "U se 1972 Act Blois p ro p o sa ls  d ropped  after 1978 pari B onnet Bill on Som e p refec ts  the Vlgouroux R eport S e n a te  Bill for G iraud (Ile-de- Dynamic and
C om m rs short- fully". G ives Regl elections. 1980 s ta r ts  intermin review local freedom  - regional on E P R s - to do regions. PS France): econom ic n e ed
circuit P refects , Council new of Act; 1981 d e c re e s  ex tend  CR but not region. coordinator of both m ore an d  le s s  introduce Bill in Nat decen tra lise  to pulling E P R s
EPR  but good pow ers to fund pow ers but keep  E P R  s ta tu s S en a te  ag ree econom ic action than  1972 law A ssem bly regions, to further th an  1972
work" econ  devt then  silence responsib ilise law in tended
R31 D efferre  A c t o f  2/3/82 PM P lan  a n d  A dT I S y s te m * * *
1982 No input W an ted  e lected W an ts  decentralisa- R ocard  pro-region; For big c ities vs Defferre would Gaullists: e lec ted  CR th re a t to national No regional Priority to  rapid T ransfer o f power;
reg ions ,decen tr­ tion to  regions, w an ted  to Prefects; w an ts abolish but unity; M itterrandistes for departm ents: contributions institutional political reg ions
alisation; pro­ though  a  big-city participate bu t had responsib le , free, Constitution, R ocard ians regions; M auroy w an ts from g ra ssro o ts reform  and c rea ted
d epartm en t and actor little to  do with it. e lected  regions President, e lus large regions: Nord and  Picardy in 1981 tran sfe r of pow er
p refec ts protect them against to  e lus
R32 P la n n in g  R efo rm  A ct 0 * *
1982- H ad C ontracts P u sh e d  R ocard  to A greed  in ClATs. G ave DATAR H ad history of N egotiate with Ministries go direct S om e n o tab les Mostly u n u sed  to Technical d eb a te S tate-R egion Plan
1983 idea. C oordin-ated; m ore reform ist A sked friend to coordination role. a rgum en ts  with a regions, and to regions. ab le  to  modify planning. W ant by cab inets, C ontracts  a
but p re sse d  from tex ts  than  w anted , o v e rsee W eak. No Plan Parisian DATAR propose  S ta te Prom ote own C ontract after CIAT pow ers bu t often adm inistration, a co ncrete  role th a t
top  a n d  below. in C onseil negotiation. co n tac ts  in priorities secto ral p lans by direct a c c e s s overw helm ed few  grand defined regions
M inistries n o tab les
R33 Im p lem e n ta tio n  o f  D e ffe rre 's  re fo rm I I E lec to ra l 0
1982- M issions go to Told Defferre to  let D evolved regional Delors, Fabius, S a y s  will give a s "Directs" field First again st W hile w ait for CR UntH election, R ight won D epts M inisters fight lo ss
1986 regions; new m inisters k eep a id s  to  regions. Rocard , Lang w ant m any new admin. R egain decentralisa-tion; elections, P re s  of Council 1982: 'would b e of power: 'c lassic
regional m ore pow ers; to  k eep  grip on pow ers to pow er b e c a u se then  sen io r officials d ep t b eco m es re p re sen ted  by naive to  give the French polltico-
com m issioners P refec t useful the ir bud g e ts ' P refec ts  a s  give etectorally useful to  u s e  for c a ree r "new  strong  man". M Ps a n d  local pow ers to  o thers ' adm in reform '
crea ted . a g a in st e lus to reg ions G overnm ent councillors
R34 E lec tio n  o f  R eg io n a l C o u n c ils i I E lec to ra l | *
1986 No role P rom otes PR  by O p p o sed  to (Defferre) No input P re se n ts  Bill: M ost P S  w ant Big cities b e ca m e  G overnm ent Electoral sy stem
d e p ts  to  sa v e regions. W an ts  PR  known "D epartm ent departm ental de  ju re  a s  well a s  doing badly in reinforces
d e p ts  and  give by d e p t to  s top deeply  rooted  in election; a  few  PR d e  facto  powerful polls, w an t to departm en t
b e s t  national effect regional 'dukes ' an c ien t history” by dept; Right minimise lo s se s s tra te g ies  of
for P S o p p o se s  PR councillors
NOTE changes of column headings relating to ministers from page 4 onwards.
Star rating: 0 to *** in order of level of institutional change towards regions; X = move away.
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Figure 7.5 Regionalisation analysis charts in date order
R egional in s tru m en ts  o r  p ro jec ts
DAT/
DATAR
Political leaders Bureaucrats Other actors 'Crisis' Outcome
Pres­
ident





R1 1941 Vichy regional administration V V V V V V X 0 V S y s te m *
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
R2 1944 Regional commissioner V V X 0 V 0 X X X S y s te m *
R3 1946 Commissioners abolished 0 0 V 0 X X X X V 0 X
FOURTH REPUBLIC
R4 1947 Creation of IGAME V X? 0 V V 0 X V V 0 M ajo r *
R5 1948 Reform under IGAME V 0 V V V V X X 0 V 0 *
R6 1948 Economic regionalisation V 0 V 0 V V 0 V -r V 0 *
R7 1953 Rejection of regional admin 0 X? 0 X 0 0 -T- -r X V 0 X
R8 1954 Official expansion committees 0 0 V 0 V V 0 X X V M ajo r *
R9 1955 Regional action programmes (PARs) V 0 V 0 V 0 -r V X V M ajo r **
R10 1955 Programme regional boundaries V 0 V 0 V V X V X 0 M ajo r * *
R11 1955 Preparation of PARs 0 0 V V V 0 X X 0 V 0 0
R12 1956 Relaunch of PARs V 0 X V V 0 X X X 0 0 0
R13 1957 DAT regional development plans V 0 0 0 0 ■3- 0 0 0 V 0 *
R14 1958 Relaunch of administrative reforms V 0 V V 0 V «*■ V V V S y s te m *
PRESIDENT DE GAULLE
R15 1960 Interdepartmental conference 0 V yl -r 0 V X X X V M ajo r *
R16 1960 Regional boundaries V V V V 0 V 0 V — V M ajo r *
Codes: 0 = no view/input; V= view/input favouring regionalisation; X = opposition to regionalisation; -f = mixed views. 
Star rating: 0 to *** in order of level of change in region's favour. X = move away.
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Figure 7.5 Regionalisation analysis charts in,date order
R egional in s tru m en ts  o r  p ro jec ts
DAT/
DATAR
Political leaders Bureaucrats Other actors 'Crisis' Outcome
Pres­
ident




R17 1961 Coordinating prefect 0 T V -r 0 yl -r 0 V 0 *
R18 1961 Official regional committees V 0 V 0 0 V -S- yl X V Electoral *
R19 1962 Regional administrative project V V V V V V V -r X X X 0. *
R20 1963 Reform of regional committees V V 0 X 0 0 V X X r - 0 0
R21 1964 Introduction of CODERS V V V X 0 V V X X •A . ~> 0 * *
R22 1964 Prefect of the Region 0 V 0 V 0 0 V V X 0 0 * *
R23 1964 Execution of 1964 decrees V 0 -A . V 0 H- V ■7* X X V 0 0
R24 1968 De Gaulle's socio-econ regions V V X 0 0 yl 0 X V V V Major 0
R25 1969 Regional referendum V V 0 X 0 yj V X 0 X X 0 0
PRESIDENT POMPIDOU
R26 1970 Regional deconcentration yl V 0 0 y/ X? -r- X. X V Electoral *
R27 1972 1972 Act on EPRs 0 V V 0 0 V V .V V yl V Electoral * *
PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING
R28 1974 Regional promise and halt V -r -r V 0 V V T 0 yl + Electoral 0
R29 1978 Blois programme of the Right V -r >/ 0 yl yl -r yl V -*• Electoral *
R30 1980 Bonnet bill, Barre decrees 0 -r -r 0 0 -T- V V V V 0 *
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
R31 1982 Defferre Act 1982 0 V V V 0 V X 0 0 System * * *
R32 1982 Planning Reform Act V V V V X V V X •A- 0 * *
R33 1982 Implementation of Defferre Act V X V ■r X X V —■ X -r Electoral 0
R34 1986 Election of regional councils 0 X X X 0 0 0 0 X V Electoral *
Codes: 0 = no view/input; V= view/input favouring regionalisation; X = opposition to regionalisation; -r = mixed views. 
Star rating: 0 to *** in order of level of change in region's favour. X = move away.
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2 0 0
Second, the link between leadership aims and output is not just statistical but 
supported by evidence of their active involvement in many decisions. For example, 'it was a 
personal idea of [Prime Minister] Michel Debr6 in April I960', to use an announcement to 
the national council of regional committees (CNER) to 'bounce' the prefects into activating 
the Interdepartmental Conferences.51 In the 1964 reforms President de Gaulle asked two 
cabinet members to monitor progress on two specific outcomes he wanted.52 In 1969 
President de Gaulle sent the newly-created Prime Minister Couve and Minister Jeanneney 'a 
letter fixing a programme of reforms, in which he assigned the creation of regions and the 
reform of the Senate to [Jeanneney]'.53 Minister of Interior Defferre himself decided and 
insisted that his decentralisation bill should be presented very soon after the 1981 election, 
even if it could not be finely-prepared 54 These were not decisions taken in the name of the 
leader by other actors.
Opposition to reforms by four groups of actors in this policy-making community 
(prefects, other officials, £lus, other regional actors), certainly had an impact on outcomes. 
Over half those producing no significant change had been opposed by two or more groups 
(5 of 8), in contrast to only a third of those that ;.ucceeded (8 of 24). Nonetheless, though 
the prefectoral corps had opposed half the regionalisation reforms that failed (4 of 8), its 
opposition to nearly half those that made largest changes (3 of 7) did not stop the political 
leadership achieving them. The elus successfully opposed or reduced in scope a dozen 
reforms, especially the empowerment of the regional expansion committees.55 Nevertheless, 
most successful reforms were introduced despite local political objections, perhaps with 
some concessions such as by increasing the number of regions. Successful attempts to 
strengthen regions were more likely to be associated with events such as elections or system 
change. But the tendency is slight, and there is a noteworthy contrast between the Defferre 
Act, expressly introduced in 1981 to gain any advantage from the 'honeymoon period', and 
the almost equally significant 1964 reforms, prepared after the crises of 1958-62 were 
settled.
Figure 7.6 contrasts the instruments in which DAT and DATAR intervened. Each 
was involved in about two-thirds of projects before or after 1963. However the reforms 
engaging DATAR were more likely to end in failure, partly because they were more 
ambitious, 'system-changing' attempts by President de Gaulle to introduce a different type 
of non-party, socio-professional representation. Though these issues need further 
exploration in the qualitative analysis below, the statistical exercise indicates that political 
leaders in a large majority of cases implemented the changes they proposed to territorial
51 Grdmion, C. (1979), p. 135 and p.l35n, quoting Debra's cabinet aide.
52 Aubert (1977), p.287; Gr6nion, C. (1979), p. 147.
53 Jeanneney, J.M. (1992) 'Histoire du projet de loi r£f6rendaire', in L.Hamon (ed) La Region de De Gaulle k 
nos iours (Maison des sciences de l'homme), 71-91, p.73. The letter was published in Le Figaro.
54Giuily(1992), p. 118.
55 Gremion, C. (1979), p. 166.
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AdT Reform Prefects Others Elus Regional
actors
Crisis Outcome
R12 1956 - yl 0 X yl yl 0 X X X 0 0 0
R1 1941 V V V yl V yl X V 0 V System *
R2 1944 V V X 0 yl 0 X X X System *
R4 1947 V X ? 0 yl V 0 X >/ V 0 Major *
R5 1948 V 0 yl V V V X X 0 V 0 *
R6 1948 V 0 V 0 V V 0 V • i. V 0 *
R13 1957 V 0 0 0 0 •b 0 0 0 V 0 *
R14 1958 V 0 V V 0 V V V V System *
R16 1960 V V V V 0 V 0 V -4- V Major *
R18 1961 V 0 V 0 0 V T V X V Electoral *
R19 1962 V yl V V V V V -i. X X X 0 *
R9 1955 V 0 V 0 >/ 0 V X V Major * *
R10 1955 V 0 yl 0 V V X V X 0 Major * *
R3 1946 0 0 V 0 X X X X yl 0 X
R7 1953 0 X ? 0 X 0 ■ 0 *T- -4- X yl 0 X
R11 1955 0 0 V V V 0 X X 0 '  yl 0 0
R8 1954 0 0 V 0 V V 0 X X V Major *
R15 1960 0 V V -i- 0 V X X X V Major *
R17 1961 0 V V J. 0 V + -s- 0 V 0 *
DATAR
R20 1963 V V 0 X 0 0 yl + X X •T" 0 0
R23 1964 V 0 •f yl 0 -f- yl •4- X X V 0 0
R24 1968 V V X 0 0 V 0 X V V V Major 0
R25 1969 V V 0 X 0 V V X 0 X X 0 0
R28 1974 yl •f V 0 V V + 0 V Electoral 0
R26 1970 V V V 0 0 V X ? .2- X X V Electoral *
R29 1978 V J- V 0 V' V -L. V V •f" Electoral *
R21 1964 V V V X 0 V V X X -r a. 0 * *
R32 1982 V V V V X 1 V X -s- + 0 * *
R33 1982 0 X V X 0 0 0 0 X >/ Electoral 0
R30 1980 0 + -s. 0 0 ... V V V V 0 *
R34 1986 0 X X X 0 0 0 0 X V Electoral *
R22 1964 0 V 0 V 0 0 V + V X 0 0 * *
R27 1972 0 V yl 0 0 yl V yl V V V Electoral * *
R31 1982 0 V yl V 0 yl X 0 X 0 System * * *
Notes: V = input favouring regionalisation (of whatever type); X = opposition to regionalisation 
0 = no view/ input; + = group has mixed views; ? -  less certain interpretation 
Star rating: 0 to *** of level of change in regions' favour, X = move away
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institutions, even if most changes were incremental or reduced in scale by opposition (which 
could come from within the leadership). They met considerable opposition from those 
holding power at territorial level, whether bureaucrats or local politicians, but it could be 
overcome.
EXERCISING POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
Qualitative analysis within Blondel's scheme can specify better the conditions in which 
leaders took and implemented the decisions in the regionalisation process; while the findings 
from the quantitative survey ensure that the examples cited typify a more general pattern.
The positional resources of political leaders
Overall, the Constitutional changes of 1958 did not much help leaders in this domain. 
Projects occurred about once a year on average in both Republics, and about three-quarters 
achieved some success in each case; even the incidence of really major reforms was similar. 
However the most significant regional reforms of the Fourth Republic (those of Mend&s- 
France and Faure in 1954-55), were made under special powers granted by parliament; 
whereas the equivalent Ordormance-making power in the 1958 Constitution did not help 
Debre when he used it in 1959 to set up a Paris regional body, because it was not obeyed by 
the councils and ministries it concerned; Debrd had to seek parliamentary authority with the 
Act of August 1961.56 Defferre would have used the Ordormance procedure for his initial 
decentralisation bill to save time, but rejected the idea as politically-unsustainable once the 
Left gained a large parliamentary majority.57 His desire to abolish the prefect was 
constrained by Article 72, but in any case Mitterrand argued that the State needed this official 
on its side in face of the local elus.58 The different Constitutional contexts therefore made 
little practical difference to the outcome of these projects.
The configuration of the party system weakened leaders of the Fourth Republic. The 
frequent changes of prime minister could bring policy reversals, as when Pinay's 
conservative coalition took over from centrists in 1952 and rejected their moves towards a 
regionalised administration; it announced that the IGAMEs would not head groups of 
departments, nor run regional conferences of field officials; and it gave more powers to 
department prefects.59 The President, Vincent Auriol, intervened on this occasion (as on the 
same theme in 1947-48), 'as a guarantor of State authority'. He told the Finance Minister, 
Edgar Faure, that the prefectoral corps had prepared a bill in 1948 to deconcentrate functions 
to the prefects.60 Regionalisation nevertheless tended to progress because there was much
^Debrd (1988), p. 168.
57 Giuily (1992), p. 119.
58 Favier (1990), p. 146.
59 Circular of 21 May 1952, Mdny (1974), p.354; Decree 26 Sept 1953; Lemasurier (1954), p.380.
60 Auriol, V. (1971) Journal du Septennat 1947-1954. vol.7. 1953-54. ed. J.Ozouf (Colin), p.332; letter of 
16 Aug. 1953; and Auriol, V. (1970) Journal du Septennat 1947-1954. vol.l. 1947 ed. P.Nora (Colin),
p.544, 14 Nov. 1947.
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continuity of personnel between coalitions,61 and especially of centrist politicians (Radicals, 
UDSR, MRP) favourable to administrative regionalisation and/or amenagement du 
territoire.62 When Moch, Queuille, Faure and Claudius-Petit returned to government they 
took up again their own or each other's projects. For instance Queuille as Minister of 
Interior in 1950 made the IGAME the prefect of the chief town of an 'IGAME-region', and 
then as Prime Minister-and-Minister of Interior in 1951 gave ministers authority to delegate 
some powers to the IGAMEs, while his fellow-ministers of Reconstruction (Claudius-Petit) 
and the economy (Petsche and Faure) adopted the IGAME boundaries for the DAT planners 
and the IGENs (economic inspectors-general).63 Nonetheless, poor cohesion between 
leaders in these governments restricted reform.
The Fifth Republic's Constitution and party system configuration together greatly 
influenced which leader's views prevailed on regionalisation reforms, the decisions being 
ultimately in the President's hands, except during periods of cohabitation, as was evident in 
the previous chapter and as numerous texts have shown for other domains.64 The projects 
with the strongest outcomes for regions were all actively supported by presidents, though 
this support did not guarantee success, as de Gaulle's projects on socio-economic 
representation showed.
Prime Minister Debre implemented the 1958-59 decrees that Prime Minister de 
Gaulle had issued, inaugurating administrative reform within existing departments and PAR- 
region boundaries, even though Debre had argued for a decade for a territorial restructuring 
into 40 to 50 super-departments for economic and administrative purposes;65 and this 
despite Debre being premier at a time when the President was fully engaged in foreign and 
colonial policy. Although de Gaulle took Prime Minister Pompidou's advice not to hold a 
referendum on representation on 27 May 1968, but to call a parliamentary election instead,66 
he then exercised his right to appoint a different prime minister, who was immediately asked 
to prepare a referendum on the same subject President Pompidou himself openly over-ruled 
his Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas, who had said in September 1970 that he had 'not 
abandoned regionalisation'.67 Chaban was contradicted by Pompidou in October 1970 who 
said the 'region must be ..a union of departments;68 and that he himself would decide the 
outcome of regional reform 69 and did so with his advisers (creating the EPRs).70 Similarly,
61 Williams (1972), p.430, puts the total number of ministrables in the Fourth Republic at about 50.
62 Radicals: Marie, Queuille, Mend&s-France, Faure, Chaban; UDSR: Pleven, Claudius-Petit; MRP: Bidault, 
Pflimlin, Buron; responsible between them for a dozen regionalisation instruments 1948-55.
63 Decrees 19 May 1950 and 24 May 1951.
64 Massot (1979, 1987, 1988), Elgie (1993, 1995), Hayward (1993).
65 Debrd (1988), p. 176; Debre (1956) p.311.
66 Alexandre, P. (19721 The Duel: De Gaulle and Pompidou (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin), p. 171; Jeanneney 
(1992), p.73.
67 Chaban-Delmas (1997), p.435, p.441; Ashford (1982), p.37p.
68 In a speech at Lyon, 30 Oct 1970. Essig (1979), pp. 111-12.
69 Machin (1977), p.60.
204
though Prime Minister Barre negotiated the 'Blois common programme’ in January 1978
that proposed increasing the powers of the EPRs, Giscard proclaimed in December 1978 (at
the Vichy conference 'celebrating' DATAR’s 15 years), that 'the issue is not to increase their
powers but for them to exercise them fully'.71 Despite Mitterrand leaving the Defferre Act
1982 very much to his colleague at the Ministry of Interior, his wishes as well of those of
the Prime Minister determined the principles of the Act.
'Defferre essentially preferring the commune... Pierre Mauroy and his chief aide... being primarily 
regionalists, while the President... loved to reaffirm his attachment to the department council and 
the cantons'... [Defferre's aides] 'received very firm instructions to decentralise equally to all three 
local administrative tiers'.72
Prime Minister Fabius opposed the regional tier because it could create 'regional grands 
dues', but in choosing in 1985 an electoral system for regions in which councillors 
represented departments, this 'bizarre choice...satisfied the presidential concern to ensure 
the survival of departments'.73
In the Fourth Republic Economic and Finance Ministers led many of the successful 
moves in the regionalisation process, which had developed more rapidly after the Minister of 
Amenagement du territoire, Claudius-Petit, promoted expansion committees and regional 
economic development from 1950.74 In the Fifth Republic they were minor players even if 
the prime concern of the administrative reforms was efficient coordination of State 
investment. Raymond Barre, as Prime Minister and Economic Minister in 1977 issued a 
decree extending the economic powers of the EPRs. In 1982, Delors as Finance Minister 
was only the most prominent of ministers who resisted transferring spending to regions. 
'Delors, Fabius, Rocard and Lang are still opposed to decentralisation. They intend to keep 
their grip on the whole of their budget'.75 The President told Defferre 'to be realistic' and to 
'adjust the balance between ministers and territorial authorities'.76 While Mitterrand 
generally left Defferre to organise the decentralisation bills as the Minister wanted, he set 
limits on Defferre's aims where they clashed with those of ministers on budgets or his own 
on prefects and departments.
Initiatives in the Fourth Republic and even in the Fifth Republic were more likely to 
succeed if they did not involve the Minister of Interior - such as the 1972 Act on EPRs 
written under President Pompidou's guidance by the Minister of Administrative Reform,
70 Archives nationales [Pompidou] (1996) Dossiers of secretary-general and conseillers: 5AG2/2/ 61, 66, 71, 
82, 253, 258: conseils and comitds restraints: 10 June 1970, 7 Apr. 1971, 22 Sept. 1971, 12 July 1972 on 
the regional reform; draft bill on regions, variants erf the draft bill and amendments.
71 R6mond (1999), p.26; Phlipponneau (1981), p. 17.
72 Giuily (1992), pp. 119-20.
73 Chevallier (2002), p.324, and also Attali, J. (1993a) Verbatim I: 1981-86 (Ravanll. p.755, p.789, p.794: 
entries for 15 Jan, 26 March and 3 April 1985.
74 Randet (1994), p.60; Bloch-Lain6 (1977), p. 141.
75 Attali (1993), p.99: entry for 27 July 1981; and see Grdmion, C. (187), p.242, p.245.
76 Gr^mion, C. (1987), p.246.
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Frey.77 As Interior Minister in 1961 Frey had to be ’reminded’ firmly by Prime Minister 
Debre to implement the Interdepartmental Conferences, and told what tactics to use 78 At the 
same time, those instruments strongly promoted by the minister were a little more likely to 
succeed. The Defferre Act of 1982 was pursued with vigour by the Interior Minister (his 
two aides on the bill were constantly in parliament),79 while working within limits set by the 
other political leaders.
During the two-year preparation of the 1964 decrees Prime Minister Pompidou was 
also Minister for Amenagement du territoire, with DATAR, led by Guichard, playing a large 
part in the package. In 1969 Guichard as Minister for Amenagement du territoire drew up a 
proposal for the regional referendum but it was rejected for its brevity (De Gaulle wanted a 
detailed referendum text that would not need parliamentary debate).80 Barre as Prime 
Minister and Minister for Amenagement du territoire added increments to the funding 
powers of the EPRs. In 1982 Rocard and the delegue, Bernard Attali, worked together on a 
reform of planning that gave regional councils a strong role in determining State capital 
expenditure in their area.81
The evidence from this chapter confirmed that in the Fifth Republic (apart from 
cohabitation), presidents set the overall goals and then intervene to the extent they determine, 
so that prime ministers and ministers have to work within those constraints.
The influence of bureaucratic organisations
The key question for Blondel in considering bureaucratic organisations was whether these 
vital instruments ’helped' or ’hindered’.82 It would be posed more acutely for the DAT, a 
conventional ministerial bureaucracy, than for DATAR, which could be adapted to a political 
leadership's needs, as previous chapters have shown. DAT participated in many 
regionalisation projects, but its contribution to them was weak. It 'very early encouraged 
regional initiatives by expansion committees - because it was unable to carry them out 
effectively itself.83 Though DAT was vice-chair of the group selecting regional boundaries 
in 1955-56, the 19 or 22 regions agreed did not help its planning of development within the 
larger IGAME -region. The regional programmes promoted an administrative structure that 
was not based on any serious criterion and has paralysed the establishment of a healthy 
urban structure.84 DAT's very incapacity to coordinate regional planning stimulated the 
Gaullist reform of regional administrative structures.
^Machin (1977), p.60.
78 Gr&nion, C. (1979), p. 137, quoting Monod.
79 L.Favoreu, 'Contribution' in Gilbert, G. and Delcamp, A. (eds) (1993), La decentralisation dix ans aprfes 
(LGDJ), 16-22, p.21.
80 Jeanneney (1992), p.75, p.93.
81 F.Grosrichard, Le Monde. 29 Sept. 1988.
82 Blondel (1987), p. 149.
® Pouyet (1968). p.23
84 Labasse, J. (1966^ L'Organisation de l'espace (Hermann), p.568.
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DATAR played the lead role in preparing the representation elements of the 1964 
reforms and it gave de Gaulle substantial help with his referendum proposals.85 However, 
the 1964 reforms did not enfranchise the 'modernising' elites as both DATAR and the 
political leadership expected,86 leading DATAR, with the Prime Minister's authority, to 
appoint Regional Commissioners outside the Regional Prefect's direct control (see Chapter 
4).87 The decentralising views DATAR promoted from 1968 did not fit the 'Jacobin 
centralising concepts' that underpinned the Act of 1972 on EPRs, and DATAR played no 
part in its drafting;88 though 'it was very active in putting the new arrangements in place'89 
Rocard.and therefore DATAR had no role in the Defferre Act of 1982, and the Act took no 
account of amenagement du territoire. But DATAR had developed a technique of negotiating 
contracts with local authorities, and transferred this procedure to the new decentralised 
national planning and State-Region Plan Contracts that Rocard introduced in the Planning 
Reform Act of 1982.90 Though DATAR participated in about the same proportion of 
initiatives as had the DAT, it played a more central role when it intervened. However, 
leaders could leave it out of their reforms, including some of those that produced the greatest 
change, when the amenagement du territoire that DATAR represented clashed with their own 
aims.
The prefectoral corps was more often against regionalisation initiatives than for
them, and even though these initiatives were eventually put into effect, the corp's protests
and delaying tactics were a constraint on political leaders. The corps had to accept the
creation of the IGAMEs approved by parliament in 1948 in a time of crisis, but its 'fear that
the IGAMEs were regional prefects in disguise',91 led the IGAMEs to remain in Paris until
1950, paying their areas 'flying visits' (IGAMEs-volants).92 Though an arrete of 13 July
1956 made the IGAMEs responsible for drawing up the regional action programmes, those
IGAMEs who called meetings met strong resistance from 'the prefects and the field services'
and 'the text of 13 July 1956 was not in fact implemented'93 When the Comite central
d'enquete... recommended that administrative coordination at regional level be strengthened,
the prefectoral corps asked the government:
'to create no new intermediate level of authority...(whether regional prefectures or regional services) 
between [the Prefect] and the Government; [and] not to superimpose...any new regional units...; and 
to beware of the 'regional mystique'.94
85 Aubry, F.X. (1988) Essai sur la Decentralisation (Journal des Communes), p. 131, Camous, P. (1973) 
'DATAR: dixi&ne anniversaire', Revue administrative. 152, 222-3, p.233; Essig (1979), p. 110, Grdmion 
(1979), passim; Gr6mion, C. (1992), p.38; Jeanneney (1992), pp.82-83.
86 Gr^mion, C. (1979), p. 148, pp. 167-9.
87 Gr&nion, P. (1976), p.37.
88 Lacour, C. (1983) Amenagement du territoire et ddveloppement regional. 2nd edn (Dalloz), p.57.
89 Essig (1979), p. 114.
90 Charlet (1976), p.216; Balme and Bonnet (1995), p.53.
91 12 Dec. 1947, 14 Jan. 1948. Mdny (1974), p.352.
92 Lemasurier (1954), p.378.
93 Monier (1965), p.30, p.62.
94 Text of July 1958 quoted in Machin (1977), pp.52-3.
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De Gaulle’s decrees of 1958 required common ministerial regional boundaries and 
an Interdepartmental Conference coordinated by a prefect The implementing texts were 
prepared by members of Debra's cabinet but they 'did not dare' designate a regional 
coordinator;95 and the prefects did not choose one. Debre had to 'issue a sharp reminder to 
the Interior Minister, Frey, that the government had agreed this reform'.96 Prefects had 
approved and organised the 22 regional economic committees by January 1962 97 However 
they were worried again by the CODERs proposed by DATAR in 1964. They wanted a 
weak regional conference of local ilus,98 and as already seen, in their appointments to the 
CODERs local elus predominated. The 1972 reform creating the EPRs gave new economic 
tasks to Regional Prefects. At the same time a large number of retirements and promotions 
brought in younger Prefects, more interested in 'regional solutions to economic 
development'.99 There had long been a few in the corps, like the former prefect Pisani, 
arguing for changes to budgets, taxation and administrative habits not just boundaries.100 By 
1958 some IGAMEs and prefects, including Camous who went to DATAR in 1963, wanted 
radical regional reform and a strong role for prefects in regional development.101 Philip 
recognised in 1968, as Regional Prefect of Limousin, that he could not ignore regional 
priorities negotiated between the Socialist Chademagor and the Gaullist Chirac even if they 
were not 'what the administration wanted'. By 1976 he foresaw elected regional councils 
making decisions, even if power to execute them was likely to remain in the hands of 
prefects.102 The Interior Minister Defferre kept the prefectoral corps away from the 
preparation of his decentralisation bill in 1981-82.103 However, after the Left lost heavily in 
the departmental elections of 1982, the government 'needed the prefects for preparing the 
municipal elections'. Prefects were 'compensated' for decentralisation with further 
deconcentration from Paris ministries.104
The prefects were not the only bureaucratic group to resist regionalisation, especially 
the control of State spending at regional level that the reforms would facilitate. Many other 
ministries had deliberately obstructed political leaders' efforts to create regional coordinating 
structures.105 They had kept the functionally-useful regional divisions of Vichy but varied 
the boundaries, 'enabling them to resist change'.106 Thirty field services did not adopt the
95 Lanversin (1970), p.55.
96 Gr&nion, P. (1976), p. 122.
97 Monier (1965), pp.72-4.
98 Grdmion, C. (1979), p. 180, p. 185.
99 Machin (1977), p. 101.
100 Pisani, E. [E.P.] (1956) 'Avant-propos' Revue franyaise de science politique. 6/2, 262-6 (1956), p.262.
101 Machin (1977), p.53.
102 Philip (1976), 25-7.
103 Nakano, K. (2000) The role of ideology and elite networks in the decentralisation reforms in 1980s 
France' West European Politics. 23/3, 97-114, pp. 108-11.
104 Attali (1993), p.388, 22 March 1982.
105 Phlipponneau (1981), p.28.
106 Monod and Castelbajac (1971), pp.47-8.
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regional boundaries decreed in 1956 until after Debre renewed the decree in 1960. Only 
three ministries (Public Works, Agriculture, Construction), had appointed regional officials 
to the Interdepartmental Conferences by 1963.107 Departmental field offices refused to 
’delegate1 to the regional officials,108 while central ministries handicapped DATAR’s 
planning by resisting the deconcentration to regional prefects that Chaban decreed in 
1970.109 However, if the actions of the technical officials were important, no other 
bureaucratic group was as able as the prefects to constrain the political leadership on 
regionalisation, because none was as crucial to monitoring implementation or so close to 
local politicians.
The constraints posed bv other policy actors
Pierre Gremion and Jean-Pierre Worms showed the networks of complicity between the 
prefects and ’their’ elus, in which each actor supported the other in the promotion of their 
joint goals.110 Like the prefects, therefore, in both Republics elus were more often against 
regionalisation moves than for them. The first post-war department councillors, especially 
with the experience of Vichy, did not like having a State official at a territorial level that was 
not controlled by elected people,111 and their representatives in the National Assembly 
refused to vote a budget for de Gaulle’s Regional Commissioners in 1946. Though they 
agreed to Moch’s IGAMEs in 1948 he had to assure parliament that the IGAME's powers 
would not grow.112 They ’reluctantly tolerated’ Mendes-France and his regional economic 
modernisation in 1954 while he took on the Indochina problem.113 The regional map 
prepared by the Plan Commissariat and DAT in 1955 for the action programmes could not 
’transgress' department borders, and political compromises had to be made, before it 
became official in 1956.114
In the Fifth Republic the Senate, over-representative of rural cantons that did not 
mirror the expansion committees, set up a group to veto Debre’s regional reform.115 It 
forced the government to ’take oratorical precautions’, assuring departments that ministerial 
field divisions would not be touched.116 The 1960 texts on the Interdepartmental 
Conferences 'did not dare' name regional 'capitals' because of local rivalries (for every 
department with a regional capital there would be three or four without).117 Many
07 Monier (1965), p.66.
08 Gremion and Worms (1968), p.53.
09 Essig (1979), p. 112.
10 Worms, J.P. (1966) 'Le Prdfet et ses notables', Socioloeie du Travail. 8/3, 249-75; Grdmion, P. (1966), 
Resistance au changement de I'administration territoriale', Sodologie du Travail. 8/3, 276-95.
11 Lemasurier (1954), p.378.
12 ibid. p.378.
13 Williams (1972), p.440; Guichard (1975), p.20, p.64.
14 Monier (1965), p.35.
15 Roig (1964), pp. 15-16.
16 Monier (1965),p.44.
17 Lanversin (1970), p.55.
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parliamentarians were scornful of the regional committees ('unelected stamp clubs').118 In 
contrast, ’grands elus' (such as Pleven, Pflimlin and Chaban), who were interested in 
regional development, chaired the committees and wanted a larger role for regional economic 
actors, rejected DATAR's plans for a stronger role for the new actors in the CODERs, 
fearing participation would lead to capture.119 But 80 per cent of notables at this time wanted 
the prefect to exercise the regional powers.120 The 1972 Act creating the EPRs had to go 
through parliament, where
'the Senate, the bastion and guardian of traditional local notables was especially critical, and
successfully diluted the content of the bill by a number of amendments.121
During the passage of the 1982 Act the National Assembly had the largest number ever of 
deputes holding local mandates;122 and 'the debates in the Senate were particularly long and 
difficult'.123 Even when announcing to the Senate the electoral procedures for the regions, 
the new Minister of Interior, Joxe, was still reassuring senators that 'the department, deeply 
rooted in ancient cultural and economic history, cannot be ignored’.124
Institutional and contingent constraints and opportunities
No specific institutional forum emerged that political leaders could use systematically to 
decide or ratify decisions on territorial structures, analogous to DATAR's CIAT on roads 
policy. In the Fourth Republic political leaders might discuss projects in Councils of 
Ministers, but they adapted regional institutions as individual ministers. In the Fifth 
Republic, the president's conseils restreints with the prime minister and a small number of 
ministers, followed by a Council of Ministers to adopt decrees, as organised for the three 
decrees of 14 February 1964, seem to be typical arrangements.125 Despite these collegiate 
formalities, presidents exercised their prerogative to decide the outcome, sometimes in 
advance. Although the 1972 Act on EPRs was considered by at least one comite restreint 
(chaired by the prime minister) and three conseils restreints (chaired by the president),126 the 
most significant decision had already been announced by President Pompidou in his Lyon 
speech on 'the union of departments'.
Blondel suggested that honeymoon periods and crises might create special 
opportunities for leaders to assert their will. In 1981 'some Socialists, from Mitterrand 
down' thought it was so.127 Significant steps towards regions were taken following regime 
change in 1940,1944 and 1958. Other considerable reforms were contemporaneous with
118 Gremion, C. (1979), p. 166.
119 ibid. p. 166, p. 190.
120 Hayward (1983), p.51.
121 Machin (1977), p.61.
122 M6ny (1987), p.248.
123 Giuily (1992), p. 120.
124 Douence (1995), p. 16.
125 Burin des Roziers, E. (1990) 'Communication', in Institut Charles de Gaulle, De Gaulle et ses Premiers 
ministres (Plon), 81-89, p.84.
126 Archives Nationales (1996) 22 Sept. 1971; 10 June 1970, 7 April 1971 and 12 July 1972.
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the major events in 1947-48 (strikes and riots), 1954-55 (Indochina) and 1960-61 (Algeria).
Yet if Moch in 1948, and Mendes and Faure in 1954-55 used parliamentary support deriving
from a crisis to launch reform, Debr6 signed the January 1960 texts despite the crisis,
accepting that domestic business must continue,128 and de Gaulle turned his attention to
administrative reform and the substantial 1964 project only ’after Algeria was settled'.129
The belief in crises and 'honeymoon periods' as environmental opportunities may be as
important as the environmental conditions themselves in producing a rush to action. De
Gaulle's hasty referendum text of May 1968, imposed on a Council of Ministers 'in the
middle of the Paris insurrection', would have been an embarrassment had it been
published.130 The same concept conditioned the content of Defferre's Bill on the 'Rights and
Liberties of Communes, Departments and Regions'.
'Defferre's approach was based on two deep convictions: first the need to work quickly to benefit 
from what was then called 'the state of grace', and impose a radical reform before conservative forces, 
in the broadest sense, took over again. Gaston Defferre was very influenced by Pierre Mendbs- 
France's theory about "the hundred days" and the need to undertake any fundamental reform during 
the short period after the elections'.....
The second conviction was that any metaphysical or philosophical discussion about the territorial 
organisation of France must be avoided.. .131
Defferre's convictions ensured a speedy transfer of political power by giving all tiers and 
authorities equal autonomy, leaving to a later date the consideration of responsibilities and 
limitations on autonomy, leading Guichard among others to oppose the Bill.132 They barred 
a reconsideration of regional boundaries, because it was 'useless to increase the difficulties 
by drawing new regions or departments'. Although Defferre and Mauroy spoke in 1981 
about changing the size of regions, Mauroy had soon found that political opinion in his 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais and neighbouring Picardie was against it.133
In the Fifth Republic a third of instruments seemed to have been affected by short­
term electoral concerns. Giscard as Presidential candidate and as President put forward 
decentralisation proposals when needing electoral support of centrist parties promoting 
regionalism, and dropped them when the need evaporated. Defferre's reforms were affected 
first by the Socialists' willingness to give more power to department prefects to ensure their 
support before local elections, and then by the choice of a department-based electoral system 
for regions to minimise losses in simultaneous national elections. In this domain at least, 
forthcoming elections constituted environmental constraints whereas post-election euphoria,
127 M&iy (1987), p.248.
128 Signing the ministerial instructions Monod presented on the night of the Algerian barricades, he said: 
'You're right, we must continue to ensure that things go on'. Quoted in Grdmion, C. (1979), p. 133.
129 Aubert (1977), p.287.
130 Jeanneney (1992), p. 73.
131 Giuily (1992), pp. 118-19.
132 For example, there was not, as in Britain and in Germany, the need for the lower tiers to work within 
planning guidelines set by upper tiers; it also led to rich communes being able to outbid any incentives 
provided to developers in poorer regions.
133 G.Defferre, Le Monde. 10 June 1981.
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and economic and political crises, provided opportunities that could take a number of 
directions depending on the response of the leadership to the opportunities presented.
Implementation and persistence
The significance of the 'duration' of a political leadership is evident in the short-lived 
regional structures of the Vichy State and the Liberation government compared with the 
capacity of political leaders of the Fifth Republic to consolidate and develop the direction of 
their reforms. The Gaullists exemplified most clearly the intensive use that French political 
leaders could make of their extensive powers to overcome substantial opposition. Yet, the 
persistence shown by some political leaders of the Fourth Republic also demonstrates the 
capacity of political leaders to make a impact against the opposition of bureaucratic 
institutions, and in a difficult political context.
Even in the Fifth Republic individual political leaders could make a difference by the 
paths they took. Prime Minister Debrd did not accept the tardiness of the prefects and the 
Interior Minister (a former head of the prefectoral corps) in setting up the Interdepartmental 
Conference but exercised hierarchical authority over the Interior Minister and used local 
interests to put pressure on officials. Pompidou's archives show that he ensured that the 
regional institutions he wanted in 1972 were implemented down to the individual candidates 
for the regional prefecture's economic missions.13* In contrast, Giscard had seven years to 
implement his promise to make his term 'that of a France of the regions',135 but abandoned 
both his proposals to do so. President Mitterrand reined Defferre back on their joint 
aspirations, when they met objections, while nevertheless retaining the essence of their 
goals. Thus the ability of political leaders to make an impact on regionalisation goals in 
conformity with their aspirations seems to depend in the end more on the leader than on the 
conditions that constrain them.
CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this chapter was to show that political leaders can make an impact on the regional 
institutions that condition the policy of aminagement du territoire and DATAR's work. The 
initial account of the regionalisation process showed that the 'attachment' to the department 
of the prefectoral corps and local-national politicians would make the construction of a 
regional tier difficult. The prefects valued the formal parity of their posts and relationships, 
and their direct links to Paris. The local elus, well-represented in parliament, were quick to 
reject any regional institution and to defend the prefects, in part for the same reasons of 
parity, in part because they relied on the prefect to absolve them from responsibility, as 
shown in the debates on the Defferre Bill, 1981-82. Nevertheless, initiatives on regional
134 Archives Nationales (19961 5AG2/2/ 325 Comity restreint. 4 July 1973; Conseil restreint of 12 July 
1973 on implementation of regional reform: brief, draft decrees, decisions; 2/326 Missions dconomiaues 
reeionales: composition and activities: individual fiches on candidates as chef de mission 1969- 73.
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institutions were undertaken in most premierships after the second world war. Three- 
quarters of them made some impact, nearly all in the direction of strengthening the 
institutions; and a quarter made quite radical changes. The link between political leadership 
and regionalisation project was not just formal; there was much evidence of leaders keeping 
themselves informed, taking the final decisions and putting forward their own solutions to a 
problem. The objections of bureaucratic groups and other political actors made a difference, 
weakening and delaying projects but some considerable reforms were made despite their 
opposition.
The differences between the Fourth and Fifth Republic Constitutions made little 
difference to the number of leadership initiatives or their outcomes. Fourth Republic leaders 
made use of special powers voted by the National Assembly, while Fifth Republic leaders 
did not find the new 'Ordonnance' procedure effective, and the Constitution prevented 
Defferre from abolishing the prefect in 1981 even if the President would have agreed. The 
Constitution, together with the configuration of the party system, made more difference to 
which political leader prevailed. Overall, it seems that political leaders in the Fourth Republic 
were able to take incremental actions that laid the groundwork for the more spectacular 
changes of the Fifth Republic. However, these actions were the work of sectoral ministers 
operating within their ministerial remit (or prime ministers who took a ministerial portfolio), 
and were poorly-coordinated across the government as a whole. In the Fifth Republic, 
presidential wishes on regional reform mostly constrained the choices of prime ministers. In 
turn prime ministers might take on a sectoral role or leave actions to a minister, but they 
could put pressure on a minister to implement agreed actions. Regionalisation projects were 
better coordinated in the Fifth Republic, with the corollary that individual political leaders 
were less free to pursue their own aims.
The ministerial division DAT was energised by a long-serving minister into 
encouraging regional committees, but its organisational weaknesses brought the issue of 
coordinated administration at regional level onto the political agenda. DATAR played a 
central and effective role in some substantial regionalisation projects, but others failed, and 
political leaders did not always call on its services. However, the chief bureaucratic actors 
were the prefects. They were often against regionalisation projects, and although their 
opposition did not negate the political leadership's efforts it delayed implementation or 
reduced the import of the change. By 1958 there were already a few prefects who wanted 
regional reform, and when in the 1970s political leaders promoted a new generation of 
regional prefects at the same time as creating the EPR regional councils, there were more 
prefects who saw the regional economic role as interesting. But even these 'regionalist' 
regional prefects found it hard to imagine elected councils that executed their own decisions.
13S La Vie franyaise. 13 March 1975, quoted in D61oye, Y. (1997) 'L'amdnagement du territoire en d£bats', in 
Gaxie, D. (ed.) Luttes constitutions (Harmattari). 23-48, p.39.
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Local elus were important in constraining the political leadership's regionalisation 
initiatives, since those with a national role were policy actors with a veto and also policy 
recipients, both dependent upon the prefects and putting pressure on them. In the Fourth 
Republic they rejected the Vichy Regional Prefect and the Liberation Regional 
Commissioners, limited the role given to the IGAMEs, forced a redrawing of the map of 
regions, delayed the concept of a regional town and opposed the participation of 'unelected' 
regional committees. In the Fifth Republic, ilus ensured the new CODERs were dominated 
by themselves and, through the Senate, ensured that regions did not diminish departments. 
From the 1970s elus from larger urban areas, often with significant national roles, changed 
their position on regions. But many protected the status quo, wanting neither to give up 
powers to regions nor to take responsibility for their own acts. Despite this opposition, a 
series of political leaders gradually constituted regions, and Defferre removed the prefects' 
supervisory guarantee. But Mitterrand and Fabius chose to delay the first elections to 
regional councils, giving time for the incumbent elus to consolidate their power at 
department and city level.
Successful regionalisation projects often took place at times of national crisis or 
national euphoria. However the motivation was partly pragmatic, making use of special 
powers given by parliament at these times, or deriving from a scepticism about colleagues' 
resistance to conservative forces. Moreover, an equally large number of regionalisation 
instruments were enacted either despite crisis or expressly because there was no crisis. But 
electoral considerations were important, whether the political leadership needed tactical 
alliances with parties, support from the prefects, or to reduce electoral losses at national 
level.
Implementation was a particular problem for Liberation and Fourth Republic leaders. 
Early reforms were occasionally put into reverse under the next government. Bureaucratic 
groups could delay putting texts into effect until the next dissolution; yet some political 
leaders pursued the same goals through different coalitions and thus the regionalisation 
process gradually moved forward. But even with the powers of the Fifth Republic, Debre 
and his cabinet had to persist and insist that the Interior Minister and the prefects 
implemented decrees agreed by the political leadership as a whole. President Pompidou and 
his advisers monitored carefully the putting in place of his projects. The outcome of the 
Defferre reforms was substantially altered by the implementing texts, particularly under a 
new Prime Minister and Interior Minister that did not share the same goals.
The flowchart in Figure 7.7 portrays the networks of influence on regionalisation 
instruments during the Fifth Republic; a Fourth Republic version would differ little. In 
contrast to roads policy, there are no new institutions such as CIAT or special funds that 
might give later leaders an advantage earlier leaders did not have. While the DAT was 
permanently involved in the process but weak and with no special powers, DATAR 
provided stronger support to leaders when they chose to involve it, but it was not an
Figure 7.7 Flow chart tracing the interplay between political leaders and the regionalisation environment
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essential part of any reform instrument; and it has also taken different paths to 'alternative
regions' with the consent of the political leadership. The constituted regions have evolved in
their composition and functions (programme-regions, CODER, EPR, regional councils) but
their territorial boundaries were no easier for political leaders to change in 1981 from the
pattern set in 1917 than they were in 1955. But within the overall context of positional
resources provided by the constitution and party system configuration, and the constraints
from bureaucracies and local political actors, political leaders found considerable opportunity
to pursue their aims effectively in their own manner.
Figure 7.7 is a composite picture of the diverse ways in which leaders operated the
system. The decrees issued by Mendes-France and Faure in 1954-55 or by Prime Minister
de Gaulle in 1958 were 'heroic decisions', as defined by Jack Hayward in 1974 in relation
to economic planning. Such decision-making
'would be heroic in the dual sense that it would be both an ambitious political exercise in rational 
decision-making and an ambitious assertion of political will by government leaders'.136
The decrees issued by Mendes-France and Faure were developed by a small circle of people
(the ministers Mendes, Faure and Buron and their cabinets), and comprised an unusually
coherent set of measures, developed by linking the regional committees, the regional action
programmes and harmonised regional boundaries, as well as a large number of practical
measures for helping regional economic development. That was not to say they were
implemented, especially where the technical bureaucracies were concerned; and General de
Gaulle had to re-state the same demand on boundaries while adding the Interdepartmental
Conference that prefects had opposed for a century. Debre's preparation of the implementing
decrees was similarly Tieroic', in being conducted as 'a technocratic reform, not political or
dogmatic',137 with the help of his cabinet aides [it was before the creation of DATAR], and
executed despite the reluctance of officials and the Interior Minister, who was reminded of
the government decision in an authoritative fashion.
'Men as different as Pierre Mendes-France and Michel Debre feared that without a modernised state 
and a real political will in Paris, economic progress would be hampered and social reform 
blocked138
Yet political leaders could also introduce political change of wide scope through a 
process of 'negotiating with’ rather than ’imposing on' other policy actors.139 The 1964 
innovations were more ambitious in their scope and effect than the 1959-61 reforms. But the 
decision-making was widely shared among political leaders and bureaucratic agencies, and
136 Hayward, J. (1982) 'Mobilising Private Interests in the Service of Public Ambitions: The Salient 
Element in the Dual French Policy Style?', in J.Richardson (ed.) Policy Styles in Western Europe (George 
Allen & Unwin), 111^40, p. 112, commenting on his earlier work.
137 Antoine, S. (1960) 'Les Regions de programme et la g^ographie administrative fransaise1, Revue 
administrative. 76, 357-62, p.358. Serge Antoine, part-author of Debre's 1960 decrees, assuring readers of the 
'non-revolutionary' character of these regions 'carried over' from the Fourth Republic.
138 Williams (1972), p.435.
139 This distinction is made in Hayward (1982), p.l 13.
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substantial consultation was undertaken by DATAR on the part to be played by regional 
actors, with the outcome 'a compromise'.140 The 1982 Defferre Act combined significant 
institutional change with intensive negotiation, notwithstanding the minister's determined 
exercise of political will on aspects that he considered non-negotiable, such as the transfer of 
executive power.
In contrast, other initiatives more clearly matched Meny's categorisation of the 
decentralisation laws as 'part of a progressive, incremental process in the politico- 
administrative system...'.141 They were low-key, but were often very effective even if the 
amount of change was relatively limited. Most Fourth Republic proposals were of this 
nature: narrow in scope (within the remit of a single minister), making small steps, with 
reforming premiers having to take on a ministerial role to act in the sector, rather than expect 
to be able to lead an interministerial project. In the Fifth Republic there were also 
instruments of this nature: measures that implemented and then added to the 1964 reforms; 
the setting-up with the help of DATAR of the EPRs; the Barre decrees prepared by DATAR 
that gave additional economic powers to EPRs; and the State-Region Plan Contracts, 
initiated and negotiated by DATAR, fit into this un-heroic but progressive model.
Finally, some initiatives were neither heroic nor 'progressive' in Many's sense, but 
weak, negative or vacillating, such as the 1952 circular that confirmed 'there could be no 
question of transforming the IGAME into the administrative head of a group of 
departments';142 the short-lived 'Blois' proposals on regional decentralisation that DATAR 
was asked to develop to shore up electoral alliances with regionalists; or the choice of a 
'bizarre' electoral system that would departmentalise the region that political leaders from the 
same government had so recently created.
These four different modes of operating the policy-making institutions could be 
corralled into a rather approximate double dichotomy based not on Blondel's two 
dimensions of the 'scope' and the 'amount' of leadership ambitions, but on the nature of the 
ambitions and the nature of the policy process: heroically-ambitious change versus limited 
modifications; leadership-imposed initiative versus a negotiated compromise settlement. But 
like all dichotomies these would misrepresent the diversity and complexity of approaches 
taken by political leaders, and the range of their capacities to adapt to the institutional and 
non-institutional constraints and opportunities.
140 Gr&nion, P. (1976), p.37.
141 M6ny (1987), p.250, citing Hayward (1982).





The objective of this thesis was to demonstrate that political leaders have considerable 
control over bureaucratic institutions, with a substantial ability to modify organisational 
structures and re-orient bureaucratic activities towards their own political goals. The 
predominant interpretation of the relationship between leaders and institutions in the political 
science literature is that political leaders have little autonomy relative to the constraints 
exerted by formal and informal institutions.1 Journalists and political biographers often 
credit individual leaders with a strong influence on political events but administrative and 
political scientists working explicitly or implicitly within an institutionalist framework are 
more reluctant to accept that possibility. Even authorities on individual presidents and prime 
ministers, despite providing evidence that the contributions of these leaders to outcomes 
matter, assert at some point that institutional constraints are even stronger.2 For most 
authors leadership initiative is reduced to more or less the status of a 'residual', the gap that 
is left in the analysis of a phenomenon when all that can be explained by the institutional and 
non-institutional environment has been.
Exceptions to the general rule are widely- accepted: exceptional leaders, or leaders 
profiting from exceptional situations, can change institutions.3 However, rather than being 
seen as a pointer to a widespread potential for power that all leaders might exercise to 
varying extents, exploiting as well as submitting to institutional contexts, such instances are 
often used to support a dichotomous classification of political executives as, on the one 
hand, 'charismatic' or 'strong' leaders who make a profound impact on the polity, and the 
rest, mere 'managers' or 'jugglers', not even deserving the term 'leader'. Presidents and 
prime ministers are divided into those exceptional leaders who override institutions and 
those who are subordinate to them.
Not all writers on political leaders adopt a pure dichotomous typology. Blondel is 
among the few who argue that a full spectrum of intermediate cases exists, whether of 
leaders’ intentions or of their actual impact in the short or long term.
1 See Chapter 1.
2 Neustadt (1990), p.ix., Cole (1994), p. 175; Elgie (1995), p.210.
3 Thelen, K. and Steinmo, S. (1992) 'Historical institutionalism in comparative politics', in S.Steinmo, 
KThelen and F.Longstreth (eds) Structuring Politics: Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis 
(Cambridge: CUP), 1-32, pp. 15-16; Edinger (1993), p.67.
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’Between those who maintain, reconstruct or otherwise concern themselves with the "whole" system 
and those who devote their activities to one or a very limited number of policies, there is a large 
number - indeed, an infinity of - positions which leaders may, and indeed, do take’.4
Blondel also makes a more even-handed assessment of the balance between the behaviour of 
leaders on the one hand and the responses of the institutional and societal environment on 
the other. He argues that leaders differ in the extent of their ambitions, and that the eventual 
outcome of these ambitions will depend on the level of resources the leaders have by virtue 
of their position, on the extent to which the institutions constrain or assist them, and on the 
contingent opportunities they are offered. Leaders may maintain the policy orientation set by 
their predecessors because 'the system is strong' or because their preferred policy 
orientation really is 'do nothing'.5 Others may achieve the reputation of being a great leader 
in part because the social or environmental climate was propitious for radical change. The 
exact contribution of a leader to the outcome is often hard to distinguish from that of the 
environment, though the 'immense influence' of some outstanding leaders is more easily 
recognised as such.
The real difficulty is therefore not so much about the large part played by some leaders, but about 
the smaller impact of the great majority of leaders.6
As one of the rare academics to be interested in comparing the actions of 'a mass of 
grey and indistinct office-holders',7 Blondel proposed a general methodology for appraising 
the comparative impact of different leaders within their institutional and non-institutional 
context, summarised in Chapter 1. The thesis focused on and expanded one element of that 
methodology - the relationship between the political leadership and bureaucratic institutions - 
and then examined that relationship within one policy domain, amenagement du territoire, 
and especially with reference to the central bureaucratic actor within that domain, DATAR. 
Blondel considered the bureaucratic institutions to be very significant constraints to political 
leaders.
To an extent, at least, they can try to bend the "muscles" of the bureaucracy; but their expectations 
will remain largely unfulfilled'.8
Yet the help of bureaucratic groups is also crucial to leaders' success:
'bureaucracies are the tools, the instruments, par excellence, which leaders have to use and on which 
they have to rely.19
It is therefore probable, says Blondel, that 'activist' leaders will try
'to improve (somewhat) the general conditions under which bureaucracies can be expected to help 
their rule to be more effective'.10
4 Blondel (1987), p.94.
5 ibid. p.97.
6 Blondel (1995), p.300.
7 ibid. p.303.
8 Blondel (1987), p. 170.
9 ibid. p. 167.
10 ibid. p. 171.
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Bureaucracies are only one part of Blondel’s ’general analysis of political leadership',11 and 
he does not establish criteria for a 'model' bureaucracy, should one exist. However, he 
suggests that 'four factors' in the civil service affect the impact of political leaders, which 
they are likely to take into account as they seek to improve the effectiveness of the 
bureaucracy, namely:
- the design of the administrative organisation: it should not be too light nor too 
heavy; coordination must be good and horizontal links may be as important as 
vertical hierarchy;
- the links between the bureaucracy and the leaden they 'must be close and effective 
... The fostering of the loyalty of civil servants by a variety of means - but not at the 
expense of initiative taking - is a manifest requirement';
- the competence of officials;
- the links between the bureaucracy and the population: bureaucracies must be 
closely linked to the population, for example through offices in the provinces.12
The thesis tested the capacity of political leaders to control and adapt these features of the
bureaucratic organisation, DATAR. The first 'empirical' chapter (Chapter 2) examined the
efforts to design an effective organisational structure for implementing amenagement du
territoire from the time the policy emerged in the 1940s until DATAR's creation in 1963.
While noting the attention leaders paid to the 'weight' and 'coordination' of the structures
they were amending, it was more important to judge whether Blondel was correct that:
’leaders are not powerless to move the machinery and the structures, but the extent of their power is, 
and to their own detriment, often overestimated'.13
Then Chapter 3 investigated the links between DATAR and the leadership. Blondel thought 
that when leaders 'press a button' to the bureaucracy 'all they can hope for is that some of 
[their] decisions will be partly implemented in the fairly near future'.14 Chapter 3 therefore 
tried to determine the character of the links that would make DATAR an effective button to 
press. Chapter 4 inquired into how a changing political leadership could ensure DATAR's 
personal loyalty and overall responsiveness to leadership goals, without at the same time 
reducing the level of competence and capacity for independent initiative of officials selected 
from a small pool. How damaging to a leader's effectiveness were the 'inevitable trade-offs' 
that Blondel saw between these various desiderata? Blondel's fourth factor applies only 
indirectly to DATAR, which was not designed to link directly to the population as a whole. 
Its 'population' is the set of public actors whose programmes it coordinates and steers on the 
leadership's behalf, mainly through administrative and financial procedures. Chapter 5 
surveyed the committees and funds that DATAR organises, or in which it participates, to 
evaluate the leadership's ability to use and reshape these traditional instruments to match the
11 ibid. in pp. 149-50, 167-73, and passim.
12 ibid. p. 168.
13 ibid. p. 173.
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current political goals for amenagement du territoire. Blondel thought that:
•because the system is simply unresponsive or only partly responsive... there are manifest limits to 
the degree in which leaders are able to rely on institutions, arrangements and organizations around 
them to have the desired impact1.15
Chapter 5 reviewed those limits, as did the case-studies reported in Chapters 6 and 7. In
World Leaders Blondel had reminded readers that
'whether political leaders appear to "make a difference" to the type of policies which are followed 
...is in many ways the central question of political activity'.16
The comparative examination of this question that he had proposed to undertake was 
replaced in Political Leadership by an assessment of 'potential leadership impact' based on 
leadership goals. However, by confining the study to two sub-policy areas, it proved 
possible to make an empirical assessment of the ability of leaders to 'make a difference'. As 
in Blondel's scheme, the goal was to compare political leaders' actions in the context of their 
institutional and non-institutional environment Though the terrains of these case-studies 
('roads planning' and 'regionalisation'), were occupied by bureaucratic groups reputed to be 
powerful, the policies were strongly contrasted in other ways: one was a conventional public 
policy, the other that of institutional change; in the former DATAR was a constant participant 
on behalf of the leadership; in the latter it could be lead actor or have no part. These chapters 
completed the study of the interplay between the political leaders and the bureaucratic and 
other institutions that Blondel thought would circumscribe leadership action, to demonstrate 
that leaders could make significant and widely-varying levels of impact on the institutions, 
and to explore the conditions in which they did so.
THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL LEADERS ON A BUREAUCRACY
The evidence presented in the first part of this thesis showed Blondel was too pessimistic 
when he asserted that those activist leaders who expected to be able to adapt a bureaucratic 
organisation to match their needs would find their expectations remained 'largely 
unfulfilled’.17
Reshaping organisational structures
Chapter 2 examined the changes made to the central administrative structures responsible 
for the policy of amenagement du territoire, as a succession of governments created, 
enhanced, reduced, revived, ignored, reinstated and eventually replaced the ministerial 
division DAT with DATAR. Its findings could be summed up as follows: using the strong 
executive powers of Vichy, then of the Liberation government, technocratic ministers with a 
planning ideology were able to introduce an innovative policy and its bureaucratic office 
without difficulty; then political leaders in the Fourth Republic were able to modify the
14 ibid. p. 150.
15 ibid. p. 150.
16 Blondel (1980), p. 15.
17 Blondel (1987), p. 168, p. 170.
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bureaucratic structure within the ministries they ran, weakening or strengthening it to match
their particular aims; but they had less success ensuring coordination with other bureaucratic
groups. During a period in which ministers were uninterested in this topic top officials
pursued their own solutions, while other bureaucrats inside and outside the DAT tried to
preserve their own roles. The first prime minister of the Fifth Republic used conventional
coordinating committees without success to overcome sectoral conflicts between ministers
and ministries. Once the new political conditions of the Fifth Republic had settled, a prime
minister with a strong commitment to the policy initially tried to introduce a new type of
ministry, and when that failed created a small but powerful coordinating agency, DATAR,
transferring responsibilities away from the old ministerial division.
As Blondel had suggested would happen, leaders active in management du territoire
undertook reforms to its administrative organisation, and were concerned by the mid-1950s
with improving horizontal links across the 'silo' bureaucracies. Having failed in 1962, for
unconnected reasons, to construct a vertically-organised ministry with a horizontal tier, the
political leadership’s solution in 1963 was a lighter organisation that was given a strong
presence in interministerial coordinating mechanisms. Blondel had expected political leaders
to be able to reform bureaucratic structures, but slowly.
’Leaders have to accept that the bureaucratic tools at their disposal cannot enable them to achieve 
more than a certain amount over a specified period of time; they can improve these tools somewhat, 
but also over time. The impact of leadership depends on the structure of the bureaucracy. Leaders are 
not powerless to move the machinery and the structures, but the extent of their power is, and to 
their own detriment, often overestimated’.18
Yet the frequency with which changes took place to the structure for conceiving and 
implementing amenagement du territoire was strong support for the argument that political 
leaders can make an impact on bureaucratic institutions. Seven changes of configuration of 
the central machinery in twenty years (see Figure 2.1) are testimony to the speed with which 
bureaucratic structures could be altered to fit the goals of the leadership, even if the effort to 
create a ministry for amenagement du territoire in 1962 was useful only in serving as a 
lesson for the creation of DATAR. However, the restructuring process cannot be assigned 
wholly and clearly to political leaders, at least in a conventional understanding of that term.19 
Career officials were always in the background, promoting their ideas for administrative 
reform - though some ministers, but not others, chose to pick them up. In addition, the early 
arrangements were conceived by prime ministers and ministers who were not typical 'party- 
politicians'; they were either former officials and officers who had been ’technical' ministers 
in 1939 (Darlan, Dautry, de Gaulle), or officials or public-private managers who had been in 
the cabinet of one of those ministers (Lehideux, Giraud, Surleau). The same pattern was 
repeated in 1958 with Prime Minister de Gaulle and the Minister of Construction Sudreau (a
18 ibid. p. 173.
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former prefect), and the final changes were carried out under a prime minister who had 
political goals but was no more elected than these others had been (Pompidou).
Some judgment of the impact of political leaders on bureaucratic structures can be 
made nonetheless. First, the ’ministerial' leadership mostly had the outcome it intended. 
There was success on five of the eight occasions (creating the service in the DGEN and 
again in the Ministry of Reconstruction, and the DAT and DATAR; and dismissing the 
regional Reconstruction officials); in another case (the interministerial instruments instigated 
by Sudreau), new structures were implemented though coordination was not much 
improved. The reform to regional boundaries in the mid-1950s could be judged to have 
failed or to have 'improved over time' (eight years). Only Schumann's reform of 1962 was 
abandoned (when he resigned for other reasons). That is, 'ministerial' leaders usually made 
an impact on bureaucratic structures and mostly with the results they intended.
Second, political leaders were more likely than 'technical' ministers or officials to 
achieve a successful reform. Even the most authoritative of top officials in the Fourth and 
Fifth Republics could not introduce reforms inside the ministerial machinery; and their 
reforms in the public-private sector were dependent on powers agreed by political leaders. 
Moreover there was a tendency for the radical and lasting changes to be introduced by 
politicians, whether or not they had at that point been elected (Claudius-Petit, Mendes- 
France, Faure, Pompidou); and the changes they introduced were more likely to be 
respected by political successors or colleagues than those introduced by technicians 
(Dautry's regional tier, Sudreau's coordinating efforts).
Third, the career status of the minister (politician or former official; elected or 
unelected), was immaterial to whether bureaucrats implemented the changes demanded. It 
was the post or position that counted. Blondel's argument (see Chapter 1) that the defining 
characteristic of a political leader, as far as his or her relationship with the institutions are 
concerned, is the executive position in government, seemed to be justified by the evidence in 
Chapter 2. However, while Blondel was no doubt correct that leaders might well 
'overestimate' their power to 'move the machinery and the structures',20 in the case of 
amenagement du territoire at least, it seems their power should not be underestimated.
The relative importance of positional links and political commitment 
The evidence presented in Chapter 3 supports Blondel's hypothesis that the 'links between 
the bureaucracy and the leaders must be close and effective' if the leadership is to have a 
strong impact on policy implementation.21 However, the essential relationship was not the 
legal link of DATAR to the position of prime minister, as is frequently asserted, but the 
'effective' and 'affective' relationships between the political leadership and the bureaucratic
19 Implying achieving power through a political career and competitive elections: Page E.C. (1992) Political 
Authority and Bureaucratic Power A Comparative Analysis. 2nd edn (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf), p. 148.
20 ibid. p. 173.
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organisation it expected to deliver its goals. The impact of the political leadership on 
bureaucratic action in this field was more a function of the level of interest taken by the 
president and prime minister in DATAR's action than the governmental location of DATAR. 
A close empirical relationship was demonstrated between the political leadership’s reported 
commitment to amenagement du territoire and DATAR's reputation for being a strong actor 
in this policy domain. This finding was evidence that individual leaders made an impact on a 
policy in accordance with their level of support for the policy (the effect was proportional to 
their input). It also showed that the important link between a bureaucratic agency and a 
leadership that wants to make a strong impact on that bureaucracy's work is the political 
commitment of the leadership to the agency's work, not a formal link on organisational 
diagrams to the office of leader.
Numerous political, academic and bureaucratic authorities had stressed the 
importance for implementation of DATAR's close links to the prime minister, interpreting 
this link in legal-institutional terms.22 They thought DATAR would have more power to 
translate the political leadership's goals into action if attached directly to the prime minister 
rather than delegated to another minister or a junior minister. This reasoning emphasised the 
prime minister's positional status, putting it before other considerations such as the prime 
minister's positional resources (which are maintained and continue to be used by the prime 
minister even when DATAR is delegated),23 or personal attributes, such as a leader's 
political commitment to the policy. Yet, according to the Conseil d'Etat's report to the prime 
minister on 'governmental structures', the prime minister's political authority transferred to a 
delegated authority (such as DATAR or its minister), only if 'it was not just in principle but 
also in fact that they were acting in the prime minister's name'.24
Arguments of administrative principle, illustrated with practical examples, showed 
that other locations had advantages that could balance the disadvantages. A close link to the 
minister of infrastructure and tourism in 1972, for example, enabled the minister to promote 
and supervise the implementation of DATAR's tourist development projects. A quantitative 
assessment of DATAR's evolving 'reputational power', even if it was unavoidably rather 
subjective,25 seemed to show there was no 'single best site'. DATAR could be attached to a 
technical ministry and look relatively strong (or weak) and be attached to the prime minister 
and look relatively weak (or strong). In contrast, there was a very close (’highly 
significant') statistical link between the president's reported and self-avowed political 
commitment to amenagement du territoire and DATAR's reputational power, and a weaker 
('probably significant') link between the prime minister's interest and DATAR's reputational
21 ibid. p. 168.
22 See Chapter 3.
23 The prime minister still chairs Cl AT, co-appoints the d616gug. decides DATAR's budget, etc.
24 Conseil d'Etat (1986), p. 19.
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power. Schematically, DATAR's power declined since 1963 in step with the decreasing 
enthusiasm of the president (see Figure 3.10), the prime minister's level of interest making 
relatively little difference to DATAR's effectiveness compared with that of the president (see 
Figure 3.11). DATAR looked strong during the premierships of Couve de Murville and 
Messmer because their presidents signalled a strong interest in regional development (and 
the premiers followed their lead in enacting the practical decisions). Prime ministers might 
still be able to implement their distinctive goals even within the same presidency, as for 
example Cresson distinguished herself from Beregovoy when she inaugurated a very 
energetic policy of moving civil servants from Paris to the provinces. Yet premiers were 
nevertheless constrained by their president's wishes - Cresson acted in a sub-sector that 
happened to engage the enthusiasm of President Mitterrand, and she made sure she had his 
support for this decision. In terms of the impact that could be made on bureaucratic 
institutions by these two members of the political leadership, prime ministers were weaker 
than presidents, as many studies of the French leadership have shown.26
A re-attachment of DATAR to the prime minister was not irrelevant if leaders used it 
as a signal that the political leadership was keen to promote the policy (as reporters inferred 
when Prime Minister Barre took direct responsibility for DATAR and made a well- 
publicised visit to its premises), but it was not sufficient to make DATAR effective. It was 
the political commitment to the policy that mattered.
Responsiveness, lovaltv and competence
Although a direct link to the position of prime minister was not the most vital factor in 
ensuring DATAR's effectiveness, the positional resources given to the prime minister by 
virtue of DATAR's legal link gave the political leadership strong powers to orient DATAR - 
and these powers were retained whether or not DATAR was delegated to another minister. 
Blondel thought that 'the system' linking political leaders to the bureaucracy was 'often- 
perhaps mostly - simply unresponsive or only partly responsive' to leaders' needs.27 
Bureaucrats had to be not only competent but also 'reliable', meaning loyal to the leadership 
of the day, and ready to work to their particular aims:
The fostering of the loyalty of civil servants... is a manifest requirement if bureaucracies are to
provide a significant help to leaders in achieving their goals’.28
He argued that new leaders could improve this state of affairs by using 'personal 
mechanisms', such as their prestige and following, to encourage loyalty and reliability in the 
bureaucracy, and 'institutional mechanisms', such as organisational design and 'recruitment
25 DATAR does not evaluate its work, though in 2005 it set up regional observatories to collect data. There 
are a few academic assessments of its work in particular sectors that are themselves handicapped by lack of 
data. See Chapter 4.
26 For instance, Elgie (1993), Hayward (1983), Hayward and Wright (2002), Massot (1979), Massot (1987), 
Massot (1988), Stevens (1992), Wright (1989), Wright (1993).
27 Blondel (1987), p. 150.
28 ibid. p. 168.
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and training', to improve competence; but there would be 'inevitable trade-offs' between the 
various elements.29
Chapter 4 demonstrated that French political leaders had considerable positional 
resources with which to alter DATAR's staffing, size, structure and activities so that it 
responded to their particular demands. Such is the extent of their formal powers of 
appointment that some recent leaders were able to prioritise political sympathies and 
relationships in the case of the deUgui, reducing the traditional prestige of this post, and 
thereby harming the capacity of their successors to appoint the most highly-regarded 
officials. The Constitution and civil service statutes between them gave the president, prime 
minister and the minister for amenagement du territoire joint formal powers to appoint a 
detegue from any part of the public, private or political world, and to ease out the previous 
incumbent The greatest constraint came from conflict within the leadership, with the 
president and then prime minister having most influence over the name and the timing, to the 
extent that some ministers for amenagement du territoire had difficult relationships with 
'their' deligues (Minister Defferre with Sallois, 1984-86; Minister Gaudin with Aubert, 
1995-97; Minister Voynet with Guigou, 1997-2001). The qualifications of the dozen 
delegues appointed since 1963 (considered along a number of criteria) exhibited a common 
trend of decline as personal and political loyalty superseded professional qualifications and 
experience (see Figure 4.1). Politicisation of the appointment process started to make it 
dysfunctional from the 1980s, at first because the expectation of a delegue's dismissal at 
each change of government made the official and DATAR 'lame ducks’, and then because 
the credibility of the incumbents was undermined by its 'clientelist' character.30 The 
possibility for future political leaders to make an impact on policy implementation through 
DATAR was reduced.
The analysis of the leaders' capacity for controlling DATAR's internal composition 
was organised around the three characteristics of an administration de mission that prevailed 
at its creation, and which in principle assured a blend of responsiveness and competent 
coordination of interministerial policies: a 'lightweight' staff whose numbers can be adapted 
quickly to different demands, a core of interdisciplinary grands corps officials; and 
interministerial teams working on the leadership's priority areas. The prime minister can use 
budgetary procedures to control in fine detail the number of DATAR personnel, and a high 
proportion, especially among 'policy' staff can be appointed or transferred elsewhere at 
short notice. Staff numbers tabulated in Chapter 4 were shown to respond mainly to 
leadership demands, whether Pasqua in 1993 asked for rapid expansion, or Balladur in 
1994 asked for a 20 per cent contraction. Expansion was occasionally the result of extensive 
research programmes which, though approved by ministers, were enthusiasms of the 
deMguis Monod and Guigou, and probably did not reflect leadership priorities. Political
29 ibid. pp. 171-2.
30 Lochak (1992), p.55, 'rewarding services rendered'.
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leaders were able to control and adapt DATAR's overall size to their requirements. On the 
other hand, recruitment of senior staff from the grands corps and ministries depends on the 
career attraction of a post at DATAR. If the political leadership wants DATAR to be effective 
it therefore has to convince these officials that 'something promising is going on', as was 
the case in 1963.31 From the mid-1980s political leaders were unable to recruit grands corps 
staff to DATAR in the same numbers. Yet the sudden increase in appointments of well- 
qualified officials during the revival of the policy in 1993-95 showed that a leadership that 
wanted to make a strong impact in this policy domain was able to recruit such staff.
Finally, a survey of the policy programmes tackled by DATAR teams since 1963 
proved not only that the agency retained the interdisciplinary team-working, but that its 
teams were reshaped to match leaders' priorities, this responsiveness being especially clear 
at times of strong ideological change (1979-82,1992-93,2002-03). However DATAR in 
the early 1980s did not follow up the new leadership's political concern for industrial 
restructuring, and in the 1990s added some highly technical programmes to a range that 
otherwise faithfully translated leadership priorities. In sum, DATAR as a body seems to be a 
flexible tool that responds well generally to leadership changes. However, appointments 
increasingly reflected the lack of presidential commitment and the prioritisation of personal 
loyalty, which in combination was likely to constrain the capacity of future leaders to recruit 
the competent officials they need.
Steering policy with administrative and financial tools
The "lines'' linking leaders to the bureaucracy and the populations' were often 
unresponsive, according to Blondel, because
'we do not know how to make the system effective. There are thus manifest limits to the degree in 
which leaders are able to rely on institutions, arrangements and organizations around them to have 
the desired impact'.32
For a political leadership seeking to make an impact on policies through DATAR the 
'institutions, arrangements and organisations' were the committees and financial 
mechanisms in which DATAR had a locus. The creators of DATAR arranged in 1963 for the 
dilegue to organise the prime minister's committee for amenagement du territoire (CIAT, 
later CIADT), and be secretary or member of interministerial policy and funding committees 
that should be steered towards amenagement du territoire. Furthermore, the prime minister's 
budget would service a new fund for amenagement du territoire (FIAT, replaced later by 
FNADT), put at DATAR's disposal to inspire suitable ministerial projects. Especially, 
DATAR would help decide and monitor ministries' capital spending in each region. These 
carefully-considered improvements to 'the system' were scrutinised in Chapter 5 for their 
effectiveness and their continuing utility to later political leaders.
31 Roche (1986), p.70, and see Essig (1979), p. 19.
32 ibid. p. 150.
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The CIAT was until the mid-1970s an exemplar for other government committees for 
the way it enabled the core leadership to make an impact on policy efficiently and effectively; 
for instance, prime-ministerial authority was used to ratify substantial and conflictual 
regional development projects (see Figure 5.1). While keeping the capacity to make equally- 
significant interministerial decisions (as the CIATs conducted by Prime Minister Cresson 
and Minister for Amenagement du territoire Delebarre illustrated), CIAT became less 
administratively- efficient (treating more, smaller, uncontentious decisions). Qualitative and 
quantitative evidence in Chapter 5 demonstrated that political leaders held CIAT meetings 
for one of three reasons: they were interested in amenagement du territoire; they wanted to 
announce a programme that had legally to be agreed in a CIAT (such as major transport 
projects); or they wanted to spend FIAT, which is legally- allocated in CIAT. Although the 
CIAT is a legal resource of the prime minister, and the frequency of CIAT meetings was 
significantly-related statistically to the prime minister's interest in amenagement du territoire, 
the president's views were even more influential. Prime Ministers Couve and Messmer, 
either antipathetic to or uninterested in amenagement du territoire, followed the lead of their 
more enthusiastic presidents. Presidents that had specific intentions for policy instruments 
(if not legally-decided in CIAT), had them agreed in meetings at which they could be present 
(Pompidou in conseils restreints, Giscard in his Central Planning Council and Mitterrand in 
the Council of Ministers). These three leaders 'presidentialised amenagement du territoire 
in the detegue Essig's words. Numerous other interministerial councils and committees were 
set up in sectors or areas linked to amenagement du territoire, with DATAR as secretary. A 
review of three dozen institutions showed the considerable practical powers of political 
leaders to create, modify, and abolish consultative councils and coordinating committees, 
adapting them both to their particular policy needs and, in the case of the consultative 
councils, to their party-political orientations.
A similar review of two dozen special funds confirmed that leaders had substantial 
freedom to create funds to match their own policy priorities. They occasionally abolished 
older funds not relevant to their interests but mostly they just reduced their budgets. They 
did not maintain the budgets 'in real terms' of FIAT, which had increasingly become a 
provider of on-going support to established programmes. Leaders found it easier to 
announce new funds for new projects than to conduct a drastic reform of existing funds that 
policy recipients expected to flow in their direction (for example, the fusion of several small 
funds, including the 'mountain fund' FIAM, into a larger FNADT, as experts 
recommended, brought objections from parliamentarians from upland areas). To that extent, 
political leaders were constrained by local pressures and budgetary inertia; they had to be 
innovatory if they wanted to make an impact in their own priority areas. The prime 
minister's budget for amenagement du territoire, and for its largest element, FIAT/ FNADT, 
were determined primarily by the prime minister and the minister for the budget, working 
within a 'headline' figure set (except during cohabitation) by the president. Chapter 5
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showed that political leaders were able to alter budgets almost at will during the year; that 
those who did not prioritise amenagement du territoire could restrict spending by holding 
CIADTs late in the year or not at all. While DATAR could 'store up' unspent budgets and 
spend fairly consistently from one year to the next, DATAR's expenditure in the end had to 
be approved by the political leadership in CLADT.
The least effective of the arrangements made in 1963 was the ambitious decision that 
DATAR should coordinate that part of ministries' capital budgets which was allocated by 
region. The proportion was only ever at most 30 per cent of ministry capital expenditure. 
Instead DATAR, with the support of political leaders (especially Pompidou as Prime 
Minister and Debre as Finance Minister) found other ways to programme inter-ministerial 
expenditure for regional development projects. Following the Left's decentralisation of 
power in 1982-84 the procedure to check ministries' budgets was formally abandoned. 
However, the State-Region Plan Contracts, invented by DATAR, and negotiated by DATAR 
and the prefects, seemed to achieve a control over regionalised public spending as good as 
that DATAR achieved in the 1970s using the centralised procedures. Despite Blondel's 
strictures, therefore, it appears that the standard interministerial administrative and financial 
procedures have been used effectively by DATAR on behalf of the political leadership to 
steer public bodies towards leadership goals.
THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL LEADERS ON THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT
Having established that leaders can make a substantial impact on bureaucratic institutions, 
whether with respect to DATAR or through DATAR in accordance with their own policy 
orientations, Chapters 6 and 7 extended the comparative inquiry to the impact of political 
leaders on the wider bureaucratic environment, as Blondel suggested in World Leaders, by
'examining whether, on a comparative basis, political leaders appear to "make a difference" to the
type of policies followed1.33
In Political Leadership Blondel makes an 'a priori' assessment of 'potential leadership 
impact' based on the 'scope' and 'extent' of their firm ambitions (see Chapter 1 of the 
thesis). He discusses the elements of the institutional and non-institutional environment that 
will need to be taken into account in establishing the actual achievements of the leaders, but 
does not model this evaluation. The thesis therefore adopted a procedure similar to Alistair 
Cole's appraisal of Mitterrand's leadership, 'by contrasting the resources and opportunities 
available to executive leaders', under a number of headings derived from Blondel.34 That 
is, the actions of political leaders were considered in the light of the institutional and non- 
institutional context, particularly the resources and constraints deriving from constitutional- 
legal provisions and the configuration of the party system; the 'help or hindrance’ of
33 Blondel (1980), p. 15.
34 Cole (1994), p. 170.
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bureaucratic organisations - especially DATAR - and other groups; and the constraints and 
opportunities offered by such factors as crises or honeymoon periods.
Roads planning and funding
The ministerial DAT and then DATAR participated constantly in road planning decision­
making, on behalf of the leadership; other principal bureaucratic actors were the grands 
corps of the Ponts et Chaussees (Ponts), which had been 'in charge' of roads planning for 
two centuries and staffed the senior technical posts, including the Roads Directorate of the 
Ministry of Infrastructure; the Plan Commissariat, and the Finance Ministry.
A quantitative analysis revealed that half the roads instruments matched well the 
leadership's announced intentions in terms of roads policy. The proportion increased to two- 
thirds if instruments were included whose mixed outcomes accurately translated differences 
within the leadership (for instance much of the funding destined for roads linking regional 
capitals, which prime minister Pompidou wanted, went to roads that de Gaulle wanted for 
Paris). There was a much stronger statistical link between leadership support for instruments 
and their outcomes than there was between bureaucratic support (or opposition) and 
outcomes; and there was substantial primary evidence that political leaders were personally 
engaged in initiating, developing or negotiating instruments (see Chapter 6). Political leaders 
found several ways to overcome or side-step some long-held 'taboos' of the Roads 
Directorate (road tolls and motorways) and the Finance Ministry (block budgets).
The general findings from the quantitative analysis guided the qualitative analysis, 
structured around Blondel's 'resources and opportunities'. The change of Constitution in 
1958 did not by itself make a difference. Although it helped Prime Minister Debre to remove 
a legislative restriction on tolled motorways, it did not persuade the Roads Directorate to 
build them. Changes in the party system enabled Infrastructure Minister Chalandon in 
Chaban-Delmas's government to introduce in 1969 the tolled motorways that Chaban- 
Delmas as Minister for Roads and Amenagement du territoire in the Fourth Republic could 
not persuade an oppositional parliament to accept, but 'compensation' still had to be offered 
to the Ponts. However, the Constitution, together with party hierarchy, determined which 
members of the political leadership were more likely to see their policy goals prevail. Fourth 
Republic presidents did not intervene in this domain, whereas in the Fifth, President de 
Gaulle's concern for Paris took precedence over Prime Minister Pompidou's concern for the 
provinces and the roads vehicle industry. Throughout the Fifth Republic, presidents 
determined what role they and the prime minister would play. President Pompidou 
discussed the details of motorway contracts in conseils restreints, on the basis of briefs 
prepared by his own aides with technical advice from the Roads Directorate; President 
Giscard decided a special programme for Brittany and the Massif Central in 1976, but was 
content to let Prime Minister Barre make CIATs the forum for approving the national road 
network; while President Mitterrand asked Prime Minister Mauroy to tell DATAR and the 
Minister of Transport to organise a funded transport programme. In a policy domain in
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which projects take some years to complete, crises in the political or economic environment 
were unlikely to help leaders make a lasting impact, even if Prime Minister Pompidou used 
'the events of May 1968' to ask the Roads Minister to 'strike a blow for one of our 
provinces', and agree to the Breton expressway. President de Gaulle, Prime Minister Chirac 
and President Giscard d'Estaing all had to re-approve sections of this road network in the 
following decade in different political environments. Yet the variety of responses to 
economic crisis confirmed that much depended on the individual leader: some cutting back 
the roads budget, others increasing it
Whether and how 'leaders made a difference', or whether the outcome was 
dominated by bureaucratic groups, varied from road instrument to road instrument, and 
depended both on leaders and on the role DAT or DATAR played on their behalf. The 
different processes could be grouped into four schematic models that fall approximately into 
time-periods that are also in part those of different leaderships:
- instruments whose outcomes are dominated by the incumbent bureaucratic institutions, 
especially when the DAT (in the Fifth as well as the Fourth Republic) did not have the 
administrative and financial tools given later to DATAR, nor sustained support from a 
cohesive political leadership. These conditions also re-emerged at the start of the Mitterrand 
presidency when DATAR's coordinating role was (temporarily) rejected and Interim State- 
Region Contracts were negotiated separately by each region with each ministry.
- substantial projects actively promoted by political leaders, using DATAR to prepare an 
instrument that challenged or ignored the opposition of bureaucratic groups. Examples were 
the Breton expressway, the Presidential announcement of the Strasbourg motorway and the 
'block budgets' for DATAR's regional development projects.
- low-key but effective intervention by political leaders, initiating, announcing or ratifying 
agreements that DATAR had organised in a consensus-seeking manner. During the 1970s 
DATAR collaborated with Ponts engineers in designing a 'national road network for 
amenagement du territoireand served on a working group with Ponts economists, the Plan 
Commissariat and Finance officials that agreed that amenagement: du territoire would be a 
criterion in evaluating road projects. Political leaders were still present in these decisions, 
whether approving the network in a CIAT or 'ordering' the working party and authorising 
its final report.
- personalised interventions by presidents, using DATAR just to implement them or not at 
all. President de Gaulle, in a joint initiative with administrative reformer and minister, 
Edgard Pisani, brought together road infrastructure and the planning of DATAR's regional 
cities by combining the Ministries of Construction and Public Works into a new Ministry of 
Infrastructure. Mitterrand's transport funding programme (and his reminder to the Finance 
Ministry), and Cresson and Bahadur's unexpected announcements of 'massive' or 
'accelerated' road programmes, would be included here.
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Nevertheless these general models undervalue the variety of approaches adopted, 
and the flowchart in Figure 6.6 is a better representation of the diversity of paths that could 
be taken by political leaders through the institutional constraints and opportunities in the 
roads planning and funding area.
Regionalisation
Chapter 7 showed that DAT was an early, consistent but weak player in the long 
regionalisation process whereas DATAR, by decision of the political leadership, could be 
the lead actor, disregarded, or something in-between. The permanently-powerful 
institutional actors in this domain were the prefects and their partners in the departements 
(departments), and the elus - politicians with a dual local-national mandate. The prefects and 
the elus until the 1970s opposed any instrument that might initiate or enhance a regional 
institution. Despite their objections, three-quarters of the three dozen official proposals that 
were made by political leaders from 1941 to 1986 made some impact, and a quarter 
implemented substantial reforms. There was considerable evidence of personal involvement 
by individual leaders in the projects; whether Prime Minister Debr6 in 1960 coming up with 
a solution to prefectoral resistance, or President de Gaulle asking particular cabinet members 
to monitor specific aspects of the 1964 reforms, or Defferre's decision to push ahead 
quickly with the 1981 decentralisation bill.
The change of Constitution in 1958 made no difference to the frequency with which 
political leaders introduced regionalisation instruments, the level of their ambitions or their 
impact Fourth Republic leaders even seem to have made more effective use of 'special 
powers' than Fifth Republic leaders did of the equivalent Ordonnance procedure. The hold 
of rural politicians over the Senate and the prevalence of dual-mandate politicians in both 
parliamentary chambers were also constant Constitution-derived constraints on reform. 
President Auriol in the Fourth Republic gave advice to ministers on deconcentrating power 
to department prefects, while President de Gaulle in the Fifth, having issued regional reform 
decrees as premier, left this domestic issue to Debr6. But these events were something of 
exceptions and constitutional conventions, coupled with the party system, usually meant that 
presidents imposed their views on regionalisation projects over those of their prime 
ministers. Whereas Fourth Republic ministers for amenagement du territoire were freer to 
introduce their own regional initiatives (as Dautiy, Billoux, Queuille and Claudius-Petit did), 
but could not diffuse them to other ministries, in the Fifth Republic projects were better- 
coordinated but by presidential authority.
The prefects posed the greatest bureaucratic constraint to regionalisation. They 
encapsulated Blondel's argument that political leaders need the bureaucracy in order to 
achieve their goals, and yet may find it erects hurdles.35 Prefects were the generalist 
coordinators of State field services, and the traditional conciliators between local councils,
35 Blondel (1987), p. 172.
232
and between local and national political goals. Chapter 7 showed that the prefectoral corps 
was the most frequent source of opposition to a regional tier, because it would destroy the 
traditional parity between prefects and impede direct access to Paris. Yet a younger 
generation of prefects saw the interest of posts promoting economic development, such that 
there was a measurable (if small) change between 1958 and 1972 in prefectoral attitudes to 
regional institutions, if not to decentralisation.36 The Interior Minister Defferre took care not 
to let the prefects design his Act of 1982, but still had to 'compensate' them for 
decentralisation with additional deconcentrated powers. The elus were equally important 
because they constituted a potential veto point in both parliamentary chambers. They 
amended and delayed the leadership's reforms, allowing them to proceed but reducing their 
content In the Fourth Republic, national leaders found that the ilus reshaped the proposed 
instruments more to their own liking; for instance, they altered the number and boundaries 
of regions and prevented the naming of regional towns. In the Fifth Republic ilus ensured 
that prefects nominated them to the first regional bodies designed by DATAR in 1964, not 
the newer economic elites which DATAR and the Gaullist political leadership wanted to 
make responsible for regional investment decisions. Each major reform to regional 
institutions was only partly successful from the point of view of leaders promoting 
amenagement du territoire because it tended to reconstitute old departmental practices within 
the regional framework. Some of the regionalisation projects in which leaders made the most 
impact took place at times of crisis or during a post-election 'state of grace', but other 
equally ambitious projects, such as the 1964 reforms, were embarked upon by General de 
Gaulle because Algeria had been settled. The use of contingent events, like the successful 
implementation of projects through persistence or insistence, depended greatly on the 
leader's individual response to problems and opportunities.
These variations on how 'leaders made a difference' and on the role DAT or DATAR 
played on their behalf, seemed to fit into one of four models - that do not parallel exactly 
those identified for roads planning:
- initiatives whose (negative) outcomes were dominated by bureaucracies, local actors or 
electoral considerations, that is, by the institutional and non-institutional environment. They 
included the slowness of ministries to harmonise their boundaries, the reluctance of prefects 
to meet in an interdepartmental conference, the regional referendums and the electoral law of 
1985.
- modest incremental instruments that represented what was possible given the opposition to 
more significant change, in which the DAT often played a role in the Fourth Republic 
(delineating regional planning boundaries, drawing up regional programmes), and DATAR 
in the Fifth Republic (implementing the 1972 regional councils, and negotiating proposals to 
increase their economic powers);
36 Machin (1977), p.53, p. 101.
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- ambitious instruments introduced despite group opposition, enacted by political leaders 
with some concessions negotiated with the groups; the exemplars being the 1964 reforms 
and the Defferre Acts of 1982-84, which combined significant institutional change and a 
determination not to concede the most important points. Among this small group of reforms 
DATAR might be the chief actor or, like other bureaucratic groups, deliberately kept out of 
the reform process;
- heroic decisions, in the dual sense of being ’both an ambitious political exercise in rational 
decision-making and an ambitious assertion of political will by government leaders’.37 
These instruments (such as the Mend&s-France and Faure package of 1954-55 and the Debr6 
decrees of 1960-61) were decided by a very small number of ministers and prepared by 
them with their cabinet advisers. (The creation of DATAR itself, as a contribution to the 
construction of regions, might have been included under this category).
These four models are nevertheless a generalisation that should not obscure the 
diversity of pathways that can be seen in the flowchart in Figure 7.7.
CONCLUSIONS
Blondel suggested that for political leaders to implement their goals they would need an 
effective administrative organisation that was not too light nor too heavy, and well- 
coordinated, with horizontal links being as important as the vertical hierarchy. Political 
leaders were able to construct DATAR as a model bureaucracy of this kind, and make it their 
resource for re-orienting the State bureaucracy towards their goals for amenagement du 
territoire. Though technocrats in the 1940s introduced the precursor of this policy with a 
small service of officials in a conventional ministry, it took political leaders in the 1950s to 
push amenagement du territoire onto the government’s policy agenda and give it its first 
effective instruments. Yet though Fourth Republic leaders could advance a cause that 
particularly interested them, poor coordination between ministers and ministries hindered 
this multi-sectoral policy. It required the stability of a post-Algeria Fifth Republic and a 
government majority, but also a committed prime minister and president, before the 
appropriate agency, DATAR, could be created.
The 'links between the bureaucracy and the leaders must be close and effective’, 
Blondel argued, if the leadership were to have a strong impact on policy. As far as DATAR 
and amenagement du territoire are concerned, many experts had argued that the ideal 
organisational arrangement was that instituted at its creation: directly attached to a prime 
minister who was keen for the policy to succeed, and run by a delegue who had the personal 
support of both president and prime minister. For the political leadership to make an impact, 
it was the demonstration of political commitment that was important, not the direct formal
37 Hayward (1982), p. 112.
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attachment to the prime minister. That is, the policy impact of the political leadership was 
strongly related to its active policy input.
Blondel thought that the ’system' linking political leaders to the bureaucracy was 
'often .. simply unresponsive... to leaders' needs'. In DATAR's case, leaders were able to 
use their budgetary powers to increase or decrease its staffing levels to match their own 
ambitions, and were nearly always able to adapt its policy work to their own priorities, even 
if officials occasionally added their own technical initiatives. However, the most effective 
way for the leadership to make DATAR a competent and flexible organisation, responsive to 
leadership needs, without itself needing to intervene in detail, was to appoint a delegui and 
senior staff who were well-regarded among the ministerial cabinets and the bureaucracy as a 
whole. The French bureaucracy provides a large pool of such officials in the grands corps, 
who are able to assure horizontal links across ministries and influence the technical 
bureaucracies; and constitutional provisions give French leaders considerable powers to 
appoint them. In part, the gradual decline in the traditional profile of DATAR's top officials 
accurately reflected the decline in the leadership's concern to make amenagement du territoire 
a high-profile policy, as confirmed by the stronger recruitment of grands corps members 
during the policy revival of the early 1990s. In part, decline in the reputation of DATAR's 
top officials was a consequence of changes in the wider political environment that applied to 
DATAR too. Personalisation and politicisation of appointments after 1981 exacerbated the 
disputes between president, prime minister and minister over who would have most say on 
choice of dilegue. The subsequent prioritisation of political and 'reward' criteria perhaps 
increased 'loyalty' (though there had been no evidence of disloyalty) but reduced the pool of 
willing and competent candidates available to future leaders.
The exercise of political leadership through to policy implementation demands a 
bureaucracy that can ensure an effective link between the leaders and the population - 
Blondel's fourth proposition. For amenagement du territoire, political leaders have 
specialised tools to steer and implement their programmes in interministerial committees and 
funds run by DATAR. The CIAT/ CIADT remains a tool that each leadership can modulate 
according to its own priorities. Political leaders adjusted the frequency of its meetings to 
their own level of interest; they varied its purpose between a solemn meeting between a few 
ministers to decide the long-term future of a whole region, a dramatic occasion in which the 
prime minister put pressure on ministers to agree decisions that officials would then find 
difficult to dispute, or an occasion for pre-election publicity. Leaders rarely confronted 
established interests by abolishing committees, especially funding committees; most 
preferred to leave them to 'wither on the vine', and create new ones (but the 'established 
interests' were likely to be local politicians as much as bureaucrats). Political leaderships had 
adequate powers to give DATAR the financial resources for programmes to which they were 
committed, to finance less well existing funds that did not match their aims, to reduce 
funding in particular years, or to transfer control to different agents.
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The thesis took up the challenge announced by Blondel in World Leaders (but not 
fully implemented in Political Leadership), to examine the comparative impact of different 
political leaders on two policy areas, both shown by previous researchers to be dominated 
by distinctive bureaucratic groups. Though roads planning and regionalisation cannot 
represent all the policy domains that amenagement du territoire covers, their intrinsic 
differences and organisational contrasts mean weight must be given to features found to be 
common to both. The flowchart in Figure 8.1 brings together the findings from the two 
policy studies to show the potential resources at leaders’ disposal and the constraints they 
are likely to meet as they seek to implement their aims. They illustrate some of the many 
paths that individual leaders can take as they manoeuvre their way through the institutional 
and non-institutional environment The outcomes, in relation to the input of political leaders 
and bureaucratic institutions, can be generalised as four schematic models:
- initiatives dominated by the institutional and non-institutional environment, in 
which there was no significant output from the instrument because of the constraints exerted 
by bureaucratic institutions and/or local political actors, often in concert; or because of a 
context in which national political leaders were divided or had 'do nothing' aims; or because 
of electoral constraints on the leaders. DATAR (or the DAT) was not asked to contribute on 
these issues or its advice was rejected. In both policy domains examined, these failed 
initiatives, from the leadership's point of view, represented a quarter to a third of 
instruments. The poor outcomes were as much the result of opposition by local political- 
administrative networks as by bureaucratic organisations themselves;
- incremental achievements by political leaders against strong constraints from 
bureaucratic groups or more powerful political leaders. These were instruments in which 
DATAR was often used as a leadership resource to negotiate with State bureaucrats and 
other groups at national or local level, to move the technical paradigm along, or to modify 
ministries' or Regions' projects using FIAT and other funds, before politicians settled last 
details in CIAT. Where DATAR was not directly involved, or even where it was, political 
leaders had an adequate set of conventional institutions in which to take decisions and issue 
formal instructions: Council of Ministers, Giscard's Planning Council, conseils restreints. 
This model applied to nearly half the instruments across both policy sectors, but more often 
in the regionalisation process in which local actors were directly affected, than on road 
instruments, whose incremental outcomes were more frequently the result of internal 
compromise within the political leadership. Though it cannot be described as the 'normal' 
method of interaction - because processes varied greatly - it was the most usual method;
- ambitious achievements by highly-committed political leaders who used resources 
from outside the traditional policy community to prepare or implement the instruments, 
challenging the incumbent power-holders. But they were willing to give concessions on the 
non-essential to oppositional groups of bureaucrats or local political actors, providing their 
core goals were retained. The outsiders could be advisers from a different corps or no corps,
Figure 8.1 Interplay of political leaders and the institutional and non-institutional environment in amenagement du territoire 
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DATAR or the private sector. A few of these instruments were enacted by leaders using
'special powers' or in 'honeymoon' conditions, but it was difficult to demonstrate that the
'honeymoon' was essential to the output. This form of interaction represented nearly a
quarter of the instruments in the two policy domains;
- assertions o f personal political will by a president or prime minister over other
political leaders and/or bureaucratic groups, with little or no discussion with them. Although
the idea might come from a close adviser or be elaborated with close advisers, essentially
they were projects that others, including DATAR, were expected to accept and implement as
they stood. They constituted only about a tenth of the processes examined and were not
necessarily 'ambitious' projects; those that were, happened perhaps once in a presidency.
A more or less absolute exercise of political will and judgment by a leader, defying
the institutional constraints, was thus a very rare event. The empirical assessment of the
interplay between leaders and bureaucrats confirmed the continuous spectrum of'potential
leadership impact' that Blondel was sure existed. As Blondel says:
'Whether because they are forced to choose or because they are able to choose, leaders seem prima 
facie to be able to make an impact on the complex network of the environment Clearly, there is an 
interplay between the will of the leaders, their aims and ambitions, and the reality around them. It is 
by gradually analysing the conditions of this interplay that we shall be better able to assess the 
precise impact of leadership under various types of circumstances and discover the ways leaders can 
serve nations in the manner most profitable to their populations'.38
While disassociating itself from Blondel's final normative sentiments, this thesis examined 
the same assumption that political leaders have considerable control over bureaucratic 
institutions, with a substantial ability to modify organisational structures and re-orient 
bureaucratic activities to match their own political ambitions. It was Blondel's ambition to 
demonstrate the validity of that assumption through an examination of the interplay between 
leaders and institutions in a comparative framework. This study has gone some way towards 
achieving that through a longitudinal study of the impact of political leaders on the work of 
one bureaucratic institution in France.
38 Blondel (1987), pp. 113-14.
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There is no adequate translation of this term'.1 Amenagement du territoire is described by 
Prud'homme as being even 'in French both vague and beautiful'.2 French texts explain it to 
their readers at length.3 Amenager is to arrange in an orderly manner, for a certain purpose 
(<disposer avec ordre... pour tel ou tel usage), in order to make the objects arranged more 
comfortable, more convenient and easier to use.4 The term can be used at any scale: interior 
design, landscape design, town planning, a transport network.
Amenagement du territoire - the first aim in the title of the Delegation a 
Vamenagement du territoire et a Vaction regionale (DATAR) - arranges on a national scale, 
and as such can only be a policy of national government, though the post-1981 left-wing 
governments especially have tried to combine it with decentralised economic and land-use 
planning. However, the dispute in 1997 between the Jacobin Interior Minister, 
CMvenement, and the Green minister for the Environment and Amenagement du territoire, 
Voynet, over whether there could be amenagement du territoire without one single national 
plan, demonstrates the continuing vitality of the philosophical argument Vaction regionale - 
the second aim in DATAR's title - focuses on the development of each region. Having 
passed almost into disuse after being used to promote the investment programmes drawn up 
for each new administrative region in the 1960s, the emphasis on this aspect comes and goes 
(see names of DATAR's teams in Figure 4.8). This term too gave rise to conflict on grounds 
pertinent to the main theme of the thesis. Every time the legal text creating DATAR came 
back from the 'countless' meetings in which it was debated, the term action regionale had 
disappeared: the law specialists and the technical ministries wanted a ' delegation a 
Vamenagement du territoire, full stop'. Members of the Conseil d'Etat resisted a term 
'unusual in French law', and the State technical corps rejected the suggestion of 'a region' 
that might not fit their technical needs and would make it easier for the prefect to coordinate 
them. 'Guichard put the term back each time, feeling he was interpreting exactly what the 
General thought and Pompidou thought'.5
The translation offered by Biarez or her editors puts these two aspects together well.
1 Biarez (1982), p.27Qfn.
2 Prud'homme, R. (1974) 'Regional economic policy in France, 1962-1972', in N.Hansen (ed.) Public Policy 
and Regional Economic Development (Cambridge. Mass: Ballinger), 33-63, p.35.
3 Lanversin (1970), pp. 15-18.
4 Petit Larousse: Grand Larousse.
5 Perrilliat, J. 'La revolution de la Ve R£publique dans la representation', in Hamon (ed) (1992), 1-13, pp.9- 
10. Perrilliat was in Pompidou's cabinet at the time; he went to DATAR with Guichard. At DATAR's 40th 
birthday event (13 Feb. 2003), Guichard admitted he had to work hard to persuade the General.
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'It can best be described as a flexible and generic notion referring to that state activity which aims to 
promote the balanced territorial development of France as a whole without neglecting die specific 
needs and character of individual regions and their constituent parts'.6
Regional planning academics and government documents commonly quote the
definition of amenagement du territoire given by Eugene Claudius-Petit, Minister of
Reconstruction, in a 'communication’ to a Council of Ministers in 1950:
'Amenagement du territoire est la recherche, dans la cadre geographique de la France, d'une meilleure 
repartition des hommes enfonction des ressources naturelles et des activities economiques... cette 
recherche est faite dans la constante preoccupation de donner aux hommes de meilleurs conditions 
d'habitat et de travail, de plus grandes facilitds de loisir et de culture. Elle n'est done pas faite & des 
fins strictement economiques, mats bien davantage pour le bien-etre et Vepanouissement de la 
population'.
'Amenagement du territoire is the search for a more balanced distribution of the population within 
the territory of France in relation to the distribution of natural resources and economic activity. Its 
constant concern is to provide people with better living and working conditions, and improved 
facilities for leisure and cultural activities. It is therefore being carried out not just from economic 
motives, but much more for the people's well-being and fulfilment'.7
Though policy analysts and political scientists tend to focus on the economic aspects when 
trying to measure the effectiveness of amenagement du territoire, successive governments 
and dileguis have continued to emphasis the social goals mentioned by Claudius-Petit too. 
The latter are assumed to have been mentioned to counterbalance the economic goals and 
impact of the Modernisation and Infrastructure Plans of the Commissariat giniral du Plan 
(Plan Commissariat), which not only ignored social issues but reinforced existing spatial 
inequalities.
Though the main goal of amenagement du territoire is an improved balance between 
regions, and especially between the Paris region and the rest of France, there are many other 
policy goals with which amenagement du territoire is linked and which have been 
emphasised to different extents at different times. 'Regional policy' can be a suitable 
translation when considering the total sum of policy measures promoted by various 
ministries which it is DATAR's responsibility to coordinate, and which apply to one or 
many regions, whether constituted as formal institutions or specific to each ministry's 
sectoral concerns. However, another strong element within amenagement du territoire is a 
'regional planning' that is both top-down in concept and applies to all regions. Whether 
'regional policy', 'regional planning' or the more recent 'territorial cohesion' (another 
concept somewhat alien to English thought), is uppermost at any one time depends on who 
is in charge of the policy domain.
Urban planning and urban policy are components of amenagement du territoire that 
could perhaps be separated from regional planning and regional policy at the national scale.
6 Biare (1982), p.270fn.
7 Ministbre de la Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme (1950) Pour un plan national d'amdnagement du territoire. 
(MRU), p.3. Quoted in Lajugie (1964) 'Amenagement du territoire et ddveloppement economique regional en 
France (1945-1964)', Revue d'Economie politique. 74/1, 278-336, p.282.
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Yet planning an urban area can affect the region of which it is a part and, in the end, the 
whole country, and it is indeed the deliberate goal of the policy to develop regional cities 
(metropoles d'equilibre) as counterweights to Paris. Peter Hall's standard textbook on 
'Urban and regional planning' deals with the semantic and conceptual problem by referring, 
in the French case, to 'national/regional' and 'regional/local' planning.8 They are not 
convenient terms and reinforce the impression that there is no single translation. For local 
politicians outside the main cities, industrial decentralisation, rural development policies and 
road construction are often identified with amenagement du territoire. But industrial 
restructuring, water supply and water pollution control, transport planning, ports 
development, administrative and financial services decentralisation, coastal protection, 
control of development in Paris and agricultural modernisation policies and many others are 
connected in theory and in reality by DATAR's activities.
When DATAR acts as a regional development agency for poorer, undeveloped rural 
areas or for regions of outdated industry, amenagement du territoire can be translated 
appropriately as regional development. Yet DATAR is an agency for the whole of the 
countiy: its purpose as much to reduce congestion in areas of economic growth or to save 
areas of coastline under threat of property development as to stimulate development: it is not 
a Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (working just for the Italian South), nor 'an agency for 
developing clapped-out regions' as one anglocentric LSE colleague described it. While it 
might be trivial to say, as did one source quoted by Hayward, that 'regional policy was what 
DATAR did',9 the subsidiary objectives of regional policy, though not the fundamental 
concern for regional balance, have had to adapt to match the paradigms of professional 
theories of development, evolving social and economic conditions, reallocation of central- 
local government powers and alternations of parties in government. The multiplicity of goals 
and ideas that are encompassed with the term amenagement du territoire is the main reason 
that there is no one English translation that is adequate. The thesis therefore adopted the 
same solution as the first volume of West European Politics to publish an article on the 
subject, and refers to the policy as amenagement du territoire.10
8 Hall, P. (1975) Urban and Regional Planning (Harmondsworth: Pelican), p.204.
9 Hayward (1986), p. 121.
10 Biarez, S. (1982),H Amenagement du territoire1 in France: State intervention or regulation?', West
European Politics. 5, July, 271-86.
252
APPENDIX B 
MULTIPLE SOURCES OF DATA
Pettigrew's case-study on 'the politics of organizational decision-making' provided a useful 
point of departure for the data-collecting and analytical strategies of this thesis. According to 
Pettigrew, case studies should, where practicable, employ multiple methods, multiple data 
sources and multiple observers, in order to improve validity through 'triangulation', and 
expose the researcher to a wide range of insights and evidence.1 From a different 
epistemological perspective, Denzin and Lincoln observe that 'triangulation is not a tool or a 
strategy of validity, but an alternative to validation'; the multiple methods inherent to 
qualitative research are used to gain a deeper understanding of a phenomonon whose 
objective reality can never be captured.2 Even researchers working within a non-positivist 
epistemology think triangulation of methods and sources of evidence assists validation by 
reducing the likelihood of misinterpretation, as Stake puts it.3
The methods chosen have to fit the theoretical requirements of the study. This 
research project shared with Pettigrew the focus on power and cognate concepts that are 
hard to define in ways capable of being operationalised and measured. 'Concepts like these 
[power, influence, control...]... have proved notoriously difficult both to interpret and to 
employ rigorously in empirical work'.4 Moreover, this thesis is often dealing with notions 
Dahl regards as 'particularly troublesome':5 potential power as opposed to manifest power; 
having power as opposed to exercising power; and the power of anticipated reactions, for 
example, of civil servants and political leaders who frame their advice or their policy 
demands in terms of what they think will be accepted by the other party.6
Dahl distinguished between rigour and relevance. Experimental rigour can produce 
interesting results but not well-rounded explanations of complex political systems, whereas 
attempts to understand concrete phenomena can provide a guide to the real world but often at 
the expense of rigorous logic and verifiability. Dahl's pragmatic solution was 'to 
compensate for the unsatisfactory character of all existing operational measures [by being] 
eclectic' and to use a wide assortment of data.7
By basing analysis on DATAR's 'reputational power' and 'leadership commitment' 
or 'interest', the research project shifts to some extent the burden of defining and measuring
1 Pettigrew, A. (1973) The Politics of Organizational Decision-Making (Tavistock). p.52
2 Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (1998) 'Introduction' in N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln Strategies of Qualitative 
Inquiry (Sage). 1-34, p.4.
3 Stake, R. (1998), 'Case studies' in Denzin and Lincoln (1998), 86-109, p.96.
4 Dahl, R. (1989) Democracy and its Critics (New Haven: Yale), p.272.
5 ibid.
6 Page (1992), p. 143.
7 Dahl (1961), pp. 330-1; Pettigrew (1973) p.64.
253
a variable concept to the subjective opinions of multiple observers. Yet the multiple methods 
adopted in the different chapters (quantitative, qualitative, historical-legal and comparative) 
also allow that variability to be expressed and its different aspects to be treated. In turn these 
multiple methods led to the adoption of multiple analytical strategies to produce findings of 
relevance to the thesis. These included the 'quantivised' coding of text-based evidence, 
socio-biographical surveys, tabular arrays, graphical pattern-matching and statistical 
correlation, heuristic graphical plots, comparisons of measures over time, and Boolean 
'truth tables’.8
Pettigrew, studying decision-making processes within a private company, chose as 
his multiple data sources participant observation, interviews and content analysis of the 
firm’s contemporary records. His emphasis on gathering evidence 'by immersion' in the 
subject, in an inductive and post-positive manner, derived from the limited theoretical 
understanding of the processes he was studying, and the possibility of being able to observe 
them ’in real time'. Elgie's thesis similarly examined events over a very recent time-period, 
which made interviews with participants and witnesses a strong data- collecting strategy.9
In contrast, the overall strategy of this thesis was to analyse events over a long 
period of time, in order that the interplay between political leaders and bureaucratic 
institutions could be compared across different environments (different constitutions, 
different configurations of the party system, times of crisis and times of peace...). 
Furthermore the material was to be analysed against a familiar theoretical assumption about 
leadership and within a firm framework outlined by Blondel (see Chapter 2). Specific 
empirical data from 'historical' records were therefore required: participant observation and 
interviews on current and recent activities would be inadequate. These two ’interactive’ data- 
collecting strategies were still employed, but to a limited extent only.
Participant observation served chiefly as a cross-check on evidence from other 
sources. The participation comprised writing reports for DATAR-led projects (including 
negotiations and discussions at DATAR); giving lectures at conferences run by DATAR or 
in a team with DATAR officials; and operating as UK member of a French government 
observatory in European transport policy run by a former DATAR official, attended by 
senior members of the 'Ponts' corps, which was particularly helpful in the roads policy case 
study. DATAR staff and other 'witnesses' were informed that I was undertaking a PhD 
thesis on 'DATAR's coordination’, but not that it concerned political leadership. 
Participation in these events was also used to obtain informal opinions on DATAR's 
activities, working procedures and reputation with people from external bodies who were 
working, or had worked with DATAR in a variety of contexts. This information was 
generally used as background or in footnotes to illustrate general points.
8 Ragin (1987); Miles and Huberman (1994); Yin, R. (19931 Applications of Case Study Research (SageV. 
Yin, R. (1994) Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 2nd edn (Sage).
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The main evidence came from primary and secondary documents. Case-study 
researchers on the French bureaucracy can find far more 'first-hand' evidence and opinion 
offered by officials in memoirs, other books and articles in the press than could be 
envisaged from any British organisation, public or private. Few DATAR delegues have not 
put their views into print, or described DATAR's activities, whether in or out of office. One 
benefit in conducting longitudinal research on 'contemporary history' is that sufficient time 
has passed for officials to be willing to participate in 'witness seminars'. While these texts 
have to be treated with caution they are as credible as a researcher's interview with a top 
official or politician who has long ago decided 'the line to take'. In many cases 'cross- 
validation' is possible between several primary sources. Two texts by academic researchers 
on DATAR who became staff members or participant observers of the organisation 
(Wachter, Massardier) were virtually primary sources, and a source of expert observations. 
Massardier's collection of socio-biographical data on DATAR staff and recruitment statistics 
for his thesis were immensely useful for a different analysis in this one (see Chapter 5). 
Bezes's thesis on the decision to relocate one particular administrative body provided not 
only a 'cameo' case study for this thesis (in Chapter 6) but interview material that 
illuminated other issues too.10
DATAR publishes a bulletin on its activities, goals and staff (Lettre de la DATAR), 
reports by its staff and outside experts, and conference proceedings. A number of official 
enquiries have included reviews of DATAR, and leading politicians have published their 
own critiques. Print sources are richer in France than in Britain in a number of other ways, 
such as the interviews undertaken and commentaries by Le Monde's specialist journalists, 
and the 'dossiers de presse' at the Paris Institut d'Etudes Politiques. Some unpublished 
internal DATAR records were provided on request and other DATAR documents obtained as 
a result of 'participant-observer' activity. But most of the empirical material was available 
and derived from published sources. Thus equivalents of all the 'multiple sources of data' 
that Rhodes lists for studies of the UK core executive were used in this thesis:
- parliamentary debates
- white papers, green papers, official statistics
- media reports
- memoirs, autobiographies and diaries
- biographies
- discussions with past and present officials [but ministers from printed sources only]
- seminars [as participant-observer and not under Chatham House rules]
- Cabinet papers (Archives nationales)
- other secondary sources, written by participants, journalists or academics.11
9 Elgie, R. (1992) The influence of the French Prime Minister in the Policy-Making Process, 1981-1991', 
PhD thesis, LSE, F6923.
10 Massardier (1996); Wachter, S. (1985) Uamdnagement du territoire et son institutionalisation: des reseaux 
centraux et locaux1, Revue d'Economie et Urbaine. 3; Wachter, S. (1989) 'Ajustements et recentrage d'une 
politique publique', Sociologie du Travail. 31/1. Bezes (1994).
11 Rhodes, R. (1995) 'From Prime Ministerial Power to Core Executive', in R.Rhodes and P. Dunleavy, 
Prime Minister. Cabinet and Core Executive (Basingstoke: Macmillan), p.32.
APPENDIX C POLITICAL LEADERS 1944 TO 2004
PRIME MINISTER PM's INTERIOR ECONOMY & CONSTRUCTION PUBLIC AMENAGEMENT DU DELEGUE
Dartv FINANCE WORKS TERRITOIRE
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
Mendes then From 1944 to 1962 the Minister of
De Gaulle 10/9/44 Tixier Pleven Dautry R. Mayer Reconstruction or Construction was
De Gaulle 21/11/45 Tixier Pleven Dautry Moch responsible for amenagement du territoire
Gouin 26/1/46 Soc Le Troquer Philip Billoux Moch
Schuman &
Bidault 24/6/46 MRP Depreux Pflmlin Billoux Moch
Philip &
Blum 16/12/46 Soc Depreux Guyon Schmitt Moch
FOURTH REPUBLIC
PRESIDENT AURIOL (Soc) 1946-Dec 53
Schuman &
Ramadier 22/1/47 Soc Depreux Philip Tillon Moch
Ramadier 22/10/47 Soc Depreux Moch Letourneau Moch Moch was Minister Economy, Plan, Works
Schuman 24/11/47 MRP Moch R. Mayer Coty Pineau
Marie 26/7/48 Rad Moch Reynaud Coty Pineau
Schuman 5/9/48 MRP Moch Pineau Coty Queuille
Queuille, then
Queuille 11/9/48 Rad Moch Petsch C-Petit Pineau
Moch then Petsche & BUDGET Pineau, then
Bidault 28/10/49 MRP Queuille Buron C-Petit Chastellain
Queuille 2/7/50 Rad Queuille(PM) Petsche E.Faure C-Petit Bourgds-M
Pleven 12/7/50 UDSR Queuille Petsche E.Faure C-Petit Pinay
Queuille 10/3/51 Rad Queuille(PM) Petsche E.Faure C-Petit Pinay
Pleven 11/8/51 UDSR Brune R. Mayer Courant C-Petit Pinay
E.Faure 20/1/52 Rad Brune Buron (Econ) Courant C-Petit Pinay
Pinay &
Pinay 8/3/52 Rl Brune s/sGaillard Moreau C-Petit Morice
R. Mayer 8/1/53 Rad Brune Bourges-M Moreau Courant Morice
Martinaud-
Laniel 28/6/53 Rl Dgplat E.Faure Lemaire Chastellain
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PRESIDENT COTY (Cons) Jan  1954-May 1958
Laniel 28/6/53 Rl Deplat
Mendes-F 19/6/54 Rad Mitterrand
Bourges-M,
E.Faure 23/2/55 Rad 2/12/55 Faure 
Mol let 1/2/56 Soc Gilbert-Jules 
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PRESIDENT DE GAULLE 8 Jan 1959-26 April 1969
Debr6 8/1/59 UNR Berthouin Pinay Sudreau Buron
Debr6 28/5/59 Chatenet Baumgartner 13/1/60 Works & TSP ADMIN MIN-



















PM & AdT 8/1/66 UNR Frey Debr6






























APPENDIX C POLITICAL LEADERS 1944 TO 2004
PRIME MINISTER PM's INTERIOR ECONOMY & CONSTRUCTION PUBLIC AMENAGEMENT DU DELEGUE
Dartv FINANCE WORKS TERRITOIRE
PRESIDENT POMPIDOU (UDR) 20 Jun  1969-2 April 1974
INFRAST­ TRANSPORT ADMIN Min-Del Monod
Chaban-D 20/6/69 UDR Marcellin Giscard RUCTURE Mondon then REFORM PLAN- AdT
s/sChirac Chalandon Chamant Frey from Bettencourt
AdT & INFRA... 7/1/71 with
Messmer 5/7/72 UDR Marcellin Giscard Guichard & Galley s/s Malaud
Messmer 2/4/73 UDR Marcellin Giscard s/s Bonnet Gu6na Peyrefitte
AdT, SUPER-INFRASTRUCTURE
Messmer 27/2/74 UDR Chirac Giscard 1/3/74 Guichard, s/s Bonnet Peyrefitte
PRESIDENT GISCARD (UDF) 21 May 1974-21 May 1981
INTER & AdT INFRA TRANSPORT
Chirac 27/5/74 UDR Poniatowski Fourcade Galley Cavailte PLAN &
INTERIOR AdT 12/9/75
Barre 25/8/76 Poniatowski Barre Fourcade Cavaill6 3/7/76 Lecanuet Essig
PM & Economy AdT, SUPER-INFRASTRUCTURE
Barre 29/3/77 Bonnet Barre Fourcade s/s Tsp Cavaille
PM & Economy 26/9/77 Icart s/s Dijoud ADT
ENVIRONMENT TRANSPORT
Barre 3/4/78 Bonnet Monory D'Omano Le Theule 27/4/78
PM & AdT Hoeffel 2/10/80 Chadeau
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND (PS) 21 May 1981-7 May 1988
TOWNS TRANSPORT PLAN & AdT
Mauroy 21/5/81 PS Defferre Delors Quilliot Fiterman s/s PLAN Rocard 27/10/81
Mauroy 22/3/83 PS Defferre Delors Quilliot Fiterman Le Garrec Attali
PM, Plan & AdT
Mauroy 4/10/83 PS Defferre Delors Quil&s Fiterman goes 28/6/84
PM, Plan & AdT INFRA s/s Tsp PLAN & AdT
Fabius 18/7/84 PS Joxe Ber6gevoy Quiles Auroux Defferre 6/9/84
Fabius 20/9/85 PS Joxe B6r6gevoy Auroux 11/85Josselin Sallois
AdT, SUPER-INFRASTRUCTURE 6/5/87
Chirac 20/3/86 RPR Pasqua Balladur Mehaignerie s/s Douffiagues Carrez
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PRESIDENT MITTERRAND (PS) 8 May 1988-  7 May 1995 INDUSTRY
INFRA TRANSPORT PLAN & AdT


































s/s AdT Hoeffel Pons s/s Bosson 2/9/93
Paillet
PRESIDENT CHIRAC (RPR) 8 May 1995- 7 May 2002





17/5/95 RPR J.L.Debre 
7/11/95 RPR
























Main sources: Yvert, B. (ed) (1980) Dictionnaire des ministres 1789-1989 (Perrin); Le Monde.
